Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q106. Thankfulness or gratitude
Source context
- Theme
- gratitude as moral virtue: its nature, obligation, and degrees
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 306, 1923-04-20Steiner treats gratitude as a foundational virtue for human development, distinguishing shallow verbal thankfulness from gratitude that pervades the whole human being, and identifies it as essential to right moral education alongside love and duty.
- GA 181, 1918-03-19Steiner connects the feeling of thankfulness to subconscious soul processes analogous to memory-formation, and argues that true gratitude toward the dead requires appreciation of what was given rather than longing for its continuation.
- GA 145, 1913-03-24Steiner notes a form of inner thankfulness — not self-satisfaction — that arises when one has managed to express something morally or intellectually appropriate, suggesting gratitude operates across both ethical and cognitive dimensions.
Cross-tradition
- Stoic ethics (Seneca, De Beneficiis)Seneca treats gratitude as one of the primary social bonds sustaining human community, distinguishing the act of receiving a benefit from the interior disposition of thankfulness — a structural parallel to Aquinas's distinction between the external act of repayment and the interior virtue of gratitude.
- Confucian virtue ethics (li, reciprocity)Confucian emphasis on reciprocal obligation (bào) within hierarchical relationships shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's graded analysis of gratitude owed to parents, benefactors, and God according to the magnitude of benefit received.
Q106. Thankfulness or gratitude
Article 1
[II-II.q.106.a.1.arg.1] It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod gratia non sit virtus specialis ab aliis distincta. Maxima enim beneficia a Deo et a parentibus accepimus. Sed honor quem Deo retribuimus pertinet ad virtu-tem religionis; honor autem quem retribuimus parentibus, pertinet ad virtutem pietatis. Ergo gratia sive gratitudo non est virtus ab aliis distincta.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.arg.2] Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, retributio proportionalis pertinet ad justitiam commutativam, ut patet per Philosophum in V Ethic., cap. iv. Sed gratiae redduntur, ut retributio sit, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo redditio gratia-rum quæ pertinet ad gratitudinem, est actus justitiae. Non ergo gratitudo est specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. 1. Præterea, recompensatio requiritur ad amicitiam conservandam, ut patet per Philosophum in VIII Ethic., cap. xiii, et in IX, cap. 1. Sed amicitia se habet ad omnes virtutes, propter quas homo amatur. Ergo gratia, sive gratitudo, ad quam pertinet recompensare beneficia, non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.arg.3] Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.sc] Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).
[II-II.q.106.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit gratiam specialem justitiae partem, lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.co] As stated above (I-II, 60, 3), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him.
Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, secundum diversas causas ex quibus aliquid debetur, necesse est diversificari debiti reddendi rationem; ita tamen quod semper in majori illud quod minus est contineatur. In Deo autem primo et principaliter inventur causa debiti, in eo quod ipse est primum principium omnium bonorum nostrorum; secundario autem in patre, quia est proximum nostræ generationis et disciplinæ principium; tertio autem in persona quæ dignitate præcellit, ex qua communia beneficia procedunt; quarto autem in aliquo benefactore, a quo aliqua particularia et privata beneficia percepimus, pro quibus particulariter ei obligamur. Quia ergo non quicquid debemus Deo, vel patri, vel personæ dignitate præcellenti, debemus alicui benefactorum, a quo aliquod particulare beneficium recepimus, inde est quod post religionem qua debitum cultum Deo impendimus, et pietatem qua colimus parentes, et observantiam qua colimus personas dignitate præcellentes, est gratia, sive gratitudo, quæ benefactoribus gratiam recompensat; et distinguitur a præmissis virtutibus, sicut quodlibet posteriorum distinguitur a priori, quasi ab eo deficiens.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.ad.1] Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above (Question 83, Article 17) among things pertaining to religion.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut religio est quædam superexcellens pietas, ita est etiam quædam excellens gratia, sive gratitudo. Unde et gratiarum actio ad Deum supra posita est inter ea quæ ad religionem pertinent.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.ad.2] Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).
[II-II.q.106.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod retributio proportionalis pertinet ad justitiam commutativam, quando attenditur secundum debitum legale: puta si pacto firmetur ut tantum pro tanto retribuatur. Sed ad virtutem gratiae, sive gratitudinis, retributio pertinet quæ fit ex solo debito honestatis, quam scilicet aliquis sponte facit. Unde et gratitudo est minus grata, si sit coacta, ut Seneca dicit in lib. III De benef., cap. VII.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.ad.3] Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. On this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.
[II-II.q.106.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum vera amicitia supra virtutem fundetur, quidquid est virtuti contrarium in amico, est amicitiae impeditivum; et quidquid est virtuosum, est amicitiae provocativum. Et secundum hoc per recompensationem beneficiorum amicitia conservatur; quam vis recompensatio beneficiorum ad virtutem gratitudinis specialiter pertineat.
Article 2
[II-II.q.106.a.2.arg.1] It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent.
[II-II.q.106.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod magis teneatur ad gratias reddendas Deo innocens quam pœnitens. Quanto enim aliquis majus donum a Deo percipit, tanto magis ad gratiarum actiones tenetur. Sed majus est donum innocentiae quam justitiae restitutæ. Ergo videtur quod magis teneatur ad gratiarum actionem innocens quam pœnitens. 2. Praeterea, sicut benefactori debetur gratiarum actio, ita et dilectio. Sed Augustinus dicit in II Confess., cap. VII, col. 681, t. 1: «Quis hominum suam cogitans infirmitatem audet viribus suistribue-re castitatem atque innocentiam suam, ut minus amet te, quasi minus ei necessaria fuerit misericordia tua, qua donas peccata conversis ad te? » Et postea subdit: «Et ideo te tantumdem, imo amplius diligat, quia per quem me videt tantis peccatorum meorum languoribus exui, per eum se videt tantis peccatorum languoribus non implicari. » Ergo etiam magis tenetur ad gratiam reddendam innocens quam pœnitens. 3. Praeter ea quanto gratuitum beneficium est magis continuatum, tanto major pro eo debetur gratiarum actio. Sed in innocente magis continuatur divinæ gratiae beneficium quam in pœnitente: dicit IV. enim Augustinus ibidem: « Gratiæ tuæ deputo, et misericordiae tuæ, quod peccata mea tamquam glaciem solvisti; gratiae tuæ deputo et quæcumque non feci mala: quid enim non facere potui? Et omnia mihi dimissa esse fateor, et quæmea sponte feci mala, et quæ te duce non feci. » Ergo magis tenetur ad gratiarum actionem innocens quam pœnitens.
[II-II.q.106.a.2.arg.2] Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
[II-II.q.106.a.2.arg.3] Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
[II-II.q.106.a.2.sc] It is written (Luke 7:43): "To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more [Vulgate: 'To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less' Luke 7:47." Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.
[II-II.q.106.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc., VII, 47: Cui * plus dimittitur, plus diligit. Ergo eadem ratione plus tenetur ad gratiarum actus.
[II-II.q.106.a.2.co] Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed "gratis": wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[II-II.q.106.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actio gratiarum in accipiente respicit gratiam dantis: unde ubi est major gratia ex parte dantis, ibi requiritur major gratiarum actio ex parte recipientis. Gratia autem est, quia gratis datur. Unde dupliciter potest esse ex parte dantis major gratia. Uno modo ex quantitate dati: et hoc modo innocens tenetur ad majores gratiarum actiones, quia majus donum ei datur a Deo, et magis continuatum, cæteris paribus, absolute loquendo. Alio modo potest dicii major gratia, quia magis datur gratis; et secundum hoc magis tenetur ad gratiarum actiones pœnitens quam innocens, quia magis gratis datur illud quod ei datur a Deo: cum enim esset dignus pœna, datur ei gratia. Et sic licet illud donum quod datur innocenti, sit absolute consideratum majus, tamen donum quod datur pœnitenti, est majus in comparatione ad ipsum; sicut etiam parvum donum pauperi datum est majus quam diviti magnum. Et quia actus circa singularia sunt, in his quæ agenda sunt, magis consideratur quod est hic vel nunc tale, quam quod est simpliciter tale, sicut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. I de voluntario et involuntario. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
Article 3
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.1] It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Sirach 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod homo non teneatur ad gratiarum actiones omni homini benefacienti. Potest enim aliquis sibi benefacere, sicut et sibi ipsi nocere, secundum illud Eccli., xiv, 5: Qui sibi nequam est, cui alii bonus erit? Sed homo sibi ipsi non potest gratias agere, quia gratiarum actio videtur transire ab uno in alterum. Ergo non omni benefactori debetur gratiarum actio.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.2] Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, gratiarum actio est quædam gratiae recompensatio. Sed aliqua beneficia non cum gratia dantur, sed magis cum contumelia, et tarditate, vel tristitia. Ergo non semper benefactori sunt gratiae reddendæ.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.3] Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulli debetur gratiarum actio ex eo quod suam utilitatem procurat. Sed quandoque aliqui aliqua beneficia dant propter suam utilitatem. Ergo eis non debetur gratiarum actio.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.4] Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, servo non debetur gratiarum actio; quia hoc ipsum quod est, domini est. Sed quandoque contingit servum in dominum beneficum esse. Ergo non omni benefactori debetur gratiarum actio.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.5] Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for favors received.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.5] 5. Præterea, nullus tenetur ad id quod facere non potest honeste et utiliter. Sed quandoque contingit quod ille qui beneficium tribuit, est in statu magnæ felicitatis; cui inutiliter aliquid recompensaretur pro suscepto beneficio: quandoque etiam contingit quod benefactor mutatur de virtute in vitium, et sic videtur quod ei honeste recompensari non potest: quandoque etiam ille qui accipit beneficium, pauper est, et omnino recompensare non potest. Ergo videtur quod non semper teneatur homo ad gratiarum recompensationem.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.6] Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.arg.6] 6. Præterea, nullus debet pro alio facere quod ei non expedit, sed est ei nocivum. Sed quandoque contingit quod recompensatio beneficii est nociva, vel inutilis ei cui recompensatur. Ergo non est semper beneficium recompensandum per gratiarum actionem.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.sc] It is written (1 Thessalonians 5:18): "In all things give thanks."
[II-II.q.106.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Thess., ult., 18: In omnibus gratias agite.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.co] Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father (31, 3; 101, 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis effectus naturaliter ad suam causam convertitur. Unde Dionysius dicit I cap. De div. nom., § 7, col. 595, t. 1, quod « Deus omnia in se convertit tamquam omnium causa. » Semper enim oportet quod effectus ordinetur ad finem agentis. Manifestum est autem quod benefactor, inquantum hujusmodi, est causa beneficii. Et ideo naturalis ordo requirit ut ille qui suscepit beneficium, per gratiarum recompensationem convertatur ad benefactorem secundum modum utriusque: et sicut de patre dictum est supra, benefcatori quidem, inquantum hujusmodi, debetur honor et reverentia, eo quod habet rationem principii; sed per accidens debetur ei subventio, vel sustentatio, si indigeat.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.1] In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable." Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Seneca dicit in lib. V De benef., cap. 1x, « sicut non est liberalis qui sibi donat, nec clemens qui sibi ignoscit, nec misericors qui malis suis tangitur, sed qui aliis; ita etiam nemo sibi ipsi beneficium dat; sed naturæ suæ paret, quæ movet ad refutanda nociva, et ad appetenda proficua. » Unde in his quæ sunt ad seipsum, non habet locum gratitudo et ingratitudo: non enim potest homo sibi aliquid denegare, nisi sibi retinendo. Metaphorice tamen illa quæ ad alterum proprie dicuntur, accipiuntur in his quæ sunt ad seipsum, sicut de justitia dicit Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. ult., in quantum scilicet accipiuntur diversæ partes hominis, sicut diversæ personæ.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.2] It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor."
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod boni animi est ut magis attendat ad bonum quam ad malum. Et ideo si aliquis beneficium dedit non eo modo quo debuit, non ideo debet recipiens a gratiarum actione cessare; minus tamen quam si modo debito præstitisset, quia ut Seneca dicit in lib. II De benef., cap. vi, in princ., « multum celeritas fecit, multum abstulit mora. »
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.3] As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby."
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Seneca dicit in VI De benef., cap. xii, « multum interest utrum aliquis beneficium nobis det sua causa, an nostra; an sua et nostra. Ille qui totus ad se spectat, et nobis prodest, quia aliter sibi prodesse non potest, eo mihi loco habendus videtur quo qui pecori suo pabulum prospicit. » Et mox, cap. xiii: « Si modo me in consortium admisit, si duos cogitavit, ingratus sum, non solum injustus, nisi gaudeam hoc illi profuisse quod proderat mihi. Summæ malignitatis est non vocare beneficium, nisi quod dantem aliquo incommodo afficit. »
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.4] As Seneca observes (De Benef. ii.), "when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut Seneca dicit in III De benef., cap. xxi, in princ., « quamdiu servus præstat quod a servo exigi solet, ministerium est; ubi 1 Corderius: « Deus omnium rerum causa est... eademque ad se convertens.» plus quam a servo necesse est, beneficium est: ubi enim in affectum amici transit, si tamen transit, desinit vocari ministerium. » Et ideo etiam servis ultra debitum facientibus gratiae sunt habendæ.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.5] A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): "There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!"
If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3).
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod etiam pauper ingratus non est, si faciat quod possit. Sicut enim beneficium magis in affectu consistit, quam in effectu: ita etiam recompensatio magis in affectu consistit. Unde Seneca dicit in II De benef., cap. xxii, in fin.: « Qui grate beneficium accipit, primam ejus pensionem solvit. Quod grate autem ad nos beneficiia pervenerint, indicemus effusis affectibus: quod non ipso tantum audiente, sed ubique testemur. » Et ex hoc patet quod quantum-cumque in felicitate existenti potest recompensatio beneficii fieri per exhibitionem reverentiae et honoris. Unde Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. ult., quod « superexcellenti quidem debet fieri honoris retributio, indigenti autem retributio lucri. » Et Seneca dicit in VI De benef., cap. xxix, in fin.: « Multa sunt per quae quidquid debemus reddere et felicibus possumus: fidele consilium, assidua conversatio, sermo comis, et sine adula-tione jucundus. » Et ideo non oportet ut homo optet indigentiam ejus, seu miseriam, qui beneficium dedit, ad hoc quod beneficium recompensetur; quia, ut Seneca dicit in VI De benef., cap. xxvi, in fin.: « Si hoc ei optares, cujus nullum beneficiium haberes, inhumanum erat votum. Quanto inhumanius ei optas cui beneficium debes? » Si autem ille qui beneficium dedit, in pejus mutatus est, debet tamen ei fieri recompensatio secundum statum ipsius, ut scilicet ad virtutem reducatur si sit possibile. Si autem sit insanabilis propter malitiam, tunc alter est effectus quam prius erat: et ideo non debetur ei recompensatio beneficii, sicut prius. Et tamen, quantum fieri potest, salva honestate, memoria debet haberi præstiti beneficii, ut patet per Philosophum in IX Ethic., cap. iii, in fin.
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.6] As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment."
[II-II.q.106.a.3.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est recompensatio beneficii præcipue pendet ex affectu: et ideo eo modo debet recompensatio fieri quo magis sit utilis. Si tamen postea per ejus incuriam in damnum ipsius vertatur, non imputatur recompensanti, ut Seneca dicit in VII De benef., cap. xix, parum a princ.: « Red-dendum mihi est, non servandum, cum reddidero, ac tuendum. »
Article 4
[II-II.q.106.a.4.arg.1] It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod homo debeat statim beneficium recompensare. Illa enim quæ debemus sine certo termino, tenemur restituere statim. Sed non est aliquis terminus præscriptus recompensationi beneficiorum; quæ tamen cadit sub debito, ut dictum est. Ergo tenetur homo statim beneficium recompensare.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.arg.2] Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quanto aliquod bonum fit majore animi fervore, tanto videtur esse laudabilius. Sed ex fervore animi videtur procedere quod homo nullas moras adhibeat in faciendo quod debet. Ergo videtur esse laudabilius quod statim homo beneficium reddat.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.arg.3] Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Seneca dicit in II De benef., cap. v, circ. fin., quod « proprium benefactoris est libenter, et cito facere. » Sed recompensatio debet beneficium ad-quare. Ergo debet statim recompensare.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.sc] Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness."
[II-II.q.106.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit in IV De benef., in fin.: « Qui festinat reddere, non animum habet grati hominis, sed debitoris. »
[II-II.q.106.a.4.co] Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. On fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful."
[II-II.q.106.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut in beneficiio dando duo considerantur, scilicet affectus et donum, ita etiam hæc duo considerantur in recompensatione beneficiii. Et quantum quidem ad affectum, recompensatio statim fieri debet: unde Seneca dicit in II De benef., in fin.: « Vis reddere beneficium? accipe benigne. » Quantum autem ad donum, debet expectari tempus quo recompensatio sit benefactori opportuna. Si autem non convenienti tempore statim velit munus pro munere reddere, non videtur esse virtuosa recompensatio. Ut enim Seneca dicit in IV De benef., in fin., « si nimis cito cupit solvere, invitus debet; et qui invitus debet, ingratus est ».
[II-II.q.106.a.4.ad.1] A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod debitum legale est statim solvendum; alio-quin non esset conservata justitiae aequalitas, si unus retineret rem alterius absque ejus voluntate. Sed debitum morale dependet ex honestate debentis: et ideo oportet reddi debito tempore, secundum quod exigit rectitudo virtutis.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.ad.2] Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fervor voluntatis non est virtuosus, nisi sit ratione ordinatus: et ideo si aliquis ex fervore animi præoccupet debitum tempus, non erit laudandus.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.ad.3] Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in repaying favors.
[II-II.q.106.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod beneficia etiam sunt opportuno tempore danda: et tunc non est amplius tardandum, cum opportunum tempus advenerit: et idem etiam observari oportet in beneficiorum recompensatione.
Article 5
[II-II.q.106.a.5.arg.1] It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod beneficiorum recompensatio non sit attendenda secundum affectum benefacientis, sed secundum effectum. Recompensatio enim beneficiis debetur. Sed beneficium in effectu consistit, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo recompensatio debet attendi secundum effectum.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.arg.2] Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, gratia quæ recompensat beneficia est pars justitiae. Sed justitia respicit aequalitatem dati et accepti. Ergo et in gratiarum recompensatione attendendus est magis effectus quam affectus benefacientis.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.arg.3] Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus potest attendere ad id quod ignorat. Sed solus Deus cognoscit interiorem affectum. Ergo non potest fieri gratiae recompensatio secundum affectum.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.sc] Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly."
[II-II.q.106.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit in I De benef., cap. vii, circa princ.: « Nonnunquam magis nos obligat qui dedit parva magnifice, et qui exiguum tribuit, sed libenter. »
[II-II.q.106.a.5.co] The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received.
On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod recompensatio beneficii potest ad tres virtutes pertinere, scilicet ad justitiam, ad gratiam et ad amicitiam. Ad justitiam quidem pertinet, quando recompensatio habet rationem debiti legalis, sicut in mutuo, et aliis hujusmodi; et in tali recompensatio debet attendi secundum quantitatem dati. Ad amicitiam autem pertinet recompensatio beneficii, et similiter ad virtutem gratiae, secundum quod habet rationem debiti moralis; aliter tamen et aliter. Nam in recompensatione amicitiae oportet respectum haberi ad amicitiae causam: unde in amicitia utilis debet recompensatio fieri secundum utilitatem, quam quis ex beneficio consecutus est; in amicitia autem honesti debet in recompensatione haberi respectus ad electionem, sive ad affectum dantis; quia hoc præcipue requiritur ad virtutem, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., cap. xiii, in fin. Et similiter, quia gratia respicit beneficium, secundum quod est gratis impensum, quod quidem pertinet ad affectum, ideo etiam gratiae recompensatio attendit magis affectum dantis quam effectum.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.ad.1] Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer."
[II-II.q.106.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnis actus moralis ex voluntate dependet. Unde beneficium, secundum quod est laudabile, prout ei gratiae recompensatio debetur, materialiter quidem consistit in effectu, sed formaliter et principaliter in voluntate. Unde Seneca dicit in I De benef., cap vi, circa princ.: « Beneficium non in eo quod fit aut datur consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo ».
[II-II.q.106.a.5.ad.2] Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (Article 80). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod gratia est pars justitiae, non quidem sicut species generis, sed per quamdam reductionem ad genus justitiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde non oportet quod eadem ratio debiti attendatur in utraque virtute.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.ad.3] God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily.
[II-II.q.106.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod affectum hominis per se quidem solus Deus videt; sed secundum quod per aliqua signa manifestatur, potest etiam ipsum homo cognoscere. Et hoc modo affectus benefacientis cognoscitur ex ipso modo quo beneficium tribuitur, puta quia gaudenter et prompte aliquis beneficium impendit.
Article 6
[II-II.q.106.a.6.arg.1] It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non oporteat aliquem plus exhibere in recompensatione quam susceperit in beneficio. Quibusdam enim, sicut parentibus, nec etiam aqualis recompensatio fieri potest, sicut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., circa fin. Sed virtus non conatur ad impossibile. Non ergo gratiae recompensatio tendit ad aliquid majus.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.arg.2] Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si aliquis plus recompensat quam in beneficio acceperit, ex hoc ipso quasi aliquid de novo dat. Sed ad beneficium de novo datum tenetur homo gratiam recompensare. Ergo ille qui primo beneficium dederat, tenebitur aliquid majus recompensare, et sic procederetur in infinitum. Sed virtus non conatur ad infinitum, quia « infinitum aufert naturam boni, » ut dicitur in II Metaph., text. 8. Ergo gratiae recompensatio non debet exceedere acceptum beneficium.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.arg.3] Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, justitia in aqualitate consistit. Sed majus est quidam aqualitatis excessus. Cum ergo in qualibet virtute excessus sit vitiosus, videtur quod recompensare aliquid majus accepto beneficio sit vitiosum et justitiæ oppositum.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. v, a princ.: « Refamulari oportet ei qui gratiam fecit, et rursum ipsum incipere; » quod quidem fit dum aliquid majus retribuitur. Ergo recompensatio debet tendere ad hoc quod aliquid majus faciat.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.co] As stated above (Article 5), gratitude regards the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est recompensatio gratiae respicit beneficium secundum voluntatem benefacientis. In quo quidem præcipue hoc commendabile videtur, quod gratis beneficium contulit, ad quod non tenebatur. Et ideo qui beneficium accepit, ad hoc obligatur ex debito honestatis, ut similiter aliquid gratis impendat. Non autem videtur gratis aliquid impendere, nisi excedat quantitatem accepti beneficii: quia quamdiu recompensat minus vel aquale, non videtur facere gratis, sed redere quod accepit. Et ideo gratiae recompensatio semper tendit ut pro suo posse aliquid majus retribuat.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.ad.1] As stated above (3, ad 5; 5), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. ii.). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, in recompensatione beneficii magis est considerandus affectus beneficii quam effectus. Si ergo consideremus effectum beneficii, quod filius a parentibus accepit, scilicet esse et vivere, nihil aqualle filius recompensare potest, ut Philosophus dicit, lib. VIII Ethic., circa fin. Si autem attendamus ad ipsam voluntatem dantis et retribuentis, sic potest filius aliquid majus patri retribuere, ut Seneca dicit in III De benef., cap. xxix, xxx et xxxv. Si tamen non posset, sufficeret ad gratitudinem recompensandi voluntas.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.ad.2] The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Romans 13:8, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod debitum gratitudinis ex charitate derivatur: quæ quanto plus solvitur, tanto magis debetur, secundum illud ad Rom., xiii, 8: Nemini quidquam debeatis, nisi ut invicem diligatis. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si obligatio gratitudinis interminabilis sit.
[II-II.q.106.a.6.ad.3] As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.106.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut in justitia, quæ est virtus cardinalis, attenditur aqualitas rerum; ita in gratitudine attenditur aqualitas voluntatum, ut scilicet sicut ex promptitudine voluntatis beneficus aliquid exhibuit, ad quod non tenebatur, ita etiam ille qui suscepit beneficium, aliquid supra debitum recompenset.
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