Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q107. Ingratitude
Source context
- Theme
- ingratitude as moral vice opposed to the virtue of gratitude for benefits received
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 44/03In a dramatic draft, Steiner characterizes ingratitude toward the wise guidance of fate as a deep moral failure of the soul that has received what it needed at the right hour.
- GA 41b/part_12Steiner observes that those who receive kindness and repay it with ingratitude are driven into a madness of self-justification, identifying ingratitude as a psychologically and morally corrosive disposition.
Cross-tradition
- Stoic ethics (Seneca, De Beneficiis)Seneca treats ingratitude as the cardinal social vice that dissolves the bonds of mutual benefit holding human society together, structurally parallel to Aquinas's analysis of ingratitude as a sin against justice owed to a benefactor.
- Hebrew Bible / rabbinic ethicsIngratitude toward God (kefui tovah) is treated in rabbinic literature as a root failing that disorders the soul's right relation to its source, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's framing of ingratitude as a disorder in the virtue of gratitude.
Q107. Ingratitude
Article 1
[II-II.q.107.a.1.arg.1] It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. ii.) that "he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful." But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not always a sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ingratitudo non semper sit peccatum. Dicit enim Seneca in III De beneficiiis, cap. 1, circa med., quod « ingratus est qui non reddit beneficium. » Sed quando aliquis non posset recompensare beneficium nisi peccando, puta si aliquis auxiliatus est homini ad peccandum. Cum ergo abstinere a peccato non sit peccatum, videtur quod ingratitudo non semper sit peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.arg.2] Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), "no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. ii.) that "to forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne peccatum est in potestate peccantis: quia secundum Augustinum, lib. III De lib. arb., cap. xviii, col. 1295, t. 1, « nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest. » Sed quandoque non est in potestate peccantis ingratitudinem vitare, puta cum non habet unde reddat: oblivio etiam non est in potestate nostra: cum tamen Seneca dicat in III De beneficiis, loc. cit., quod « ingratissimus omnium est qui oblitus est. » Ergo ingratitudo non semper est peccatum. 3. Praeterea, non videtur peccare qui non vult aliquid debere, secundum illud Apostoli ad Rom., xiii, 8: Nemini quidquam debeatis. Sed « qui invitus debet, ingratus est, » ut Seneca dicit in IV De beneficiis, in fin. Ergo non semper ingratitudo est peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.arg.3] Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Romans 13:8), "Owe no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad perfectionem hominis pertinere videtur ut prætermissis humanis auxiliis in solo Deo spem ponat. Unde Ambrosius super illud Luc., ix, Nihil tuleritis in via, etc., §65, col. 1774, t. 2, dicit: « Qualis debeat esse qui evangelizat regnum Dei, praceptis evangelicis designatur; hoc est ut subsidii sæcularis adminicula non requirat, fideque tutus putet sibi, quo minus ista requirat, magis posse suppetere: » et B. Agatha dixit: « Medicinam corporalem corpori meo nunquam exhibui; sed habeo Dominum Jesum Christum, qui solo sermone restaurat universa. » Sed Dei tentatio non consistit in eo quod ad perfectionem pertinet. Ergo Dei tentatio non consistit in hujusmodi factis in quibus expectatur solum Dei auxilium.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.sc] Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Timothy 3:2), where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked." etc.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod II ad Timoth., ii, 2, ingratitudo connumeratur aliis peccatis, cum dicitur: Parentibus non obedientes, ingrati, scelesti, etc.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.co] As stated above (106, 4, ad 1, 6) a debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, debitum gratitudinis est quoddam debitum honestatis, quam virtus requirit. Ex hoc autem aliquid est peccatum, quod repugnat virtuti. Unde manifestum est quod omnis ingratitudo est peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.ad.1] Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. On such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary to gratitude.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod gratitudino respicit beneficium: ille autem qui alicui auxiliatur ad peccandum, non confert beneficium, sed magis nocumentum: et ideo non debetur ei gratiarum actio, nisi forte propter voluntatem, si sit deceptus, dum credidit adjuvare ad bonum, et adjuvit ad peccandum. Et tunc non debetur talis recompensatio ut adjuvetur ad peccandum: quia hoc non esset recompensare bonum, sed malum; quod contrariatur gratitudini.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.ad.2] No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (106, 6, ad 1).
Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. ii.), "when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment."
[II-II.q.107.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nullus propter impotentiam reddendi ab ingratitudine excusatur, ex quo ad debitum gratitudinis reddendum sufficit sola voluntas, ut dictum est. Oblivio autem beneficii ad ingratitudinem pertinet, non quidem illa quæ provenit ex naturali de- Vide etiam l. I Retractat., c. ix, col. 596, t. 4. —
[II-II.q.107.a.1.ad.3] The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor.
[II-II.q.107.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod debitum gratitudinis ex debito amoris derivatur, a quo nullus debet velle absolvi. Unde quod aliquis invitus hoc debitum debeat, videtur provenire ex defectu amoris ad eum qui beneficium dedit.
Article 2
[II-II.q.107.a.2.arg.1] It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ingratitudo non sit speciale peccatum. Quicumque enim peccat, contra Deum agit, qui est summus benefactor. Sed hoc pertinet ad ingratitudinem. Ergo gratitudo non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.arg.2] Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullum speciale peccatum sub diversis peccatorum generibus continetur. Sed diversis peccatorum generibus potest aliquis esse ingratus; puta si quis benefactori detrahat, si quis furetur, vel aliquid aliud hujusmodi contra eum committat. Ergo ingratitudo non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.arg.3] Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. ii.): "It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it." Now these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Seneca dicit in III De beneficiis, cap. 1, circa med: « Ingratus est qui dissimulat, ingratus est qui non reddit, et ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus est. » Sed ista non videntur ad unam peccati speciem pertinere. Ergo ingratitudo non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.sc] Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod ingratitudo oppositur gratitudini, sive gratiae, quæ est specialis virtus. Ergo est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.co] Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Question 106, Article 4). But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Question 106, Article 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin.
It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omne vitium quod ex defectu virtutis nominatur, magis virtuti opponitur; sicut illiberalitas magis opponitur liberalitati quam prodigalitas. Potest autem virtuti gratitudinis aliquod vitium opponi per excessum; puta si recompensatio beneficii fiat vel pro quibus non debet, vel citius quam debet, ut ex dictis patet. Sed magis opponitur gratitudini vitium quod est per defectum, quia virtus gratitudinis, ut supra habitum vitium ex defectu virtutis nominatur, quia magis virtuti opponitur. » — Sed hoc falsum est, siquidem non omne vitium ex defectu virtutis nominatur, dum quædam nominentur ex excessu. est, in aliquid amplius tendit. Et ideo proprie ingratitudo nominatur ex gratitudinis defectu. Omnis autem defectus seu privatio speciem sortitur secundum habitum oppositum; differunt enim cæci-tas et surditas secundum differentiam visus et auditus. Unde sicut gratitudo vel gratia est una specialis virtus, ita etiam ingratitudo est unum speciale peccatum. Habet tamen diversos gradus secundum ordinem eorum quæ ad gratitudinem requiruntur: in qua primum est quod homo acceptum beneficium recognoscat; secundum est quod laudet et gratias agat; tertium est quod retribuat pro loco et tempore secundum suam facultatem. Sed quia quod est ultimum in generatione, est primum in resolutione; ideo primus ingratitudinis gradus est ut homo beneficium non retribuat; secundus est ut dissimulet, quasi non demonstrans se beneficium accepisse; tertius et gravissimus est, quod non recognoscat sive per oblivionem, sive quocumque alio modo. Et quia in affirmatione opposita intelligitur negatio, ideo ad primum ingratitudinis gradum pertinet quod aliquis retribuat mala pro bonis; ad secundum, quod beneficium vituperet; ad tertium, quod beneficium quasi maleficium reputet.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.ad.1] In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in quolibet peccato est materialis ingratitudo ad Deum, inquantum scilicet facit homo aliquid quod potest ad ingratitudinem pertinere: formaliter autem ingratitudo est, quando actualiter beneficium contem-nitur; et hoc est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.ad.2] Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet formalem rationem alicujus specialis peccati in pluribus peccatorum generibus materialiter inveniri; et secundum hoc in multis generibus peccatorum invenitur ingratitudinis ratio.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.ad.3] These three are not different species but different degrees of one special sin.
[II-II.q.107.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa tria non sunt diversæ species, sed diversi gradus unius specialis peccati.
Article 4
[II-II.q.107.a.4.arg.1] It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wisdom 16:29): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice." But this hope would not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ingratis sint beneficiia subtrahenda. Dicitur enim Sap., xvi, 29: Ingrati spes tamquam hibernalis glacies tabescet. Non autem ejus spes tabesceret, si non esset ei beneficium subtrahendum. Ergo sunt subtrahenda beneficiia ingratis.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.arg.2] Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus debet alteri præbere occasionem peccandi. Sed ingratus beneficium recipiens sumit occasionem ingratitudinis. Ergo non est ingrato beneficium dandum.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.arg.3] Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wisdom 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, In* quo quis peccat, per hoc et torquetur, ut dicitur Sap., xi, 17. Sed ille qui ingratus est beneficio accepto, peccat contra beneficium. Ergo est beneficio privandus.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.sc] It is written (Luke 6:35) that "the Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc., vi, 35, quod Altissimus benignus est super ingratos et malos. Sed per ejus imitationem nos filios ejus esse oportet, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo non debemus ingratis beneficia subtrahere.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.co] There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.), "a man is often grateful although he repays not," because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa ingratum duo consideranda sunt: primo quidem, quid est quod ipse dignus sit pati; et sic certum est quod meretur beneficii subtractionem. Alio modo considerandum est quid oporteat beneficium facere. Primo namque non debet esse facilis ad ingratitudinem judicandam; quia « frequenter aliquis, » ut Seneca dicit, lib. III De benef., cap vii, « qui non reddidit, gratus est, » quia forte non occurrit ei facultas, aut debita opportunitas reddendi. Secundo debet tendere ad hoc quod de ingrato gratum faciat; quod si non potest primo beneficio facere, forte faciet secundo. Si vero ex beneficiis multiplicatis ingratitudinem augeat, et pejor fiat, debet a beneficio-rum exhibitione cessare.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.ad.1] The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa loquitur quantum ad id quod ingratus dignus est pati.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.ad.2] He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ille qui ingrato beneficium exhibet, non dat ei occasionem peccandi, sed magis gratitudinis et amoris. Si vero ille qui accipit, ingratitudinis exinde occasionem sumat, non est danti imputandum.
[II-II.q.107.a.4.ad.3] He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.107.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui beneficium dat, non statim se debet exhibere punitorem ingratitudinis, sed prius pium medicum; ut scilicet iteratis beneficiis ingratitudinem sanet.
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