Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q130. Presumption
Source context
- Theme
- presumption as the vice of disordered confidence in achieving an unattainable good through one's own spiritual or moral capacity
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 13, chapter 1Steiner addresses the charge that penetrating the supersensible with one's own cognition is presumption, arguing instead that failing to exercise this capacity when it is available constitutes a betrayal of human potential.
- GA 137, 1912-06-07Steiner identifies pride and presumption as distortions arising in the soul when the human countenance is taken as a self-sufficient source of inner truth, thereby closing off awareness of higher spiritual realities.
- GA 9, chapter 4Steiner distinguishes the path of genuine knowledge as one taken in humility and without presumption, contrasting it with a self-aggrandizing claim to spiritual attainment.
- GA 129, 1911-08-27Steiner notes that recognizing the human being as the goal of the gods can occasion pride and presumption, framing this as a spiritual danger requiring conscious counterbalancing.
- GA 34, chapter 2Steiner uses the image of the worm that mistakes the circumference of its sense-world for the whole of existence to characterize the spiritual poverty underlying presumptuous self-limitation.
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic moral theology (Aquinas, ST II-II Q130)Aquinas defines presumption as a species of sin against hope, whereby the soul expects to obtain divine mercy or beatitude by means disproportionate to its nature or merit, treating the disordered assertion of one's own sufficiency as the structural core of the vice.
- Stoic ethicsStoic teaching on self-overestimation (oiesis) identifies a parallel disorder in which the rational agent attributes to itself a degree of wisdom or virtue it has not yet achieved, thereby corrupting the governing faculty (hegemonikon).
Q130. Presumption
Article 1
[II-II.q.130.a.1.arg.1] It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulgate: 'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod præsumptio non sit peccatum. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Philipp., 13: Quæ retro sunt obliviscens, ad * anteriora me extendo. Sed hoc videtur ad præsumptionem pertinere quod aliquis tendat in ea quæ sunt supra seipsum. Ergo præsumptio non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in X Ethic., cap. vii, ad fin., quod « oportet non secundum suadentes, humana sapere hominem entem, neque mortalia mortalem, sed inquantum contingit immortalem facere; » et in I Metaph., cap. ii, a med., dicit quod « homo debet se trahere ad divina, inquantum potest. » Sed divina et immortalia maxime videntur esse supra hominem. Cum ergo de ratione præsumptionis sit quod aliquis tendat in ea quæ sunt supra seipsum, videtur quod præsumptio non sit peccatum, sed magis sit aliquid laudabile.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.arg.3] Further, the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Apostolus dicit, II ad Corinth., 11, 5: Non * sumus sufficientes aliquid cogitare a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Si ergo præsumptio, secundum quam aliquis nititur in ea ad quæ non sufficit, sit peccatum, videtur quod homo nec cogitare aliquod bonum licite possit: quod est inconveniens. Non ergo præsumptio est peccatum.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.sc] It is written (Sirach 37:3): "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil will." Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., xxxvii, 3: O præsumptio nequissima, unde creata es? Ubi respondet Glossa interl.: « De mala scilicet voluntate creaturæ. » Sed omne quod procedit ex radice malæ voluntatis, est peccatum. Ergo præsumptio est peccatum.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.co] Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, sint ordinata ratione divina, quam humana ratio debet imitari; quicquid secundum rationem humanam fit quod est contra ordinem communiter in naturalibus rebus inventum, est vitiosum et peccatum. Hoc autem communiter in omnibus rebus naturalibus inventur, quod quælibet actio commensuratur virtuti agentis; nec aliquod agens naturale nititur ad agendum id quod excedit suam facultatem. Et ideo vitiosum est et peccatum, quasi contra ordinem naturalem existens, quod aliquis assumat ad agendum ea quæ præferuntur suæ virtuti: quod pertinet ad rationem præsumptionis, sicut et ipsum nomen manifestat. Unde manifestum est quod præsumptio est peccatum.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.ad.1] Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect virtue. On this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse supra potentiam activam alicujus rei naturalis, quod non est supra potentiam passivam ejusdem: inest enim aeri potentia passiva, per quam potest transmutari in hoc quod habet actionem et motum ignis, quæ excedunt potentiam activam aeris. Sic etiam vitiosum esset et præsumptuosum quod aliquis in statu imperfectæ virtutis existens, attentaret statim assequi ea quæ sunt perfectæ virtutis. Sed si quis ad hoc tendat ut proficiat in virtutem perfectam, hoc non est præsumptuosum nec vitiosum. Et hoc modo Apostolus in anteriora se extendebat, scilicet per continuum profectum.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.ad.2] Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. On this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod divina et immortalia secundum ordinem naturæ sunt supra hominem. Homini tamen inest quædam potentia naturalis, scilicet intellectus, per quam potest conjungi immortalibus et divinis. Et secundum hoc Philosophus dicit, quod « oportet hominem se trahere ad immortalia et divina, » non quidem ut ea operetur quæ decet Deum facere, sed ut ei uniatur per intellectum et voluntatem.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.ad.3] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God's assistance.
[II-II.q.130.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. 11, a med., « quæper alios possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus. » Et ideo quia cogitare et facere bonum possumus cum auxilio divino, non totaliter hoc excedit nostram facultatem. Et ideo non est præsumptuosum, si aliquis ad aliquod opus virtuosum agendum intendat: eset autem præsumptuosum, si ad hoc aliquis tenderet absque fiducia divini auxilii.
Article 2
[II-II.q.130.a.2.arg.1] It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (14, 2; 21, 1). But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod præsumptio non opponatur magnani-mitati per excessum. Præsumptio enim ponitur species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, ut supra habitum est. Sed pecatum in Spiritum sanctum non opponitur magnani-mitati, sed magis charitati. Ergo etiam neque præsumptio opponitur magnani-mitati.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.arg.2] Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad magnani-mitatem pertinet quod aliquis se magis dignificet. Sed aliquis dicitur præsumptuosus, etiamsi se parvis dignificet, dummodo hoc excedat propriam facultatem. Non ergo directe præsumptio opponitur magnani-mitati.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.arg.3] Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great." Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, magnani-mus exteriora bona reputat quasi parva. Sed secundum Philosophum in IV Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, circa med., « præsumptuosi propter exteriorem fortunam fiunt despectores et injuriatores aliorum, quasi magnum aliquid aestimantes exteriora bona. » Ergo præsumptio non opponitur magnani-mitati per excessum, sed solum per defectum.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."
[II-II.q.130.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. Ⅶ, et in IV, cap. Ⅲ, ad fin., quod « magnanimo opponitur per excessum chaunos, » idest, fumosus, vel ventosus, quem nos dicimus præsumptuosum.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.co] As stated above (129, 3, ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us.
Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnani-mitatas consistit in medio, non quidem secundum quantitatem ejus in quod tendit, quia tendit in maximum, sed constituitur in medio secundum proportionem ad propriam facultatem; non enim in majora tendit quam sibi conveniant. Præsumptuosus autem, quantum ad id in quod tendit, non excedit magnani-mum, sed multum quando ab eo deficit; excedit autem secundum proportionem suæ facultatis, quam magnani-mus non transcendit. Et hoc modo opponitur præsumptio magnani-mitati per excessum.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.ad.1] It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non quælibet præsumptio ponitur peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, sed illa qua quis divinam justitiam contemnit ex inordinata confidentia divinæ misericordiæ; et talis præsumptio ratione materiæ, in quantum scilicet per eam contemnitur aliquid divinum, opponitur charitati, vel potius dono timoris, cujus est Deum revereri. Inquantum tamen talis contempus excedit proportionem propriæ facultatis, potest opponi magnani-mitati.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.ad.2] Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above (Question 129, Article 2).
[II-II.q.130.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut magnani-mititas, ita et præsumptio in aliquod magnum tendere videtur. Non enim multum consuevit dici aliquis præsumptuosus, si in aliquo modico vires proprias transcendat. Si tamen talis præsumptuosus dicatur, hæc præsumptio non opponitur magnani-mitati, sed illi virtuti quæ est circa mediocres honores, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.130.a.2.ad.3] No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. On this one may err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous."
Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.130.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nullus attentat aliquid supra suam facultatem, nisi inquantum facultatem suam aestimat majorem quam sit. Circa quod potest esse error dupliciter: uno modo secundum solam quantitatem; puta cum aliquis aestimat se habere majorem virtuem, vel scientiam, vel aliquid aliud hujusmodi, quam habeat; alio modo secundum genus rei; puta cum aliquis ex hoc aestimat se magnum et magnis dignum, ex quo non est, puta propter divitias, vel propter aliqua bona fortunæ. Ut enim Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, circa med., « qui sine virtute talia bona habent, neque juste magnis seipsos dignificant, neque recte magnanimi dicuntur. » Similiter etiam illud ad quod aliquis tendit supra vires suas, quandoque quidem secundum rei veritatem est magnum simpliciter, sicut patet de Petro, qui tendebat ad hoc quod pro Christo pateretur, quod erat supra virtutem suam: quandoque vero non est aliquid magnum simpliciter, sed solum secundum stultorum opinionem, sicut pretiosis vestibus indui, despicere, et injuriari aliis: quod quidem pertinet ad excessum magnani-mitatis, non secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum opinionem. Unde Seneca dicit in libro De quatuor virtutibus, cap. « De moderanda fortitud., » quod « magnani-mititas, si se extra modum suum extolat, faciet virum minacem, inflatum, turbidum, inquietum, et in quascumque excellentias, dictorum factorumque, neglecta honestate, festinum. » Et sic patet quod præsumptuosus secundum rei veritatem quandoque deficit a magnanimo, sed secundum apparentiam in excessu se habet.
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