Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q148. Gluttony
Source context
- Theme
- gluttony as disordered appetite for food and drink, its species and gravity as vice
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 93a, 1905-10-17Steiner identifies retrograde astral beings from the old Moon period as feeding on astral substance in a manner structurally parallel to what he names gluttony, treating excessive consumption as a characteristic of spiritually arrested entities.
- GA 155, 1912-05-30Steiner places gluttony as the deficient extreme opposite to asceticism, with temperance as the virtuous mean belonging to the development of the Spiritual Soul.
- GA 352, 1924-01-23Steiner links undisciplined eating in winter to disruption of the abdomen's natural participation in seasonal rhythms, treating gluttony as physiologically and cosmically disruptive.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle's treatment of temperance (sophrosyne) in Nicomachean Ethics II-III establishes gluttony as excess of appetite for bodily pleasure, providing the structural framework Aquinas inherits and deploys in Q148.
- Evagrian-monastic traditionEvagrius Ponticus placed gastrimargia (gluttony) first among the eight logismoi, identifying disordered appetite as the root condition weakening the soul's capacity for prayer and discernment — a schema transmitted through Cassian and Gregory into Aquinas's analysis.
Q148. Gluttony
Article 1
[II-II.q.148.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said (Matthew 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod gula non sit peccatum. Dicit enim Dominus Matth., xv: Quod * intrat in os, non coinquinat hominem. Sed gula est circa cibos, qui intrant in hominem. Cum ergo omne peccatum coinquinet hominem, videtur quod gula non sit peccatum.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.arg.2] Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [Ep. lxxi, ad Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary?" Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest, utAugustinus dicit, lib. De natura et gratia, c. lxvii, col. 286, t, 10. Sed gula consistit in immoderantia cibi, quam non potest homo vitare: dicit enim Gregorius XXX Moral., c. xviii, § 62, col. 558, t. 2: « Quia per esum voluptas necessitati miscetur, quid necessitas petat, et quid voluptas suppetat, ignoratur; » et Augustinus dicit in X Confess., c. xxxi, § 47, col. 799, t. 4: « Quis est, Domine, qui aliquantulum extra metas necessitatis cibum non sumit? » Ergo gula non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.arg.3] Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in quolibet genere peccati primus motus est peccatum. Sed primus « remus, nec in procinctu belli, ubi necessarius « labor et sudor est, edulio carnium delectemur. « Qui autem legum præcepta custodiunt, ignorant vinum in jejuniis, esum carnium repudiant. » Ac licet addat socios Danielis in Babylone abstinentes exemplum nobis fortitudinis reliquisse « ut omnem deinceps ætatem docerent « jejuniorum tempore a carnibus et vino absti-nendum; » abstinentia tamen carnium magis visa est Ecclesiae necessaria quam abstinentia vini ad jejuniii rationem, et sic in vino, non in carnibus dispensavit. Unde abstinentia vini modo in jejunio consilii tantum est, non præcepti, sicut et abstinentia piscium; a quibus tamen olim abstinuisse christianos in jejunio illo Chrysostomus indicat Hom. Ⅲ ad populum: et similiter aridi cibi, hoc est panis et aqua, quibus ultima hebdomada Quadragesimæ ante Paschatis dies vesce-bantur. Cum sola ergo abstinentia generali carnium in præcepto remansit ut a lacte, caseo et ab ovis in jejunio quadragesimæ communiter debeat abstineri, quia nimirum « par est ut qui « perillos dies a carnibus animalium abstinemus, « ab omnibus etiam quæ sementinam carnis « trahunt originem jejunemus » sicut in iv parte Decretorum, cap. xxix, loquitur Ivo Carnotensis. Quamvis nunc satis communiter in aliquibus locis propter necessitatem in lactis et casei abstinentia dispensetur. » motus sumendi cibum non est peccatum: alioquin fames et sitis essent peccata. Ergo gula non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat." But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXX Moral., c. xviii, § 58, col. 555, t. 2, dicit quod « ad conflictum spiritualis agonis non assurgitur, si non prius intra nosmetipsos hostis positus, gulæ videlicet appetitus, edomatur. » Sed interior hostis hominis, est peccatum. Ergo gula est peccatum.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.co] Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod gula non nominat quemlibet appetitum edendi et bibendi, sed inordinatum. Dicitur autem appetitus inordinatus ex eo quod recedit ab ordine rationis, in quo bonum virtutis moralis consistit, Ex hoc autem dicitur aliquid esse peccatum quod virtuti contrariatur. Unde manifestum est quod gula est peccatum.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.ad.1] That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their signification, but by reason of their nature [Cf. I-II, 102, 6, ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod id quod intrat in hominem per modum cibi, secundum suam substantiam et naturam, non coinquinat hominem spiritualiter. Sed Judæi, contra quos Dominus loquitur et Manichæi opinabantur quod aliqui cibi immundos facerent, non propter figuram, sed propter propriam naturam. Inordinata tamen ciborum concupiscentia spiritualiter hominem coinquinat.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.ad.2] As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, vitium gulæ non consistit in substantia cibi, sed in concupiscentia non regula ratione. Et ideo si aliquis excedat in quantitate cibi, non propter concupiscentiam cibi, sed æstimans id sibi necessarium esse, non pertinet hoc ad gulam, sed ad aliquam imperitiam. Sed hoc solum pertinet ad gulam quod aliquis propter concupiscentiam cibi delectabilis scienter excedat mensuram in edendo.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.ad.3] The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. On these powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.
[II-II.q.148.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est appetitus: unus quidem naturalis, qui pertinet ad vires animæ vegetabilis in quibus non potest esse virtus et vitium, eo quod non possunt subjici rationi: Hucusque S. Thomas; hæc vero in textu addit Nicolai: « Unde iterum Gregorius, ut supra, inter innumera vitia contra quæ oppositæ virtutes pugnant, gulam ponit, et mentem ipsam dicit sub gravi confusionis dedecore a spiritualis certaminis congressione repelli quando infirma in carnis prælio gulæ gladiis confossa superatur; quia cum se prosterni parvis respicit, confligere cum majoribus erubescit. » Et in libro De cura pastorali, part. III, adm. XX: « Unde, inquit, hosti callido, qui primi hominis sensum in concupiscentia pomi aperuit, sed in peccati laqueo strinxit, divina voce dicitur: Pectore ac ventre repes, Gen. III, unde et vis appetitiva dividitur contra retentivam, digestivam et expulsivam: et ad talem appetitum pertinet esuries et sitis. Est autem et alius appetitus sensitivus, in cujus concupiscentia vitium gulæ consistit. Unde primus motus gulæ importat inordinationem in appetitu sensitivo, quæ non est sine peccato.
Article 3
[II-II.q.148.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says [Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah." According to Ezekiel 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister . . . fulness of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod gula sit maximum peccatorum. Magnitudo enim peccati ex magnitudine pœnæ consideratur. Sed peccatum gulae est gravissime punitum: dicit enim Chrysostomus, Hom. xiii in Matth., § 1, col. 456, t. 41,: « Adam intemperantia ventris expulit a paradiso; diluvium, quod fuit tempore Noe, ipsa fecit, et pœnam Sodomorum, secundum illud Ezech., xvi, 49: Hæc fuit iniquitas Sodomæ sororis tuæ saturitas panis, » etc. Ergo peccatum gulae est maximum peccatorum.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.arg.2] Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Psalm 135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust, concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, causa in quolibet genere est potior. Sed gula videtur esse causa aliorum peccatorum: quia super illud psal. cxxxv, Qui percussit Egyptum cum primogenitis eorum, dicit Glossa: « Luxuria, concupiscentia, superbia sunt ea quæ primo venter generat. » Ergo gula est gravissimum peccatorum.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.arg.3] Further, man should love himself in the first place after God, as stated above (Question 25, Article 4). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Sirach 37:34): "By surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, post Deum homo debet seipsum maxime diligere, ut supra habitum est. Sed per vitium gulae homo infert sibi ipsi nocumentum: dicitur enim Eccli., xxxvii, 34: Propter crapulam multi obierunt. Ergo gula est maximum peccatorum, ad minus præter peccata quæ sunt contra Deum.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.sc] The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
[II-II.q.148.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod vitia carnalia, inter quæ computatur gula, secundum Gregorium, lib. XXXIII Moral., c. xviii, § 25, col. 688, t. 2, sunt minoris culpæ.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.co] The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod gravitas alicujus peccati potest tripliciter considerari: primo quidem et principaliter secundum materiam in qua peccatur: et secundum hoc peccata quæ sunt circa res divinas, sunt maxima. Unde secundum hoc vitium gulae non est maximum: est enim circa ea quæ ad sustentationem corporis spectant. Secundo autem ex parte peccantis: et secundum hoc peccatum gulae magis alleviatur quam aggravetur, tum propter necessitatem assumptionis ciborum, tum etiam propter difficultatem discernendi et moderandi id quod in talibus convenit. Tertio vero modo ex parte effectus consequentis: et secundum hoc Sic cod.; Edit. Vivès. vitium gulæ habet quamdam magnitudinem, inquantum ex ea occasionantur diversa peccata.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.ad.1] These punishments are to be referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang, rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illæ pœnæ referuntur magis ad vitia quæ sunt consecuta ex gula, vel ad gulæ radicem quam ad ipsam gulam. Nam primus homo expulsus est de paradiso propter superbiam, ex qua processit ad actum gulæ. Diluvium autem et pœna Sodomorum sunt inducta propter peccata luxuriæ pracedentia, ex gula occasionata.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.ad.2] This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ex parte peccatorum quæ ex gula oriuntur. Non autem oportet quod causa sit potior, nisi in causis per se. Gula autem non est causa illorum vitiorum per se, sed quasi per accidens et per occasionem.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.ad.3] The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily injury through taking too much food.
[II-II.q.148.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod gulosus non intendit suo corpori nocumentum inferre; sed in cibo delectari. Si autem nocumentum corporis sequatur, hoc est per accidens. Unde hoc non directe pertinet ad gravitatem gulæ: cujus culpa tamen aggravatur, si quis corporale detrimentum incurrat propter immoderatam cibi sumptionem.
Article 4
[II-II.q.148.a.4.arg.1] It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate appetite"--which are contained in the following verse: "Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."
For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the aforesaid.
[II-II.q.148.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter species gulæ distinguentur a Gregorio, qui XXX Moral., c. xviii, § 60, col. 556, t. 2, dicit: «Quinque modis nos gulæ vitium tentat: aliquando namque indigentiæ tempora praævenit; aliquando lautiores cibos quærit; aliquando quæ sumenda sunt, praæparari accuratius appetit; aliquando in ipsa quantitate sumendi mensuram refectionis excedit; aliquando ipso æstu immensi desiderii aliquis peccat; » et continentur in hoc versu: Præpropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, studiose. Prædicta enim diversificantur secundum aliud differens motivum pertinens ad usum cibi, quod faciat aliam speciem gulæ.
[II-II.q.148.a.4.arg.2] Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.
[II-II.q.148.a.4.arg.3] Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distinguished thus.
[II-II.q.148.a.4.sc] stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
[II-II.q.148.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 1), gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"--i.e. costly food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely--i.e. "daintily"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."
Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating "greedily."
Isidore [De Summo Bon. ii, 42 comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats, or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats."
[II-II.q.148.a.4.ad.1] The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.
[II-II.q.148.a.4.ad.2] Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.
[II-II.q.148.a.4.ad.3] In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above (I-II, 72, 09).
[II-II.q.148.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in quibus-cumque aliis vitiis diversæ circumstantiæ habent diversa motiva, oportet accipi diversas species vitiorum secundum diversas circumstantias. Sed hoc non contingit in omnibus, ut supra dictum est.
Article 5
[II-II.q.148.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod gula non sit vitium capitale. Vitia enim capitalia dicuntur ex quibus alia oriuntur secundum rationem causæ finalis. Sed cibus, circa quem est gula, non habet rationem finis: non enim propter se quæritur, sed propter corporis nutritionem. Ergo gula non est vitium capitale.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.arg.2] Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus, is apparently the least gluttony is not a capital vice.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, vitium capitale aliquam principalitatem habere videtur in ratione peccati. Sed hoc non competit gulæ, quia videtur esse secundum suum genus minimum peccatorum, utpote plus appropinquans ad id quod est secundum naturam. Ergo gula non videtur esse vitium capitale.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.arg.3] Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum contingit ex hoc quod aliquis recedit a bono honesto propter aliquid utile præsenti vitæ vel delectabile sensui. Sed circa bona quæ habent rationem utilis, ponitur unum tantum vitium capitale, scilicet avaritia. Ergo et circa delectationes videtur esse ponendum unum tantum vitium capitale. Ponitur autem luxuria, quæ est majus vitium quam gula, et circa majores delectationes. Ergo gula non est vitium capitale.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.sc] Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the capital vices.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., c. xlv, § 87, col. 624, t.2, computat gulam inter vitia capitalia.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.co] As stated above (I-II, 84, 3), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium capitale dicitur ex quo alia vitia oriuntur secundum rationem causæ finalis, inquantum scilicet habet finem multum appetibilem: unde ex ejus appetitu homines provocantur multipliciter ad peccandum. Ex hoc autem aliquis finis redditur multum appetibilis Sic prosequitur in textu Nicolaius: « Sic enim in cap. xvii vel xxi: « Vitiorum regina superbia « cum devictum plene cor ceperit, mox illud « septem principalibus vitiiis quasi quibusdam « suis ducibus devastandum tradit. Radix quippe quod habet aliquam de conditionibus felicitatis, quæ est naturaliter appetibilis. Pertinet autem ad rationem felicitatis delectatio, ut patet in I Ethic., cap. viii, et in X, cap. iii, vii et viii. Et ideo vitium gulæ, quod est circa delectationes tactus, quæ sunt præcipuæ inter alias, convenienter ponitur inter vitia capitalia.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.ad.1] It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man's life is directed thereto, according to Ecclesiastes 6:7, "All the labor of man is for his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed," wherein namely the pleasure consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this--not to thirst and not to hunger."
[II-II.q.148.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ipse cibus ordinatur quidem ad aliquid sicut ad finem; sed quia ille finis, scilicet conservatio vitæ, est maxime appetibilis, quæ sine cibo conservari non potest, inde etiam est quod ipse cibus est maxime appetibilis; et ad hoc fere totus labor humanæ vitæ ordinatur, secundum illud Eccle., vi, 7: Omnis labor hominis in ore ejus. Et tamen magis gula videtur esse circa delectationes cibi quam circa cibos: propter quod, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera religione, c. liii, col. 167, t. 3, « quibus vilis est corporis salus, malunt vesci, » in quo scilicet delectatio est, « quam saiari; cum omnis illius voluptatis sit finis non esurire ac sitire. »
[II-II.q.148.a.5.ad.2] In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod finis in peccato accipitur ex parte conversionis, sed gravitas peccati accipitur ex parte aversionis. Et ideo non oportet vitium capitale, quod habet finem maxime appetibilem, habere magnam gravitatem.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.ad.3] That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such things.
[II-II.q.148.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod delectabile est appetibile secundum se: et ideo secundum ejus diversitatem ponuntur duo vitia capitalia, scilicet gula et luxuria. Utile autem ex se non habet rationem appetibilis, sed secundum quod ad aliud ordinatur: et ideo in omnibus utilibus videtur esse una ratio appetibilitatis. Et propter hoc circa hujusmodi non ponitur nisi unum vitium capitale.
Article 6
[II-II.q.148.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding." For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Proverbs 2:14, "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to Proverbs 14:22, "They err that work evil." Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur gulæ « cuncti mali superbia est; ut autem soboles ejus « principalia septem vitia de hae virulenta ra- « dice proferuntur, scilicet inanis gloria, invidia, « ira, tristitia (vel acedia), ventris ingluvies (vel gula), luxuria, » etc. quinque filiæ, scilicet, « inepta lætitia, scurrilitas, immunditia, multiloquium, hebetudo mentis circa intelligentiam. » Inepta enim lætitia consequitur omne peccatum, secundum illud Proverb., ii, 14: Qui lætantur, cum male fecerint, et exultant in rebus pessimis. Similiter etiam hebetudo mentis invenitur in omni peccato, secundum illud Proverb., xiv, 22: Errant qui operantur malum. Ergo inconvenienter ponuntur filiæ gulæ.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.arg.2] Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isaiah 28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of counsel, according to Sirach 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee." Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, immunditia, quæ maxime consequitur gulam, videtur ad vomitum pertinere, secundum illud Isa., xxviii, 8: Omnes mensæ repletæ sunt vomitu *sordibusque. Sed hoc non videtur esse peccatum, sed pœna peccati, vel etiam aliquid utile sub consilio cadens, secundum illud Eccli., xxxi, 25: Si coactus fueris in edendo multum, surge e medio, et *vome, et refrigerabit te. Ergo non debet poni inter filias gulæ.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.arg.3] Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Isidorus 4 ponit scurrilitatem filiam luxuriæ. Non ergo debet poni inter filias gulæ.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.sc] Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., cap. xlv, § 88, col. 621, t. 2, has filias gulæ assignat.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.co] As stated above (1 and 2,3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense in the understanding," on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Ecclesiastes 2:3, "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as regards the. appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdra 3:20, that "wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have "loquaciousness," because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue." Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have "scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Ephesians 5:4, "Or foolish talking or scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality--i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh." Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility."
On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Ephesians 5:3, "But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust."
[II-II.q.148.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, gula proprie consistit circa immoderatam delectationem quæ est in cibis et potibus. Et ideo illa vitia inter filias gulæ computantur quæ ex immoderata delectatione cibi et potus consequuntur. Quæ quidem possunt accipi vel ex parte animæ, vel ex parte corporis. Ex parte autem animæ quadrupliciter; primo quidem quantum ad rationem, cujus acies hebetatur ex immoderatione cibi et potus; et quantum ad hoc ponitur filia gulæ « hebetudo sensus circa intelligentiam, » propter fumositates ciborum perturbantes caput; sicut e contrario abstinentia confert ad sapientiae perceptionem, secundum illud Eccle., ii, 3: Cogitavi in corde meo abstrahere a vino carnem meam, ut animum meum transferrem ad sapientiam. Secundo, quantum ad appetitum, qui multipliciter deordinatur per immoderantiam cibi et potus quasi sopito gubernaculo rationis; et quantum ad hoc ponitur « inepta lætitia, » quia omnes aliæ inordinatæ passiones ad lætitiam et tristitiam ordinantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. v. Et hoc est quod dicitur III Esdræ, iii, 20, quod vinum omnem mentem convertit in securitatem et jucunditatem. Tertio, quantum ad inordinatum verbum: et sic ponitur « multiloquium; » quia ut Gregorius dicit in Past., part. iii, c. xix, col. 81, t. 3, « nisi gulæ deditos immoderata loquacitas raperet, dives ille qui epulatus quotidie dicitur splendide, in lingua gravius non arderet. » Quarto quantum ad inordinatum actum; et sic ponitur « scurrilitas, » idest, jocularitas quædam proveniens ex defectu rationis, quæ sicut non potest cohibere verba, ita non potest cohibere exteriores gestus; unde ad Eph., v, 4, super illud, Aut stultiloquium, aut scurrilitas, dicit Glossa interl., quod « a stultis curialitas dicitur, idest, jocularitas, quæ risum movere solet. » Quam vis posset utrumque horum referri ad verba in quibus contingit peccare vel ratione superfluitatis, quod pertinet ad « multiloquium, » vel ratione in honestatis, quod pertinet ad « scurrilitatem. » Ex parte autem corporis ponitur immunditia, quæ potest attendi sive secundum inordinatam emissionem quarum-cumque superfluitatum, vel specialiter quantum ad emissionem seminis. Unde super illud ad Eph., v, 3, Fornicatio autem, et omnis immunditia, etc., dicit Glossa, « idest, incontinentia pertinens ad libidinem quocumque modo. »
[II-II.q.148.a.6.ad.1] Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. On like manner, we reply that dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod lætitia quæ est de actu peccati vel fine, consequitur omne peccatum, maxime quod procedit ex habitu. Sed lætitia vaga, incomposita, quæ hic dicitur inepta, præcipue oritur ex immoderata sumptione cibi vel potus. Similiter etiam dicendum quod hebetudo sensus quantum ad eligibilia communiter invenitur in omni peccato; sed hebetudo sensus circa speculabilia maxime procedit ex gula, ratione jam dicta.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.ad.2] Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet utilis sit vomitus post superfluam conestionem, tamen vitiosum est quod aliquis huic necessitati se subdat per immoderantiam cibi vel potus. Potest tamen absque culpa vomitus procurari ex consilio medicinæ in remedium alicujus languoris.
[II-II.q.148.a.6.ad.3] Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.148.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod scurrilitas procedit quidem ex actu gulæ, non autem ex actu luxuriæ, sed ex ejus volun- 1 Non occurrit apud Isidorum. tate; et ideo ad utrumque vitium potest pertinere.
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