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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q90. The taking of God's name by way of adjuration

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Licit and illicit invocation of divine names in adjuration and oath

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Cross-tradition

  • Hebrew Bible / Rabbinic traditionProhibitions on taking the divine name in vain (Exodus 20:7) and Talmudic restrictions on oath-taking establish a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's distinction between reverent adjuration and blasphemous misuse of sacred names.
  • Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)Classical fiqh distinguishes lawful qasam (oath invoking Allah) from forbidden idle swearing, a structural parallel to Aquinas's taxonomy of licit versus illicit adjuration.

Q90. The taking of God's name by way of adjuration

Article 1

[II-II.q.90.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man. Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living God."

[II-II.q.90.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pœnitentiae non debeant partes assignari. Sacramenta enim sunt in quibus divina virtus secretius operatur salutem. Sed virtus divina est una et simplex. Non ergo pœnitentiae, cum sit sacramentum, debent partes assignari.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.arg.2] Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pœnitentia et est virtus et est sacramentum. Sed ei, inquantum est virtus, non assignantur partes, cum virtus sit habitus quidam qui est simplex qualitas mentis; similiter etiam et pœnitentiae, inquantum est sacramentum, non videtur quod sint partes assignandæ, quia baptismo et aliis sacramentis non assignantur partes. Ergo pœnitentiae nullo modo debent partes assignari.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.arg.3] Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, pœnitentiae materia est peccatum, ut supra dictum est. Sed pecato non assignantur partes. Ergo etiam nec pœnitentiae sunt partes assignandæ.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.sc] Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy of God" (Romans 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is lawful to adjure.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod partes sunt ex quibus perfectio alicujus integratur. Sed pœnitentiae perfectio integratur ex pluribus, scilicet contritione, confessione et satisfactione. Ergo pœnitentia habet partes.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.co] A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as stated above (Question 83, Article 1). Accordingly when either of these orderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference between them, that man is master of his own actions but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken.

Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing, intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.

If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully employed in respect of anyone.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod partes rei sunt in quas materialiter totum dividitur; habent enim se partes ad totum sicut materia ad formam: unde in II Physic., text. 34, partes ponuntur in genere causæ materialis, totum autem in genere causæ formalis. Ubicumque igitur ex parte materiæ invenitur aliqua pluralitas, ibi est invenire partium rationem. Dictum est autem supra, quod in sacramento pœnitentiae actus humani se habent per modum materiæ. Et ideo cum plures actus humani requirantur ad pœnitentiae perfectionem, scilicet contritio et satisfactio, ut infra patebit, consequens est quod sacramentum pœnitentiae habeat partes.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.ad.1] Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure our Lord Jesus Christ [Matthew 26:63].

[II-II.q.90.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quodlibet sacramentum habet simplicitatem ratione virtutis divinæ, quae in eo operatur; sed virtus divina propter sui magnitudinem operari potest et per unum et per multa, ratione quorum alicui sacramento possunt partes assignari.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.ad.2] This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an obligation.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pœnitentiae, secundum quod est virtus, non assignantur partes: actus enim humani, qui multiplicantur in pœnitentia, non comparantur ad habitum virtutis sicut partes, sed sicut effectus. Under relinquitur quod partes assignentur pœnitentiae, inquantum est sacramentum, ad quod actus humani comparantur ut materia. In aliis autem sacramentis materia non sunt actus humani, sed aliqua res exterior, una quidem simplex, ut aqua vel oleum; sive composita, ut chrisma. Et ideo aliis sacramentis non assignantur partes.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.ad.3] To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain thing.

Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.

[II-II.q.90.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccata sunt materia remota pœnitentiae, inquantum scilicet sunt materia vel objectum humanorum actuum, qui sunt propria materia pœnitentiae, prout est sacramentum.

Article 2

[II-II.q.90.a.2.arg.1] It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says (Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice." Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur partes pœnitentiae, contritio, confessio et satisfactio. Contritio enim est in corde, et sic pertinet ad interiorem pœnitentiae; confessio autem est in ore, et satisfactio in opere: et sic duo ultima pertinent ad exteriorem pœnitentiam. Pœnitentia autem interior non est sacramentum, sed sola pœnitentia exterior, quæ sensui subjacet. Non ergo convenienter assignantur hæ partes sacramento pœnitentiae.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.arg.2] Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration. Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore the antecedent is false also.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in sacramento novæ legis confertur gratia, ut supra habitum est. Sed in satisfactione non confertur aliqua gratia. Ergo satisfactio non est pars sacramenti.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.arg.3] Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship with the demons, according to 1 Corinthians 10:20, "I would not that you should be made partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, non est idem fructus rei et pars. Sed satisfactio est fructus pœnitentiae, secundum illud Luc., III, 8: Facite fructus dignos pœnitentiae. Ergo non est pars pœnitentiae.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.sc] It is written (Mark 16:17): "In My name they shall cast out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.sc] Sed contra, videtur quod debeant poni plures partes pœnitentiae. Pars enim hominis ponitur non solum corpus, quod est ejus materia, sed etiam anima, quæ est ejus forma. Sed tria prædicta, cum sint actus pœnitentis, se habent sicut materia, absolutio autem sacerdotis se habet per modum formæ. Ergo absolutio sacerdotis debet poni quarta pars pœnitentiae.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.co] As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. On the first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during the course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), "the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit." Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name, lest they do us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by Luke 10:19: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall hurt you."

It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of the Blessed James [the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam. Apost. vi, 19 that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the instrumentality of the demons.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est pars, ut dicitur in VII Metaph., text. 33 et 34, scilicet pars essentiae, et pars quantitatis. Partes essentiae sunt naturaliter quidem forma et materia, logice autem est genus et differentia. Hoc autem modo quodlibet sacramentum distinguitur in materiam et formam sicut in partes essentiae. Unde et supra dictum est, quod sacramenta consistunt in rebus et verbis. Sed quia quantitas se tenet ex parte materiae, partes quantitatis sunt partes materiae. Et hoc modo sacramento pœnitentiae specialiter assignantur partes, ut supra dictum est, quantum ad actus pœnitentis, qui sunt materia hujus sacramenti. Dictum est autem supra, quod alio modo fit recompensatio offensæ in pœnitentia, et in vindicativa justitia. Nam in vindicativa justitia fit recompensatio se Durandus negat pœnitentiam, ut est sacramentum, habere pro partibus contritionem, confessionem, et satisfactionem, quia omne sacramentum dispensatur a ministris Ecclesiæ secun-dum arbitrium judicis, non secundum voluntatem offendentis vel offensi; sed in pœnitentia fit recompensatio offensæ secundum voluntatem peccantis, et secundum arbitrium Dei in quem peccatur, quia hic non quæritur sola redintegratio aqualitatis justitiae sicut in justitia vindicativa; sed magis reconciliatio amici-tiae, quod fit dum offendens recompensat secundum voluntatem ejus quem offendit. Sic igitur requiritur ex parte pœnitentis: primo quidem voluntas recompensandi, quod fit per contritionem; secundo quod se subjiciat arbitrio sacer-dotis loco Dei, quod fit in confessione; tertio quod recompenset secundum arbitrium ministri Dei, quod fit in satisfactione. Et ideo contritio, confessio et satisfactio ponuntur partes pœnitentiae.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.ad.1] Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly appeal.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod contritio secundum essentiam quidem est in corde, et pertinet ad interiorem pœnitentiam; virtualiter autem pertinet ad exteriorem pœnitentiam, in quantum sci-licet implicat propositum confitendi et satisfaciendi.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.ad.2] Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the unclean spirit (Mark 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man," says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the demons, however much they speak the truth."

[II-II.q.90.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod satisfactio confert gratiam, prout est in proposito, et auget eam, prout est in executione, sicut etiam baptismus in adultis, ut supra dictum est.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.ad.3] This argument considers the adjuration whereby the demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.

[II-II.q.90.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod satisfactio est pars pœnitentiae sacramenti, fructus autem pœnitentiae virtutis.

Article 3

[II-II.q.90.a.3.arg.1] It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.

[II-II.q.90.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod prædicta tria non sint partes integrales pœnitentiæ. Pœnitentia enim, ut dictum est, contra peccatum ordinatur. Sed peccatum cordis, oris et operis sunt partes subjectivæ peccati, et non partes integrales, quia peccatum de quolibet horum prædicatur. Ergo etiam in pœnitentia contritio cordis, confessio oris et satisfactio operis non sunt partes integrales.

[II-II.q.90.a.3.arg.2] Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible, swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards one.

[II-II.q.90.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulla pars integralis in se continet aliam sibi condivisam. Sed contritio continet in se confessionem et satisfactionem in proposito. Ergo non sunt partes integrales.

[II-II.q.90.a.3.arg.3] Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above (1 and 2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we have not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of Whom it was said (Matthew 8:27): "For the winds and the sea obey Him." Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures.

[II-II.q.90.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ex partibus integralibus simul et aequaliter constituitur totum, sicut linea ex suis partibus. Sed hoc non contingit hic. Ergo prædicta non sunt partes integrales pœnitentiæ.

[II-II.q.90.a.3.sc] Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [From the apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]

[II-II.q.90.a.3.sc] Sed contra, illæ dicuntur partes integrales ex quibus perfectio totius integratur. Sed ex tribus prædictis integratur perfectio ipsius pœnitentiæ. Ergo sunt partes integrales pœnitentiæ.

[II-II.q.90.a.3.co] Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man.

Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God: secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.90.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt hæc tria esse partes subjectivas pœnitentiæ. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia singulis partibus subjectivis adest tota virtus totius et simul et aequaliter, sicut tota virtus animalis, inquantum est animal, salvatur in qualibet specie animalis, quæ simul et aequaliter dividunt animal. Sed hoc non est in proposito. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod sunt partes potentiales. Sed nec hoc verum esse potest, quia singulis partibus potentialibus adest totum secundum totam essentiam, sicut tota essentia animæ adest cuilibet ejus potentiae. Sed hoc non est in proposito. Unde re-linquitur quod prædicta tria sint partes integrales pœnitentiæ; ad quarum rationem exigitur ut totum non adsit singulis partibus, neque secundum totam virtu-tem ejus, neque secundum totam ejus essentiam, sed omnibus simul.

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