Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q88. Vows
Source context
- Theme
- voluntary sacred pledges binding the will to God — their nature, conditions, and fulfillment
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 130, 1912-06-17Steiner notes that the founders of spiritual communities must take a vow not to treat their commitment lightly but to hold fast with loyalty and full strength to what they have pledged.
- GA 251, 1914-01-18Steiner addresses the institutional question of whether a vow of obedience by handshake is appropriate within the esoteric school, treating the binding force of such a pledge as a matter of serious organizational and ethical weight.
Cross-tradition
- Judaic tradition (neder)The Hebrew institution of the neder (vow) as a voluntary consecration of person or property to God provides a direct structural parallel to Aquinas's analysis of vows as acts of latria directed to God as ultimate end.
- Hindu tradition (vrata)The Sanskrit vrata designates a sacred vow or religious observance undertaken as a binding commitment to a deity, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that vows belong properly to divine worship rather than to merely human moral obligation.
- Buddhist monastic code (Vinaya)The Vinaya's formal ordination vows, which bind the monk to a rule of life undertaken freely before the community, display structural congruence with Aquinas's requirement that a valid vow be deliberate, free, and directed toward a superior good.
Q88. Vows
Article 1
[II-II.q.88.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some [William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38, "a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod votum consistat in solo proposito voluntatis. Quia, secundum quosdam, votum est «conceptio boni propositi cum deliberatione firmata, qua quis ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum se Deo obligat. » Sed conceptio boni propositi cum omnibus quæ adduntur, potest in solo motu voluntatis consistere. Ergo votum in solo proposito voluntatis consistit.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.arg.2] Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from "voluntas" [will], for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" [by one's own vow] when one does it voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act of the will, while to "promise" is an act of the reason. Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Super illud Lucæ, xi, Revertar in domum meam, unde exivi, dicit Beda, col. 478, t. 3: «Timendus est iste versiculus, non exponendus; ne culpa quam in nobis extinctam credebamus, per incuriam nos vacantes opprimat. » Hoc autem non esset nisi rediret. Ergo culpa per pœnitentiam dimissa redit.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.arg.3] Further, our Lord said (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Ezech., xviii, 24, Dominus dicit: Si averterit se justus a justitia sua, et fecerit iniquitatem, omnes justitiae ejus quas fecerat, non recordabuntur. Sed inter alias justitias quas fecit etiam præcedens pœnitentia continetur, cum supra dictum sit pœnitentiam esse partem justitiae. Ergo postquam pœnitens peccat, non impeditur ei præcedens pœnitentia, per quam consecutus est veniam peccatorum. Redeunt ergo illa peccata.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.sc] It is written (Ecclesiastes 5:3): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit Rom., xi, 29: Sine pœnitentia sunt dona et vocatio Dei. Sed peccata pœnitentis sunt dimissa per donum Dei. Ergo per peccatum sequens non redeunt dimissa peccata, quasi Deus de dono remissionis pœniteat. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in libro 5 Responzionum Prosperi, object. ii, col. 1 Plenius in textu D. Augustini. 3 Liber Responzionum ad capitula Gallorum est Prosperi, qui responsiones desumsit ex dictis Augustini; unde recte dici potest: « Aug. dicit. » 1834, t. 10: « Qui recedit a Christo, et alienatus a gratia finit hanc vitam, quid nisi in perditionem cadit? sed non in quod remissum est recidit, nec pro originali peccato damnabitur. » Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, in peccato mortali sunt duo, scilicet aversio a Deo, et conversio ad bonum creatum. Quidquid autem est ex parte aversionis in peccato mortali, secundum se consideratum, est commune omnibus peccatis mortalibus, quia per quodlibet peccatum mortale homo avertitur a Deo: unde et per consequens macula quæ est per privationem gratiae, et reatus pœnæ αternæ communia sunt omnibus peccatis mortalibus. Et secundum hoc intelligitur id quod dicitur Jacobi, ii, 10: Qui offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus. Sed ex parte conversionis peccata mortalia sunt diversa, et interdum contraria. Unde manifestum est quod ex parte conversionis peccatum mortale sequens non facit redire peccata mortalia prius abolita; alioquin seque-retur quod homo per peccatum prodigalitatis reduceretur in habitum vel dispositionem avaritiæ prius abolitæ, et sic contrarium esset causa sui contrarii, quod est imposibile. Sed considerando in peccatis mortalibus id quod est ex parte aversionis absolute, per peccatum mortale sequens 4 homo privatur gratia, et fit reus pœnæ αternæ, sicut et prius erat vita 5. Quia aversio in peccato mortali ex conversione quodammodo 6 inducit diversitatem per comparisonem ad diversas conversiones, sicut ad diversas causas, ita quod sitalia conversio 7, et alia macula, et alius reatus, prout consurgit ex alio et alio actu peccati mortalis 8, hoc ergo in quaestionem vertitur utrum macula et reatus pœnæ αternæ, secundum quod causabantur ex actibus peccatorum prius dimissorum, redeant per peccatum mortale sequens. Quibusdam igitur visum est quod simpliciter etiam hoc modo redeant. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia opus Dei per opus hominis irritari non potest. Remissio 5 In cui substituitur in principio sequentis propositionis « verum. » autem peccatorum priorum fuit opus divinæ misericordiae; unde non potest irritari per sequens peccatum hominis, secundum illud Rom., III, 3: Numquid incredulitas illorum fidem Dei evacuabit? Et ideo alii ponentes peccata redire, dixerunt quod Deus non remittit peccata pœnitenti postmodum peccaturo secundum præscientiam, sed solum secundum præsentem justitiam: præscit enim eum pro his peccatis æternaliter puniendum, tamen per gratiam facit eum præsentialiter justum. Sed nec hoc stare potest, quia si causa absolute ponatur, et effectus ponitur absolute. Si igitur non absolute fieret per gratiam et gratia sacramenta peccatorum remissio, sed cum quadam conditione in futurum dependente, sequeretur quod gratia et gratia sacramenta non essent sufficiens causa remissionis peccatorum, quod est erroneum, utpote derogans gratia Dei. Et ideo nullo modo potest esse quod macula et reatus præcedentium peccatorum redeant, secundum quod ex talibus actibus causabantur. Contingit autem quod sequens actus peccati virtualiter continet reatum prioris peccati, inquantum scilicet aliquis homo secundo peccans, ex hoc ipso videtur gravius peccare quam prius peccaverat, secundum illud Rom., II, 5: Secundum duritiam tuam et impænitens cor, thesaurizas tibi iram in die iræ, ex hoc scilicet solo quod contemniitur Dei bonitas, quæ ad pœnitentiam expectat. Multo autem magis contemniitur Dei bonitas, si post remissionem prioris peccati secundo peccatum iteretur, quanto majus est beneficium peccatum remittere, quam peccatorem sustinere. Sic igitur per peccatum sequens pœnitientiam redit quodammodo reatus peccatorum prius dimissorum, non inquantum causabatur ex illis peccatis, prius dimissis, sed inquantum causátur ex peccato ultimo perpetrato, quod aggravatur ex peccatis prioribus. Et hoc non est peccata dimissa redire simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum scilicet virtualiter in peccato sequenti continentur.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.co] A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Samuel 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer (83, 12), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Psalm 65:13, "I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and about things relating to God": although the "witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod votum quamdam obligationem importat ad aliqid faciendum vel dimittendum. Obligat autem homo se homini ad aliqid per modum promissionis, quæ est rationis actus, ad quam pertinet ordinare. Sicut enim homo imperando, vel deprecando, ordinat quodammodo quid sibi ab aliis fiat, ita promittendo ordinat quid ipse pro alio facere debat. Sed promissio quæ ab homine fit homini, non potest fieri nisi per verba vel quæcumque exteriora signa; Deo autem potest fieri promissio per solam interiorem cogitationem; quia, ut dicitur I Reg., xvI, 7: Homo videt ea quæ parent;* sed Deus intuetur cor. Exprimuntur tamen quando verba exteriora vel ad sui ipsius excitationem, sicut circa orationem dictum est, vel etiam ad alios contestandum, ut non solum desistant a fractione voti propter timorem Dei, sed etiam propter reverentiam hominum. Promissio autem procedit ex proposito faciendi. Propositum autem aliquam deliberationem præexigit, cum sit actus voluntatis deliberatæ. Sic ergo ad votum tria ex necessitate requiruntur: primo quidem deliberatio; secundo propositum voluntatis; tertio promissio, in qua perficitur ratio voti. Superadduntur vero quando et alia duo ad quamdam voti confirmationem, scilicet pronuntiatio oris secundum illud psalmi lxv, 13: Reddam tibi vota mea, quæ distinxerint labia mea; et iterum testimonium aliorum. Unde magister dicit in xxxviii dist., lib. IV Sent., quod votum est « testificatio quædam promissionis spontaneæ, quæ Deo et de his quæ sunt Dei, fieri debet; » quamvis testificatio possit ad interiorem testificationem proprie referri.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.ad.1] The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud verbum Augustini videtur esse intelligendum de reditu peccatorum quantum ad reatum pœnæ æternæ in se consideratum, quia scilicet post pœnitentiam peccans incurrit reatum pœnæ æternæ, sicut et prius, non tamen omnino propter eamdem rationem. Unde August. 5 in lib. De responsionibus, cum dixisset quod « non in eo quod remissum est recidit, nec pro originali peccato damnabitur, » subdit: « Qui tamen propter postrema crimina ea morte afficietur quæ ei propter illa quæ ei remissa sunt, debebatur, » quia scilicet incurrit mortem æternam, quam meruerat per peccata præterita.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.ad.2] Man's will moves the reason to promise something relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in illis verbis non intendit dicere Beda quod culpa prius dimissa hominem opprimat per reditum reatus præteriti, sed per iterationem actus.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.ad.3] He that puts his hand to the plough does something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
[II-II.q.88.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod per consequens peccatum justitiæ priores oblivioni traduntur, inquantum erant meritoriae vitæ æternæ, non tamen inquantum erant impeditivæ peccati. Unde si aliquis peccet mortaliter, postquam restituit debitum, non efficitur reus, quasi debitum non reddidisset; et multo minustraditur oblivioni pœnitentia prius acta, quantum ad remissionem culpæ, cum remissio culpæ magis sit opus Dei quam hominis.
Article 2
[II-II.q.88.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Psalm 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Genesis 28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better good.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod votum non semper fieri debeat de meliori bono. Dicitur enim melius bonum quod ad supererogationem pertinet. Sed votum non solum fit de his quæ sunt supererogationis, sed etiam de his quæ pertinent ad salutem; nam et in baptismo vovent homines abrenuntiare diabolo, et pompis ejus, et fidem servare, ut dicit Glossa super illud psalmi lxxv: Vovete et reddite Domino Deo vestro. Jacob etiam vovit quod esset ei Dominus in Deum, ut habetur Gen., xxviii. Hoc autem est maxime de necessitate salutis. Ergo votum non solum fit de meliori bono.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.arg.2] Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Hebrews 11:32). Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges 11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only about a better good, but also about something unlawful.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Rabanus dicit, implic. lib. V In Matth., in fin.: « Nequam servum tradidit Deus tortoribus, quoadusque redderet universum debitum, quia non solum peccata quæ post baptismum homo egit, reputabuntur ei ad pœnam, sed et originalia, quæ in baptismo sunt ei dimissa ». Sed etiam peccata venialia inter debita computantur, pro quibus dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra. Ergo ipsa etiam redeunt per ingratitudinem; et pari ratione videtur quod per peccata venialia redeant peccata prius dimissa, et non solum per peccata prædicta.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.arg.3] Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good. Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always about a better good.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, tanto est major ingratitudo, quanto post majus beneficium acceptum aliquis peccat. Sed beneficium Dei est etiam ipsa innocentia, qua peccatum vitamus; dicit enim Augustinus in II Confess., cap. VII, col. 684, t. 1: « Gratiæ tuæ deputo, quæcumque peccata non feci. » Majus autem donum est innocentia quam etiam remissio omnium peccatorum. Ergo non minus est ingratus Deo qui primo peccat post innocentiam, quam qui peccat post pœnitentiam; et ita videtur quod per ingratitudinem, quæ fit secundum peccata, non maxime redeant peccata dimissa.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.sc] It is written (Deuteronomy 23:22): "If thou wilt not promise thou shalt be without sin."
[II-II.q.88.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, lib. IV Dialog., cap. LX, col. 428, t. 3: « Ex dictis evangelicis constat quia si hoc quod in nos delinquitur, ex corde non dimittimus; et illud rursus exigitur quod nobis jam per pœnitentiam dimissum fuisse gaudebamus; » et ita propter odium fraternum specialiter peccata dimissa redeunt secundum ingratitudinem: et eadem ratio videtur de aliis.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would do something against someone. On like manner it would be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the supposition of an end--for instance if salvation be unattainable without it--it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it. But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccata dimissa per pœnitentiam redire dicuntur, inquantum reatus eorum ratione ingratitudinis virtualiter continentur in peccato sequenti. Ingratitudo autem potest committi dupliciter: uno modo ex eo quod aliquid fit contra beneficium, et hoc modo per omne peccatum mortale quo Deum offendit redditur homo ingratus Deo, qui peccata remisit, et sic per quodlibet peccatum mortale sequens redeunt peccata prius dimissa, ratione ingratitudinis; alio modo committitur ingratitudo, non solum faciendo contra ipsum beneficium, sed etiam faciendo contra formam beneficii præstiti. Quæ quidem forma si attendatur ex parte benefactoris, est remissio debitorum: unde contra hanc formam facit qui fratri petenti veniam non remittit, sed odium tenet. Si autem attendatur ex parte pœnitentis, qui recipit hoc beneficium, invenitur ex parte ejus duplex motus liberi arbitrii. Quorum primus est motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, qui est actus fidei formatæ; et contra hoc facit homo apostando a fide. Secundus autem est motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, qui est actus pœnitentiae; ad quem primo pertinet, ut supra dictum est, quod homo detestetur peccata præterita; et contra hoc facit ille qui dolet se pœnituisse. Secundo, pertinet ad actum pœnitentiæ ut pœnitens proponat se subjicere clavibus Ecclesiae per confessionem, secundum illud psalmi xxxi, 5: Dixi, confitebor adversum me injustitiam meam Domino, et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei; et contra hoc facit ille qui contemnit confiteri secundum quod proposuerat. Et ideo dicitur quod specialiter ingratitudo hominum peccatorum facit redire peccata prius dimissa.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.ad.1] Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same passage.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur specialiter de istis peccatis, quia sint cæteris graviora, sed quia directius opponuntur beneficio remissionis peccatorum.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.ad.2] Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30-31, "made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome says [Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist. Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges 11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something good.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam peccata venialia, et ipsum originale re- Habetur in Decreto, cap. « Si Judas, » De pœnitentia, dist. IV. deunt modo prædicto, sicut et peccata mortalia, inquantum contemnitur Dei beneficium, quo hæc peccata sunt remissa. Non tamen per peccatum veniale aliquis incurrit ingratitudinem, quia homo peccando venialiter non facit contra Deum, sed præter ipsum; et ideo per peccata venialia nullo modo peccata dimissa redeunt.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.ad.3] The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening nature. on this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Romans 12:1), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
[II-II.q.88.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod beneficium aliquod habet pensari dupliciter; uno modo ex quantitate ipsius beneficii, et secundum hoc innocentia est majus Dei beneficium quam pœnitentia, quæ dicitur secunda tabula post naufragium: alio modo potest pensari beneficium ex parte recipientis, qui minus est dignus, et sic magis fit ei gratia, unde et ipse magis est ingratus si contemnat; et hoc modo beneficium remissionis culpæ est majus in quantum præstatur totaliter indigno; et ideo ex hoc sequitur major ingratitudo.
Article 3
[II-II.q.88.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things that are done by another, more than God does, since He has no need for our goods (Psalm 15:2). Now according to the prescription of human laws [Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod per ingratitudinem peccati sequentis consurgat tantus reatus, quantus fuerat peccatorum prius dimissorum; quia secundum magnitudinem peccati est magnitudo beneficii quo peccatum remittitur, et per consequens magnitudino ingratitudinis, qua hoc beneficium contemnitur. Sed secundum quantitatem ingratitudinis est quantitas reatus consequentis. Ergo tantus reatus consurgit ex ingratitudine sequentis peccati, quantus fuit reatus omnium præcedentium peccatorum.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.arg.2] Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always binding.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, magis peccat qui Deum offendit quam qui offendit hominem. Sed servus manumissus ab aliquo domino reducitur in eamdem servitutem a qua prius fuit liberatus, vel etiam in graviorem. Ergo multo magis ille qui contra Deum peccat post liberationem a peccato, reducitur in tantum reatum pœnæ quantum primo habuerat.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.arg.3] Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not always binding.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Matth., xviii, 34, dicitur quod iratus Dominus tradidit eum, cui replicantur peccata dimissa propter ingratitudinem, tortoribus, quoadusque redderet universum debitum. Sed hoc non esset nisi consurgeret ex ingratitudine tantus reatus, quantus fuit omnium præteritorum peccatorum. Ergo æqualis reatus per ingratitudinem redit.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.sc] It is written (Ecclesiastes 5:3-4): "Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised."
[II-II.q.88.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut., xxv, 2: Pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus; ex quo patet quod ex pravo peccato non consurgit magnus reatus. Sed quandoque peccatum mortale sequens est multo minus quolibet peccatorum prius dimissorum. Non ergo ex peccato sequenti redit tantus reatus, quantus fuit peccatorum prius dimissorum.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.co] For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac. xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word" ['Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because "an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him" [Ecclesiastes 5:3.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod ex peccato sequenti propter ingratitudinem consurgit tantus reatus, quantus fuit reatus peccatorum prius dimissorum, super reatum proprium hujus peccati. Sed hoc non est necessarium; quia, sicut supra dictum est, reatus præcedentium peccatorum non redit per peccatum sequens, inquantum sequebatur ex actibus præteritorum peccatorum, sed inquantum consequitur actum sequentis peccati. Et ideo oportet quod quantitas reatus redeuntis sit secundum gravitatem peccati subsequentis. Potest autem contingere quod gravitas peccati subsequentis adæquetur gravitati omnium peccatorum præcedentium. Sed hoc non semper est necesse, sive loquamur de gravitate ejus quam habet ex sua specie, cum quandoque peccatum sequens sit fornicatio simplex, peccata vero præterita fuerunt adulteria vel homicidia, seu sacrilegia; sive etiam loquamur de gravitate quam habet ex ingratitudine annexa. Non enim oportet quod quantitas ingratitudinis sit absolute æqualis quantitati beneficii suscepti, cujus quantitas attenditur secundum quantitatem peccatorum prius dimissorum. Contingit enim quod contra idem beneficium unus est multum ingratus vel secundum intensionem contemptus beneficii, vel secundum gravitatem culpæ contra benefactorem commissæ: alius autem parum, vel quia minus contemnit, vel quia minus contra benefactorem agit. Sed proportionaliter quantitas ingratitudinis adæquatur quantitati beneficii; supposito enim aequali contemptu beneficii, vel offensa benefactoris, tanto erit gravior ingratitudo quanto beneficium fuit majus. Unde manifestum est quod non est necesse quod propter ingratitudinem semper per peccatum sequens redeat tantus reatus, quantus fuit præcedentium peccatorum: sed necesse est quod proportionaliter, quanto peccata prius dimissa fuerunt plura et majora, tanto redeat major reatus per qualecumque sequens mortale peccatum.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.ad.1] Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beneficium remissionis culpæ recipit quantitatem absolutam secundum quantitatem peccatorum prius dimissorum; sed peccatum ingratitudinis non recipit quantitatem absolutam secundum quantitatem beneficii, sed secundum quantitatem contemptus, vel offensæ, ut dictum est. Et ideo ratio non sequitur.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.ad.2] If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. on the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by sinning.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod servus manumissus non reducitur in pristinam servitutem pro qualicumque ingratitudine, sed pro aliqua gravi.
[II-II.q.88.a.3.ad.3] The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is written (Deuteronomy 23:23): "That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately.
But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written (Deuteronomy 23:21): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."
[II-II.q.88.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illi cui peccata dimissa replicantur propter subsequentem ingratitudinem, redit universum debitum, inquantum quantitas peccatorum præcedentium proportionaliter inventur in ingratitudine subsequenti, non autem absolute, ut dictum est.
Article 4
[II-II.q.88.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ingratitudo, ratione cujus sequens peccatum facit redire peccata prius dimissa, sit speciale peccatum. Retributio enim gratiarum pertinet ad contrapassum quod requiritur in justitia, ut patet per Philosophum, V Ethic., cap. v. Sed justitia est specialis virtus. Ergo ingratitudo est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.arg.2] Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow." Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Tullius in II Rhetor., seu De invent., aliquant. ante fin., ponit quod gratia est specialis virtus. Sed ingratitudo opponitur gratiae. Ergo ingratitudo est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.arg.3] Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, specialis effectus a speciali causa procedit. Sed ingratitudo habet specialem effectum, scilicet quod facit aliqualiter redire peccata prius dimissa. Ergo ingratitudo est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.sc] It is written (Psalm 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God."
[II-II.q.88.a.4.sc] Sed contra, illud quod consequitur omnia peccata non est speciale peccatum. Sed per quodcumque peccatum mortale aliquis efficitur Deo ingratus, ut ex præmissis patet. Ergo ingratitudo non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.co] As stated above (1 and 2), a vow is a promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ingratitudo peccantis quando est speciale peccatum quandoque autem non; sed est circumstantia generaliter consequens omne peccatum mortale, quod contra Deum committitur; peccatum enim speciem recipit ex intentione peccantis; unde ut Philosophus dicit V Ethic., cap. 11, parum a princ.: « ille qui mœchatur ut furetur, magis est fur quam mœchus. » Si igitur aliquis peccator in contemptum Dei et suscepti beneficii aliquod peccatum committat, illud peccatum trahitur ad speciem ingratitudinis; et hoc modo ingratitudo peccantis est speciale peccatum. Si vero aliquis intendens aliquod peccatum committere, puta homicidium aut adulterium, non retrahitur ab hoc propter hoc quod pertinet ad Dei contemptum, ingratitudo non erit speciale peccatum; sed trahetur ad speciem alterius peccati, sicut circumstantia quædam. Ut autem Augustinus dicit in lib. De natura et gratia, cap. xxix, col. 263, t. 10, non omne peccatum est ex contemptu, et tamen in omni peccato Deus contemnitur in suis præceptis. Unde manifestum est quod ingratitudo peccantis quandoque est speciale peccatum, sed non semper. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta; nam primæ rationes conclusunt quod ingratitudo secundum se sit quædam species peccati; ultima autem ratio conclusit quod ingratitudo secundum quod inventur in omni peccato, non sit speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.88.a.4.ad.1] Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things."
[II-II.q.88.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut non posse peccare non diminuit libertatem, ita etiam necessitas firmatæ voluntatis in bonum non diminuit libertatem, ut patet in Deo, et in beatis; et talis est necessitas voti, similitudinem quamdam habens cum confirmatione beatorum. Unde Augustinus dicit in eadem epistola, § 8, quod « felix est necessitas quæ in meliora compellit. »
[II-II.q.88.a.4.ad.2] When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Ecclesiastes 11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment."
[II-II.q.88.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quando periculum nascitur ex ipso facto, tunc factum illud non est expediens, puta quod aliquis per pontem ruinosum transeat fluvium; sed si periculum immineat ex hoc quod homo deficit ab illo facto, non desinit propter hoc esse expediens; sicut expediens est ascendere equum, quamvis periculum immineat cadenti de equo: alioquin oporteret ab omnibus bonis cesare, quæ per accidens ex aliquo eventu possunt esse periculosa. Unde dicitur Eccle., xi, 4: Qui observat ventum, non seminat, et qui considerat nubes, nunquam metet. Periculum autem voventi non imminet ex ipso voto, sed ex culpa hominis, qui voluntatem mutat transgrediens vovum. Unde Augustinus dicit in eadem epistola, § 8: « Non te vovisse pœniteat, imo gaude jam tibi non licere quod cum tuo detrimento licuisset. »
[II-II.q.88.a.4.ad.3] It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor." By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Psalm 21:26): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.
The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."
[II-II.q.88.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christo secundum se non competebat vovere, tum quia Deus erat, tum etiam quia, inquantum homo, habebat firmatam voluntatem in bono, quasi comprehensor existens; quamvis per quamdam similitudinem ex persona ejus dicatur in Psal. xxi, secundum Glossam 5: Vota mea reddam in conspectu timentium eum; loquitur autem pro 4 corpore suo, quod est Ecclesia. Apostoli autem intelliguntur vovisse pertinenia ad perfectionis statum, quando Christum, relictis omnibus, sunt secuti.
Article 5
[II-II.q.88.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod votum non sit actus latriæ sive religionis. Omne enim opus virtutis cadit sub voto. Sed ad eamdem virtutem pertinere videtur promittere aliquid, et facere illud. Ergo votum pertinet ad quamlibet virtutem, et non specialiter ad religionem.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.arg.2] Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Tullium, lib. II de Invent., aliquant. ante fin., ad religionem pertinet cultum et cæremoniam Deo afferre. Sed ille qui vovet, nondum aliquid Deo affert, sed solum promittit. Ergo votum non est actus religionis. 1 In Parm. 4 In
[II-II.q.88.a.5.arg.3] Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God. But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cultus religionis non debet exhiberi nisi Deo. Sed votum non solum fit Deo, sed etiam Sanctis et Prælatis, quibus religiosi profitentes obedientiam vovent. Ergo votum non est religionis actus.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.sc] It is written (Isaiah 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them." Now, the worship of God is properly the act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or religion.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Isai., xix, 21: Colent eum in hostiis et muneribus, et vota vovebunt Domino, et solvent. Sed colere Deum est proprie actus religionis, sive latriæ. Ergo votum est actus latriæ sive religionis.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.co] As stated above (81, 1, ad 1), every act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper act of latria.
Now, it is evident from what has been said above (1 and 2) that a vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an act of latria or religion.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, omne opus virtutis ad religionem seu latriam pertinet per modum imperii, secundum quod ad divinam reverentiam ordinatur; quod est proprius finis latriæ. Ordinare autem alios actus in suum finem, pertinet ad virtutem imperantem, non ad virtutes imperatas. Et ideo ipsa ordinatio actuum cujuscumque virtutis in servitium Dei, est proprius actus latriæ. Manifestum est autem ex prædictis, quod votum est quædam promissio Deo facta, et quod promissio nihil est aliud quam ordinatio quædam ejus quod promittitur, in eum cui promittitur. Unde votum est ordinatio quædam eorum quæ quis vovet in divinum cultum seu obsequium. Et sic patet quod vovere proprie est actus latriæ seu religionis.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.ad.1] The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying.
But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud quod cadit sub voto, quandoque quidem est actus alterius virtutis, sicut jejunare, continentiam servare; quandoque vero est actus religionis, sicut sacrificium offerre vel orare. Utrorumque tamen promissio Deo facta ad religionem pertinet, ratione jam dicta. Undepatet quod votorum quoddam pertinet ad religionem ratione solius promissionis Deo factæ, quæ est essentia voti; quandoque vero etiam ratione rei promissæ, quæ est voti materia.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.ad.2] He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ille qui promittit, inquantum se obligat ad dandum, jam quodammodo dat, sicut dicitur fieri aliquid cum fit causa ejus, quia effectus virtute continetur in causa; et inde est quod non solum danti, sed etiam promittenti gratiae aguntur.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.ad.3] A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is fore made to a man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or one's superiors.
[II-II.q.88.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod votum soli Deo fit, sed promissio etiam potest fieri homini; et ipsa promissio boni quæ fit homini, potest cadere sub voto inquantum est quoddam opus virtuosum. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est votum quo quis vovet aliquid Sanctis, vel Prælatis; ut ipsa promissio facta Sanctis vel Prælatis cadat sub voto materialiter, inquantum scilicet homo vovet Deo se impleturum quod Sanctis vel Prælatis promittit.
Article 6
[II-II.q.88.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow. Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod magis sit laudabile et meritorium facere aliquid sine voto quam cum voto. Dicit enim Prosper in II de Vita contemplativa, cap. xxiv: « Sic abstinere vel jejunare debemus, ut non nos necessitati jejunandi subdamus; ne jam non devoti, sed inviti rem voluntariam faciamus. » Sed ille qui vovet jejunium, subdit se necessitati jejunandi. Ergo melius esset, si jejunaret sine voto.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 9:7): "Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to Metaph. v [Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Apostolus dicit II Corinth., 1x, 7: Unusquisque prout destinavit in corde suo, non ex tristitia aut ex necessitate, hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus. Sed quidam ea quæ vovent, ex tristitia faciunt; et hoc videtur procedere ex necessitate quam votum imponit, quia necessitas contristans est, ut dicitur V Metaph., text. 6. Ergo melius est aliquid facere sine voto quam cum voto.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.arg.3] Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated above (Article 4). But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, votum necessarium est ad hoc quod firmetur voluntas hominis ad rem quam vovet, ut supra habitum est. Sed non potest firmari melius voluntas ad aliquid faciendum quam cum actu facit illud. Ergo non melius est facere aliquid cum voto quam sine voto.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.sc] A gloss on the words of Psalm 75:12, "Vow ye and pay," says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the counsel to do it.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud psal. Lxxv, 12, Vovete, et reddite, dicit Glossa: « Vovere voluntati consulitur. » Sed consilium non est nisi de meliori bono. Ergo melius est facere aliquid opus ex voto quam sine voto; quia qui facit sine voto, implet tantum unum consilium, scilicet de faciendo; qui autem facit cum voto, implet duo consilia, scilicet de vovendo et faciendo.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.co] For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to vow, as stated above (Article 5) is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the better the more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished by godly continence."
Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as stated above (5, ad 2).
Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Question 14, Article 2).
[II-II.q.88.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod triplici ratione facere idem opus cum voto est melius et magis meritorium quam facere 1 Sic cod.; in sine voto: primo quidem quia vovere, sicut dictum est, est actus latriæ quæ est praecipua inter virtutes morales. Nobilioris autem virtutis est opus melius et magis meritorium. Unde actus inferioris virtutis est melior et magis meritorius ex hoc quod imperatur a superiori virtute, cujus actus fit per imperium; sicut actus fidei vel spei melior est, si imperetur a charitate. Et ideo actus 4 virtutum moralium, puta jejunare, quod est actus, abstinentiae; et continere, quod est actus castitatis, sunt meliora et magis meritoria, si fiant ex voto, quia sic jam pertinent ad divinum cultum, quasi quædam Dei sacrificia. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. de Virg., cap. vIII, col. 400, t. 6, quod « neque ipsa virginitas, quia virginitas est, sed quia Deo dicata est, honoratur, quam vovet et servat continentia pietatis. » Secundo, quia ille qui vovet aliquid, et facit, plus se Deo subjicit, quam ille qui solum facit: subjicit enim se Deo non solum quantum ad actum, sed etiam quantum ad potestatem, quia de cætero non potest aliud facere; sicut plus daret homini qui daret ei arborem cum fructibus quam qui daret ei fructus tantum, ut dicit Anselmus 2 in libro de Similitudinibus, cap. Lxxxiv, col. 655, t. 2. Et inde est quod etiam promittentibus gratia aguntur, ut dictum est. Tertio, quia per votum immobiliter voluntas firmatur in bonum. Facere autem aliquid ex voluntate firmata in bonum, pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. iv, circa med. Sicut etiam peccare mente obstinata, aggravat peccatum, et dicitur peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.ad.1] The passage quoted should be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa est intelligenda de necessitate coactionis, quæ involuntarium causat, et devotionem excludit. Unde signanter dicit: « Ne jam non devoti, sed inviti rem voluntariam faciamus. » Necessitas autem voti est per immutabilitatem 5 voluntatis; unde et voluntatem confirmat, et devotionem auget. Et ideo ratio non sequitur.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.ad.2] According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod necessi-tas coactionis, inquantum est contraria voluntati, tristitiam causat, secundum Philosophum. Necessitas autem voti in his qui sunt bene dispositi, inquantum voluntatem confirmat, non causat tristitiam, sed gaudium. Unde Augustinus dicit in epist. cxxvii ad Armentarium et Paulinam, §8, col. 487, t. 2: « Non te vovisse pœniteat, imo gaude jam tibi non licere quod cum tuo detrimento licuisset. » Si tamen ipsum opus secundum se consideratum, triste et involuntarium rederetur post votum, dum tamen remaneat voluntas votum implendi, adhuc est magis meritorium quam si fieret sine voto: puta impletio voti est actus religionis, quæ est potior virtus quam abstinentia, cujus actus est jejunare.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.ad.3] He who does something without having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.
[II-II.q.88.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui facit aliquid sine voto, habet immobilem voluntatem respectu illius operis singularis quod facit, et tunc quando facit; non autem manet voluntas ejus omnino firmata in futurum, sicut voventis, qui suam voluntatem obligavit ad aliquid faciendum, et antequam faceret illud singulare opus, et fortasse ad pluries faciendum.
Article 7
[II-II.q.88.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As stated above (Article 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper circumstance of a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod votum non solemnizetur persuscepitionem sacri ordinis, et per professionem ad certam regulam. Votum enim, ut dictum est, est promissio Deo facta. Ea vero quæ exterius aguntur ad solemnitatem pertinentia, non videntur ordinari ad Deum, sed ad homines. Ergo per accidens se habent ad votum. Non ergo solemnitas talis est propria conditio voti.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.arg.2] Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod pertinet ad conditionem alicujus rei, videtur posse compere omnibus illis in quibus res illa invenitur. Sed multa possunt sub voto 2 Legitur in codic. et in edit.: « Anselmus in lib. de similitudinibus»; et in aliquo verum est, siquidem librum istum ex verbis et ex consuetis exemplis Anselmi collegit ejus discipulus et amanuensis scriba, Eadmerus, monachus cluniacensis et abbas monasterii S. Albani. Contra Pseudo-apostolos dicentes quod perfectius est vivere sine voto quam cum voto, et quod ad majus præmium destinata sunt quæ sine voto fiunt, quam quæ fiunt ex necessitate voti. cadere quæ non pertinent neque ad sacrum ordinem, neque pertinent ad aliquam regulam; sicut cum quis vovet peregrinationem, aut aliquid hujusmodi. Ergo solemnitas quæ fit in susceptione sacri ordinis, vel in promissione certæ regulæ, non pertinet ad conditionem voti.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.arg.3] Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow. Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only these vows are solemn.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, votum solemne idem videtur esse quod votum publicum. Sed multa alia vota possunt fieri in publico quam votum quod emittitur in susceptione sacri ordinis, vel professione certæ regulæ; et hujusmodi etiam vota possunt fieri in occulto. Ergo non solum hujusmodi vota sunt solemnia.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.sc] These vows alone are an impediment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this work [Supplement, 53, 2].
[II-II.q.88.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod solum hujusmodi vota impediunt matrimonium contrahendum, et dirimunt jam contractum, quod est effectus voti solemnis, ut infra dicetur.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.co] The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its nature [conditio]: thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God: wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. On like manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod unicuique rei solemnitas adhibetur secundum illius rei conditionem; sicut alia est solemnitas novæ militiæ, scilicet in quodam apparatu equorum et armorum, et concursu militum, et alia solemnitas nuptiarum, quæ consistit in apparatu sponsi et sponsæ, et conventu propinquorum. Votum autem est promissio Deo facta: unde solemnitas voti attenditur secundum aliquid spirituale, quod ad Deum pertineat, idest, secundum aliquam spiritualem benedictionem, vel consecrationem, quæ ex institutione Apostolorum adhibetur in professione certæ regulæ, secundo gradu post sacri ordinis susceptionem, ut dicit Dionysius vi cap. eccles. Hier., § III, col. 534, t. 4. Et hujus ratio est, quia solemnites non consueverunt adhiberi nisi quando aliquis totaliter mancipatur alicui rei. Non enim solemnitas nuptialis adhibetur nisi in celebratione matrimonii, quando uterque conjugum sui corporis potestatem alteri tradit. Et similiter voti solemnitas adhibetur, quando aliquis per susceptionem sacri ordinis divino ministerio applicatur; et in professione certæ regulæ, quando per abrenuntiationem sæculi et propriæ voluntatis aliquis statum perfectionis assumit.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.ad.1] This kind of solemnization regards not only men but also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister, according to Numbers 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding with God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either commits a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hu- Ad solemnitatem voti requiritur acceptatio Ecclesiæ votum illud ut solemne acceptantis. Henno dicit solemnitatem voti non in illa acceptancee consistere, sed in quodam Ecclesiæ statuto, quia si statueret Papa vota non esse sojusmodi solemnitas pertinet non solum ad homines, sed ad Deum, inquantum habet aliquam spiritualem consecrationem, seu benedictionem, cujus Deus est auctor, etsi homo sit minister, secundum illud Num., vi, 27: Invocabunt nomen meum super filios Israel, et ego benedicam eis. Et ideo votum solemne habet fortiorem obligationem apud Deum, quam votum simplex, et gravius peccat qui illud transgreditur. Quod autem dicitur quod votum simplex non minus obligat apud Deum quam solemne, intelligendum est quantum ad hoc quod utriusque transgressor peccat mortaliter.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.ad.2] It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as under a universal.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod particularibus actibus non consuevit solemnitas adhiberi, sed assumptioni novi status, ut dictum est. Et ideo cum quis vovet aliqua particularia opera, sicut aliquam peregrinationem vel aliquod speciale jejunium, tali voto non congruit solemnitas, sed solum voto quo aliquis totaliter se subjicit divino ministerio seu famulatui; in quo tamen voto quasi universali multa particularia opera comprehenduntur.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.ad.3] Through being pronounced in public vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.
[II-II.q.88.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vota ex hoc quod fiunt in publico, possunt habere quamdam solemnitatem humanam, non autem solemnitatem spiritualem et divinam, sicut habent vota præmissa, etiamsi coram paucis fiant. Unde aliud est votum esse publicum, et aliud esse solemne.
Article 8
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod illi qui sunt alterius potestati subjecti, non impediantur a vovendo. Minus enim vinculum superatur a majori. Sed obligatio qua quis subjicitur homini est minus vinculum quam votum, per quod lemnia in Ordine Seraphico, sed simplicia, talia forent. — Quid esset autem statutum illud Papæ? Tacet P. Henno; essetne aliud quam revocatio acceptanceis Ecclesiæ? — Tenenda est omnino doctrina D. Thomæ: « Solemnizatio voti sub dispensatione Ecclesiæ cadit. » aliquis obligatur Deo. Ergo illi qui sunt alienæ potestati subjecti, non impediuntur a vovendo.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.2] Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to another's power.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, filii sunt in potestate patris. Sed filii possunt profiteri in aliqua religione etiam sine voluntate parentum. Ergo non impeditur aliquis a vovendo per hoc quod est subjectus potestati alterius.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.3] Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, majus est facere quam promittere. Sed religiosi qui sunt sub potestate Prælatorum, possunt aliqua facere sine licentia suorum Prælatorum, puta dicere aliquos psalmos, vel facere aliquas abstinentias. Ergo videtur quod multo magis possunt hujusmodi Deo vovendo promittere.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.4] Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quicumque facit quod de jure facere non potest, peccat. Sed subditi non peccant vovendo, quia hoc nunquam inventur prohibitum. Ergo videtur quod de jure possint vovere.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.sc] It is commanded (Numbers 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said there (Numbers 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot bind themselves by vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Num., xxx, 4, mandatur quod si * mulier in domo patris sui, et adhuc in puellari ætate aliquid voverit, non tenetur rea voti, nisi pater ejus consens erit; et idem dicit de muliere habente virum. Ergo pari ratione nec aliæ personæ alterius potestati subjectæ possunt se voto obligare.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.co] As stated above (Article 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, votum est promissio quædam Deo facta. Nullus autem potest per missionem se firmiter obligare ad id quod est in potestate alterius, sed solum ad id quod est omnino in sua potestate. Quicumque autem est subjectus alicui, quantum ad id in quo est subjectus, non est suæ potestatis facere quod vult, sed dependet ex voluntate alterius. Et ideo non potest se per votum firmiter obligare in his in quibus alteri subjicitur, sine consensu sui superioris.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.1] Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated above (Article 2). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above (Question 86, Article 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sub missione Deo facta non cadit nisi quod est virtuosum, ut supra dictum est. Est autem contra virtutem ut id quod est alterius, homo offerat Deo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non potest omnino salvari ratio voti, cum quis in potestate alterius constitutus vovet id quod est in potestate alterius, nisi sub conditione, si ille ad cujus potestatem pertinet, non contradicat.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.2] As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.
A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master's service.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex quo homo venit ad annos pubertatis, si sit liberæ conditionis, est suæ potestatis quantum ad ea quæ pertinent ad suam personam, puta quod obliget se religioni per votum, vel quod matrimonium contrahat; non autem est suæ potestatis quantum ad dispositionem domesticam, unde circa hoc non potest aliquid vovere quod sit ratum sine consensu patris. Servus autem quia est in potestate domini etiam quantum ad personales operationes, non potest se voto obligare ad religionem, per quam ab obsequio domini sui abstraheretur.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.3] A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod religiosus subditus est Prælato quantum ad suas operationes secundum professionem regulæ. Et ideo etiamsi aliquis ad horam aliquid facere possit, quando ad alia non occupatur a Prælato, quia tamen nullum tempus est exceptum in quo Prælatus non possit eum circa aliquid occupare, nullum votum religiosi est firmum, nisi sit de consensu Prælati; sicut nec votum puellae existentis in domo, nisi sit de consensu patris; nec uxoris, nisi sit de consensu viri.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.4] Although the vow of one who is subject to another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it.
[II-II.q.88.a.8.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet votum eorum qui sunt alterius potestati subditi, non sit firmum sine consensu eorum quibus subjiciuntur, non tamen peccant vovendo; quia in eorum voto intelligitur debita conditio, scilicet si suis superioribus placuerit, vel non renitantur.
Article 9
[II-II.q.88.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter religion.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pueri non possint voto se obligare ad religionis ingressum. Cum enim ad votum requiratur animi deliberatio, non competit vovere nisi illis qui habent usum rationis. Sed hoc deficit in pueris, sicut et in amentibus vel furiosis. Sicut ergo amentes et furiosi non possunt se ad aliquid voto adstringere; ita etiam nec pueri, ut videtur, possunt se voto obligare religioni.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.arg.2] Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod rite potest ab aliquo fieri, non potest ab alio irritari. Sed votum religionis a puero vel puella factum ante annos pubertatis, potest a parentibus revocari, vel a tutore, ut habetur XX, quæst. 11, can. «Puella,» col. 4104. Ergo videtur quod puer, vel puella ante quatuordecim annos non possit rite vovere.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.arg.3] Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [Ch. 58 and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation, for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, religionem intrantibus annus probationis conceditur secundum regulam B. Benedicti, cap. LVIII, col. 804, et secundum statutum 1 Innocentii IV, ad hoc quod probatio obligationem voti praecedat. Ergo illicitum videtur esse quod pueri voto obligentur ad religionem ante probationis annum.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.sc] That which is not done aright is invalid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a vow to enter religion.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.sc] Sed contra, id quod non est rite factum non est validum, etiamsi a nullo revoce-tur. Sed votum puellæ etiam ante annos pubertatis emissum, validum est, si intra annum a parentibus non revocetur, ut habetur XX quæst. 11, can. «Puella,» col. 1104. Ergo licite et rite possunt pueri voto obligari ad religionem, etiam ante annos pubertatis.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.co] As may be gathered from what has been said above (Article 7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another's power, as stated above (Article 8). Now these two circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of the Church's decree [Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, duplex est votum, sci-licet simplex et solemne. Et quia solem-nitas voti in quadam spirituali benedic-tione et consecratione consistit, ut dictum est, quæ fit per ministerium Ecclesiæ, ideo solemnizatio voti sub dispensatione Ecclesiæ cadit. Votum autem simplex efficaciam habet ex deliberatione animi, qua quis se obligare intendit. Quod autem talis obligatio robur non habeat, dupliciter potest contingere: uno quidem modo propter defectum rationis, sicut patet in furiosis et in amentibus, qui se voto non possunt obligare ad aliquid, dum sunt in furia vel amentia: alio modo, quia ille qui vovet, est alterius potestati subjectus, ut supradictum est. Et ista duo concurrunt in pueris ante annos pubertatis, quia et patiuntur rationis defectum ut in pluribus, et sunt naturaliter sub cura parentum, vel tutorum qui sunt eis loco parentum; et ideo eorum vota ex duplici causa robur non habent. Contingit tamen propter naturæ dispositionem, quæ legibus humanis non subditur, in aliquibus, licet paucis, accelerari rationis usum, qui ob hoc dicuntur doli capaces: nec tamen propter hoc in aliquo eximuntur a cura parentum, quæ subjacet legi humanæ respicienti ad id quod frequentius accidit. Est ergo dicendum quod si puer vel puella ante pubertatis annos nondum habeat usum rationis, nullo modo potest ad aliquid se voto obligare. Si vero ante puber-tatis annos attingit usum rationis, potest quidem, quantum in ipso est, se obligare; sed votum ejus potest irritari per parentes, quorum curæ remanet adhuc subjectus. Quantumcumque tamen sit doli capax, ante annos pubertatis non potest obligari voto solemni religionis, propter Ecclesiæ statutum, quod respicit id quod in pluribus accidit. Post annos autem pubertatis possunt jam se voto religionis obligare, vel simplici vel solemni, absque voluntate parentum.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.ad.1] This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid, as stated above.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de pueris qui nondum atti-gerunt usum rationis, quorum vota sunt invalida, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.ad.2] The vows of persons subject to another's power contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated above.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vota eorum qui sunt in potestate aliorum, habent conditionem implicitam, scilicet si non revocentur a superiore, ex qua licita redduntur et valida, si conditione existat, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.ad.3] This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are taken in profession.
[II-II.q.88.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de voto solemni, quod fit per professionem.
Article 10
[II-II.q.88.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Leviticus 27:9-10, "A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.arg.2] Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown above (Article 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of dispensation.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in his quæ sunt de lege naturæ et in præceptis divinis non potest per hominem dispensari, præcipue in præceptis primæ tabulæ, quæ ordinantur directe ad dilectionem Dei, quæ est ultimus præceptorum finis. Sed implere votum est de lege naturæ, et est etiam præceptum 1 Vide VI Decretal., titul. de Regularibus, cap. «Non solum.», edit. veteres, et Vulgata. Parm. autem habet: «majus bono.» legis divinæ, ut ex supra dictis patet, et pertinet ad præcepta primæ tabulæ, cum sit actus latriæ. Ergo in voto dispensari non potest.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.arg.3] Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above (Article 3). But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, obligatio voti fundatur super fidelitatem quam homo debet Deo, ut dictum est. Sed in hac nullus potest dispensare. Ergo nec in voto.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.sc] That which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.sc] Sed contra, majoris firmitatis esse videtur quod procedit ex communi voluntate, quam quod procedit ex singulari voluntate alicujus personæ. Sed in lege, quæ habet robur ex communi voluntate, potest per hominem dispensari. Ergo videtur quod etiam in voto per hominem dispensari possit.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.co] The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as stated above (I-II, 96, 6; I-II, 97, 4), a law is made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances. But since, in certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a household.
In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above (Article 2). Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, the vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, are in the power of the Church.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dispensatio voti intelligenda est ad modum dispensationis quæ fit in observantia alicujus legis; quia, ut supra dictum est, lex ponitur respiciendo ad id quod est ut in pluribus bonum. Sed quia contingit hujusmodi in aliquo casu non esse bonum, oportuit per aliquem determinari in illo particulari casu legem non esse servandam. Et hoc proprie est dispensare in lege: nam dispensatio videtur importare quamdam commensuratam distributionem, vel applicationem communis alicujus ad ea quæ sub ipso continentur; per quem modum dicitur aliquis dispensare cibum familiæ. Similiter autem ille qui vovet, quodammodo sibi statuit legem, obligans se ad aliquid quod est secundum se, et in pluribus, bonum. Potest tamen contingere quod in aliquo casu sit vel simpliciter malum, vel inutile, vel majoris boni impeditivum; quod est contra rationem ejus quod cadit sub voto, ut ex prædictis patet. Et ideo necesse est quod determinetur in tali casu votum non esse servandum. Et si quidem absolute determinetur aliquod votum non esse servandum, dicitur esse dispensatio voti; si autem pro hoc quod servandum erat, aliquid aliud imponatur, dicitur commutatio voti. Unde minus est votum commutare quam in voto dispensare; utrumque tamen in potestate Ecclesiæ consistit.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.ad.1] An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has intervened.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod animal quod immolari poterat, ex hoc ipso quod vovebatur, sanctum reputabatur, quasi divino cultui mancipatum; et hæc erat ratio quare non poterat commutari; sicut nec modo posset aliquis rem quam novit jam consecratam, puta calicem vel domum, commutare in melius, vel in pejus. Animal autem quod non poterat sacrificari, quia non erat immolatitium, redimi poterat et debebat, sicut ibidem lex dicit. Et ita etiam nunc commutari possunt vota, si consecratio non interveniat.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.ad.2] Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to this--that what was law is not law in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every circumstance.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut ex jure naturali et præcepto divino tenetur homo implere votum, ita etiam tenetur ex eisdem obedire superiorum legi, vel mandato. Et tamen cum dispensatur in aliqua lege humana, non fit ut legi humanæ non obediatur, quod est contra legem naturæ et mandatum divinum: sed fit, ut hoc quod erat lex, non sit lex in hoc casu. Ita etiam auctoritate superioris dispensantis fit, ut hoc quod continebatur sub voto, non contineatur, inquantum determinatur in hoc casu hoc non esse congruam materiam voti. Et ideo cum Prælatus Ecclesiæ dispensat in voto, non dispensat in præcepto juris naturalis, vel divini; sed determinat id quod cadebat sub obligatione deliberationis humanæ, quæ non potuit omnia circumspicere.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.ad.3] The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not contrary to the fidelity due to God.
[II-II.q.88.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad fidelitatem Deo debitam non pertinet quod homo faciat id quod ad vitandum est malum, vel inutile, vel majoris boni impeditivum; ad quod tendit voti dispensatio: et ideo dispensatio voti non est contra fidelitatem Deo debitam.
Article 12
[II-II.q.88.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world, even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior prelate.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ad commutationem vel dispensationem voti non requiratur Prælati auctoritas. Aliquis enim potest intrare religionem absque auctoritate alicujus superioris Prælati. Sed per introitum religionis absolvitur homo a votis in saeculo factis, etiam a voto terræ sanctæ. Ergo voti commutatio vel dispensation potest esse absque auctoritate superioris Prælati. Sed quidquid contrarium congerant multi Thomistæ et alii magni nominis theologi papa potest dispensare religiosum in votis solemnibus, quia papæDeus totius Ecclesiae regimen concessit, et aliquando dispensationis causa urgentissima est, bonum scilicet commune Ecclesiae, vel alicujus provinciæ aut regni. Hanc doctrinam D. Thomas, teste Cajetano contra Billuart, semper retinuit.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.arg.2] Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows, as stated above (10, ad 2; 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it have an evil result (2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dispensatio voti in hoc consistere videtur, quod determinatur in quo casu votum non sit observandum. Sed si prælatus male determinet, non videtur esse vovens absolutus a voto, quia nullus prælatus potest dispensare contra præceptum divinum; sed præceptum divinum est de implendo voto, ut dictum est. Similiter etiam si aliquis propria auctoritate recte determinet in quo casu votum non sit implendum, non videtur voto teneri: quia votum non obligat in casu in quo habet pejorem eventum, ut dictum est. Ergo dispensatio voti non requirit auctoritatem alicujus Prælati.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.arg.3] Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow. Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from vows.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si dispensare in voto pertinet ad potestatem Prælatorum, pari ratione pertinet ad omnes. Sed non pertinet ad omnes dispensare in quolibet voto. Ergo non pertinet ad potestatem Prælatorum dispensatio voti.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.sc] A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a precept of the law, as stated above (I-II, 96, 6; I-II, 97, 4). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.sc] Sed contra, sicut lex obligat ad aliquid faciendum, ita et votum. Sed ad dispensandum in præcepto legis requiritur superioris auctoritas, ut supra dictum est. Ergo pari ratione etiam in dispensatione voti.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.co] As stated above (1 and 2), a vow is a promise made to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place. Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God, according to 2 Corinthians 2:10: "For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ." And he says significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His Body.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, votum est promissio Deo facta de aliquo quod sit Deo acceptum. Quid sit autem in aliqua promissione acceptum ei cui promittitur, ex ejus pendet arbitrio. Prælatus autem in Ecclesia gerit vicem Dei. Et ideo in commutatione vel dispensatione votorum requiritur Prælati auctoritas, qui in persona Dei determinat quid sit Deo acceptum, secundum illudII Cor., 11, 40: Nam et ego quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos in persona Christi; et signanter dicit, propter vos, quia omnis dispensatio petita a Prælato debet fieri ad honorem Christi, in cujus persona dispensat, vel ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, quae est ejus corpus.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.ad.1] All other vows are about some particular works, whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a Decretal [Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other burdens.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnia alia vota sunt quorumdam particularium operum; sed per religionem homo totam vitam suam Dei obsequio deputat. Particulare autem in universali includitur; et ideo Decretalis dicit, cap. « Scripturæ, » de Voto, etc., quod « reus voti fracti non habetur qui temporale obsequium in perpetuam religionis observantiam commutat. » Nec tamen religionem ingrediens tenetur implere vota vel jejuniorum, vel orationum, vel aliorum hujusmodi quae existens in sæculo feci; quia religionem ingrediens moritur priori vitæ; et etiam singulares observantiæ religioni non competunt; et religionis onus satis hominem onerat, ut alia superaddere non oporteat.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.ad.2] Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (Article 8) that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does not dissent." And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given "unto edification, not for destruction" (2 Corinthians 10:8), and consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod ideo Prælati possunt in votis pro libito dispensare, quia in quolibet voto includitur conditionaliter voluntas Prælati superioris, sicut supra dictum est quod in votis subditorum, puta servi vel filii, intelligitur conditio « si placuerit patri, » vel « domino » vel « si non renitantur ». Et sic subditus absque omni remorsu conscientiæ posset votum præterittere, quandocumque sibi a Prælato diceretur. Sed prædicta positio falso innititur: quia cum potestas Prælati spiritualis, qui non est dominus sed dispensator, in aedificationem sit data, et non in destructionem, ut patet II ad Cor., x, sicut Prælatus non potest imperare ea quæ secundum se Deo displicent, scilicet peccata, ita non potest prohibere ea quæ secundum se Deo placent, scilicet virtutis opera. Et ideo absolute potest homo ea vovere. Ad Prælatum tamen pertinet dijudicare quid sit magis virtuosum et Deo magis acceptum. Et ideo in manifestis dispensatio Prælati non excusaret a culpa; puta si Prælatus dispensaret cum aliquo super voto de ingressu religionis, nulla apparenti causa obstante. Si autem esset causa apparens, per quam saltem in dubium verteretur, posset stare judicio Prælati dispensantis vel commutantis; non tamen judicio proprio, quia ipse non gerit vicem Dei, nisi forte in casu in quo id quod vovit esset manifeste illicitum, et non posset opportune ad superiorem recurrere.
[II-II.q.88.a.12.ad.3] Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff [Cap. Ex multa].
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.88.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia Summus Pontifex gerit plenarie vicem Christi in tota Ecclesia, ipse habet plenitudinem potestatis dispensandi in omnibus dispensabilibus votis. Aliis autem inferioribus Prælatis committitur dispensatio in votis quæ communiter fiunt, et indigent frequenti dispensatione, ut habeant de facili homines ad quem recurrant, sicut sunt vota peregrinationum et jejuniorum, et aliorum hujusmodi. Vota vero majora, puta continentiæ et peregrinationis terræ sanctæ, reservantur Summo Pontifici.
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