Q89. Oaths

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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q89. Oaths

Source context

Theme: the moral and spiritual legitimacy of oaths, their proper conditions, and their liability to abuse
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

GA 90b, 1905-12-02Steiner identifies the perniciousness of the oath in Christ's teaching as a prohibition against dragging the transcendental sphere down to confirm earthly affairs.
GA 10, c02-4Steiner clarifies that the initiatory commitment described as an 'oath' is not an oath in the ordinary sense, and that the term is misleading when applied to the inner spiritual resolve of the student.
GA 93, 1904-12-02Steiner describes the candidate's oath within Masonic initiatory procedure as a solemn act set in a deliberately austere ritual context.
GA 198, 1920-06-03Steiner examines the anti-modernist oath imposed on Roman Catholic clergy as an institutional instrument enforcing doctrinal conformity, raising the question of what is genuinely new in such a mechanism.
GA 185a, 1918-11-17Steiner cites the widespread breaking of constitutional oaths over eight decades as evidence of the moral collapse attending modern political life.

Cross-tradition

Biblical / Matthean injunctionMatthew 5:33–37 records the dominical command to let one's yes be yes and no be no, treating oath-taking as a concession to moral weakness rather than a virtue — a structural antecedent to Aquinas's careful delimitation of licit oaths.
Jewish halakha (shevuot)Talmudic tractate Shevuot elaborates conditions for valid and invalid oaths, distinguishing vain, false, and rash oaths — a parallel taxonomic concern to Aquinas's analysis of the conditions making an oath licit.

Article 1

[II-II.q.89.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would swear.

But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod per pœnitentiam virtutes non restituantur. Non enim possent virtutes amissæ per pœnitentiam restitui, nisi pœnitentia virtutes causaret. Sed pœnitentia, cum sit virtus, non potest esse causa omnium virtutum, præsertim cum quædam virtutes sint naturaliter priores pœnitentia, scilicet fides, spes et charitas, ut supra dictum est. Ergo per pœnitentiam non restituuntur 2.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.arg.2] Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is written (Matthew 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to the Lord"; and Augustine says [Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is "to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God." Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pœnitentia in quibusdam actibus pœnitentis consistit. Sed virtutes gratuitæ non causantur ex actibus nostris: dicit 3 enim Augustinus in lib. II De libero arbit., cap. xviii, col. 1267, t. 4, quod « virtutes Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. » Ergo videtur quod per pœnitentiam non restituantur virtutes.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.arg.3] Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a witness, as shown above (Q67,70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing, implores the Divine judgment, according to Psalm 7:5, "If I have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my enemies." Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, habens virtutem sine difficultate et delectabiliter actus virtutum operatur: unde Philosophus dicit in I Ethic., cap. xviii, a med., quod « non est justus qui non gaudet justa opera-tione. » Sed multi pœnitentes adhuc difficultatem patiuntur in operando actus virtutum. Non ergo per pœnitentiam restituuntur virtutes.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.sc] Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx): "When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his witness?"

[II-II.q.89.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod, sicut Luc., xv, legitur, pater mandavit quod filius pœnitens indueretur stola prima, quæ, secundum Ambrosium in hunc loc., col. 1851, t. 2, est amictus sapientiae, quam simul consequuntur omnes virtutes, secundum illud Sap., viii, 7: Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, et justitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus. Ergo per pœnitentiam omnes virtutes restituuntur.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.co] As the Apostle says (Hebrews 6:16), oaths are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many give way to lying, according to Psalm 16:10, "Their mouth hath spoken lies [Vulgate: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of this lack of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established as though it were a principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is termed a "declaratory oath"; while sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory oath."

But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod per pœnitentiam remittuntur peccata, ut dictum est supra 4. Remissio autem peccatorum non potest esse nisi per infusionem gratiae. Unde relinquitur quod per pœnitentiam homini gratia infundatur. Ex gratia autem consequuntur omnes virtutes gratuitæ, sicut ex essentia animæ fluunt omnes potentiæ, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Unde relinquitur quod per pœnitentiam omnes virtutes restituantur.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.ad.1] It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod eodem modo pœnitentia restituit virtutes, per quem modum est causa gratiae, ut jam dictum est. Est autem causa gratiae, in quantum est sacramentum; nam in quantum est virtus, est magis gratiae effectus. Et ideo non oportet quod pœnitentia secundum quod est virtus, sit causa omnium aliarum virtutum, sed quod habitus pœnitentiae simul cum habitibus aliarum virtutum per sacramentum pœnitentiae causetur.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.ad.2] A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowledge and unerring truth.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in sacramento pœnitentiae actus humani se habent materialiter; sed formalis vis hujus sacramenti dependet ex virtute clavium. Et ideo virtus clavium effective causat gratiam et virtutes, instrumentaliter tamen; sed actus primus pœnitentis se habet ut ultima dispositio ad gratiam consequendam, scilicet contritio; alii vero sequentes actus pœnitentiae procedunt jam ex gratia et virtutibus.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.ad.3] A person is called to give witness, in order that he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. On one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as Augustine states [See argument On the contrary]; the other is by cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to punishment if what is alleged be not true.

[II-II.q.89.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando post primum actum pœnitentiae, qui est contritio, remanent quædam reliquiæ peccatorum, scilicet dispositiones ex prioribus actibus peccatorum causatæ, ex quibus præstatur dif- 5 Implicite. 4 In ficultas quædam pœnitenti ad operandum opera virtutum; sed, quantum est ex ipsa inclinatione charitatis et aliarum virtutum, pœnitens opera virtutum delectabiliter, et sine difficultate operatur; sicut si virtuosus per accidens difficultatem pateretur in executione actus virtutis propter somnum, aut aliquam corporis dispositionem.

Article 2

[II-II.q.89.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Matthew 5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James 5:12), "Above all things, my brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing is unlawful.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod post pœnitentiam resurgat homo in æquali virtute. Dicit enim Apostolus Rom., viii, 28: Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum: ubi dicit Glossa Augustini 2 quod « hoc adeo verum est, ut si qui horum deviant, et exorbitant, etiam hoc ipsum eis Deus faciat proficere in bonum. » Sed hoc non esset, si homo resurgeret in minori virtute 3.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.arg.2] Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful, because according to Matthew 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Matthew 5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is over and above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is apparently unlawful.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Ambrosius 4 dicit quod « pœnitentia res optima est, quæ omnes defectus revocat ad perfectum. » Sed hoc non esset nisi virtutes in æquali quantitate recuperentur. Ergo per pœnitentiam semper recuperatur æqualis virtus.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.arg.3] Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to Deuteronomy 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is altogether unlawful.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Super illud Gen., i: Factum est vespere et mane dies unus, dicit Glossa: « Vespertina 5 lux est, a qua quis cecidit; matutina, in qua resurgit. » Sed lux matutina est major vespertina. Ergo aliquis resurgit in majori gratia vel charitate quam prius habuerit; quod etiam videtur per id quod Apostolus dixit Rom., v, 20: Ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.sc] It is written (Deuteronomy 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name."

[II-II.q.89.a.2.sc] Sed contra, charitas proficiens vel perfecta est major quam charitas inci- 2 Desumpta est ex lib. De correptione et gratia, c. ix, § 24, col. 930, t. 10. legitur autem in libro Hypognostici, paulo post mortem D. Augustini scripto, cujus auctor habetur vel Sixtus presbyter romanus, vel Mercator, ut putant. Videlib. III piens. Sed quando aliquis cadit a charitate proficiente, resurgit autem in charitate incipiente. Ergo semper resurgit homo in minori virtute.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.co] Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it "unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1 Corinthians 11:29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to controversy (Hebrews 6:16).

Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man." Wherefore it is written (Sirach 23:9): "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls."

[II-II.q.89.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii, qui est in justificatione impii, est ultima dispositio ad gratiam; unde in eodem instanti est gratiae infusio cum prædicto motu liberi arbitrii, ut in secunda parte habitum est, in quo quidem motu comprehenditur actus pœnitentiæ, ut supra dictum est. Manifestum est autem quod formæ quæ possunt recipere magis et minus, intenduntur et remittuntur secundum diversam dispositionem subjecti, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Et inde est quod secundum quod motus liberi arbitrii in pœnitentia est intensior vel remissior, secundum hoc pœnitens consequitur majorem vel minorem gratiam. Contingit autem intensionem motus pœnitentis quandoque proportionatam esse majori gratiae quam fuerit illa a qua ceciderat per peccatum, quandoque autem æquali, quandoque vero minori. Et ideo pœnitens quandoque resurgit in majori gratia quam prius habuerat, quandoque autem in æquali, quandoque etiam in minori; et eadem ratio est de virtutibus quæ ex gratia consequuntur.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.ad.1] Jerome, commenting on Matthew 5:34, says: "Observe that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because James adds, "nor by any other oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say to you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty words."

[II-II.q.89.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non omnibus diligentibus Deum cooperatur in bonum hoc ipsum quod per peccatum a Dei amore cadunt: quod patet in his qui cadunt, et nunquam resurgunt, vel qui resurgunt, iterum casuri; sed his tanum qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti, id est, prædestinatis, qui quostiescumque cadunt, finaliter tamen resurgunt. Cedit ergo eis in bonum hoc quod cadunt, non quia semper in majori gratia resurgant, sed quia resurgunt in permanentiori gratia: non quidem ex parte ipsius gratiae, quia quanto gratia est major tanto de se est permanentior; sed ex parte hominis, qui tanto stabilius in gratia permanet, quanto est cautior et humiliar. Unde et Glossa ibidem subdit, quod « ideo proficit eis in bonum Hypog., cap. ix, § 17, col. 1631, t. 10, op. Augustini. Ex Aug., l. I De Genesi ad litteram, c. xvii, § 33, col. 259, t. 3. Juxta Scotum, omnis resurgens a peccato resurgit ad majorem gloriam quam ante; juxta Aureolum resurgens semper resurgit in majori habitu charitatis, gratiae, et gloriae, vel saltem in æquali; juxta Henricum omnes in æquali gratia resurgunt. quod cadunt, quia humiliores redeunt atque doctiores. »

[II-II.q.89.a.2.ad.2] According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): "If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes of the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear."

[II-II.q.89.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pœnitentia, quantum est de se, habet virtutem reparandi omnes defectus ad perfectum, et etiam promovendi in ulteriorem statum; sed hoc quando impeditur ex parte hominis, qui remissius movetur in Deum et in detestationem peccati; sicut etiam in baptismo aliqui adulti consequuntur majorem vel minorem gratiam, secundum quod diversimode se disponunt.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.ad.3] He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1 Corinthians 4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither for nor against him.

[II-II.q.89.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod assimilatio illa utriusque gratia ad lucem vespertinam et matutinam fit propter similitudinem ordinis, quia post lucem vespertinam sequuntur tenebræ noctis, post lucem autem matutinam, sequitur lux diei, non autem propter similitudinem majorem vel minorem quantitatis. Illud etiam verbum Apostoli intelligitur de gratia Christi, quæ superat omnem abundantiam humanorum peccatorum. Non autem est verum in omnibus quod quanto abundantius peccant, tanto abundantiorem gratiam consequuntur, pensata quantitate habitualis gratia. Est tamen superabundans gratia quantum ad ipsam gratia rationem, quia magis gratis beneficium remissionis magis peccatori confertur; quamvis quandoque abundanter peccantes abundantius doleant, et sic abundantiorem habitum gratia et virtutum consequuntur, sicut patet in Magdalena. Ad id vero quod in contrarium objicitur, dicendum quod una et eadem gratia major est proficiens quam incipiens, sed in diversis hoc non est necesse: unus enim incipit a majori gratia quam alius habeat in statu profectus, sicut Gregorius dicit in II Dialog. cap. I, ante med.: « Quatenus et præsentes et secuturi omnes agnoscerent, Benedictus puer conversationis gratiam a quanta perfectione cæpisset. »

Article 3

[II-II.q.89.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (Question 60, Article 1). Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod per pœnitentiam non restituatur homo in pristinam dignitatem, quia super illud Amos, v: Virgo Israel cecidit, dicit Glossa: « Non negat posse resurgere, sed non resurget virgo Israel quia semel aberrans ovis, etsi reportetur humeris pastoris, non habet tantam gloriam, quantam quæ nunquam erravit. » Ergo per pœnitentiam non recuperat homo pristinam dignitatem.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.arg.2] Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently enumerated.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Hieronymus 5 dicit Decr., distinct. L, c. xxx, col. 272: « Quicumque dignitatem divini gradus non custodiunt, contenti fiant animam salvare; reverti enim in pristinum gradum difficile est; » et Innocentius Papa, Epist. vi ad Agapit., dist. L, cap. « Canones,» col. 282, dicit quod canones « apud Nicæam constituti pœnitentes etiam ab infimis officiis clericorum excludunt. » Non ergo per pœnitentiam homo recuperat pristinam dignitatem.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.arg.3] Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without judgment, according to 1 Timothy 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice," i.e. without previous judgment [Vulgate: 'Observe these things without prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with other human actions.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ante peccatum potest aliquis ad majorem gradum ascendere. Non autem hoc post peccatum conceditur pœnitenti: dicitur enim Ezech., xliv, 10: Levitæ qui recesserunt a me…. nunquam appropinquabunt mihi, ut sacerdotio fungantur; et sicut habetur in Decret., dist. L, c. LII, col. 279, in Ilerdensi concilio legitur: « Hi qui sancto altari deserviunt, si subito in flenda carnis fragilitate corruerint, et Domino respiciente digne pœnituerint, sic officiorum suorum loca recipiant, ut non possint ad altiora officia ulterius promoveri. » Non ergo pœnitentia restituit hominem in pristinam dignitatem.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.sc] It is written (Jeremiah 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice."

[II-II.q.89.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod, sicut in eadem distinct., cap. xvi, col. 263, legitur, Gregorius scribens Secundino, lib. IX Regist., indict. II, epist. LII, col. 987, t. 3, dicit: « Post dignam satisfactionem credimus 6 hominem posse redire ad suum honorem; » et in concil. Agathensi, cap. xxI, col. 265, legitur: « Contumaces clerici prout dignitatis ordo permiserit, ab episcopis corrigantur; ita ut cum eos pœniapud quem non occurrit. Migne. tentia correxerit, gradum suum dignitatemque recipiant. 》 Respondeo dicendum, quod homo per peccatum duplicem dignitatem amittit, unam quantum ad Deum, aliam vero quantum ad Ecclesiam. Quantum autem ad Deum, amittit duplicem dignitatem: unam principalem, qua scilicet computatus erat inter filios Dei per gratiam, et hanc dignitatem recuperat per pœnitentiam, quod significatur Luc., xv, in filio prodigo, cui pœnitenti pater jussit restitui stolam primam, et annulum, et calceamenta. Aliam vero dignitatem amittit secundariam, scilicet innocentiam, de qua, sicut ibidem legitur, gloriabatur filius senior dicens; Ecce tot annis servio tibi, et nunquam mandatum tuum præterivi; et hanc dignitatem pœnitens recuperare non potest: recuperattamen quandoque aliquid majus, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in Hom. de centum ovibus, xxxiv in Evang., § 4, col. 1248, t. 2, « qui se errasse a Deo considerant, damna præcedentia lucris sequentibus recompensant. Majus ergo gaudium de eis fit in cælo, quia et dux in prælio plus eum militem diligit qui post fugam reversus hostem fortiter premit, quam illum qui nunquam terga præbuit, et nunquam aliquid fortiter gessit. 》 Dignitatem autem ecclesiasticam homo per peccatum perdit, quia indignum se reddit ad ea quæ competunt dignitati ecclesiasticæ exercendæ, quam quidem recuperare prohibetur: uno modo quia non pœnitet; unde Isidorus Ad 4 Julianum episcopum scribit, sicut in eadem distinctione legitur, cap. « Domino, » col. 268: « Illos ad pristinos gradus redire canones præcipiunt, quos pœnitentiæ præcessit satisfactio, vel condigna peccatorum confessio. At contra hi qui a vitio corruptionis non emendantur, nec gradum honoris nec gratiam recipiunt communionis. » Secundo, quia pœnitentiam negligenter facit; unde in eadem dist., cap. « Si quis diaconus, » col. 270, dicitur: « Cum in aliquibus nec compunctio humilitatis, nec instantia orandi appareat, nec jejuniis, vel lectionibus eos vacare videamus, possumus agnoscere, si ad pristinos honores redirent, cum quanta negligentia permanerent. » Tertio, si commisitaliquod peccatum habens irregularitatem aliquam annexam: unde in eadem distinct., cap. « Si quis viduam, » col. 257, ex 2 concilio Martini Papæ dicitur: « Si quis viduam aut ab alio relictam duxerit, non admittatur ad clericatum; quod si irrepserit, dejiciatur. Similiter si homicidii aut facto, aut præcepto, aut consilio, aut defensione post baptismum conscius fuerit. » Sed hoc non est ratione peccati, sed ratione irregularitatis. Quarto propter scandalum, unde, ut in eadem dist. legitur, cap. « De his vero, » Rabanus dicit, lib. I Pœnitentiæ ad Heribaldum, cap. 1: « Hi qui deprehensi vel capti fuerint publice in perjurio, furto atque fornicatione, et cæteris hujusmodi criminibus, secundum canonum sacrorum instituta a proprio gradu decidant, quia scandalum est populi Dei, tales personas supra se positas habere. Qui autem de prædictis peccatis absconse a se commissis occulte sacerdoti conflitentur, et se per jejunia et eleemosynas, vigiliasque et sacras operationes purgare curaverint, his etiam gradu proprio servato spes veniæ de misericordia Dei promittenda est. Et hoc est quod dicitur Extra De qualitate ordinandorum., cap. « Quæsitum »: « Si proposita crimina ordine judiciario comprobata, vel alias notoria non fuerint præter reos homicidii, post pœnitentiam in jam susceptis vel jam suscipiendis ordinibus impediri non possunt. 》 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod eadem ratio est de recuperatione virginitatis, et de recuperatione innocentiæ, quæ pertinet ad secundariam dignitatem quoad Deum. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Hieronymus in verbis illis non dicit esse impossibile, sed dicit 5 esse difficile, hominem recuperare post peccatum pristinum gradum, quia hoc non conceditur nisi perfecte pœnitenti, ut dictum est. Ad statuta autem canonum, quae hoc prohibere videntur, respondet Augustinus Bonifacio scribens, Epist. clxxxv, § 45, col. 812, t. 2: « Ut constitueretur in Ecclesia, ne quisquam post alicujus criminis pœnitentiam clericatum accipiat, vel ad clericatum redeat, vel in clericatu maneat, non desperatione indulgentia, sed rigore factum est disci- 1 Cod. Paris. et Alcan.: « Ad Julianum; » alias « Ad Massanum; » « Ad Massianum; » « Ad Massonnam. » Legitur apud Migne in Epist. ad Massonnam, § 3, col. 899, t. 6, op. Isidori. Correctores autem Decreti substituunt Capitula Martini episc. Bracarensis, cap. xxvi. 3 In plinæ; alioquin contra claves Ecclesiæ datas disputabitur, de quibus dictum est: Quæcumque solveritis super terram, soluta erunt et in cælo. » Et postea subdit: « Nam et sanctus David de criminibus mortiferis pœnitentiam egit, et tamen in honore suo perstitit; et beatum Petrum, quando amarissimas lacrymas fudit, utique Dominum negasse pœnituit, et tamen apostolus mansit. Sed non ideo supervacua putanda est posteriorum diligentia, qui ubi saluti nihil detrahebatur, humilitati aliquid addiderunt, experti, credo, aliquorum fictas pœnitentias per affectatas honorum potentias.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 2), an oath is not good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, juramentum non est bonum nisi ei qui bene utitur juramento. Ad bonum autem usum juramenti duo requiruntur: primo quidem quod aliquis non leviter, sed ex necessaria causa et discrete juret: et quantum ad hoc requiritur judicium scilicet discretionis ex partes jurantis; secundo quantum ad id quod per juramentum confirmatur, ut scilicet neque sit falsum, neque sit aliquid illicitum, et quantum ad hoc requiritur veritas per quam aliquis juramento confirmat quod verum est; et justitia, per quam confirmat quod licitum est. Judicio autem caret juramentum incautum; veritate autem juramentum mendax: justitia autem juramentum iniquum sive illicitum.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.ad.1] Judgment does not signify here the execution of justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of speech.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod judicium non sumitur hic pro executione justitiae, sed pro judicio discretionis, ut dictum est. Neque etiam veritas hic accipitur secundum quod est pars justitiae, sed secundum quod est quædam conditione locutionis.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.ad.2] Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice regards the reason for swearing.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod devotio et fides, et omnia hujusmodi quæ exiguntur ad debitum modum jurandi, intelligentur in judicio; alia enim duo pertinent ad rem de qua juratur, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod justitia pertinet ad causam pro qua juratur.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.ad.3] There is great danger in swearing, both on account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than for other human actions.

[II-II.q.89.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud statutum intelligitur de illis qui publicam pœnitentiam agunt, qui postmodum non possunt ad majorem provehi gradum. Nam et Petrus post negationem pastor ovium Christi constitutus est, ut patet Joan., ult., ubi etiam Chrysostomus dicit Hom. lxxxviii in Joan., § 2, col. 419, t. 14, quod « Petrus negationem et pœnitentiam se habere majorem fiduciam ad Christum; qui enim in cœna non audebat interrogare, sed Joanni interrogationem commisit, huic postea et præpositura fratrum credita est, et non solum non committit alteri interrogare quæ ad ipsum pertinent, sed de reliquo ipse pro Joanne magistrum interrogat. »

Article 4

[II-II.q.89.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod opera virtutum in charitate facta mortificari non possint. Quod enim non est, immutari non potest. Sed mortificatio est quædam mutatio de vita in mortem. Cum ergo opera virtutum, postquam facta sunt, jam non sint, videtur quod ulterius mortificari non possint.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.arg.2] Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per opera virtutum in charitate facta homo meretur vitam æternam. Sed subtrahere mercedem merenti est injustitia, quæ non cadit in Deum. Ergo non potest esse quod opera virtutum in charitate facta per peccatum sequens mortificentur.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.arg.3] Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fortius non corrumpitur a debiliori. Sed opera charitatis sunt fortiora quibuslibet peccatis, quia, ut dicitur Proverb., x, 12, universa delicta operit charitas. Ergo videtur quod opera in charitate facta, per sequens mortale peccatum mortificari non possint.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.sc] It is written (Deuteronomy 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name." Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of religion.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech., xviii, 24: Si averterit se justus a justitia sua, omnes justitiæ ejus quas fecerat, non recordabuntur.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.co] As appears from what has been said above (Article 1), he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle says (Hebrews 6:16) that "men swear by one greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Matthew 5:34, says that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear is to give very great honor." Now to show reverence to God belongs to religion or latria. wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod res viva per mortem perdit operationem vitæ. Unde per quamdam similitudinem dicuntur res mortificari, quando impediuntur a suo proprio effectu vel operatione. Effectus autem operum virtuosorum, quæ in charitate fiunt, est perducere ad vitam æternam; quod quidem impeditur per peccatum mortale sequens, quod gratiam tollit. Et secundum hoc opera in charitate facta mortificari dicuntur per sequens peccatum mortale.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.ad.1] Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and not of the latter.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut opera peccatorum transeunt actu, et manent reatu, ita opera in charitate facta, postquam transeunt actu manent merito in Dei acceptancee; et secundum hoc mortificantur, inquantum impeditur homo ne consequatur suam mercedem.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.ad.2] In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God, namely, reverence and honor.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sine injustitia potest merces subtrahi merenti, quando ipse reddidit se indignum mercede per culpam sequentem: nam et ea quæ homo jam accepit, quandoque juste propter culpam perdit.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.ad.3] Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God also works for His own glory and for our good.

[II-II.q.89.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est propter fortitudinem operum peccati, quod mortificantur opera prius in charitate facta; sed est propter libertatem voluntatis, quæ potest a bono in malum deflecti.

Article 5

[II-II.q.89.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above (Question 88, Article 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable as being good essentially.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod opera mortificata per peccatum, per pœnitentiam non reviviscant. Sicut enim per pœnitentiam subsequentem remittuntur peccata præterita, ita etiam per peccatum sequens mortificantur opera prius in charitate facta. Sed peccata dimissa per pœnitentiam non redeunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod etiam opera mortificata per charitatem non reviviscant.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.arg.2] Further, Jerome, commenting on Matthew 5:34, says that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now reverence and love of God are desirable as something good essentially. Therefore swearing is also.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea opera dicuntur mortificari, ad similitudinem animalium quæ moriuntur, ut dictum est. Sed animal mortuum non potest iterum vivificari. Ergo nec opera mortificata possunt iterum per pœnitentiam reviviscere.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.arg.3] Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion. Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, opera in charitate facta merentur gloriam secundum quantitatem gratia vel charitatis. Sed quandoque per pœnitentiam homo resurgit in minori gratia vel charitate. Ergo non consequitur gloriam secundum meritum priorum operum; et ita videtur quod opera per peccatum mortificata non reviviscant.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.sc] It is written (Sirach 23:12): "A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De Mendacio xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing."

[II-II.q.89.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Super illud Joel. II: Reddam vobis annos, quos comedit locusta, dicit Glossa 1: « Non patiar perire ubertatem, quam cum perturbatione animi amisistis. » Sed illa ubertas est meritum bonorum operum quod fuit perditum per peccatum. Ergo per pœnitentiam reviviscunt opera meritoria prius facta.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.co] Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need."

[II-II.q.89.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod opera meritoria per peccatum sequens mortificata non reviviscunt per pœnitentiam subsequentem, considerantes quod opera illa non remanent, ut iterum vivificari possint. Sed hoc impedire non potest quin vivificentur; non enim habent vim perducendi in vitam æternam, quod pertinet ad eorum vitam, solum secundum quod actu existunt, sed etiam postquam actu esse desinunt, secundum quod remanent in acceptatione divina. Sic autem remanent quantum est de se, etiam postquam per peccatum mortificantur, quia semper Deus illa opera, prout facta fuerunt, acceptabit, et sancti de eis gaudebunt, secundum illud Apoc., III, 14: Tene quod habes, ne * alius accipiat coronam tuam. Sed quod isti qui ea fecit, non sint efficacia ad ducendum in vitam æternam, provenit ex impedimento peccati supervenientis, per quod ipse redditus est indignus vita æterna. Hoc autem impedi-mentum tollitur per pœnitentiam, inquantum per eam remittuntur peccata. Unde restat quod opera prius mortificata, per pœnitentiam recuperant efficaciam perducendi eum qui fecit ea, in vitam æternam, quod est ea reviviscere. Et ita patet quod opera mortificata per pœnitentiam reviviscunt.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.ad.1] There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from the end.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod opera peccati per pœnitentiam abolentur secundum se, ita scilicet quod ex eis ulterius, Deo indulgente, nec macula nec reatus inducatur; sed opera in charitate facta non abolentur a Deo, in cujus acceptatione remanent, sed impedimentum acci-piunt ex parte hominis operantis; et ideo remoto impedimento, quod est ex parte hominis operantis, Deus implet ex parte sua illud quod opera merebantur.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.ad.2] He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is necessary for the present life.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod opera in charitate facta non mortificantur secundum se, sicut dictum est, sed solum per impedimentum superveniens ex parte operantis. Animalia autem moriuntur secundum se, inquantum privantur principio vitæ, et ideo non est simile.

[II-II.q.89.a.5.ad.3] Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed aright; for, as it is written (Sirach 23:13), "if he make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with dissimulation, "he offendeth double," [because, to wit, "pretended equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [Enarr. in Psalm 63:7] declares: "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and necessity, "he shall not be justified."

[II-II.q.89.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui per pœnitentiam resurgit in minori charitate, consequetur quidem præmium essentiale, secundum quantitatem charitatis in qua invenitur; habebit tamen gaudium majus de operibus quæ secundo fecit, quod pertinet ad præmium accidentale.

Article 7

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true, though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Corinthians 1:15, seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Corinthians 16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod juramentum non habeat vim obligandi. Inducitur enim juramentum ad confirmandum veritatem ejus quod dici-tur. Sed quando aliquis dicit aliquid de futuro, verum dicit, etiamsi non eveniat quod dicit: sicut Paulus, quamvis non iverit Corinthum, sicut dixerat, non tamen est mentitus, ut patet II Cor., 1. Ergo videtur quod juramentum non sit obligatorium.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.2] Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (Article 4). But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an oath is not always binding.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus non est virtuti contraria, ut dicitur in Prædicamentis, cap. « de Oppos. » Sed juramentum est actus virtutis, ut dictum est. Quandoque autem esset contra virtutem, aut in aliquod ejus impedimentum, si quis servaret id quod juravit; sicut cum aliquis jurat se facere aliquod peccatum, vel cum jurat se desistere ab aliquo opere virtutis. Ergo juramentum non est semper obligatorium.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.3] Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quandoque aliquis invitus compellitur ad hoc quod sub juramento aliquid promittat. Sed « tales a juramenti nexibus sunt per Romanos Pontifices absoluti, » ut habetur extra de Jure jur., cap. « Verum in ea quæst., » etc. Ergo juramentum non semper est obligatorium.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.4] Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, nullus potest obligari ad duo opposita. Sed quandoque oppositum est quod intendit jurans, et quod intendit ille cui juramentum præstatur. Ergo juramentum non potest esse semper obligatorium.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.sc] It is written (Matthew 5:33): "Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord."

[II-II.q.89.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., v, 33: Reddes Domino juramenta tua.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.co] An obligation implies something to be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about things to be done by the person who swears.

Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present, this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth.

Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap. as when a man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow (88, 3, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good. For in either case "its result is evil" [Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]

Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod obligatio refertur ad aliquid quod est faciendum vel dimittendum. Unde non videtur respicere juramentum assertorium, quod est de præsenti, vel de præterito, neque etiam juramentum de his quæ sunt per alias causas fienda, sicut si quis juramento assere-ret quod cras pluvia esset futura; sed solum in his quæ sunt fienda per illum qui jurat. Sicut autem juramentum assertorium, quod est de præterito vel de præsenti, debet habere veritatem, ita etiam et juramentum de his quæ sunt fienda a nobis in futurum. Et ideo utrumque juramentum habet quamdam obligationem: diversimode tamen, quia in juramento quod est de præterito vel præsenti, obligatio est non respectu rei quæ jam fuit vel est, sed respectu ipsius actus jurandi, ut scilicet juret id quod jam verum est vel fuit: sed in juramento quod præstatur de his quæ sunt fienda a nobis, obligatio cadit e contra super rem quam aliquis juramento firmavit: tenetur enim aliquis ut faciat In verum esse id quod juravit; alioquin deest veritas juramento. Si autem est talis res quæ in ejus potestate non fuit, deest juramento discretionis judicium: nisi forte quod erat ei possibile quando juravit, reddatur ei impossibile per aliquem eventum; puta cum aliquis jurat se pecuniam soluturum, quæ ei postmodum vi vel furto subtrahitur. Tunc enim videtur excusatus esse a faciendo quod juravit, licet teneatur facere quod in se est, sicut etiam supra circa obligationem voti diximus. Si vero sit quidem possibile fieri, sed fieri non debeat, vel quia est per se malum, vel quia est boni impeditivum, tunc juramento deest justitia; et ideo juramentum non est servandum in eo casu quo est peccatum, vel boni impeditivum; secundum enim Augustinum, cap. iv, lib. de Bono conjug., utrumque eorum vergit in deteriorem exitum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod quicumque jurat aliquid se facturum, obligatur ad faciendum ad hoc quod veritas impleatur; si tamen alii duo comites adsint, scilicet judicium et justitia.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.1] It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliud est de simplici verbo, aliud de juramento, in quo divinum testimonium imploratur. Sufficit enim ad veritatem verbi, quod aliquis dicat id quod proponit se facturum, quia hoc jam verum est in sua causa, scilicet in proposito facientis. Sed juramentum adhiberi non debet nisi in re de qua aliquis firmiter certus est. Et ideo si juramentum adhibeatur propter reverentiam divini testimonii quod invocatur, obligatur homo ut faciat esse verum id quod juravit, secundum suam possibilitatem, nisi in deteriorem exitum vergat, ut dictum est.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.2] An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does not keep it.

Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel asked what it was right to grant. but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised."

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod juramentum potest vergere in deteriorem exitum dupliciter: uno modo quia ab ipso principio habet pejorem exitum, vel quia est secundum se malum, sicut cum aliquis jurat se perpetraturum adulterium, sive quia est majoris boni impeditivum, puta cum aliquis jurat se non intraturum religionem, vel quod non fiet clericus, aut quod non accipiet prælationem in casu in quo expedit eum accipere; vel si quid Habetur cap. Si aliquid, et cap. Inter cætera, XXII, quæst. IV. — Parm. Ita editi omnes, quos vidimus; Cod. Alcan. aliique: « secundum enim utrumque horum vergit in detrimentum. » aliud est hujusmodi. Hujusmodi enim juramentum a principio est illicitum; differenter tamen: quia si quis juret se facturum aliquod peccatum, et peccavit jurando, et peccat juramentum servando; si quis autem jurat se non facturum aliquod melius bonum, quod tamen facere non tenetur, peccat quidem jurando, inquantum ponit obicem Spiritui sancto, qui est boni propositi inspirator; non tamen peccat juramentum servando, sed multo melius facit, si non servet. Alio modo vergit in deteriorem exitum propter aliquid quod de novo emerserit, quod fuit impræmeditatum, sicut patet in juramento Herodis, qui juravit puellæ saltanti se daturum quod petiisset; hoc enim juramentum poterat esse a principio licitum, intellecta debita conditione, scilicet si peteret quod dare deceret; sed impletio juramenti fuit illicita. Unde Ambrosius dicit in I de Officiis, cap. L, § 254, col. 108, t. 3: « Est contra officium nonnunquam promissum solvere, sacramentum custodire; sicut Herodes, qui necem Joannis præstitit ne promissum negaret. »

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.3] There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed the obligation for some just cause.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in juramento quod quis coactus facit, duplex est obligatio: una quidem qua obligatur homini cui aliquid promittit; et talis obligatio tollitur per coactionem, quia ille qui vim intulit, hoc meretur ut ei promissum non servetur. Alia autem est obligatio qua quis Deo obligatur ut impleat quod per nomen ejus promisit; et talis obligatio non tollitur in foro conscientiæ, quia magis debet damnum temporale sustinere, quam juramentum violare. Potest tamen repetere in judicio quod solvit, vel Prælato denuntiare, non obstante si contra-rium juravit; quia tale juramentum vergeret in deteriorem exitum, esset enim contra justitiam publicam. Romani autem Pontifices ab hujusmodi juramentis homines absolverunt, non quasi decernentes hujusmodi juramenta non esse obligatoria, sed quasi hujusmodi obligationes ex justa causa relaxantes.

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.4] When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile." If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention."

[II-II.q.89.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quando non est eadem jurantis intentio et ejus cui jurat, si hoc proveniat ex dolo jurantis, debet juramentum servari secundum sanum intellectum ejus cui juramentum Nicolai: « Sicut Herodes necem Joannis, » etc. Edit. Rom. aliæque vetustæ: « Est contra officium nonnunquam promissum solvere sacramentum, sicut Herodes, qui necem Joannis præstitit, » etc. præstatur. Unde Isidorus dicit, lib. II Sentent., cap. xxxi, § 8, col. 634, t. 6: « Quacumque arte verborum quis juret, Deus tamen, qui conscientiæ testis est, ita hoc accipit, sicut ille cui juratur, intelligit. » Et quod hoc intelligatur de doloso juramento, patet per id quod subditur: « Dupliciter reus fit qui et nomen Dei in vanum assumit, et proximum dolo capit. » Si autem jurans dolum non adhibeat, obligatur secundum intentionem jurantis. Unde Gregorius dicit XXVI Moral., cap. x, col. 357, t. 2: « Humanæ aures verba nostra talia judicant, qualia foris sonant; divina vero judicia talia ea audiunt qualia ex intimis proferuntur. »

Article 8

[II-II.q.89.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod major sit obligatio juramenti quam voti; votum enim est simplex promissio. Sed juramentum supra promissionem adhibet divinum testimonium. Ergo major est obligatio juramenti quam voti.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.arg.2] Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger. Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger than a vow.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, debilius solet per fortius confirmari. Sed votum interdum confirmatur juramento. Ergo juramentum est fortius quam votum.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.arg.3] Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of the mind, a stated above (Question 88, Article 1); while the obligation of an oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation, it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, obligatio voti causatur ex animi deliberatione, ut supra dictum est; obligatio autem juramenti causatur ex divina veritate, cujus testimonium invocatur. Cum ergo veritas Dei excedat deliberationem humanam, videtur quod obligatio juramenti sit fortior quam obligatio voti.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.sc] A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore a vow is more binding than an oath.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.sc] Sed contra, per votum obligatur aliquis Deo; per juramentum autem obligatur aliquis interdum homini. Magis autem obligatur homo Deo quam homini. Ergo major est obligatio voti quam juramenti.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.co] The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod utraque obligatio, scilicet voti et juramenti, causatur ex aliquo divino; aliter tamen et aliter: nam obligatio voti causatur ex fidelitate quam Deo debemus, ut scilicet Negant Cajetanus, Lessius, Valentia, Gabriel, asserunt S. Antoninus, Sylvester, Sotus, Sylvius, Navarrus, etc. obligationem juramenti ei promissum solvamus; obligatio autem juramenti causatur ex reverentia quam debemus ei, ex qua tenemur quod verificemus id quod per nomen ejus promittimus. Omnis autem infidelitas irreverentiam continet, sed non convertitur: videur enim infidelitas subjecti ad dominum esse maxima irreverentia. Et ideo votum ex ratione sua magis est obligatorium quam juramentum.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.ad.1] A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod votum est promissio, non quæcumque, sed Deo facta, cui infidelem esse gravissimum est.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.ad.2] An oath is added to a vow not because it is more stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable things" [Hebrews 6:18.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod juramentum non adhibetur voto quasi aliquid firmius, sed ut per duas res immobiles major firmitas adhibeatur.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.ad.3] Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.

[II-II.q.89.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod deliberatio animi dat firmitatem voto, quantum ex parte voventis est; habet tamen majorem firmitatis causam ex parte Dei, cui votum offertur.

Article 9

[II-II.q.89.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has promised by oath to do in the future.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullus possit dispensare in juramento. Sicut enim veritas requiritur ad juramentum assertorium, quod est de præterito vel præsenti, ita etiam ad juramentum promissorium, quod est de futuro. Sed nullus potest cum aliquo dispensare quod juret contra veritatem de præsentibus vel præteritis. Ergo etiam nullus potest dispensare, quod non faciat aliquis esse verum id quod cum juramento in futurum promisit.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.arg.2] Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, juramentum promissorium inducitur ad utilitatem ejus cui fit promissio. Sed ille, ut videtur, non potest relaxare, quia est contra reverentiam divinam. Ergo multo minus per aliquem alium potest super hoc dispensari.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.arg.3] Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (88, 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to be against the law [Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in voto quilibet Episcopus potest dipensare, exceptis quibusdam votis quae soli Papæ reservantur, ut supra habitum est. Ergo pari ratione in juramento, si esset dispensabile, quilibet Episcopus posset dispensare; quod tamen promissorii admittere levitatem materiae, ita ut in re levi non sit obligatio nisi sub veniali. Utraque opinio probabilis, sed secunda probabilis. videtur esse contra jura, C. XV, q. vi, cap. « Auctoritatem, » et seq., col. 983, et cap. « Si vero, » Extra de Jurejurando. Non ergo videtur quod in juramento possit dispensari.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.sc] A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above (Article 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod votum est majoris obligationis quam juramentum, ut supra dictum est. Sed in voto potest dispensari. Ergo et in juramento.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.co] As stated above (Question 88, Article 10), the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, necessitas dispensationis tam in lege quam in voto est propter hoc quod id quod in se vel universaliter consideratum est utile et honestum, secundum aliquem particularem eventum potest esse inhonestum et nocivum; quod non potest cadere nec sub lege, nec sub voto. Quod autem aliquid sit inhonestum, vel nocivum, repugnat his quæ debent attendi in juramento; nam si sit inhonestum, repugnat justitiæ; si sit nocivum, repugnat judicio. Et ideo pari ratione etiam in juramento dispensari potest.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.ad.1] A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows (88, 10, ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of oaths.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dispensatio quæ fit in juramento non se extendit ad hoc quod aliquid contra juramentum fiat; hoc enim est impossibile, cum observatio juramenti cadat sub præcepto divino, quod est indispensabile. Sed ad hoc se extendit dispensatio juramenti, ut id quod sub juramento cadebat, sub juramento non cadat, quasi non existens debita materia juramenti; sicut et de voto supra diximus. Materia autem juramenti assertorii, quod est de præterito vel præsenti, in quamdam necessitatem jam transiit, et immutabilis facta est; et ideo dispensatio non referretur ad materiam, sed referretur ad ipsum actum juramenti: unde talis dispensatio directe esset contra præceptum divinum. Sed materia juramenti promissorii est aliquid futurum, quod variari potest, ita scilicet quod in aliquo eventu potest esse illicitum vel nocivum, et per consequens non esse debita materia juramenti; et ideo dispensari potest in juramento promissorio, quia talis dispensatio respicit materiam juramenti, et non contrariatur præcepto divino de juramenti observatione.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.ad.2] One man may promise something under oath to another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. On this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided he give his consent" or some such like condition.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo potest alteri promittere aliquid sub juramento dupliciter: uno modo, quando promittit aliquid pertinens ad utilitatem ipsius, puta si sub juramento promittat se serviturum ei, vel pecuniam daturum; et a tali promissione potest absolvere ille cui promissio facta est: intelligitur enim jam ei solvisse promissum quando facit de eo secundum ejus voluntatem. Alio modo promittit aliquis alteri quod pertinet ad honorem Dei vel utilitatem aliorum; puta si aliquis sub juramento promittat alicui se intraturum religionem, vel aliquod opus pietatis facturum; et tunc ille cui promittitur, non potest absolvere promittentem, quia promissio non est facta ei principaliter, sed Deo; nisi forte sit interposita conditio ratione cujus possit, scilicet si illi videbitur cui promittitur, vel aliquid aliud tale.

[II-II.q.89.a.9.ad.3] Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter a religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (07, ad 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. On this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Numbers 30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (88, A8,9).

[II-II.q.89.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quandoque illud quod cadit sub juramento promissorio est manifeste repugnans justitiæ, vel quia est peccatum, sicut cum aliquis jurat se facturum homicidium; vel quia est majoris boni impeditivum, sicut cum aliquis jurat se non intraturum religionem; et tale juramentum dispensatione non indiget. Sed in primo casu tenetur aliquis tale juramentum non servare; in secundo autem casu licitum est et servare et non servare, ut supra dictum est. Quandoque vero aliquid sub juramento promittitur de quo dubium est utrum sit licitum vel illicitum, proficuum vel nocivum, aut simpliciter aut in aliquo casu; et in hoc potest quilibet Episcopus dispensare. Quandoque vero sub juramento promittitur aliquid quod est manifeste licitum et utile; et in tali juramento non videtur habere locum dispensatio vel commutatio, nisi aliquid melius occurrat ad communem utilitatem faciendum, quod maxime videtur pertinere ad potestatem Papæ, qui habet curam universalis Ecclesiæ; vel etiam absoluta relaxatio, quod etiam ad Papam pertinet in omnibus generaliter quæ ad dispensationem rerum ecclesiasticarum pertinent, super quas habet plenitudinem potestatis; sicut et ad unumquemque pertinet irritare juramentum quod a sibi subditis factum est, circa ea quæ ejus potestati subduntur; sicut pater potest irritare juramentum puellæ, et vir uxoris, ut dicitur Num., xxx, sicut et supra de voto dictum est.

Article 10

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Hebrews 6:16), is employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod juramentum non impediatur per aliquam conditionem personæ vel temporis. Juramentum enim ad confirmationem inducitur, ut patet per Apostolum ad Hebr., vi. Sed cuilibet convenit confirmare dictum suum, et quolibet tempore. Ergo videtur quod juramentum non impediatur per aliquam conditionem personæ vel temporis.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.2] Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for the sake of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the Gospels.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, majus est jurare per Deum quam per Evangelia: unde Chrysostomus dicit, hom. xliv Op. 1 imperf., a med.: « Si aliqua causa fuerit, modicum videtur facere qui jurat per Deum; sed qui jurat per Evangelia, majus aliquid fecisse videtur. Quibus dicendum est: Stulti, Scripturæ propter Deum factæ sunt, non Deus propter Scripturas. » Sed cujuslibet conditionis personæ, et quolibet tempore in communi locutione consueverunt jurare per Deum. Ergo multo magis licitum est eis jurare per Evangelia.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.3] Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idem non causatur ex contrariis causis, quia contrariæ causæ sunt contrariorum. Sed aliqui excluduntur a juramento propter defectum personæ, sicut pueri ante quatuordecim annos, et etiam illi qui semel fuerunt perjuri. Non ergo videtur quod aliqui prohibeantur jurare vel propter dignitatem, sicut clerici, aut etiam propter temporis solemnitatem.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.4] Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written (Matthew 11:11) that "he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is written (Apocalypse 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on account of his dignity.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.arg.4] 4. Præterea, nullus homo vivens in hoc mundo est tantæ dignitatis, sicut angelus: dicitur enim Matth., xi, 41, quod qui minor est in regno cælorum, major est illo, scilicet Joanne Baptista adhuc in mundo vivente. Sed angelo convenit jurare; dicitur enim Apoc., x, 6, quod Angelus juravit per viventem in sæcula sæculorum. Ergo nullus homo propter dignitatem debet excusari a juramento.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.sc] It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): "Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of being put on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman."

[II-II.q.89.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod habetur II, qu. v, cap. iv, col. 603: « Presbyter vice juramenti per sanctam consecrationem interrogetur; » et XXII, quæst. v, cap. xxII, col. 4158, dicitur: « Nullus ex ecclesias-

[II-II.q.89.a.10.co] Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths [Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear of God."

The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear." For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that "priests should not swear for trifling reasons." Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in juramento duo sunt consideranda: unum quidem ex parte Dei, cujus testimonium inducitur; et quantum ad hoc debetur juramento maxima reverentia. Et propter hoc a juramento excluduntur et pueri ante annos pubertatis, qui non coguntur ad jurandum, quia nondum habent perfectum usum rationis, quo possint cum reverentia debita juramentum præstare; et iterum perjuri, qui ad juramentum non admittuntur, quia ex retroactis præsumitur quod debitam reverentiam juramento non exhibebunt. Et propter hoc etiam ut juramento debita reverentia exhibeatur, dicitur XXII, qu. v, cap. xvi, col. 4156: « Honestum est ut qui in sanctis audet jurare, hoc jejunus faciat cum omni honestate et timore Dei. » Aliud autem est considerandum ex parte hominis, cujus dictum juramento confirmatur. Non enim indiget dictum hominis confirmatione, nisi quia de eo dubitatur. Hoc autem derogat dignitati personæ ut dubitetur de veritate eorum quæ dicit; et ideo « personis magnæ dignitatis non convenit jurare. » Propter quod dicitur II, qu. v, cap. « Siquis presbyter, » col. 603, quod « sacerdotes ex levi causa jurare non debent; » tamen pro aliqua necessitate vel magna utilitate licitum est eis jurare, et præcipue pro spiritualibus negotiis; pro quibus etiam juramenta competit præstari in solemnibus diebus, quibus est spiritualibus rebus vacandum. Non autem tunc sunt juramenta præstanda pro rebus temporalibus, nisi forte ex magna necessitate.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.ad.1] Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be so certain that they need no confirmation.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod qui dam sunt qui dictum suum confirmare non possunt propter defectum eorum; et quidam sunt quorum dictum adeo debet esse certum, quod confirmatione non egeat. Ad secundum dicendnm, quod juramentum secundum se consideratum tanto sanctius est et magis obligat, quanto majus est id per quod juratur, ut Augustinus dicit ad Publicolam, epist. xlvii, §2, col. 484, t. 2; et secundum hoc majus est jurare per Deum quam per Evangelia. Sed potest esse e converso propter modum jurandi; utpote si juramentum, quod fit per Evangelia, fiat cum quadam delibe- — Sic cod.; ratione et solemnitate; juramentum autem quod fit per Deum, fiat leviter et absque deliberatione.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.ad.2] The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God frivolously and without deliberation.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.ad.3] Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of such little authority that their oaths have no standing.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid toli ex contrariis causis per modum superabundantiæ et defectus: et hoc modo aliqui impediuntur a jurando, quia sunt majoris auctoritatis quam quod eos jurare deceat; aliqui vero quia sunt minoris auctoritatis quam quod eorum juramento stetur.

[II-II.q.89.a.10.ad.4] The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His word, as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 6:17).

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.89.a.10.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod juramentum angeli inducitur non propter defectum ipsius, quasi non sit ejus simplici dicto credendum, sed ad ostendendum id quod dicitur ex infallibili Dei dispositione procedere; sicut etiam et Deus aliquando Scripturis jurans inducitur ad ostendendum immobilitatem ejus quod dicitur, sicut Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., vi.

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