Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q153. Lust
Source context
- Theme
- lust as disordered concupiscence and its governance by temperance and chastity
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 246Steiner states that acknowledging the ego of another person requires restraining one's lusts and desires from intruding into the neighbor's sphere, framing disordered desire as a violation of the other's spiritual autonomy.
- GA 178, 1917-11-10Steiner discusses how subconscious drives toward power and desire, when unintegrated, produce pathological conditions in the soul, paralleling the Thomistic concern with reason's failure to govern sensual appetite.
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta / Bhagavad GitaThe Gita identifies kāma (desire/lust) as a primary adversary of discriminative reason, structurally parallel to Aquinas's account of lust as that which most strongly clouds the intellect and corrupts the deliberative faculty.
- Platonic anthropologyPlato's tripartite soul places epithymia (appetitive desire) in structural tension with logos (reason), a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's framework of concupiscence overwhelming right reason when temperance is absent.
- Stoic ethicsStoic moral psychology treats excessive sensual desire as a pathos—a failure of rational governance—corresponding to Aquinas's definition of lust as inordinate attachment to venereal pleasure beyond the measure set by reason.
Q153. Lust
Article 1
[II-II.q.153.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod materia luxuriæ non solum sint concupiscentiæ et delectationes venereæ. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. II Confess., c. vi, col. 680, t. 4, quod « luxuria ad satietatem atque abundantiam se cupit vocari.» Sed satietas pertinet ad cibos et potus: abundantia autem ad divitias. Ergo luxuria non est proprie circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is written (Proverbs 20:1): "Wine is a lustful [Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Prov., xx, 4, dicitur: Luxuriosa res est vinum. Sed vinum pertinet ad delectationem cibi et potus. Ergo circa ea maxime videtur luxuria esse.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.arg.3] Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" [Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, luxuria dicitur esse libidinosæ voluptatis appetitus. Sed libidinosa voluptas non solum est in venereis, sed etiam in multis aliis. Ergo luxuria non est solum circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.sc] To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in lib. De vera religione, c. iii, § 4, col. 125, t. 3, de luxuriosis: « Qui seminat in carne, de carne metet corruptionem. » Sed seminatio carnis fit per voluptates venereas. Ergo ad has pertinet luxuria.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.co] As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etymol. § 161, col. 384, t. 3: « Luxuriosus aliquis dicitur quasi solutus in voluptates. » Maxime autem voluptates venereæ animum hominis solvunt: et ideo circa voluptates venereas maxime luxuria consideratur.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.ad.1] Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Galatians 5:19 says "lust is any kind of surfeit."
[II-II.q.153.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut temperantia principaliter quidem et proprie est circa delectationes tactus; dicitur autem ex consequenti, et per similitudinem quamdam in quibusdam aliis materiis: ita etiam luxuria principaliter quidem est in voluptatibus venereis, quæ maxime et præcipue animum hominis resolvunt; secundario autem dicitur in quibuscumque aliis ad excessum pertinentibus. Unde, ad Galat., v, 19, dicit Glossa sup. illud: Luxuria, idolorum servitus, quod « luxuria est quælibet superfluitas. »
[II-II.q.153.a.1.ad.2] Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vinum dicitur res luxuriosa vel secundum hunc modum quo in qualibet materia abundantia ad luxuriam refertur, vel in quantum superfluus usus vini incentivum voluptati venereæ præbet.
[II-II.q.153.a.1.ad.3] Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).
[II-II.q.153.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etsi libidinosa voluptas in aliis materiis dicatur, tamen specialiter hoc nomen sibi vindicant venereæ delectationes, in quibus etiam specialiter libido dicitur, ut Augustinus dicit in XIV De civ. Dei, c. xvi, col. 424, t. 7.
Article 2
[II-II.q.153.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullus actus venereus possit esse sine peccato. Nihil enim videtur impedire virtutem nisi peccatum. Sed omnis actus venereus maxime impedit virtutem: dicit enim Augustinus in I Soliloquiorum, c. x, col. 878, t. 4: « Nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce dejiciat animum virilem quam blandimenta feminea corporumque ille contactus. » Ergo nullus actus venereus videtur esse sine peccato.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.arg.2] Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency" as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ubicumque inventur aliquid superfluum, per quod a bono rationis receditur, hoc est vitiosum, quia virtus corrumpitur per superfluum et diminutum, ut dicitur II Ethic., cap. ii et vi. Sed in quolibet actu venereo est superfluitas delectationis, quæ in tantum absorbet rationem, quod impossibile est aliquid intelligere in ipsa, ut Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. xi, a med.; et sicut Hieronymus dicit, in illo actu spiritus prophetiæ non tangebat corda prophetarum. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.arg.3] Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, causa potior est quam effectus. Sed peccatum originale in parvulis trahitur a concupiscentia, sine qua actus venereus esse non potest, ut patet per Augustinum in lib. I De nuptiis et concupiscentia, c. xxiv, col. 429, t. 10. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De bono conjugali, c. xxv, col. 395, t. 6: « Satis responsum est hæreticis, si tamen capiunt non esse peccatum quod neque contra naturam committitur, neque contra morem, neque contra præceptum; » et loquitur de actu venereo quo antiqui Patres pluribus conjugibus utebantur. Ergo non omnis actus venereus est peccatum.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.co] A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccatum in humanis actibus est quod est contra ordinem rationis. Habet autem hoc rationis ordo ut quælibet convenienter ordinet in suum finem. Et ideo non est peccatum si per rationem homo utatur rebus aliquibus ad finem ad quem sunt, modo et ordine convenienti, dummodo ille finis sitaliquid vere bonum. Sicut autem est vere bonum quod conservetur corporalis natura unius individui; ita etiam est quoddam bonum excellens quod conservetur natura speciei humanæ. Sicut autem ad conservationem vitæ unius hominis ordinatur usus ciborum, ita etiam ad conservationem totius humani generis usus venereorum. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De bono conjugali, c. xvi, col. 385, t. 6: « Quod est cibus ad salutem hominis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem generis. » Et ideo sicut usus ciborum potest esse absque peccato si fiat debito modo et ordine secundum quod competit saluti corporis, ita etiam et usus venereorum potest esse absque peccato, si fiat debito modo et ordine, secundum quod est conveniens ad finem generationis humanæ.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.ad.1] A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. On this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary."
[II-II.q.153.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid potest impedire dupliciter virtutem: uno modo quantum ad communem sta-tum virtutis, et sic non impeditur virtus nisi per peccatum; alio modo quantum ad perfectum virtutis statum, et sic potest impediri virtus per aliquid quod non est peccatum, sed est minus bonum. Et hoc modo usus feminæ dejicit animum non a virtute, sed ab arce, id est, perfectione virtutis. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De bono conjugali, c. viii, col. 379, t. 6: « Sicut bonum erat quod Martha faciebat, occupata circa ministerium sanctorum, sed melius quod Maria audiens verbum Dei: ita bonum Susannæ in conjugali castitate laudamus, sed tamen ei bonum viduæ Annæ, ac multo magis Mariæ virginis anteponimus. »
[II-II.q.153.a.2.ad.2] As stated above (152, 2, ad 2; I-II, 64, 2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
[II-II.q.153.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, medium virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem, sed secundum quod convenit rationi rectæ; et ideo abundantia delectationis, quæ est in actu venereo secundum rationem ordinato, non contrariatur medio virtutis. Et præterea ad virtutem non pertinet, quantum sensus exterior delectetur, quod consequitur corporis dispositionem, sed quantum appetitus interior ad hujusmodi delectationes afficiatur. Nec ex hoc etiam quod ratio non potest liberum actum rationis ad spiritualia consideranda simul cum illa delectatione habere, ostenditur quod actus ille sit virtuti contrarius. Non enim est virtuti contrarium, si rationis actus aliquando intermittatur pro aliquo quod secundum rationem fit: alioquin quod aliquis se somno tradit, esset contra virtutem. Hoc tamen quod concupiscentia et delectatio venereorum non subjacet imperio et moderationi rationis, provenit ex pœna primi peccati, in quantum scilicet ratio rebellis Deo meruit habere suam carnem rebellem, ut patet per Augustinum XIII De civitate Dei, c. xiii, col. 386, t. 7.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.ad.3] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin." Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
[II-II.q.153.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, loc. cit., « ex concupiscentia carnis quæ in regeneratis non putatur in peccatum, tamquam ex filia peccati nascitur proles, originali obligata peccato. » Unde non sequitur quod actus ille sit peccatum, sed quod in illo 1 Refertur in Decr., xxxii, q. ii, cap. « Connubia, » col. 1469, sub nomine Hieronymi; optime vero notat editor hæc non apud Hieronymum, sed apud Origenem, Hom. vi super Numeros, col. 610, t. 2, legi. Parm.; « Hieronymus dicit Epist. xi ad Ageruch., de Monog., parum a med. et habetur cap. « Connubia », xxxii, qu. ii. » Saturninus dixit matrimonium esse illicitum. Tatiani vocabant illud, occultum meretricium; et pauperes de Lugduno fornicationem juratam, nisi continenter conjugati viverent. Marcio dixit nuptias esse illicitas, execrabiles, et spurcas. — Item Manichæi, Adamitæ, Priscillianistæ, et Albigenses. actu sit aliquid pœnale a peccato primo derivatum.
Article 4
[II-II.q.153.a.4.arg.1] It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Ephesians 5:3 (Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod luxuria non sit vitium capitale. Luxuria enim videtur idem esse immunditiæ, ut patet per Glossam interl., super illud, Omnis immunditia, ad Ephes., v. Sed immunditia est filia gulæ, ut patet per Gregorium, XXXI Moral., cap. xLV, § 88, col. 621, t. 2. Ergo luxuria non est vitium capitale.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.arg.2] Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Isidorus dicit in lib. II De summo bono sive sentent., c. xxxix, Cynici, Balaamitæ, Turrilupini, Agapetæ § 4, col. 640, t. 6, quod « sicut per superbiam mentis itur in prostitutionem libidinis, ita per humilitatem mentis salva fit castitas carnis. » Sed contra rationem capitalis vitii esse videtur quod ex alio vitio oriatur. Ergo luxuria non est vitium capitale. 3 Præterea, luxuria causatur ex desperatione, secundum illud Ephes., iv, 19: qui desperantes, semetipsos tradiderunt impudicitiæ. Sed desperatio non est vitium capitale: quinimo ponitur filia acediæ, ut supra habitium est. Ergo multo minus luxuria est vitium capitale.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.arg.3] Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Ephesians 4:19, "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated above (35, 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.sc] Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital vices.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., c. xlv, § 87, col. 624, t. 2, ponit luxuriam inter vitia capitalia.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.co] As stated above (148, 5; I-II, 84, 3,4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, vitium capitale est quod habet finem multum appetibilem; ita quod ex ejus appetitu homo procedat ad multa peccata perpetranda, quæ omnia ex illo vitio tanquam ex principaliori oriri dicuntur. Finis autem luxuriæ est delectatio venereorum, quæ est maxima. Unde hujusmodi delectatio est maxime appetibilis secundum appetitum sensitivum, tum propter vehementiam delectationis, tum etiam propter conna-turalitatem hujusmodi concupiscentiæ. Unde manifestum est quod luxuria est vitium capitale.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.ad.1] As stated above (Question 148, Article 6), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony materially--in so far as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust--and not under the aspect of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod immunditia secundum quosdam, quæ poni-tur filia gulæ, est quædam immunditia corporalis, ut supra dictum est, et sic objectio non est ad propositum. Si vero accipiatur pro immunditia luxuriæ, sic dicendum quod ex gula causatur material-liter, inquantum scilicet gula ministrat materiam corporalem luxuriæ: non autem secundum rationem causæ finalis, secundum quam potissime attenditur origo aliorum vitiorum ex vitiis capitalibus.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.ad.2] As stated above (132, 4, ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de inani gloria ageretur, superbia ponitur communis mater omnium peccatorum; et ideo etiam vitia capitalia ex superbia oriuntur.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.ad.3] Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital vice.
[II-II.q.153.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod a delectationibus luxuriæ præcipue aliqui abstinent propter spem futuræ gloriæ; quam desperatio subtrahit, et ideo causat luxu-riam sicut removens prohibens, non sicut per se causa; quod requiri videtur ad vitia capitalia.
Article 5
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod inconvenienter dicantur esse filiæ luxuriæ « cæcitas mentis, inconsideratio, præcipitatio, inconstantia, amor sui, odium Dei, affectus præsentis sæculi, horror » vel « desperatio futuri. » Quia cæcitas mentis, et inconsideratio, et præcipitatio, pertinent ad imprudentiam, quæ invenitur in omni peccato, sicut et prudentia in omni virtute. Ergo non debent poni speciales filiæ luxuriæ.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.2] Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (128, ad 6; 137, 3). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, constantia ponitur pars fortitudinis, ut supra habitum est. Sed luxuria non opponitur fortitudini, sed temperantiæ. Ergo inconstantia non est filia luxuriæ.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.3] Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei est principium omnis peccati, ut patet per Augustinum XIV De civit. Dei, c. xxviii, col. 436, t. 7. Non ergo debet poni filia luxuriæ.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.4] Further, Isidore [QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Isidorus, Quæst. in Deut., cap. xvi, § 3, col. 366, t. 5, ponit qua-tuor, scilicet « turpiloquia, scurrilia, ludicra, stultiloquia. » Ergo prædicta enumeratio videtur esse superflua.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.sc] stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
[II-II.q.153.a.5.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, XXXI Moral., c. xlv, § 88, col. 621, t. 2.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.co] When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according to Daniel 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." On this respect we have "blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." On this respect there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (Question 53, Article 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful old men (Daniel 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments." On this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must be referred.] [The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will undo those words."
On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quando inferiores potentiæ vehementer afficiuntur ad sua objecta, consequens est quod superiores vires impediantur et deordinen-tur in suis actibus. Per vitium autem luxuriæ maxime appetitus inferior, scilicet concupiscibilis, vehementer intendit suo objecto, scilicet delectabili, propter vehementiam passionis et delectationis. Et ideo consequens est quod per luxuriam Origo vitiorum ex vitiis capitalibus potissime attenditur secundum rationem causæ finalis; sed, juxta Sylvium, ratio causæ efficientis sufficeret. maxime superiores vires deordinentur, scilicet ratio et voluntas. Sunt autem rationis quatuor actus in agendis. Primo quidem simplex intelligentia, quæ apprehendit aliquem finem ut bonum; et hic actus impeditur per luxuriam, secundum illud Dan., xiii, 56: Species decepit te, et concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur cæcitas mentis. Secundus actus est consilium de his quæ sunt agenda propter finem: et hic etiam impeditur per concupiscentiam luxuriæ. Unde Terent. dicit in Eunucho., act. I, scena 1, a princ., loquens de amore libidinoso: « Quæ res in se neque consilium, neque modum ullum habet, eam consilio regere non potes. » Et quantum ad hoc ponitur « præcipitatio, » quæ importat subtractionem consilii, ut supra habitum est. Tertius actus est judicium de agendis: et hic etiam impeditur per luxuriam. Dicitur enim Dan., xiii, 9, de senibus luxuriosis: Averterunt sensum suum... ut non recordarentur judiciorum justorum. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur « inconsideratio. » Quartus autem actus est præceptum rationis de agendo, qui etiam impeditur per luxuriam, inquantum scilicet homo impeditur ex impetu concupiscentiæ, ne exequatur id quod decrevit esse facien-dum. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur « inconstantia. » Unde Terentius dicit in Eunucho, loc. cit., de quodam, qui dicebat se recessurum ab amica: « Hæc verba una falsa lacrymula restinguet. » Ex parte autem voluntatis consequitur duplex actus inordinatus: quorum unus est appetitus finis: et quantum ad hoc ponitur « amor sui, » quantum scilicet ad delectationem, quam inordinate appetit; et per oppositum ponitur « odium Dei, » inquantum scilicet prohibet delectationem concupitam. Alius autem est appetitus eorum quæ sunt ad finem: et quantum ad hoc ponitur « affectus præsentis sæculi; » in quo scilicet aliquis vult frui voluptate; et per oppositum ponitur « desperatio futuri sæculi, » quia dum nimis detinetur carnalibus delectation-nibus, non curat pervenire ad spiritua-les, sed fastidit eas.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.1] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit id VI Ethic., cap. v, a med., « intemperantia maxime corrumpit prudentiam; » et ideo vitia opposita prudentiae maxime oriuntur ex luxuria, quæ est præcipua intemperantiæ species.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.2] The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above (143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Hosea 4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. 35, 4, ad 2; 118, 8, ad 1; 148, 6).
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod constantia in arduis et terribilibus ponitur pars fortitudinis; sed constantiam habere in abstinendo a delectabilibus pertinet ad continentiam, quæ ponitur pars temperantiæ, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo inconstantia, quæ ei opponitur, ponitur filia luxuriæ: et tamen etiam prima inconstantia ex luxuria causatur, inquantum emollit cor hominis, et effeminatum reddit, secundum illud Oseæ, iv, 2: Fornicatio, et vinum, et ebrietas auferunt cor. Et Vegetius dicit in lib. I De re militari, cap. iii, in fin., quod « minus mortem metuit qui minus deliciarum norit in vita. » Nec oportet, sicutsæpe dictum est, quod filiae vitii capitalis cum eo in materia conveniant.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.3] Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod amor sui quantum ad quæcumque bona, quæ sibi aliquis appetit, est commune principium peccatorum; sed quantum ad hoc specialiter quod aliquis appetit sibi delectabilia carnis, ponitur « amor sui » filia luxuriæ.
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.4] The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" (Matthew 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.153.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod illa quæ Isidorus ponit, sunt quidam inordinati actus exteriores, et præcipue ad locutionem pertinentes. In qua est aliquid inordinatum quadrupliciter. Uno modo propter materiam; et sic ponuntur « turpiloquia: » quia enim ex abundantia cordis os loquitur, ut dicitur Matth., xii, 34, luxuriosi, quorum cor est turpibus concupiscentiis plenum, de facili ad turpia verba prorumpunt. Secundo, ex parte causæ: quia enim luxuria inconsiderationem et præcipitationem causat, consequens est quod faciat prorumpere in verba leviter et inconsiderate dicta, quæ dicuntur « scurrilia. » Tertio quantum ad finem: quia enim luxuriosus delectationem quærit, et verba sua ad delectationem ordinat; et sic prorumpit in verba « ludicra. » Quarto quantum ad sententiam verborum, quam pervertit luxuria propter cæcitatem mentis, quam causat; et sic prorumpit in « stultiloquia, » utpote cum suis verbis præfert delectationes quas appetit, quibuscumque aliis rebus.
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