Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q81. Religion
Source context
- Theme
- the nature, origin, and proper function of religion as a distinct human faculty and social bond
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 68a, 1905-12-03Steiner derives the word 'religion' from the Latin religere (to reconnect) and frames the religious impulse as humanity's need to re-establish a bond with spiritual reality that preceded what is ordinarily called religion.
- GA 70a, 1915-04-09Steiner holds that spiritual science cannot replace religion, because religion serves a distinct task that must be cultivated alongside — not subsumed within — scientific spiritual inquiry.
- GA 102, 1908-03-24Steiner addresses the question of whether religion, in its older form of directing the faithful toward wisdom through faith, must transform as knowledge and spirit-cognition develop in humanity.
- GA 300c, 1923-04-25Steiner outlines a developmental typology of religions — ethnographic, folk, and universal — as a framework for understanding religious history in its evolutionary sequence.
- GA 353, 1924-03-13Steiner distinguishes star-wisdom, moon-religion, and sun-religion as successive stages in the spiritual-historical development of religious consciousness.
Cross-tradition
- Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II Q81Aquinas defines religion (religio) as a moral virtue directing acts of worship toward God as the first principle of creation, distinguishing it from theological virtue by its residence in the will and its orientation to external cultic acts rather than to God as the object of faith.
- Cicero / Roman etymologyAquinas engages Cicero's derivation of religio from relegere (to re-read or reconsider), contrasting it with the Lactantian derivation from religare (to bind), a philological parallel to Steiner's use of religere as 'reconnect' in GA 68a.
- Vedantic traditionThe Vedantic concept of dharma as the structural ordering of human life in relation to the cosmic-spiritual order shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's account of religio as the virtue that orders human acts toward the divine first cause.
Q81. Religion
Article 1
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus non sumpserit corpus suum et sanguinem. Non enim de factis Christi et dictis asseri debet quod auctoritate sacræ Scripturæ non traditur. Sed in Evangeliiis non habetur quod Christus corpus suum manducaverit, aut sanguinem suum biberit. Non ergo est hoc asserendum.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil potest esse in seipso, nisi forte ratione partium, prout scilicet una pars ejus est in alia, ut habetur IV Physic., text. 34. Sed illud quod manducatur et bibitur, est in manducante et bibente. Cum igitur totus Christus sit sub utraque specie sacramenti, videtur impossibile fuisse quod ipse sumpserit hoc sacramentum.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.3] Further, seemingly "latria" pertains to religion. Now "latria signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to Galatians 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another." Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, duplex est sumptio hujus sacramenti, scilicet spiritualis et sacramentalis. Sed spiritualis non competebat Christo, quia nihil a sacramento accepit: et per consequens nec sacramentalis, quæ sine spirituali est imperfecta, ut supra habitum est. Ergo Christus nullo modo hoc sacramentum sumpsit.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.4] Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato [Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents." Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to God.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.arg.5] Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.sc] Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine."
[II-II.q.81.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit Ad Hedibiam, quæst. 11, col. 986, t. 4: 2 In Contra Calixtinos dicentes calicem omnibus fidelibus, etiam parvulis mox natis, esse necessa-rium. « Dominus Jesus Christus ipse conviva et convivium, ipse comedens et qui comeditur. »
[II-II.q.81.a.1.co] as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from 'religio,' because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God," so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Proverbs 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him." According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [St. Augustine plays on the words 'reeligere,' i.e. to choose over again, and 'negligere,' to neglect or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived from "religare" [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion bind us to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod Christus in cœna corpus et sanguinem suum discipulis suis tradidit, non tamen ipse sumpsit. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dici, quia Christus ea quæ ab aliis observanda instituit, ipse primitus observavit. Unde et ipse prius baptizari voluit quam aliis baptismum imponeret, secundum illud Act., 1, 1: Cæpit Jesus facere et docere. Unde et primo ipse corpus suum et sanguinem sumpsit, etpostea discipulis sumendum tradidit. Et hoc est quod Ruth, 111, super illud: Cumque comedisset et bibisset, etc. dicit Glossa, quod « Christus comedit, et bibit in cœna, cum corporis et sanguinis sui sacramentum discipulis tradidit. Unde quia pueri communicaverunt carni et sanguini, et ipse participavit eisdem. »
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.1] Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in Evangeliiis legitur quod Christus acceptit panem et calicem; non est autem intelligendum quod accepit solum in manibus, ut quidam dicunt; sed eo modo accepit quod aliis accipiendum tradidit; unde, cum discipulis dixerit, Accipite et comedite, et iterum, Accipite et bibite, intelligendum est quod ipse accipiens comederit et biberit. Unde et quidam metrice dixerunt: « Rex sedet in cœna turba cinctus duodena; Se tenet in manibus, se cibat ipse cibus. »
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.2] Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God."
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus secundum quod est sub hoc sacramento, comparatur ad locum non secundum proprias dimensions, sed secundum dimensions specierum sacramentalium, ita quod in quocumque loco ubi sunt illæ species, est ipse Christus; et quia species illæ potuerunt esse in manibus et in ore Christi, ipse totus Christus potuit esse in suis manibus et in suo ore. Non autem hoc potuisset esse, secundum quod comparatur ad locum secundum proprias species.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.3] Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as "latria" in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, effectus hujus sacramenti est non solum augmentum habitualis gratiae, 2 Habetur in Catena aurea D. Thomæ. 5 Ita cum Mss. Paris., Camer. et Alc. Theologi. Ed. Rom.: « qui augmentum gratiae suscipiunt sub sacramentalibus signis, quibus indigent, etc. Nostram lectionem retinent Nicolai et ed. Pat., sed etiam quædam actualis delectatio spiritualis dulcedinis. Quamvis autem Christo gratia non fuerit augmentata ex susceptione hujus sacramenti, habuit tamen quamdam spiritualem delectationem in nova institutione hujus sacramenti. Unde ipse dicebat, Luc., xxii, 15: Desiderio desideravi hoc Pascha manducare vobiscum; quod Eusebius exponit de novo mysterio novi Testamenti, quod tradebat discipulis 2. Et ideo spiritualiter manducavit, et similiter sacramentaliter, inquantum corpus suum sub sacramento sumpsit, quod sacramentum sui corporis intellexit et disposuit; aliter tamen quam cæteri sacramentaliter et spiritualiter sumant; qui augmentum gratiae suscipiunt, et sacramentalibus signis indigent 5 ad veritatis perceptionem.
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.4] We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to cultivate [In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship' and 'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is Eusebeia or Theosebeia, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
[II-II.q.81.a.1.ad.5] Although the name "religious" may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Galatians 4:14), "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus."
Article 2
[II-II.q.81.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Question 19, Article 09). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift
[II-II.q.81.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus Judæ non dederit corpus suum. Ut enim legitur Matth., xxvi, 29, postquam dederat 4 Dominus corpus suum et sanguinem discipulis, dixit eis: Non bibam amodo de hoc genimine vitis usque in diem illum cum illud bibam vobiscum novum in regno Patris mei. Exquo videtur quod illi quibus corpus suum et sanguinem dederat, cum eo essent iterum bibituri. Sed Judas postea cum ipso non bibit. Ergo non accepit cum aliis discipulis corpus Christi et sanguinem.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.arg.2] Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit" [Ethic. ii, 6. Now, as stated above (1, ad 3) "latria" belongs to religion, and "latria" denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Dominus implevit quod præcepit, secundum illud Act., 1, 1: Cæpit Jesus facere et docere. Sed ipse præcepit, Matth., viii, 6: Nolite dare sanctum canibus. Cum ergo ipse cognosceret Judam esse peccatorem, videtur quod ei corpus suum et sanguinem non dederit.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.arg.3] Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [Cf. 1, and ceremonial matters, as stated above (I-II, 99, 3, ad 2; I-II, 101), do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Christus specialiter legitur Judæ panem intinctum porrexisse, Joan., xiii. Si ergo corpus suum ei dedit, videtur quod sub buccella ei dederit; præmutato tantum « qui » in « quia. » Al. « quia qui augmentum gratiae suscipiunt, etiam sacramentalibus signis indigent, etc. » Id communiter doctores affirmant. cipue cum legatur ibidem quod post buccellam introivit in eum Satanas, ubi Augustinus dicit Tract. Lxii in Joan., § 1, col. 1802, t. 3: « Hinc nos docemur quam sit cavendum male accipere bonum. Si enim corripitur qui non dijudicat, hoc est, non discernit a cæteris cibis Dominicum corpus, quomodo non damnabitur qui ad ejus mensam fingens amicum accedit inimicus? » Sed cum buccella intincta non accepit corpus Christi: ut enim Augustinus dicit Super illud Joan., xiii: Cum intinxisset panem, dedit Judæ Simonis Iscariotæ, ibid., § 2, « non ut putant quidam negligenter legentes, tunc Judas Christi corpus accepit. » Ergo videtur quod Judas corpus Christi non accepit.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.sc] It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above (Article 80).
[II-II.q.81.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, Hom. Lxxxii in Matth., § 1, col. 135, t. 13: « Judas particeps existens mysteriorum conversus non est; unde fit scelus ejus utrinque immanius, tum quia tali proposito imbutus adit mysteria, tum quia adiens melior factus non fuit nec metu, nec beneficio, nec honore. »
[II-II.q.81.a.2.co] As stated above (58, 3; I-II, 55, 3,4) "a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner.
But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Hilarius posuit Super Matthæum, cap. xxx, col. 1065, t. 1, quod Christus Judæ corpus suum et sanguinem non dedit. Et hoc quidem conveniens fuisset, considerata malitia Judæ. Sed quia Christus nobis debuit esse exemplum justitiæ, non conveniebat ejus magisterio ut Judam occultum peccatorem sine accusatore et evidenti probatione ab aliorum communione separaret; ne per hoc daretur exemplum prælatis Ecclesiæ similia faciendi, et ipse Judas exasperatus inde sumeret occasionem peccandi. Et ideo dicendum est quod Judas cum aliis discipulis corpus Domini et sanguinem suscepit, ut dicit Dionysius in lib. Eccl. hierarch., cap. iii, part. iii § 1, col. 427, t. 1, et Augustinus Super Joan., tract. Lxii, col. 1801, t. 3.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.ad.1] To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (9, 1, ad 3; I-II, 68, 8).
[II-II.q.81.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa est ratio Hilarii, loc. cit., ad ostendendum quod Judas corpus Christi non sumpsit: non tamen cogit, quia Christus loquitur discipulis, a quorum collegio Judas se separavit. Non autem Christus eum exclusit: et ideo Christus, quantum est in se, etiam cum Juda vinum in regno Dei bibit; sed hoc convivium ipse Judas repudiavit.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.ad.2] Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [ Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. On like manner, to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Christo nota erat Judæ iniquitas, sicut Deo; non autem erat ei nota per modum quo hominibus innotescit. Et ideo Christus Judam non repulit a communione, ut daret exemplum, tales peccatores occultos non esse ab aliis sacerdotibus expellendos.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.ad.3] It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
[II-II.q.81.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sine dubio Judas sub pane intincto corpus Christi non sumpsit, sed simplicem panem. « Significatur autem fortassis, » ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, « per panis intinctionem fictio Judæ; ut enim inficiantur, nonnulla tinguntur. Si autem bonum aliquid hic significat tinctio, » scilicet dulcedinem bonitatis divinæ, quia panis ex intinctione sapidior redditur, « eidem bono ingratum non immerito est secuta damnatio. » Et propter hanc ingratitudinem id quod est bonum, factum est ei malum, sicut accidit circa sumentes corpus Christi indigne, et sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, « intelligendum est quod Dominus jam antea distribuerat omnibus discipulis suis sacramentum corporis et sanguinis sui, ubi et ipse Judas erat, sicut Lucas narrat; ac deinde ad hoc ventum est, ubi secundum narrationem Joannis Dominus per buccellam tinctam atque porrectam suum exprimit proditorem.
Article 3
[II-II.q.81.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above (Article 1). Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (50, 2, ad 2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus sumpserit et discipulis dederit corpus suum impassibile, quia Super illud Matth., xvii: Transfiguratus est ante eos, dicit quædam Glossa, ordin., col. 143, t. 2: « Illud corpus quod habuit per naturam, dedit discipulis in cœna, non mortale, non corruptibile. » Et Levit., ii, super illud: Si oblatio tua fuerit de sartagine, dicit Glossa: « Crux super omnia fortis carnem Christi, quæ ante passionem non videbatur esui apta, post aptam fecit. » Sed Christus dedit corpus suum aptum ad manducandum. Ergo Hoc S. Clemens negare videtur, licet non neget, si verbis ipsius bene attendatur. dedit tale quale habuit post passionem, scilicet impassibile et immortale.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.arg.2] Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne corpus passibile per contactum et manducationem patitur. Si ergo corpus Christi erat passibile, per contactum et comestionem discipulorum passum fuisset.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.arg.3] Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that religion is not one virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, verba sacramentalia non sunt modo majoris virtutis quando proferuntur a sacerdote in persona Christi, quam tunc quando fuerunt prolata ab ipso Christo. Sed nunc virtute verborum sacramentalium in altari consecratur corpus Christi impassibile et immortale. Ergo multo magis tunc.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.sc] It is written (Ephesians 4:5): "One God [Vulgate: 'Lord'], one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod, sicut Innocentius III dicit, lib. IV De myster. missæ, cap. xii, sub fin., « tale corpus tunc dedit discipulis, quale habuit. » Habuit autem tunc corpus passibile et mortale. Ergo corpus passibile et mortale discipulis dedit.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.co] As stated above (I-II, 54, 2, ad 1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Hugo de Sancto Victore posuit quod Christus ante passionem diversis temporibus quatuor dotes corporis glorificati assumpserit, scilicet subtilitatem in nativitate, quando exivit de clauso utero Virginis; agilitatem, quando ambulavit siccis pedibus super mare; claritatem in transfiguratione; impassibilitatem in cœna, quando corpus suum discipulis tradidit ad manducandum. Et secundum hoc dedit discipulis suis corpus impassibile et immortale. Sed quidquid sit de aliis, de quibus supra dictum est, quid sentiri debeat, circa impassibilitatem tamen impossibile est esse quod dicitur. Manifestum est enim quod idem verum corpus Christi erat quod a discipulis tunc in propria specie videbatur, et in specie sacramenti sumebatur. Non autem erat impassibile secundum quod in propria specie videbatur; quinimo erat passioni paratum. Unde nec ipsum corpus Christi, quod in specie sacramenti dabatur, impassibile erat. Impassibili tamen modo erat sub specie sacramenti quod in se erat visibile. Sicut enim visio requirit contactum corporis quod videtur, ad circumstans medium visionis, ita passio requirit contactum corporis quod patitur, ad ea quæ agunt. Corpus autem Christi, secundum quod est sub sacramento, ut supra dictum est, non comparatur ad ea quæ circumstant, mediantibus propriis dimensionibus, quibus corpora se tangunt, sed mediantibus dimensionibus specierum panis et vini; et ideo species illæ sunt quæ patiuntur et videntur, non autem ipsum corpus Christi.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.ad.1] The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus dicitur in cœna non dedisse corpus suum mortale et passibile, quia non dedit mortali et passibili modo. Crux autem fecit carnem Christi aptam manducationi, inquantum hoc sacramentum repræsentat passionem Christi.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.ad.2] By the one same act man both serves and worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si corpus Christi, sicut erat passibile, ita passibili modo fuisset sub hoc sacramento.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.ad.3] The worship of religion is paid to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither "latria" nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.
[II-II.q.81.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, accidentia corporis Christi sunt in sacramento ex reali concomitantia, non autem ex vi sacramenti, ex qua est ibi substantia corporis Christi. Et ideo virtus verborum sacramentalium ad hoc se extendit, ut sit sub sacramento corpus Christi, scilicet quibuscumque accidentiibus realiter in eo existentibus.
Article 4
[II-II.q.81.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod si hoc sacramentum tempore mortis Christi fuisset servatum in pixide, vel ab aliquo Apostolorum consecratum, non ibi moreretur. Mors enim Christi accidit per ejus passionem. Sed Christus impassibili modo etiam tunc erat in hoc sacramento. Ergo non poterat mori in hoc sacramento.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above (1, ad 2; 2). Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea in morte Christi separatus fuit sanguis ejus a corpore. Sed in hoc sacramento simul est corpus Christi et sanguis. Ergo Christus in hoc sacramento non moreretur. apud quem non legitur. Vide apud Innocentium III, De myst. miss., lib. IV, cap. viii. In
[II-II.q.81.a.4.arg.3] Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic. viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance, or "dulia," or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, mors accidit per separationem animæ a corpore. Sed in hoc sacramento continetur tam corpus quam anima Christi. Ergo in hoc sacramento non poterat Christus mori.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.sc] It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the other parts.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod idem Christus, qui erat in cruce fuisset in sacramento. Sed in cruce moriebatur. Ergo et in sacramento conservato moreretur.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.co] Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God. Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod corpus Christi idem in substantia est in hoc sacramento et in propria specie, sed non eodem modo: nam in propria specie contingit circumstantia corpora per proprias dimensions; non autem prout est in hoc sacramento, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo quidquid pertinet ad Christum, secundum quod in se est, potest attribui ei et in propria specie, et in sacramento existenti, sicut vivere, mori, dolere, animatum vel inanimatum esse, et cætera hujusmodi: quæcumque vero conveniunt ei per comparisonem ad corpora extrinsecca, possunt ei attribui in propria specie existenti, non autem prout est in sacramento, sicut irrideri, conspui, crucifigi, flagellari et cætera hujusmodi. Unde et quidam metrice dixerunt: « Pixide servato poteris sociare dolorem Innatum; sed non illatus convenit illi. »
[II-II.q.81.a.4.ad.1] Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated above (1, ad 1).
[II-II.q.81.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, passio convenit corpori passo per comparisonem ad agens extrinsecum. Et ideo Christus, secundum quod est sub hoc sacramento, pati non potest, potest tamen mori.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.ad.2] Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their specific character.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, sub specie panis est corpus Christi ex vi consecrationis, sanguis autem sub specie vini. Sed nunc quidem, quando realiter sanguis Christi non est separatus ab ejus corpore, ex reali concomitantia est sanguis Christi et sub specie panis simul cum corpore, et corpus sub specie vini simul cum sanguine. Sed si tempore passionis Christi, quando realiter sanguis fuit separatus a corpore Christi, fuisset hoc sacramentum consecratum, sub specie panis fuisset solum corpus, et sub specie vini fuisset solus sanguis.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.ad.3] The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
[II-II.q.81.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, anima Christi est in hoc sacramento ex reali concomitantia, quia non est sine corpore, non autem ex vi consecrationis. Et ideo si tunc fuisset hoc sacramentum consecratum vel peractum, quando anima erat a corpore realiter separata, non fuisset anima Christi sub hoc sacramento, non propter defectum virtutis verborum, sed propter aliam dispositionem rei.
Article 5
[II-II.q.81.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.5.arg.2] Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.5.arg.3] Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, 57,58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God too much, according to Sirach 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.5.sc] It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.
[II-II.q.81.a.5.co] As stated above (Article 4) religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (1, 1 and 2 and 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we believe God.
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.
[II-II.q.81.a.5.ad.1] The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
[II-II.q.81.a.5.ad.2] Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end.
[II-II.q.81.a.5.ad.3] Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance.
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance.
Article 6
[II-II.q.81.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.
[II-II.q.81.a.6.arg.2] Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written (Isaiah 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the hungry."
But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Psalm 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
[II-II.q.81.a.6.arg.3] Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Corinthians 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.
[II-II.q.81.a.6.sc] The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence (Exodus 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues.
[II-II.q.81.a.6.co] Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (5; 04, 7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
[II-II.q.81.a.6.ad.1] Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.
[II-II.q.81.a.6.ad.2] In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.
[II-II.q.81.a.6.ad.3] Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
Article 7
[II-II.q.81.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.
[II-II.q.81.a.7.arg.2] Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to God.
[II-II.q.81.a.7.arg.3] Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [Psalm 94:3. Therefore it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion has no bodily actions.
[II-II.q.81.a.7.sc] It is written (Psalm 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but also by external actions.
[II-II.q.81.a.7.co] We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Romans 1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.
[II-II.q.81.a.7.ad.1] Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God.
[II-II.q.81.a.7.ad.2] These external things are offered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, according to Psalm 49:13, "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice."
[II-II.q.81.a.7.ad.3] Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
Article 8
[II-II.q.81.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (Article 4): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [De Affectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
[II-II.q.81.a.8.arg.2] Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.
[II-II.q.81.a.8.arg.3] Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
[II-II.q.81.a.8.sc] It is written (Luke 1:74-75): "That . . . we may serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs to religion, as stated above (1, ad 3; 3, ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanctity.
[II-II.q.81.a.8.co] The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. On one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek, for hagios means "unsoiled." On another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Hebrews 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Romans 8:38-39): "I am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [Vulgate: 'shall be able to separate us'] from the love of God."
Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God
[II-II.q.81.a.8.ad.1] Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
[II-II.q.81.a.8.ad.2] Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God."
[II-II.q.81.a.8.ad.3] Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
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