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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q115. Flattery

Source context
Theme
flattery as a moral vice opposed to truth in social discourse
Soul-faculty
Intellectual Soul

Steiner

not engaged in the GA corpus

Cross-tradition

  • Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV.6–7Aristotle identifies the flatterer (kolax) as one who errs by excess in social agreeableness, seeking to please beyond what truth warrants — the structural counterpart to Aquinas's treatment of flattery as a sin against the virtue of friendliness (affabilitas).
  • Stoic ethicsStoic moral teaching treats flattery (kolakeia) as a form of servility incompatible with the sage's commitment to rational candor (parrhesia), exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's categorization of flattery as a disorder of will directed toward undue approval.

Q115. Flattery

Article 1

[II-II.q.115.a.1.arg.1] It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Proverbs 31:28, "Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her." Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Corinthians 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all men." Therefore flattery is not a sin.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod adulatio non sit peccatum. Adulatio enim consistit in quodam sermone laudis alteri exhibito intentione placendi. Sed laudare aliquem non est malum, secundum illud Proverb., ult., 28: Surrexerunt filii ejus, et beatissimam prædicaverunt, vir ejus et laudavit eam. Similiter etiam velle placere aliis non est malum, secundum illud I Cor., x, 33: Per omnia omnibus placeo. Ergo adulatio non est peccatum.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.arg.2] Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, bono malum est contrarium: et similiter vituperium laudi. Sed vituperare malum non est peccatum. Ergo neque laudare bonum, quod videtur ad adulationem pertinere. Ergo adulatio non est peccatum.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.arg.3] Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble." But detraction is an evil, as stated above (73, 2,3). Therefore flattery is a good.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, adulationi detractio contrariatur: unde Gregorius dicit, lib. XXII Moral., cap. VII, § 17, col. 223, t. 2, quod remedium contra adulationem est detractio. «Sciendum est, » inquit, «quod ne immoderatis laudibus eruamur, plerumque miro rectoris nostri moderamine detractio-nibus lacerari permittimur, ut quos vox laudantis elevat, lingua detrahentis humiliet.» Sed detractio est malum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo adulatio est bonum.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.sc] A gloss on Ezekiel 13:18, "Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery." Therefore flattery is a sin.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud Ezech., xIII, 18: Væ qui * consuunt pulvillos sub omni cubito manus, dicit Glossa: « idest, suavem adulationem. » Ergo adulatio est peccatum.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.co] As stated above (114, 1, ad 3), although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator." As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, amicitia prædicta vel affabili-tas, etsi principaliter delectare intendat eos quibus convivit, tamen ubi necesse est propter aliquod bonum exequendum vel malum vitandum, non veretur contristare. Si ergo aliquis in omnibus velit ad delectationem alteri loqui, excedit modum in delectando, et ideo peccat per excessum. Et si quidem hoc faciat sola intentione delectandi, vocatur placidus, secundum Philosophum, lib. IV Ethic., cap. vi, in fin. Si autem faciat hoc intentione alicujus lucri consequendi, vocatur blanditor sive adulator. Communiter tamen nomen adulationis attribui solet omnibus qui supra debitum modum virtutis volunt alios verbis vel factis delectare in communi conversatione.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.ad.1] One may praise a person both well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Psalm 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to Sirach 27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again (Sirach 11:2), "Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written, (Sirach 11:30), "Praise not any man before death." Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to Psalm 52:6, "God hath scattered the bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the Apostle (Galatians 1:10), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ."

[II-II.q.115.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod laudare aliquem contingit et bene et male, prout scilicet debitæ circumstantiæ vel servantur, vel prætermittuntur. Si enim aliquis aliquem velit delectare laudando, ut ex hoc eum consoletur, ne in tribulationibus deficiat, vel etiam ut in bono proficere studeat, aliis debitis circumstantiis observatis, pertinebit hoc ad prædictam virtutem amicitiæ. Pertinet autem ad adulationem, si quis velit aliquem laudare in quibus non est laudandus: quia 1 Sic ibidem ait Gregorius in hunc textum: «Pulvillus ponitur ut mollius quiescatur. Quisquis ergo male agentibus adulatur, pulvillum sub cubito jacentis ponit, ut qui corripi ex culpa debuerat, in ea fultus laudibus molliter quiescat, etc.» 2 Ex Greg., l. XVIII Moral., c. IV, col. 42, t. 2. forte mala sunt, secundum illud psal. Ⅺ, 3: Laudatur peccator in desideriis animæ suæ; vel quia non sunt certa, secundum illud Eccli., XXVII, 8: Ante sermonem non laudes virum; et iterum Eccli., XI, 2: Non laudes virum in specie sua; vel etiam si timeri possit ne humana laude ad inanem gloriam provocetur: unde dicitur Eccli., XI, 30: Ante mortem ne laudes hominem. Similiter etiam velle placere hominibus propter charitatem nutriendam, ut in ea homo spiritualiter proficere possit, laudabile est. Quod autem aliquis velit placere hominibus propter inanem gloriam, vel propter lucrum, vel etiam in malo, hoc esset peccatum, secundum illud psal. Ⅺ, 6: Deus dissipabit ossa eorum qui hominibus placent; et Apostolus dicit ad Gal., Ⅰ, 10: Si adhuc hominibus placerem, Christi servus non essem.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.ad.2] Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam vituperare malum, si non adhibeantur debitæ circumstantiæ, est vitiosum, et similiter laudare bonum.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.ad.3] Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.

[II-II.q.115.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil pro-hibet duo vitia esse contraria; et ideo sicut detractio est malum, ita et adulatio, quæ contrariatur ei quantum ad ea quæ dicuntur, non autem directe quantum ad finem; quia adulator quærit delectationem ejus cui adulatur; detractor autem non quærit ejus contristationem, cum aliquando occulte detrahat, sed magis quæ-ritejus infamiam.

Article 2

[II-II.q.115.a.2.arg.1] It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful." But flattery is most harmful, according to Psalm 9:24, "For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant): "Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on Psalm 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor." Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.arg.2] Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written (Psalm 36:15): "Let their sword enter into their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Psalm 140:5, "Let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive of vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque verbis alii nocet, non minus nocet sibi quam aliis: unde dicitur in psal. xxxvi, 45: Gladius eorum intret in corda ipsorum. Sed ille qui alteri adulatur, inducit eum ad pecandum mortaliter: unde super illud psal. cxL, 5: Oleum peccatoris non impinguet caput meum, dicit Glossa: « Falsa laus adulatoris mentes a rigore veritatis emollit ad noxia. » Ergo multo magis adulator in se mortaliter peccat.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.arg.3] Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3): "The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in Decretis scribitur, dist. XLVI, cap. 111, col. 243: « Clericus qui adulationibus et proditionibus vacare deprehenditur, degradetur ab officio. » Sed talis pœna non infligitur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo adulatio est peccatum mortale.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.sc] Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity."

[II-II.q.115.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus in Serm. de Purgat., civ, § 3, col. 194, t. 5, inter peccata minuta numerat, « si quis cuicumque majori personæ aut ex volontate, aut ex necessitate adulari voluerit. »

[II-II.q.115.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 112, Article 2), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isaiah 5:20. "Woe to you that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Proverbs 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. On this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal (43, 3,4). If, however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum mortale est quod charitati contrariatur. Adulatio autem quandoque quidem charitati contrariatur, quandoque autem non. Contrariatur siquidem charitati tripliciter: uno modo ratione ipsius materiæ, puta cum aliquis laudat alicujus peccatum, hoc enim contrariatur dilectioni Dei, contra cujus justitiam homo loquitur, et contra directionem proximi, quem in peccato fo-vet. Unde est peccatum mortale, secundum illud Isa., v, 20: Væ qui dicitis malum bonum. Alio modo ratione intentionis, puta cum quis alicui adulatur ad hoc quod fraudulenter ei noceat vel corporaliter vel spiritualiter; et hoc etiam est peccatum mortale: et de hoc habetur Proverb., xxvii, 6: Meliora sunt vulnera diligentis quam fraudulenta oscula odientis. Tertio modo per occasionem, sicut cum laus adulatoris fit alteri occasio peccandi, etiam prætter adulatoris intentionem. Et in hoc considerare oportet, utrum sit occasio data, vel accepta, et qualis ruina subsequatur; sicut potest patere ex his quæ supra de scandalo dicta sunt. Si autem aliquis ex sola aviditate delectandi aliis, vel etiam ad evitandum aliquod malum, vel consequendum aliquid in necessitate, alicui adulatus fuerit, non est contra charitatem. Unde non est pecatum mortale, sed veniale.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.ad.1] The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (43, 1, ad 3; I-II, 73, 8, ad 3; I-II, 80, 1).

[II-II.q.115.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritates illæ loquuntur de adulatore qui laudat peccatum alicujus. Talis enim adulatio dicitur plus nocere quam gladius persecutoris, quia in potioribus bonis nocet, scilicet in spiritualibus, non autem nocet ita efficaciter, quia gladius persecutoris occidit effective quasi sufficiens causa mortis, nullus autem adulando potest esse alteri sufficiens causa peccandi, ut ex supra dictis patet.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.ad.2] This argument applies to one that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de eo qui adulatur intentione nocendi: ille enim plus nocet sibi quam aliis, quia sibi nocet tamquam sufficiens causa peccandi, aliis autem occasionaliter tantum.

[II-II.q.115.a.2.ad.3] The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.115.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod auctoritas loquitur de eo qui proditorie alteri adulatur, ut eum decipiat.

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