Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q126. Fearlessness
Source context
- Theme
- fearlessness as a moral prerequisite for initiation and the overcoming of soul-begotten adversarial forces
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 144, 1913-02-03Steiner identifies fearlessness as a moral quality — grouped with courage — without which certain stages of initiation cannot be reached, and states that it must be cultivated through definite meditations as preparation for the path into higher worlds.
- GA 270, 1924-09-09In the First Class mantric verses, Steiner describes a beast-form born from the soul's fear of creative spiritual being, and states that fearless knowledge alone overcomes it — linking fearlessness directly to the threshold encounter with adversarial will-forces.
- GA 265a, 1923-05-21Steiner names fearlessness and good will as the best allies on the path, placing them in relation to the Michael-Christ impulse as the force before which evil forces must retreat.
- GA 80c, 1921-02-20Steiner notes that souls approaching higher worlds must be rendered fearless in the face of the unknown, and that this fearlessness is inseparable from courageous engagement with what lies beyond ordinary cognition.
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic Christian — Aquinas, Secunda Secundae Q126Aquinas treats fearlessness (intrepiditas) as a potential vice of deficiency when it reflects insensibility to genuine danger, distinguishing it from the virtue of fortitude; the chapter examines whether the absence of fear is always praiseworthy or can itself constitute a moral failure.
- Vedanta — AbhayamThe Bhagavad Gita (16.1) lists abhayam (fearlessness) as the first of the divine qualities conducive to liberation, presenting a cross-tradition congruence with both Aquinas's positive valuation of courage and Steiner's initiatory requirement of fearlessness.
- Buddhist ethics — Vīrya and freedom from bhayaBuddhist moral psychology identifies fearlessness (abhaya) as a quality of the awakened mind and pairs it with virya (courageous effort), offering a cross-tradition congruence with the initiatory and moral-volitional function fearlessness carries in both Aquinas and Steiner.
Q126. Fearlessness
Article 1
[II-II.q.126.a.1.arg.1] It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Proverbs 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intimiditas non sit peccatum. Quod enim ponitur in commendationem viri justi, non est peccatum. Sed in commendationem viri justi dicitur Proverb., xxviii, 1: Justus quasi leo confidens, absque terrore erit. Ergo esse impavidum non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.arg.2] Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death, according to Matthew 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body," etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isaiah 51:12, "Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?" Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « maximum terribilium est mors, » secundum Philosophum in III Ethic., cap. vi, a med. Sed nec mortem oportet timere, secundum illud Matth., x, 28: Nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, etc., nec etiam aliquid quod ab homine posset inferri, secundum illud Isa., li, 12: Quis tu, ut timeas * ab homine mortali? Ergo impavidum esse non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.arg.3] Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Question 125, Article 2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city." Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, timor ex amore nascitur ut supra habitum est. Sed nihil mundanum amare pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis: quia, ut Augustinus dicit in XIV De civit. Dei, c. xxviii, col. 436, t. 7: « Amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui facit cives civitatis cælestis. » Ergo nihil humanum formidare, videtur non esse peccatum.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.sc] It is said of the unjust judge (Luke 18:2) that "he feared not God nor regarded man."
[II-II.q.126.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod de judice iniquo dicitur Luc., xviii, 2, quod nec * Deum timebat, nec hominem reverebatur.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.co] Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:29): "No man ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se' instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the saying of Job 41:24-25: "He [Vulgate: 'who'] was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." ["A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts."] It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quia timor ex amore nascitur, idem judicium videtur esse de amore et timore. Agitur autem nunc de timore quo mala temporalia timentur, qui provenit ex temporalium bonorum amore. Inditum autem est unicuique naturaliter ut propriam vitam amet, et ea quæ ad ipsam ordinantur, cum debito modo: ut scilicet amentur hujusmodi non quasi finis constitutur in eis, sed secundum quod eis utendum est propter ultimum finem. Unde quod aliquis deficiat a debito modo amoris ipsorum, est contra naturalem inclinationem, et per consequens est peccatum. Nunquam tamen a tali amore aliquis totaliter decidit: quia id quod est naturale, totaliter perdi non potest; propter quod Apostolus dicit ad Eph., v, 29: Nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit. Unde etiam illi qui seipsos interimunt, ex amore carnis suæ hoc faciunt, quam volunt a præsentibus angustiis liberare. Unde contingere potest quod aliquis minus quam debeat, timeat mortem et alia temporalia mala, propter hoc quod minus debito amet ea. Sed quod nihil horum timeat, non potest ex totali defectu amoris contingere, sed ex eo quod aestimat mala opposita bonis quæ amat, sibi supervenire non posse. Quod quando contingit ex superbia animi de se præsumentis et alios contemnentis, secundum quod dicitur Job, xLI, 24: Factus est ut nullum timeret: omne sublime videt: quandoque autem contingit ex defectu rationis, sicut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. VII, circa med., quod « Celtæ propter stultitiam nihil timent. » Unde patet quod esse impavidum est vitiosum, sive causetur ex defectu amoris, sive causetur ex elatione animi, sive causetur ex stoliditate quæ tamen excusat a peccato, si sit invincibilis.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.ad.1] The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Sirach 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be justified."
[II-II.q.126.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justus commendatur a timore non retrahente eum a bono, non quod sit absque omni timore; dicitur enim Eccli., I, 28: Qui sine timore est, non poterit justificari.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.ad.2] Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written (Proverbs 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil."
[II-II.q.126.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod mors vel quidquid aliud ab homine mortali po-test inferri, non est ea ratione timendum ut a justitia recedatur; est tamen timendum inquantum per hoc homo potest impediri ab operibus virtuosis vel quantum ad se, vel quantum ad profectum quem in aliis facit. Unde dicitur Proverb., xIV, 16: Sapiens timet et declinat a malo.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.ad.3] Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written (Sirach 34:16): "He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
[II-II.q.126.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bona temporalia debent contemni inquantum nos impediunt ab amore et timore Dei: et secundum hoc etiam non debent timeri: unde dicitur Eccli., xxxIV, 16: Qui timet Dominum, nihil trepidabit. Non autem debent contemni bona temporalia, inquantum instrumentaliter nos juvant ad ea quæ sunt divini timoris et amoris.
Article 2
[II-II.q.126.a.2.arg.1] It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod esse impavidum non opponatur fortitudini. De habitibus enim judicamus per actus. Sed nullus actus fortitudinis impeditur per hoc quod aliquis est impavidus: remoto enim timore, aliquis et fortiter sustinet, et audacter aggreditur. Ergo esse impavidum non opponitur fortitudini.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.arg.2] Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, esse impavidum est vitiosum vel propter defectum debiti amoris, vel propter superbiam, vel propter stultitiam. Sed defectus debiti amoris opponitur charitati, superbia autem humilitati, stultitia autem prudentiæ sive sapientiae. Ergo vitium impaviditatis non opponitur fortitudini.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.arg.3] Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtuti opponuntur vitia sicut extrema medio. Sed unum medium ex una parte non habet nisi unum extremum. Cum ergo fortitudini ex una parte opponatur timor, ex alia vero parte opponatur ei audacia; videtur quod impaviditas ei non opponatur.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.sc] The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in III Ethic., cap. VII, ponit impaviditatem fortitudini oppositam.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 123, Article 3), fortitude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias. Omnis autem virtus moralis ponit modum rationis in materia circa quam est. Unde ad fortitudinem pertinet timor moderatus secundum rationem, ut scilicet homo timeat quod oportet, et quando oportet; et similiter de aliis. Hic autem modus rationis corrumpi potest sicut per excessum ita et per defectum. Unde sicut timiditas opponitur fortitudini per excessum timoris, in quantum scilicet homo timet quod non oportet, vel secundum quod non oportet; ita etiam impaviditas opponitur ei per defectum timoris, inquantum scilicet aliquis non timet quod oportet timere.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.ad.1] The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus fortitudinis est mortem sine timore sustinere et aggredi, non qualitercumque, sed secundum rationem; quod non facit impavidus.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.ad.2] Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod impaviditas ex sua specie corrumpit medium fortitudinis, et ideo directe opponitur fortitudini: sed secundum suas causas nihil prohibet quin opponatur aliis virtutibus.
[II-II.q.126.a.2.ad.3] The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.126.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vitium audaciae opponitur fortitudini secundum excessum audaciae, impaviditas autem secundum defectum timoris. Fortitudo autem in utraque passione medium ponit. Unde non est inconveniens quod secundum diversa habeat diversa extrema.
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