Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q149. Sobriety
Source context
- Theme
- sobriety as moral virtue regulating the appetite for intoxicants
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 199, 1920-08-15Steiner identifies sobriety as a prerequisite on the path to higher knowledge, requiring the practitioner to disregard egotism and avoid fanatical ecstasy in favor of clear-minded self-possession.
- GA 350, 1923-07-07Steiner instructs that all spiritual-scientific requirements must be approached with the same sobriety and scientific attitude applied to the physical world, precluding intoxicated or undisciplined states.
- GA 344, 1922-09-19In a liturgical context, Steiner addresses a participant's question about sobriety as a condition proper to the celebration of the act of consecration of man.
Cross-tradition
- Stoic ethics (temperance / sophrosyne)The Stoic virtue of sophrosyne, governing moderation of bodily appetites, provides a structural parallel to Aquinas's sobriety as a species of temperance directed against excessive drink.
- Benedictine Rule (De sobrietate)The Rule of Saint Benedict treats sobriety as a communal ascetic discipline binding monks to measured consumption, structurally analogous to Aquinas's treatment of sobriety as a moral obligation rooted in right order of appetite.
Q149. Sobriety
Article 1
[II-II.q.149.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written (Romans 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod materia propria sobrietatis non sit potus. Dicitur enim ad Rom., xii, 3: Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem. Ergo sobrietas est etiam circa sapientiam, et non solum circa potum.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.arg.2] Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wisdom 8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Sap., viii, 7, dicitur de Dei sapientia quod sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, justitiam et virtutem; ubi sobrietatem ponit pro temperantia. Sed temperantia non solum est circa potum, sed etiam circa cibos et venerea. Ergo sobrietas non est solum circa potum.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.arg.3] Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure" ['Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in ourselves"; and (1 Timothy 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety." Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nomen sobrietatis a mensura sumptum esse videtur. Sed in omnibus quæ ad nos pertinent, debemus mensuram servare, ut dicitur ad Titum, ii, 12: Sobrie, et juste, et pie vivamus in hoc sæculo, ubi dicit Glossa interl.: « Sobrie in nobis; » et I ad Tim., ii, 9, dicitur; Mulieres in habitu ornato, cum verecundia et sobrietate ornantes se: et sic videtur sobrietas esse non solum in interioribus, sed etiam in his quæ pertinent ad exteriorem habitum. Non ergo propria materia sobrietatis est potus.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.sc] It is written (Sirach 31:32): "Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober."
[II-II.q.149.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., xxxi, 32: Équa vita hominibus vinum in sobrietate potatum.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.co] When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a man is said to be sober because he observes the "bria," i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Sirach 31:37-38): "Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated above (123, 2; 141, 2) with regard to fortitude and temperance.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtutes quæ ab aliqua generali conditione virtutis nominantur, illam materiam sibi specia-liter vindicant in qua difficillimum et optimum est conditionem ejus observare; sicut fortitudo pericula mortis et temperantia delectationes tactus. Nomen autem sobrietatis sumitur a mensura: dicitur enim aliquis sobrius, quasi « briam » id est, mensuram servans. Et ideo illam materiam specialiter sibi sobrietas adscritit in qua maxime laudabile est mensuram servare. Hujusmodi autem est potus inebriare valens, quia ejus usus mensuratus multum confert, et immodicus excessus multum lædit, quia impedit usum rationis magis etiam quam excessus cibi. Unde dicitur Eccli., xxxi, 37: Sanitas est animæ et corporis sobrius potus. Vinum multum potatum irritationem, et iram, et ruinas multas facit. Et ideo specialiter sobrietas attenditur circa potum, non quemcumque, sed eum qui sua fumositate natus est caput conturbare, sicut vinum, et omne quod inebriare potest. Communiter autem sumendo nomen sobrietatis potest in quacumque materia dici, sicut et supra dictum est, de fortitudine et temperantia.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.ad.1] Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to Psalm 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut vinum materiale inebriat corporaliter, ita etiam metaphorice consideratio sapientiae dicitur potus inebrians, propter hoc quod sua delectatione animum allicit, secundum illud psal. xxii, 5: Calix meus inebrians, quam præclarus est! Et ideo circa contemplationem sapientiae per similitudinem quamdam sobrietas dicitur.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.ad.2] All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnia quæ ad temperantiam proprie pertinent, necessaria sunt præsenti vitæ, et eorum excessus nocet. Et ideo in omnibus necessarium est adhibere mensuram, quod pertinet ad officium sobrietatis: propter quod nomine sobrietatis temperantia significatur. Sed modicus excessus in potu plus nocet quam in aliis: et ideo sobrietas specialiter est circa potum.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.ad.3] Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in those wherein there is most need for a measure.
[II-II.q.149.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis mensura in omnibus requiratur, non tamen sobrietas proprie in omnibus dicitur, sed in quibus mensura est maxime necessaria.
Article 2
[II-II.q.149.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sobrietas non sit per se quædam specialis virtus. Abstinentia enim attenditur et circa cibos, et circa potus. Sed circa cibos non est specialiter aliqua specialis virtus. Ergo nec sobrietas, quæ est circa potum, est aliqua specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.arg.2] Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, abstinentia et gula sunt circa delectationes tactus, inquantum sensus est alimenti. Sed cibus et potus simul cedunt in alimentum, simul enim indiget animal nutriri humido et sicco. Ergo sobrietas, quæ est circa potum, non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.arg.3] Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut in his quæ ad nutritionem pertinent distinguitur cibus a potu; ita etiam distinguuntur diversa genera ciborum et diversa genera potuum. Si ergo sobrietas esset per se quædam specialis virtus, videtur quod circa quam-libet differentiam potus vel cibi sit quædam specialis virtus; quod est inconveniens: non ergo videtur quod sobrietas sit specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.sc] Macrobius [In Somno Scip. i, 8 reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Macrobius, lib. I In somn. Scip., cap. viii, ponit sobriatem specialem partem temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 146, Article 2), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad virtutem moralem pertinet conservare bonum rationis contra ea quibus potest impediri. Et ideo ubi inventur speciale impedimentum rationis, ibi necesse est esse specialem virtutem ad illud removendum. Potus autem inebrians habet specialem rationem impediendi usum rationis, inquantum scilicet perturbat cerebrum sua fumositate. Et ideo ad removendum hoc impedimentum rationis requiritur specialis virtus, quæ est sobrietas.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.ad.1] Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, wherefore it requires a special virtue.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cibus et potus communiter impedire possunt bonum rationis, absorbendo eam per immoderantiam delectationis: et quantum ad hoc communiter circa cibum et potum est abstinentia. Sed potus inebriare valens impedit speciali ratione, ut dictum est, et ideo requirit specialem virtutem.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.ad.2] The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtus abstinentia non est circa cibos et potus, inquantum sunt nutritiva, sed inquantum impediunt rationem. Et ideo non oportet quod specialitas virtutis attendatur secundum rationem nutritionis.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.ad.3] In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats.
[II-II.q.149.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in omnibus potibus inebriare valentibus est una et eadem ratio impediendi rationis usum: et sic illa potuum diversitas per accidens se habet ad virtutem; et propter hoc secundum hujusmodi diversitatem virtutes non diversificantur. Et eadem ratio est de diversitate ciborum.
Article 3
[II-II.q.149.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wisdom 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom," and further on (Wisdom 9:19): "By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning." Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is written (Ecclesiastes 2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom." Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod usus vini totaliter sit illicitus. Sine sapientia enim non potest aliquis esse in statu salutis: dicitur enim Sap. vii, 28: Neminem diligit Deus nisi eum qui cum sapientia inhabitat; et infra cap. ix, 19: Per sapientiam sanati sunt quicumque placuerunt tibi, Domine, a principio. Sed usus vini impeditsapientiam: dicitur enim Eccle. ii, 3: Cogitavi in corde meo abstrahere a vino carnem meam, ut animum meum transferrem ad sapientiam. Ergo potus vini est universaliter illicitus.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (Romans 14:21): "It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made weak." Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Apostolus dicit ad Rom., xiv, 21: Bonum est non manducare carnem, et non bibere vinum, neque in quo frater tuus offenditur, aut scandalizatur, aut infirmatur. Sed cessare a bono virtutis est vitiosum, et similiter fratribus scandalum ponere. Ergo uti vino est illicitum.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.arg.3] Further, Jerome says [Contra Jovin. i] that "after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning." Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Hieronymus dicit, lib. I Cont. Jovin., § 18, col. 237, t. 2, quod « vinum cum carnibus post diluvium est dedicatum; Christus autem venit in fine sæculorum, et extremitatem retraxit ad principium. » Ergo tempore christianæ legis videtur esse illicitum uti vino.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.sc] The Apostle says (1 Timothy 5:23): "Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy frequent infirmities"; and it is written (Sirach 31:36): "Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart."
[II-II.q.149.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I ad Timoth., v, 23: Noli adhuc aquam bibere, sed modico vino utere propter stomachum tuum, et frequentes tuas infirmitates; et Eccli., xxxi, 36, dicitur: Exultatio animæ et cordis vinum moderate potatum.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.co] No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to Matthew 15:11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would be scandalized thereby.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nullus cibus vel potus secundum se consideratus est illicitus, secundum sententiam Domini dicentis, Matth. xv, 2: Non quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem. Et ideo bibere vinum, secundum se loquendo, non est illicitum. Potest tamen reddi illicitum per accidens: quandoque quidem ex conditione bibentis, quia vino de facili laeditur, vel quia ex speciali voto obligatur ad vinum non bibendum; quandoque autem ex modo bibendi, quia scilicet mensuram in bibendo excedit; quandoque autem ex parte aliorum, qui ex hoc scandalizantur.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.ad.1] A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sapientia potest haberi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum modum communem, prout sufficit ad salutem, et sic non requiritur ad sapientiam habendam quod aliquis a vino omnino abstineat, sed quod abstineat ab immoderato usu vini. Alio modo secundum quemdam perfectionis gradum: et sic requiritur in aliquibus ad perfecte sapientiam percipiendam, quod omnino a vino abstineant, secundum conditiones quarumdam personarum et locorum.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.ad.2] The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would give scandal to certain people.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Apostolus non simpliciter dicit bonum esse abstinere a vino, sed in casu in quo ex hoc aliqui scandalizantur.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.ad.3] Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the like.
[II-II.q.149.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus retrahit nos a quibusdam sicut omnino illicitis, a quibusdam vero sicut ab impedimentis perfectionis: et hoc modo retrahit aliquos a vino studio perfectionis, sicut et a divitiis et aliis hujusmodi.
Article 4
[II-II.q.149.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Leviticus 19:32, "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, "That the aged man be sober." Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.
[II-II.q.149.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sobrietas magis requiratur in majoribus personis. Senectus enim excellentiam quamdam homini præstat; unde et senibus honor et reverentia debetur, secundum illud Levit., xix, 32: Coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis. Sed Apostolus specialiter senes dicit esse ad sobrietatem exhortandos, secundum illud ad Tit., ii, 2: Senes, ut sobrii sint. Ergo sobrietas maxime requiritur in excellentioribus personis.
[II-II.q.149.a.4.arg.2] Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Timothy 3:2, "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high standing.
[II-II.q.149.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Episcopus in Ecclesia excellentissimum gradum habet, cui per Apostolum indicitur sobrietas, secundum illud I ad Timoth., iii, 2: Oportet episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, unius uxoris virum, sobrium, prudentem, etc. Ergo sobrietas maxime requiritur in personis excellentioribus.
[II-II.q.149.a.4.arg.3] Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to Proverbs 31:4, "Give not wine to kings," and further on (Proverbs 31:6), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite in persons of standing.
[II-II.q.149.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sobrietas importat abstinentiam a vino. Sed vinum interdicitur regibus, qui tenent summum locum in humanis rebus; conceditur autem his qui sunt in statu desolationis, secundum illud Proverb., xxxi, 4: Noli regibus dare vinum; et postea subdit: Date siceram mærentibus, et vinum his qui amaro sunt animo. Ergo sobrietas magis requiritur in excellentioribus personis.
[II-II.q.149.a.4.sc] The Apostle says (1 Timothy 3:11): "The women in like manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (Titus 2:6) "Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober."
[II-II.q.149.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I ad Tim., iii, 4: Mulieres similiter pudicas, sobrias, etc.; et ad Tit., ii, 6, dicitur: Juvenes similiter hortare ut sobrii sint.
[II-II.q.149.a.4.co] Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. On this respect, sobriety is most requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1 among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.149.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtus habethabitudinem ad duo: uno quidem modo ad contraria vitia quæ excludit, et concupiscentias quas refrenat; alio modo ad finem in quem perducit. Sic ergo aliqua virtus magis requiritur in aliquibus duplici ratione: uno modo, quia in eis est major pronitas ad concupiscentias, quas oportet per virtutem refrenari, et ad vitia quæ per virtutem tolluntur; et secundum hoc sobrietas maxime requiritur in juvenibus et mulieribus, quia in juvenibus viget concupiscentia delectabilis propter fervorem ætatis; in mulieribus autem non est sufficiens robur mentis ad hoc quod concupiscentiis resistant. Unde secundum Valerium Maximum, lib. II, cap. i, § 3, mulieres apud Romanos antiquitus non bibebant vinum. Alio vero modo sobrietas magis requiritur in aliquibus, utpote magis necessaria ad propriam operationem ipsorum. Vinum autem immoderate sumptum præcipue impedit usum rationis: et ideo senibus, in quibus ratio debet vigere ad aliorum eruditionem, et episcopis, seu quibuslibet Ecclesiæ ministris, qui mente devota debent spiritualibus officiis insistere, et regibus, qui per sapientiam de- Encratitæ dicebant Satanam plantasse vibent populum subditum gubernare, specialiter sobrietas indicitur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
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