Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q129. Magnanimity
Source context
- Theme
- magnanimity as virtuous greatness of soul ordered toward fitting honor and noble action
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 10, chapter 2Steiner identifies magnanimity and perseverance, cultivated through initiation-training, as qualities of the higher self that cannot ordinarily be acquired in the lower world.
- GA 155, 1912-05-28Steiner describes magnanimous generosity as a characteristic moral impulse of ancient European peoples, distinguishing it from the vices with which such impulses later became entangled.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAquinas's treatment of magnanimity (megalopsychia) follows Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics IV.3, defining the magnanimous person as one who claims great things proportionate to genuine great worth, making Aquinas's Q129 a scholastic systematization of Aristotelian virtue-theory.
- Stoic traditionStoic accounts of greatness of soul (megalopsychia) similarly treat it as consonance between inner worth and outward claim, though grounded in rational cosmopolitan duty rather than Aquinas's orientation toward infused grace and supernatural end.
Q129. Magnanimity
Article 1
[II-II.q.129.a.1.arg.1] It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit circa honores. Magnanimitas enim est in irascibili, quod ex ipso nomine patet: nam magnanimitas dicitur quasi magnitudo animi. Animus autem pro vi irascibili ponitur, ut patet in III De anima, text. 42, ubi Philosophus dicit quod in « sensitivo appetitu est desiderium et animus, » idest, concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Sed honor est quoddam bonum concupiscibilie, cum sit præmium virtutis. Ergo videtur quod magnanimitas non sit circa honores.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.arg.2] Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, magnanimitas, cum sit virtus moralis, oportet quod sit circa passiones vel operationes. Non autem est circa operationes, quia sic esset pars justitiæ: et sic relinquitur quod sit circa passiones. Honor autem non est passio. Ergo magnanimitas non est circa honores.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.arg.3] Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ratio magnanimitatis videtur pertinere magis ad prosecutionem quam ad fugam: dicitur enim magnanimus, quia ad magna tendit. Sed virtuosi non laudantur ex hoc quod cupiunt honores, sed magis ex eo quod eos fugiunt. Ergo magnanimitas non est circa honores.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."
[II-II.q.129.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. III, quod « magnanimitas est circa honores et inhonorationes. »
[II-II.q.129.a.1.co] Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.
The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above (103, 1 and 2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod magnanimitas ex suo nomine importat quamdam extensionem animi ad magna. Consideratur autem habitudo virtutis ad duo: uno quidem modo ad materiam circa quam operatur; alio modo ad actum proprium, qui consistit in debito usu talis materiæ. Et quia habitus virtutis principaliter ex actu determinatur, ex hoc principaliter dicitur aliquis magnanimus, quia habet animum ad aliquem magnum actum. Aliquis autem actus potest dici dupliciter magnus: uno modo secundum proportionem; alio modo absolute. Magnus quidem potest dici actus secundum proportionem, etiam qui consistit in usu alicujus rei parvæ vel mediocris, puta si aliquis illa re optime utatur; sed simpli-citer et absolute magnus actus est qui onsistit in optimo usu rei maxim ae. Res autem quæ in usum hominis veniunt, sunt res exteriores; inter quas simpliciter maximum est honor, tum quia propinquissimum est virtuti, utpote testificatio quædam existens de virtute alicujus, ut supra habitum est; tum etiam quia Deo et optimis exhibetur; tum etiam quia homines propter honorem consequendum, ut et vituperium vitandum, alia omnia postponunt. Sic autem dicitur aliquis magnanimus ex his quæ sunt magna absolute et simpliciter, sic ut dicitur aliquis fortis ex his quæ sunt difficilia simpliciter. Et ideo consequens est quod magnanimitas consistat circa honores.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.ad.1] Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonum vel malum, absolute quidem considerata pertinent ad concupiscibilem; sed inquantum additur ratio ardui, sic pertinent ad irascibilem: et hoc modo honorem respicit magnanimitas, inquantum scilicet honor habet rationem magni vel ardui.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.ad.2] Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated (123, 4,5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod honor, etsi non sit passio vel operatio, est tamen alicujus passionis objectum, scilicet spei; quæ tendit in bonum arduum. Et ideo magnanimitas est quidem immediate circa passionem spei: mediate autem circa honorem, sicut circa objectum spei; sicut et de fortitudine supra dictum est, quod est circa pericula mortis, inquantum sunt objectum timoris et audaciæ.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.ad.3] Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.
[II-II.q.129.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illi qui contemnunt honores hoc modo quod pro eis adipiscendis nil inconveniens faciunt, nec eos nimis appetiantur, laudabiles sunt. Si quis autem hoc modo contemne-ret honores, quod non curaret facere ea quæ sunt digna honore, hoc vituperabile esset. Et hoc modo magnanimitas est circa honores, ut videlicet studeat facere ea quæ sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut pro magno æstimet humanum honorem.
Article 2
[II-II.q.129.a.2.arg.1] It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (Article 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.arg.2] Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut magnanimitas est circa honores, ita mansuetudo est circa iras. Sed non est de ratione mansuetudinis quod sit circa iras magnas vel parvas. Ergo etiam non est de ratione magnanimitatis quod sit circa magnos honores.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.arg.3] Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, parvus honor minus distat a magno honore quam exhonoratio. Sed magnanimitas bene se habet circa exhonorationes. Ergo etiam et circa parvos honores. Non ergo est solum circa honores magnos.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Ethic. cap. vii, quod magnanimitas est circa magnos honores.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.co] According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).
Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."
In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are philotimia, i.e. love of honor, and aphilotimia, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum in VII Physic., text. 17 et 18, virtus est perfectio quædam; et intelligitur esse perfectio potentiæ ad cujus ultimum pertinet, ut patet in I De Cælo, text. 116. Perfectio autem potentiæ non attenditur in qualicumque operatione, sed in operatione quæ habet aliquam magnitudinem aut difficultatem. Quælibet enim potentia quantumcumque imperfecta, po-test in aliquam operationem modicam et debilem. Et ideo ad rationem virtutis pertinet, ut sit circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. iii, in fin. Difficile autem et magnum, quæ ad idem pertinent, in actu virtutis potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte rationis, inquantum scilicet difficile est medium rationis adinvenire, et in aliqua materia statuere: et ista difficultas sola 1 inventur in actu virtutum intellectualium, et etiam in actu justitiæ. Alia autem difficultas est ex parte materiæ quæ de se repugnantiam habere potest ad motum rationis, qui est circa eam ponendus; et ista difficultas præcipue attenditur in 1 Sic cod.; aliis virtutibus moralibus, quæ sunt circa passiones, quia passiones pugnant contra rationem, ut Dionysius dicit iv cap. De div. nom. t. 1, Circa quas considerandum est quod quædam passiones sunt quæ habent magnam vim resistendi rationi, principaliter ex parte passionis: quædam vero principaliter ex parte rerum quæ sunt objecta passionum. Passiones autem non habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi, nisi fuerint vehementes: eo quod appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt passiones, naturaliter subditur rationi. Et ideo virtutes quæ sunt circa hujusmodi passiones, non opponuntur nisi circa id quod est magnum in ipsis passionibus: sicut fortitudo est circa maximos timores et audacias; temperantia autem circa maximarum delectationum concupiscentias; et similiter mansuetudo est circa maximas iras. Passiones autem quædam habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi ex ipsis rebus exterioribus, quæ sunt passionum objecta, sicut amor vel cupiditas pecuniæ sive honoris. Et in his oportet esse virtutem non solum circa id quod est maximum in eis, sed etiam circa mediocria vel minora: quia res exterius existentes, etiamsi sint parvæ, sunt multum appetibiles, utpote necessariae ad vitam hominis. Et ideo circa appetitum pecuniarum sunt duæ virtutes: una quidem circa mediores et moderatas, scilicet liberalitas; alia autem circa pecunias magnas, scilicet magnificentia. Similiter etiam et circa honores sunt duæ virtutes: una quidem circa mediores honores, quæ innominata est; nominatur tamen ex suis extremis quæ sunt « philotimia » idest, amor honoris; et « aphilotimia » idest, sine amore honoris: laudatur enim quandoque qui amat honorem, quandoque autem qui non curat de honore, prout scilicet utrumque moderate fieri potest. Circa magnos autem honores est « magnanimitas. » Et ideo dicendum est quod propria materia magnanimitatis est magnus honor; et ad ea tendit magnanimus, quæ sunt magno honore digna.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.ad.1] Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod magnum et parvum per accidens se habent ad honorem secundum se consideratum; sed magnam differentiam faciunt, secundum quod comparantur ad rationem, cujus modum in usu honoris observari oportet, qui multo difficilius ob servatur in magnis honoribus quam in parvis.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.ad.2] In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in ira et in aliis materiis non habet difficultatem notabilem nisi illud quod est maximum, circa quod solum oportet esse virtutem. Alia autem est ratio de divitiis, et honoribus, quæ sunt res extra animam existentes.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.ad.3] He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. On like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.
[II-II.q.129.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui bene magnis utitur, multo magis potest bene uti parvis. Magnanimus ergo intendit magnos honores, sicut quibus est dignus, vel etiam sicut minores his quibus est dignus, quia scilicet virtus non potest sufficienter honorari ab homine, cui debetur honor a Deo. Et ideo non extollitur ex magnis honoribus, quia non reputat eos supra se, sed magis eos contemnit; et multo magis moderatos aut parvos. Et similiter etiam dehonorationibus non frangitur, sed eas contemnit, utpote quas reputat sibi indigne afferri.
Article 3
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.1] It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit virtus. Omnis enim virtus moralis in medio consistit. Sed magnanimitas non consistit in medio, sed in maximo: quia magnanimus « maximis dignificat seipsum, » ut dicitur in IV Ethic., cap. 111. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.2] Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, qui unam virtutem habet, habet omnes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliquis potest habere aliquam virtutem non habens magnanimitatem: dicit enim Philosophus in IV Ethic., cap. 111, circa princ., quod « qui est parvis dignus, et his dignificat seipsum, temperatus est, magnananimus autem non. » Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.3] Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above (I-II, 55, 4). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « virtus est bona qualitas mentis, » ut supra habitum est. Sed magnanimitas habet quasdam corporales dispositiones: dicit enim Philosophus in IV Ethic., cap. 111, a med., quod « motus lentus magnanimi videtur, et vox gravis, et locutio stabilis. » Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.4] Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, nulla virtus oppositur alteri virtuti. Sed magnanimitas oppositur humilitati: nam « magnananimus se dignum reputat magnis, et alios contemnit, », ut dicitur in IV Ethic., loc. cit. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.5] Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [Cf. 113] towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.arg.5] 5. Præterea, cujuslibet virtutis proprietates sunt laudabiles. Sed magnanimitas habet quasdam proprietates vituperabiles: primo quidem, quia magnanimus non est memor beneficiorum; secundo, quia est otiosus et tardus; tertio, quia utitur ironia ad multos; quarto, quia non potest alii convivere; quinto, quia magis possidet infructuosa quam fructuosa. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.sc] It is written in praise of certain men (2 Maccabees 15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod in laudem quorumdam dicitur II Machab., xiv, 18: Nicanor audiens virtutem comitum Judæ, et animi magnitudinem, quam pro patriæ certaminibus habebant, sanguine judicium facere metuebat. Laudabilia autem sunt solum virtutum opera. Ergo magnanimitas ad quam pertinet magnum animum habere, est virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.co] The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above (1; I-II, 11, 2, Objection 3). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad rationem virtutis humanæ pertinet ut in rebus humanis bonum rationis servetur, quod est proprium hominis bonum. Inter cæteras autem res humanas exteriores honores praecipuum locum tenent, sicut dictum est. Et ideo magnanimitas, quæ modum rationis ponit circa magnos honores, est virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.1] As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut etiam Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. 111, parum a princ., « magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus, » inquantum scilicet ad maxima tendit; « eo autem quod ut oportet, medius, » quia videlicet ad ea quæ sunt maxima, secundum rationem tendit: « eo enim quod est secundum dignitatem seipsum dignificat, » ut ibidem dicitur; quia scilicet se non extendit ad majora quam dignus est.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.2] The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod connexio virtutum non est intelligenda secundum actus, ut scilicet cuilibet competat habere actus omnium virtutum. Unde actus magnanimitatis non competit cuilibet virtuoso, sed solum magnis. Sed secundum principia virtutum, quæ sunt prudentia et gratia, omnes virtutes sunt connexæ secundum habitus simul in anima existentes vel in actu vel in propinqua dispositione. Et sic potest aliquis cui non competit actus magnanimitatis, habere habitum magnanimitatis, per quem scilicet disponitur ad talem actum exequendum, si sibi secundum statum suum competetet.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.3] The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod corporales motus diversificantur secundum diversas animæ apprehensions et affectiones. Et secundum hoc contingit quod ad magnanimitatem consequuntur quædam accidentia determinata circa motus corporales. Velocitas enim motusprovenit ex eo quod homo ad multa intendit quæ explere festinat. Sed magnanimus intendit solum ad magna, quæ pauca sunt, quæ etiam indigenat magna attentione, et ideo habet motum tardum. Similiter etiam acuitas vocis et velocitas præcipue competit his qui de quibuslibet contendere volunt, quod non pertinet ad magnanimos, qui non intromittunt se nisi de magnis. Et sicut prædictæ dispositiones corporalium motuum conveniunt magnanimis secundum modum affectionis eorum, ita etiam in his qui sunt naturaliter dispositi ad magnanimitatem, tales conditiones naturaliter inventur.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.4] There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Psalm 14:4): "In his sight a vile person is contemned [Douay: 'The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in homine inventur aliquid magnum, quod ex dono Dei possidet; et aliquis defectus, qui competit ei ex infirmitate naturæ. Magnanimitas ergo facit quod homo se magnis dignificet secundum considerationem donorum quæ possidet ex Deo; sicut si habet magnam virtutem animi, magnanimitas facit quod ad perfecta opera virtutis tendat: et similiter est dicendum de usu cujuslibet alterius boni, puta scientiae, vel exterioris fortunæ. Humilitas autem facit quod homo seipsum parvipendat, secundum considerationem proprii defectus. Similiter etiam magnanimitas contemnit alios secundum quod deficiunt a donis Dei; non enim tantum alios appretiatur quod pro eis aliquid indecens faciat. Sed humilitas alios honorat et superiores æstimat, inquantum in eis aliquid inspicit de donis Dei. Unde dicitur in psal. xiv, 4, de viro justo: Ad nihilum deductus est in conspectu ejus malignus, quod pertinet ad contempum magnanimi; timentes autem Dominum, glorificat, quod pertinet ad honorationem humilis. Et sic patet quod magnanimitas et humilitas non sunt contraria, quamvis in contraria tendere videantur, quia procedunt secundum diversas considerationes.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.5] These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class." On the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.3.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod proprietates illæ secundum quod ad magnanimum pertinent, non sunt vituperabiles sed superexcedenter laudabiles. Quod enim primo dicitur quod magnanimus non habet in memoria eos a quibus beneficia recipit, intelligendum est quantum ad hoc quod non est sibi delectabile quod ab aliquibus beneficia recipiat, quin eis majora recompenset: quod pertinet ad perfectionem gratitudinis, in cujus actu vult superexcellere, sicut et in actibus aliarum virtutum. Similiter etiam secundo dicitur quod est otiosus et tardus, non quia deficiat ab operando ea quae sibi conveniunt, sed quia non ingerit se quibuscumque operibus sibi convenientibus, sed solum magnis, qualia decent eum. Dicitur etiam tertio quod utitur ironia non secundum quod opponitur veritati, ut scilicet dicat de se aliqua vilia, quae non sunt, vel neget aliqua magna, quae sunt; sed quia non totam magnitudinem suam monstrat, maxime quantum ad inferiorum multitudinem: quia, sicut etiam Philosophus dicit, lib. IV Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, « ad magnanimum pertinet magnum esse ad eos qui in dignitate et bonis fortunæ sunt, ad medios autem moderatum. » Quarto etiam dicitur, quod ad alios non potest convivere, scilicet familiariter, nisi ad amicos: quia omnino vitae adulationem et simulationem, quae pertinent ad animi parvitatem. Convivit tamen omnibus et magnis et parvis, secundum quod oportet, ut dictum est. Quinto etiam dicitur quod vult habere magis infructuosa non quæcumque, sed bona, idest, honesta: nam in omnibus, praponit honesta utilibus, tamquam majora: utilia enim quæruntur ad subveniendum alicui defectui, qui magnani-mitati repugnat.
Article 4
[II-II.q.129.a.4.arg.1] It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit specialis virtus. Nulla enim specialis virtus operatur in omnibus virtutibus. Sed Philosophus in IV Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, ante med., dicit quod « ad magnanimum pertinet quod est in unaquaque virtute magnum. » Ergo magnanimitas non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.arg.2] Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulli speciali virtuti attribuuntur actus diversarum virtutum. Sed magnanimo attribuuntur diversarum virtutum actus: dicitur enim in IV Ethic., loc. cit., quod « ad magnanimum pertinet non fugere commoventem, » quod est actus prudentiæ, « neque facere injusta, » quod est actus justitiæ, et quod « est promptus ad benefaciendum, » quod est actus charitatis, et quod « ministrat prompte, » quod est actus liberalitatis, et quod « est veridicus, » quod est actus veritatis, et quod « non est planctivus, » quod est actus patientiæ. Ergo magnanimitas non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.arg.3] Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Isaiah 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quælibet virtus est quidam specialis ornatus animæ, secundum illud Isaiæ, lxi, 10: Induit me Dominus vestimentis salutis; et postea subdit: Quasi sponsam ornatam monilibus suis. Sed magnanimitas est ornatus omnium virtutum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., loc. cit. Ergo magnanimitas est virtus generalis.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.sc] The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in II Ethic., cap. vii, distinguiteam contra alias virtutes.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.co] As stated above (Question 123, Article 2), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (1 and 2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.
Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above (103, 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ad specialem virtutem pertinet quod modum rationis in aliqua determinata materia ponat. Magnanimitas autem ponit modum rationis circa determinatam materiam, scilicet circa honores, ut supra dictum est. Honor autem secundum se consideratus, est quoddam speciale bonum; et secundum hoc magnanimitas secundum se considerata est specialis quædam virtus. Sed quia honor est cujuslibet virtutis præmium, ut ex supra dictis patet, ideo ex consequenti ratione suæ materiæ respicit omnes virtutes.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.ad.1] Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod magnanimitas non est circa honorem quem-cumque, sed circa magnum honorem. Sicut autem honor debetur virtuti, ita et magnus honor debetur magno operi virtutis. Et inde est quod magnanimus intendit magna operari in qualibet virtute, inquantum scilicet tendit ad ea quæ sunt digna magno honore.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.ad.2] Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia magnanimus tendit ad magna, consequens est quod ad illa præcipue tendat quæ important aliquam excellentiam, et illa fugiat quæ pertinent ad defectum. Pertinet autem ad quamdam excellentiam quod aliquis Sic cod.; « sibi convenientibenefaciat, et quod sit communicativus et plurium retributivus. Et ideo ad ista promptum se exhibet inquantum habent rationem cujusdam excellentiæ, non autem secundum eam rationem qua sunt actus aliarum virtutum. Ad defectum autem pertinet quod aliquis intantum magnipendat aliqua exteriora bona vel mala, quod pro eis a justitia vel quacumque virtute recedat et declinet. Similiter etiam ad defectum pertinet omnis occultatio veritatis, quia videtur ex timore procedere. Quod etiam aliquis sit planctivus, ad defectum pertinet, quia per hoc videtur animus exterioribus malis succumbere. Et ideo hæc et similia vitae magnanimus secundum quamdam specialem rationem, scilicet tamquam contraria excellentiæ vel magnitudini.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.ad.3] Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
[II-II.q.129.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quælibet virtus habet quemdam decorem sive ornatum ex sua specie, qui est proprius unicuique virtuti; sed superadditur alius ornatus ex ipsa magnitudine operis virtuosi per magnanimitatem, quæ omnes virtutes majores facit, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., cap. III.
Article 5
[II-II.q.129.a.5.arg.1] It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit pars fortitudinis. Idem enim est non pars sui ipsius. Sed magnanimitas videtur idem esse fortitudini: dicit enim Seneca in lib. De qua-tuor virtutibus, cap. «De magnanim.,» in princ.: «Magnanimitas, quæ et fortitudin dicitur, si insit animo tuo, cum fiducia magna vives; et Tullius dicit in I De offic., intit. «Fortitudinem, si ab honestate recedat,» etc.: «Viros fortes, magnanimos eosdem esse volumus, veritatis amicos, minimeque fallaces.» Ergo magnanimitas non est pars fortitudinis.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not philokindynos, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus in IV Ethic., cap. III, a med., dicit quod «magnanimus non est philokindynos,» idest, amator periculi. Ad fortem autem pertinet se exponere periculis. Ergo magnanimitas non convenit cum fortitudine, ut possit dici pars ejus.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.arg.3] Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, magnanimitas respicit magnum in bonis sperandis, fortitudo autem respicit magnum in malis timendis vel audendis. Sed bonum est principalius quam malum. Ergo magnanimitas est principalior virtus quam fortitudo. Non ergo est pars ejus.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.sc] Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Macrobius, lib I In somn. Scip., cap. VIII, et Andronicus ponunt magnanimitatem fortitudinis partem.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.co] As stated above (I-II, 61, 3), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, principalis virtus est ad quam pertinet aliquem generalem modum virtutis constituere in aliqua materia principali. Inter alios autem generales modos virtutis unus est firmitas animi; quia «firmiter se habere requiritur in omni virtute,» ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. IV. Præcipue tamen laudatur hoc in virtutibus quæ in aliquod arduum tendunt, in quibus difficillimum est firmitatem servare. Et ideo quanto difficilius est in aliquo arduo firmiter se habere, tanto principalior est virtus quæ circa illud firmitatem præstat animo. Difficilius autem est firmiter se habere in periculis mortis in quibus confirmat animum fortitudo, quam in maximis bonis sperandis vel adipiscendis, ad quæ confirmat animum magnanimitas: quia, sicut homo maxime diligit vitam suam, ita maxime refugit mortis pericula. Sic ergo patet quod magnanimitas convenit cum fortitudine, in quantum confirmat animum circa aliquid arduum; deficit autem ab ea in hoc quod confirmat animum in eo circa quod facilius est firmitatem servare. Unde magnanimitas ponitur pars fortitudinis, quia adjungitur ei sicut secundaria principali.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.ad.1] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. I, circa med., et cap. III, in fin., «carere malo accipitur in ratione boni;» unde et non superari ab aliquo gravi malo, puta a periculis mortis, accipitur quodammodo pro eo quod est attingere ad magnum bonum; quorum primum pertinet ad fortitudinem, sed secundum ad magnanimitatem; et secundum hoc fortitudo et magnanimitas pro eodem accipi possunt. Quia tamen alia ratio difficultatis est in utroque prædictorum, ideo proprieloquendo magnanimitas ab Aristotele, lib II Ethic., cap. VII, ponitur alia virtus a fortitudine.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.ad.2] A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not mikrokindynos, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but megalokindynos, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
[II-II.q.129.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod amator periculi dicitur qui indifferenter se periculis exponit, quod videtur pertinere ad eum qui indifferenter multa quasi magna existimat, quod est contra rationem magnanimi: nullus enim videtur pro aliquo se periculis exponere, nisi illud magnum existimet. Sed pro his quæ vere sunt magna, magnanimus promptissime se periculis exponit, quia operatur magnum in actu fortitudinis, sicut in actibus aliarum virtutum. Unde et Philosophus ibid. dicit quod «magnanimus non est microkindynos, » idest, pro parvis periclitans, sed est « megalokindynos, » idest, pro magnis periclitans. Et Seneca dicit in libro De quaetuor virtutibus, cap. «De magnanim.,» in fin.: « Eris magnanimus, si pericula nec appetas ut temerarius, nec formides ut timidus. Nam nil timidum facit animum, nisi reprehensibilis vitæ conscientia. »
[II-II.q.129.a.5.ad.3] Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect.
[II-II.q.129.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod malum, inquantum hujusmodi, fugiendum est: quod autem contra ipsum sit persistendum, est per accidens, idest, inquantum oportet sustinere mala ad conservationem bonorum. Sed bonum de se est appetendum; et quod ab eo refugiatur, non est nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet existimatur excedere facultatem desiderantis. Semper autem quod per se est, potius est quam illud quod est per accidens. Et ideo magis repugnat firmitati animi arduum in malis, quam arduum in bonis. Et ideo principalior est virtus fortitudinis quam magnanimitatis. Licet enim bonum sit simpliciter principalius quam malum, malum tamen est principalius quantum ad hoc.
Article 6
[II-II.q.129.a.6.arg.1] It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Corinthians 3:4-5, "Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod fiducia non pertineat ad magnanimitatem. Potest enim aliquis habere fiduciam non solum de seipso, sed etiam de alio, secundum illud II ad Corinth., Ⅲ, 4: Fiduciam autem talem habemus per Christum Jesum ad Deum, non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis. Sed hoc videtur esse contra rationem magnanimitatis. Ergo fiducia ad magnanimitatem non pertinet.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.arg.2] Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Isaiah 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fiducia videtur esse timori opposita, secundum illud Isa., Ⅶ, 2: Fiducialiter agam, et non timebo. Sed carere timore magis pertinet ad fortitudinem. Ergo et fiducia magis ad fortitudinem pertinet quam ad magnanimitatem.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.arg.3] Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to Hebrews 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
[II-II.q.129.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præmium non debetur nisi virtuti. Sed fiduciæ debetur præmium: dicitur enim ad Hebr., Ⅲ, 6, quod* nos sumus domus Christi, si fiduciam et gloriam spei usque in finem firmam retineamus. Ergo fiducia est quædam virtus distincta a magnanimitate; quod etiam videtur per hoc quod Macrobius, lib. I In somn. Scip., cap. Ⅷ, eam magnanimitati condividit.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.sc] Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius in sua Rhetor., lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., videtur ponere fiduciam loco magnanimitatis, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.co] Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself--for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him.
Now it has been stated above (1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen fiduciæ ex fide assumptum esse videtur. Ad fidem autem pertinet aliquid et alicui credere. Pertinet autem fiducia ad spem, secundum illud Job, xⅠ, 18: Habebis fiduciam proposita tibi spe. Et ideo nomen fiduciæ hoc principaliter significare videtur quod aliquis spem concipiat ex hoc quod credit verbis alicujus auxilium promittentis. Sed quia fides dicitur etiam opinio vehemens, contingit autem aliquid vehementer opinari non solum ex eo quod est ab alio dictum, sed etiam ex eo quod in alio consideratur, inde est quod fiducia etiam potest dici, qua aliquis spem alicujus rei concipit ex aliquo considerato; quando quidem in seipso, puta cum aliquis videns se sanum, confidit se diu victurum; quando quidem in alio, puta cum aliquis considerans alium amicum suum esse et potentem, fiduciam habet adjuvari ab eo. Dictum est autem supra, quod magnanimitas proprie est circa spem alicujus ardui. Et ideo quia fiducia importat quoddam robur spei proveniens ex aliqua consideratione, quæ facit vehementem opinionem de bono assequendo, inde est quod fiducia ad magnanimitatem pertinet.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.ad.1] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap Ⅲ, ad fin., « ad magnanimum pertinet nullo indigere, » quia hoc deficientis est. Hoc tamen debet intelligi secundum modum humanum; unde addit «vel vix.» Hoc est enim supra hominem, ut omnino nullo indigeat. Indiget enim omnis homo primo quidem divino auxilio, secundo autem etiam auxilio humano, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, eo quod sibi non sufficit ad vitam. Inquantum ergo indiget aliis, sic ad magnanimum pertinet, ut habeat fiduciam de aliis, quia hoc etiam ad excellentiam hominis pertinet quod habeat alios in promptu qui eum possint juvare. Inquantum autem ipse aliquid potest, intantum ad magnanimitatem pertinet fiducia quam habet de seipso.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.ad.2] As stated above (I-II, 23, 2; I-II, 40, 4), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de passionibus ageretur, spes quidem directe opponitur desperationi, quae est circa idem objectum, scilicet circa bonum; sed secundum objectorum contrarietatem opponitur timori, cujus objectum est malum. Fiducia autem quoddam robur spei importat; et ideo opponitur timori, sicut et spes. Sed quia fortitudo proprie firmat hominem circa mala, magnanimitas autem circa prosecutionem bonorum, inde est quod fiducia magis proprie pertinet ad magnanimitatem quam ad fortitudinem. Sed quia spes causat audaciam, quae pertinet ad fortitudinem, inde est quod fiducia ex consequenti ad fortitudinem pertinet.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.ad.3] Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.
[II-II.q.129.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fiducia, ut dictum est, importat quemdam modum spei; est enim fiducia spes roborata ex aliqua firma opinione. Modus autem adhibitus alicui affectioni potest pertinere ad commendationem ipsius actus, ut ex hoc sit meritorius; non tamen ex hoc determinatur ad speiem virtutis, sed ex materia. Et ideo fiducia non potest, proprie loquendo, nominare aliquam virtutem, sed potest nominare conditionem virtutis; et propter hoc numeratur inter partes fortitudinis, non quasi virtus adjuncta, nisi secundum quod accipitur pro magnanimitate a Tullio, loc. cit, sed sicut pars integralis, ut dictum est.
Article 7
[II-II.q.129.a.7.arg.1] It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (128, ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod securitas ad magnanimitatem non IV. pertineat. Securitas enim, ut supra habitum est, importat quietem quamdam a perturbatione timoris. Sed hoc maxime facit fortitudo. Ergo securitas videtur idem esse quod fortitudo. Sed fortitudo non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, sed potius e converso. Ergo neque securitas ad magnanimitatem pertinet.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.arg.2] Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Timothy 2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etymol., ad litt. S., t. 3, quod « securus dicitur quasi sine cura. » Sed hoc videtur esse contra virtutem, quæ curam habet de rebus honestis, secundum illud Apostoli II ad Tim., ii, 45: Sollicite cura teipsum probabilem exhibere Deo. Ergo securitas non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quæ operatur magnum in omnibus virtutibus.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.arg.3] Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14-18, "If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, non est idem virtus et virtutis præmium. Sed securitas ponitur virtutis præmium, ut patet Job, xi, 14: Si iniquitatem, quæ est in manu tua, abstuleris… defossus securus dormies. Ergo securitas non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, neque ad aliam virtutem, sicut pars ejus.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.sc] Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit in I De officiis, in tit.: « Magnanimitas in duobus sita est, » quod « ad magnanimum pertinet, neque perturbationi animi, neque homini, neque fortunæ succumbere. » Sed in hoc consistit hominis securitas. Ergo securitas ad magnanimitatem pertinet.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.co] As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the passion (I-II, 45, 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in II suæ Rhetoricæ, cap. v, a med., « timor facit homines consiliativos, » inquantum scilicet curam habent, qualiter possint evadere ea quæ timent. Securitas autem dicitur per remotionem hujus curæ, quam timor ingerit: et ideo securitas importat quamdam perfectam quietem animi a timore, sicut fiducia importat quoddam robur spei. Sicut autem spes directe pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ita timor directe pertinet ad fortitudinem. Et ideo sicut fiducia immediate pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ita securitas immediate pertinet ad fortitudinem. Considerandum tamen est, quod sicut spes est causa audacia, ita timor est causa desperationis, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo sicut fiducia ex consequenti pertinet ad fortitudinem, inquantum utitur audacia, ita et securitas ex consequenti pertinet ad magnanimitatem, inquantum repellit desperationem.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.ad.1] Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod fortitudo non praecipue laudatur ex hoc quod non timeat, quod pertinet ad securitatem, sed inquantum importat firmitatem quamdam in passionibus. Unde securitas non est idem quod fortitudo, sed est quædam conditio ejus.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.ad.2] Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non quælibet securitas est laudabilis, sed quando deponit aliquis curam, prout debet, et in quibus timere non oportet: et hoc modo est conditio fortitudinis et magnanimitatis.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.ad.3] There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, 05, 3,7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.
[II-II.q.129.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in virtutibus est quædam similitudo et participatio futuræ beatitudinis, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet securitatem quamdam esse conditionem alicujus virtutis, quamvis perfecta securitas ad præmium virtutis pertineat.
Article 8
[II-II.q.129.a.8.arg.1] It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bona fortunæ non conferant ad magnanimitatem: quia, ut Seneca dicit in lib. I De ira, cap. ix, et lib. De vita beata, cap. xvi, « virtus sibi sufficiens est. » Sed magnanimitas facit omnes virtutes magnas, ut dictum est. Ergo bona fortunæ non conferunt ad magnanimitatem.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.arg.2] Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus virtuosus contemnit ea quibus juvatur. Sed magnanimus contemnit ea quæ pertinent ad exteriorem fortunam: dicit enim Tullius in lib I De offic., in tit.: « Magnanimit. in duobus potiss. sita, » quod « magnus animus in externarum rerum despicientia commendatur. » Ergo magnanimitas non adjuvatur a bonis fortunæ.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.arg.3] Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ibidem Tullius subdit, quod « ad magnum animum pertinet, ea quæ videntur acerba, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturæ discedat, nihil a dignitate sapientis. » Et Aristoteles dicit in IV Ethic., cap. iii, ante med., quod « magnanimus in infortuniis non est tristis. » Sed acerba et infortunia opponuntur bonis fortunæ: quilibet enim tristatur de subtractione eorum quibus juvatur. Ergo exteriora bona fortunæ non conferunt ad magnanimitatem.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."
[II-II.q.129.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. iii, ante med., quod « bona fortunæ videntur conferre ad magnanimitatem. »
[II-II.q.129.a.8.co] As stated above (Article 1), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, magnanimitas ad duo respicit: ad honorem quidem sicut ad materiam, et ad aliquid magnum operandum sicut ad finem. Ad utrumque autem istorum bona fortunæ cooperantur: quia enim honor virtuosis, non solum a sapientibus, sed etiam a multitudine exhibetur, quæ maxima reputat hujusmodi exteriora bona fortunæ: fit ex consequenti, ut ab eis major honor exhibeatur his quibus adsunt exteriora bona fortunæ. Similiter etiam ad actus virtutum organice bona fortunæ deservient, quia per divitias et potentiam et amicos datur nobis facultas operandi. Et ideo manifestum est quod bona fortunæ conferunt ad magnanimitatem.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.ad.1] Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus sibi sufficiens esse dicitur, quia sine his etiam exterioribus bonis esse potest; indiget tamen his exterioribus bonis ad hoc quod expeditius operetur.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.ad.2] The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod magnanimus exteriora bona contemnit, inquantum non reputat ea bona magna, pro quibus debeat aliquid indecens facere; non tamen quantum ad hoc contemnit ea quin reputet ea utilia ad opus virtutis exequendum.
[II-II.q.129.a.8.ad.3] If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.129.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quicumque non reputat aliquid magnum, neque multum gaudet, si illud obtineat, neque multum tristatur, si illud amittat; et ideo quia magnanimus non æstimat exteriora bona, scilicet bona fortunæ, quasi aliqua magna, inde est quod nec de eis multum extollitur, si adsint, neque in eorum amissione multum dejicitur
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