Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q168. Modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body
Source context
- Theme
- modesty as virtue regulating outward bodily comportment and gesture
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethics (modesty / αἰδώς)Aristotle treats shame and modesty as quasi-virtues moderating conduct in social appearance, a structural parallel to Aquinas's treatment of modesty as ordering external bodily movements toward seemly expression.
- Stoic decorum (καθῆκον / officium)Stoic doctrine of decorum, transmitted through Cicero's De Officiis, holds that appropriate bodily deportment reflects inner rational order — a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's grounding of outward modesty in the virtue of temperance.
Q168. Modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body
Article 1
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul, according to Psalm 44:14, "All the glory of the king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the conscience." Now the movements of the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in exterioribus motibus corporis non sit aliqua virtus. Omnis enim virtus pertinet ad spiritualem animæ decorem, secundum illud psal. xliv, 14: Omnis gloria ejus filiæ regis ab intus: Glossa « id est, in conscientia. » Sed motus corporales non sunt ab intus, sed exterius. Ergo circa hujusmodi motus non potest esse virtus.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.2] Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutes non insunt nobis a natura, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. 1. Sed motus corporales exteriores insunt hominibus a natura, secundum quam quidam sunt velocis motus, et quidam tardi motus: et idem est de aliis differentiis exteriorum motuum. Ergo circa tales motus non attenditur aliqua virtus.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.3] Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with them.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis virtus moralis est circa actiones quæ sunt ad alterum, sicut justitia; vel circa passiones, sicut temperantia et fortitudo. Sed exteriores motus corporales non sunt ad alterum usum, neque etiam sunt passiones. Ergo circa eos non est aliqua virtus.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.4] Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as stated above (166, 1, Objection 1; 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement." Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, in omni opere virtutis est studium adhibendum, ut supra dictum est. Sed adhibere studium in dispositione motuum exteriorum est vituperabile; dicit enim Ambrosius in I De officiis, c. xviii, § 75, col. 49, t. 3: « Est gressus probabilis, in quo sit species auctoritatis gravitatisque pondus, tranquillitatis vestigium; ita tamen si studium desit atque affectio, sed motus sit purus ac simplex. » Ergo videtur quod circa compositionem exteriorem motuum non consistat virtus.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.sc] The beauty of honesty [Cf. 145, 1] pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty." Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward movement.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod decor honestatis pertinet ad virtutem. Sed compositis exteriorum motuum pertinet ad decorem honestatis: dicit enim Ambrosius in I De offici., c. xix, § 84, col. 53, t. 3: « Sicut molliculum et infractum aut vocis sonum aut gestum corporis non probo, ita nec agrestem ac rusticum. Naturam imitemur: ejus effigies formula disciplinæ, forma honestatis est. » Ergo circa compositionem exteriorum motuum est virtus.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.co] Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.
Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex and person," and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds: "This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish becoming to every action."
Hence Andronicus [De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward movements: namely "taste" [ornatus] which regards what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness" [bona ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."
[II-II.q.168.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtus moralis consistit in hoc quod ea quæ sunt hominis, per rationem ordinantur. Manifestum est autem quod exteriores motus hominis sunt per rationem ordinabiles, ad imperium enim rationis exteriora membra moventur. Unde manifestum est quod circa horum motuum ordinationem virtus moralis consistit. Ordinatio autem horum motuum attenditur quantum ad duo: uno quidem modo secundum convenientiam personæ; alio modo secundum convenientiam ad exteriores personas, negotia seu loca. Unde dicit Ambrosius in lib. I De officiis, loco sup. cit.: « Hoc est pulchritudinem vivendi tenere, convenientia cuique sexui et personæ reddere, » et hoc pertinet ad primum. Quantum autem ad secundum subditur: « Hic ordo gestorum optimus, hic ornatus ad omnem actionem accommodus. » Et ideo circa hujusmodi exteriores motus ponit Andronicus duo: scilicet « or- Parm. omisit: « usum. » natum, » qui respicit convenientiam personæ; unde dicit quod est « scientia circa decens in motu et habitudine; » et « bonam ordinationem, » quæ respicit convenientiam ad diversa negotia, et ea quæ circumstant; unde dicit quod est « experientia separationis, » id est, distinctionis actionum.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.1] Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, according to Sirach 19:27, "The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul."
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motus exteriores sunt quædam signa interioris dispositionis, secundum illud Eccli., xix, 27: Amictus corporis, et risus dentium, et ingressus hominis enuntiant de illo; et Ambrosius dicit in I De officiis, c. xviii, § 71, col. 48, t. 3, quod « habitus mentis in corporis statu cernitur; et quod « vox quædam animi est corporis motus. »
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.2] Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect."
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis ex naturali dispositione habeat homo aptitudinem ad hanc vel ad illam dispositionem exteriorum motuum, tamen quod deest naturæ potest suppleri ex industria rationis. Unde Ambrosius dicit in I De offici., § 75, col. 49, t. 3: « Motum natura informet: si quid sane in natura vitii est, industria emendet. »
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.3] As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish." It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form their judgment about us, according to Sirach 19:26, "A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance." Hence moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of your state." Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to "friendliness or affability" [Cf. 114, 1]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [Cf. 9], whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, exteriores motus sunt quædam signa interioris dispositionis, quæ præcipue attenditur secundum animæ passiones; et ideo moderatio exteriorum motuum requirit moderationem interiorum passionum. Unde Ambrosius dicit in I De offici., § 71, col. 48, etc, quod « hinc, » scilicet ex motibus exterioribus, « homo cordis nostri absconditus aut levior, aut jactantior, aut turbidior, aut contra gravior, et constantior, et purior, et maturior æstimatur. » Per motus etiam exteriores alii homines de nobis judicium capiunt, secundum illud Eccli., xix, 26: Ex visu cognoscitur vir, et ab occursu faciei cognoscitur sensatus. Et ideo moderatio exteriorum motuum quodammodo ad alios ordinatur, secundum illud quod Augustinus dicit In regula, § 6, col. 4380, t. 4: « In omnibus motibus vestris nihil fiat quod cujusquam offendat aspectum, sed quod vestram deceat sanctitatem. » Et ideo moderatio exteriorum motuum potest reduci ad duas virtutes, quas Philosophus tangit in IV Ethic., cap. vi et VII. Inquantum enim per exteriores motus ordinamur ad alios, pertinet exteriorum motuum mo-deratio ad « amicitiam » vel « affabilita« tem, quæ attenditur circa delectationes et tristitias, quæ sunt in verbis et factis in ordine ad alios quibus homo convivit; inquantum vero exteriores motus sunt signa interioris dispositionis, pertinet eorum moderatio ad virtutem « veritatis, » secundum quam aliquis talem se exhibet in verbis et factis qualis est interius.
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.4] It is censurable to study the style of one's outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without artifice, but not without correction."
[II-II.q.168.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in compositione exteriorum motuum studium vituperatur per quod aliquis fictione quadam in exterioribus motibus utitur, ita quod interiori dispositioni non conveniant. Debet tamen tale studium adhiberi, ut si quid in eis inordinatum est, corrigatur. Unde Ambrosius dicit in I De officiis, § 75, col. 49, t. 3: « Ars desit, non desit correctio. »
Article 2
[II-II.q.168.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.
[II-II.q.168.a.2.arg.2] Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us," as stated above (I-II, 55, 4). Now Chrysostom says [Hom. vi in Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no virtue about games.
[II-II.q.168.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « virtus est quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, » ut supra habitum est. Sed Chrysostomus dicit, Hom. vi in Matth., § 6, col. 371, t. 114: « Non dat Deus ludere, sed diabolus. Audi quid aliquando ludentes passi sunt. Sedit populus manducare, et bibere, et surrexerunt ludere. » Ergo circa ludos non potest esse virtus.
[II-II.q.168.a.2.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be no virtue about games.
[II-II.q.168.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in X Ethic., cap. vi, ante med., quod operationes ludi non ordinantur ad aliquid aliud. Sed ad virtutem requiritur ut propter aliud eligens operetur, sicut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. iv. Ergo circa ludos non potest esse aliqua virtus.
[II-II.q.168.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher [Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8 assigns to games the virtue of eutrapelia, which we may call "pleasantness."
[II-II.q.168.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Musicæ, cap. ult., col. 4146, t. 1: « Volo tandem tibi parcas: nam sapientem decet remittere interdum aciem rebus agendis intentam. » Sed ista remissio animi a rebus agendis fit per ludicra verba et facta. Ergo his uti interdum ad sapientem et virtuosum pertinet. Philosophus etiam, lib. IV Ethic., cap. viii, ponit virtutem « eutrapeliæ » circa ludos, quam nos possumus dicere jocunditatem.
[II-II.q.168.a.2.co] Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. On either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (I-II, 25, 2; I-II, 31, 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.
Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.
Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness (eutrapelia), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [Eutrapelia is derived from trepein = 'to turn'].
[II-II.q.168.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut homo indiget corporali quiete ad corporis refo-cillationem, quia non potest continue laborare propter hoc quod habet finitam virtutem quæ determinatis laboribus proportionatur; ita etiam est ex parte animæ, cujus etiam est virtus finita ad determinatas operationes proportionata. Et ideo quando ultra modum suum in aliquas operationes se extendit, laborat, et ex hoc fatigatur, praæsertim quia in operationibus animæ simul etiam laborat corpus, inquantum scilicet anima etiam intellectiva utitur viribus per organa corporea operantibus. Sunt autem bona sensibilia connaturalia homini: et ideo quando anima supra sensibilia elevatur, operibus rationis intenta, nascitur exinde quædam fatigatio animalis, sive homo intendat operibus rationis practicæ, sive speculativæ; magis tamen si operibus contemplationis intendat, quia per hoc magis a sensibilibus elevatur; quamvis forte in aliquibus operibus exterioribus rationis practicæ major labor corporis consistat. In utrisque tamen tanto aliquis magis animaliter fatigatur, quanto vehementius operibus rationis intendit. Sicut autem fatigatio corporalis solvitur per corporis quietem, ita etiam oportet quod fatigatio animalis solvatur per animæ quietem. Quies autem animæ est delectatio, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo oportet remedium contra fatigationem animalem adhiberi per aliquam delectationem, intermissa intentione ad insistendum studio rationis: sicut in Collationibus Patrum, collat. xxiv, cap. xxi, legitur quod B. Joannes Evangelista cum quidam scandalizarentur quod eum cum discipulis suis ludentem « — Volo tandem tibi parcas, labor est in chartis, « — Et apertum ire per auras animum permittas. « — Placet hoc nam sapienter, remittere interdum « — Aciem rebus agendis decenter intentam. » Non « jucunditatem » ut in Parm. Edit. invenirent, dicitur mandasse uni eorum qui arcum gerebat, ut sagittam traheret: quod cum pluries fecisset, quæsivit utrum hoc continue facere posset: qui respondit, quod si hoc continue faceret, arcus frangeretur. Unde beatus Joannes sub-intulit quod similiter animus hominis frangeretur, si nunquam a sua intentione relaxaretur. Hujusmodi autem dicta vel facta, in quibus non quæritur nisi delectatio animalis, vocantur ludicra vel jocosa. Et ideo necesse est talibus interdum uti, quasi ad quamdam animæ quietem. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. viii, quod « in hujus vitæ conservatione quædam requies cum ludo habetur. » Et ideo oportet interdum aliquibus talibus uti. Circa quæ tamen videntur tria esse praecipue cavenda. Quorum primum et principale est quod pra-dicta delectatio non quæratur in aliquibus operationibus vel verbis turpibus, vel nocivis. Unde Tullius dicit in I De officic., in tit. « De scurrilit. et facet., » quod « unum genus jocandi est illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscænum. » Aliud autem attendendum est ne totaliter gravitas animæ resolvatur. Unde Ambrosius dicit in I De officiciis, c. xx, § 85, col. 53, t. 3: « Caveamus ne dum relaxare animum volumus, solvamus omnem harmoniam, quasi concentum quemdam bonorum operum; » et Tullius dicit in I De officiciis quod « sicut pueris non omnem ludendi licentiam damus, sed eam quæ ab honestis actionibus non sit aliena; sic in ipso joco aliquod probi ingenii lumen eluceat. » Tertio autem attendendum est, sicut et in omnibus aliis humanis actionibus, ut congruat personæ, tempori et loco, et secundum alias circumstantias debite ordinetur, ut scilicet sit « tempore et homine dignus », ut Tullius dicit ibidem, in tit. « De scurrilit. » Hujusmodi autem secundum regulam rationis ordinantur. Habitus autem secundum rationem operans est virtus moralis. Et ideo circa ludos potest esse aliqua virtus, quam Philosophus, loco sup. cit., addunt: « sive bonam conversationem, sicut infra.;, omisso: « animaliter. » Cassianus factum paulo aliter narrat, et de uno tantum venatore S. Joannem interpellante loquitur. « eutrapeliam » nominat: et dicitur aliquis eutrapelus a bona versione 4, quia scilicet bene convertit aliqua dicta, vel facta in solatium; et inquantum per hanc virtutem homo refrenatur ab immoderantia ludorum, sub modestia continetur.
[II-II.q.168.a.2.ad.1] As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to Proverbs 8:6, "Hear, for I will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?"
[II-II.q.168.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, jocosa debent congruere negotiis et personis: unde et Tullius dicit in I Rhetor., seu De invent., inter princ. et med., quod « quando auditores sunt defatigati, non est inutile ab aliqua re nova aut ridicula oratorem incipere, si tamen rei dignitas non adimit jocandi facultatem. » Doctrina autem sacra maximis rebus intendit, secundum illud Proverb., vIII, 6: Audite, quoniam de rebus magnis locutura sum. Unde Ambrosius non excludit universaliter jocum a conversatione, sed a doctrina sacra: unde præmittit, c. xxiii, § 102, col. 58, t. 3: « Licet interdum honesta joca ac suavia sint; tamen ab ecclesiastica abhorrent regula; quoniam quæ in Scripturis sanctis non reperimus, ea quemadmodum usurpare possumus? »
[II-II.q.168.a.2.ad.2] This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is written (Wisdom 15:12): "They have accounted our life a pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment."
[II-II.q.168.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum illud Chrysostomi est intelligendum de illis qui inordinate ludis utuntur, et præcipue eorum qui finem in delectatione ludi constituunt; sicut de quibusdam dicitur, Sapientia, xv, 12: Estimaverunt ludum * esse vitam nostram; contra quos dicit Tullius in I De officiis, in tit. « Fontem esse modestiæ, ut appetitus obediat rationi: » « Non ita generati a natura sumus, ut ad ludum et jocum facti esse videamur; sed ad severitatem potius, et ad quædam studia graviora atque majora. »
[II-II.q.168.a.2.ad.3] Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters."
[II-II.q.168.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ipsæ operationes ludi secundum suam speciem non ordinantur ad aliquem finem: sed delectatio, quæ in talibus actibus habetur, ordinatur ad aliquam animæ recreationem et quietem: et secundum hoc, si fiat moderate, licet uti ludo. Unde Tullius dicit in I De officiis, loc. cit.: « Ludo et joco uti quidem licet, sed sicut somno et quietibus cæteris, tum cum gravibus seriisque rebus satisfecerimus. »
Article 3
[II-II.q.168.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful. Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in superfluitate ludi non possit esse peccatum. Illud enim quod excusat a peccato non videtur 2 esse peccatum. Sed ludus quando excusat a peccato: multa enim si serio fierent, gravia peccata essent, quæ quidem joco facta, vel nulla, vel levia sunt. Ergo videtur quod in superabundantia ludi non sit peccatum.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.arg.2] Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnia alia vitia reducuntur ad septem vitia capitalia, ut Gregorius dicit XXXI Moral., c. xLV, § 87, col. 620, etc., t. 2. Sed superabundantia in ludis non videtur reduci ad aliquod capitalium vitiorum. Ergo videtur quod non sit peccatum. Præterea, maxime histriones in ludo videntur superabundare, qui totam suam vitam ordinant ad ludendum. Si ergo superabundantia ludi esset peccatum, tunc omnes histriones essent in statu peccati: peccarent etiam omnes qui eorum ministerio uterentur, vel qui eis aliquod largirentur, tamquam peccati fautores, quod videtur esse falsum; legitur enim in Vitis Patrum, lib. VIII, cap. Lxiii, col. 1170, t. 1, quod beato Paphnutio revelatum est quod quidam joculator futurus erat sibi consors in vita futura.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.arg.3] Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.sc] A gloss on Proverbs 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A mourning that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud Proverb., xiv, 13: Risus dolore miscebitur, et extrema gaudii luctus occupat, dicit Glosa interl., « luctus perpetuus. » Sed in superfluitate ludi est inordinatus risus et inordinatum gaudium. Ergo est ibi peccatum mortale, cui soli debetur luctus perpetuus.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.co] In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (2) that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be "discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.
Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to God.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in omni eo quod est dirigibile secundum rationem, superfluum dicitur quod regulam rationis excedit: diminutum autem dicitur aliquid secundum quod deficit a regula rationis. Dictum est autem, quod ludicra sive jocosa verba vel facta sunt dirigibilia secundum rationem. Et ideo superfluum in ludo accipitur quod excedit regulam rationis: quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo ex ipsa specie actionum quae assumuntur in ludum; quod quidem jocandi genus secundum Tullium, lib. I De officiis, tit. « De scurrilit. et facet., » dicitur esse « illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum, » quando scilicet utitur aliquis causa ludi turpibus verbis, vel factis, vel etiam his quæ vergunt in proximi nocumentum, quæ de se sunt peccata mortalia. Et sic patet quod excessus in ludo est peccatum mortale. Alio autem modo potest esse excessus in ludo secundum defectum debitarum circumstantiarum; puta cum aliqui utuntur ludo, vel temporibus, vel in locis indebitis, aut etiam præter convenientiam negotii, seu personæ. Et hoc qui dem quandoque potest esse peccatum mortale propter vehementiam affectus ad ludum; cujus delectationem præponit aliquis dilectioni Dei, ita quod contra præceptum Dei, vel Ecclesiæ, talibus ludis uti non refugiat. Quandoque autem est peccatum veniale, puta si aliquis non tantum afficitur ad ludum quod propter hoc velit aliquid contra Deum committere.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.ad.1] Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliqua sunt peccata propter solam intentionem, quia scilicet in injuriam alicujus fiunt: quam quidem intentionem excludit ludus, cujus intentio ad delectationem fertur, non ad injuriam alicujus; et in talibus ludus excusat a peccato, vel peccatum diminuit. Quædam vero sunt quæ secundum suam speciem sunt peccata, sicut homicidium, fornicatio et similia: et talia non excusantur per ludum; quinimo ex his ludus redditur flagitiosus et obscænus.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.ad.2] Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written (Exodus 32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play."
[II-II.q.168.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod superfluitas in ludo pertinet ad ineptam laetitiam, quam Gregorius, loco cit., dicit esse filiam gulæ. Unde Exod., xxxii, 6, dicitur: Sedit populus manducare, et bibere, et surrexerunt ludere.
[II-II.q.168.a.3.ad.3] As stated (2), play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that "to give one's property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue"; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him."
[II-II.q.168.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ludus est necessarius ad conversationem humanæ vitæ. Ad omnia autem quæ sunt utilia conversationi humanæ, deputari possunt aliqua officia licita. Et ideo etiam officium histrionum, quod ordinatur ad solatium hominibus exhibendum, non est secundum se illicitum: nec sunt in statu peccati, dummodo moderate ludo utantur, idest, 1 Refertur in Decret., cap. « Pasce, » dist. Lxxxvi, col. 412. 2 Liber De vera et falsa pænitentia, quem fere totum in Decreta Gratianus, in Sententias Petrus non utendo aliquibus illicitis verbis vel factis ad ludum, et non adhibendo ludum negotiis et temporibus indebitis. Et quam vis in rebus humanis non utantur alio officio per comparisonem ad alios homines; tamen per comparisonem ad seipsos et ad Deum alias habent seriosas et virtuosas operationes; puta dum orant, et suas passiones et operationes componunt, et quandoque etiam pauperibus eleemosynas largiuntur. Unde illi qui moderate eis subveniunt, non peccant, sed juste faciunt, mercedem ministerii eorum eis tribuendo. Si qui autem superflue sua in tales consumunt, vel etiam sustentant illos histriones qui illicitis ludis utuntur, peccant, quasi eos in peccato foventes. Unde Augustinus dicit Super Joannem, tract. c, § 2, col. 1891, t. 3, quod « donare res suas histrionibus, vitium est immane, non virtus, » nisi forte aliquis histrio esset in extrema necessitate, in qua esset ei subveniendum: dicit enim Ambrosius in libro De officiis: « Pasce fame morientem: quisquis enim pascendo hominem servare poteras, si non pavisti, occidisti. »
Article 4
[II-II.q.168.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [Spurious]: "Let him refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in defectu ludi non consistat aliquod peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum indicitur pænitenti. Sed Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera et falsa pænit., de pænitente loquens: « Cohibeat se a ludis et a spectaculis sæculi qui perfectam vult consequi gratiam remissionis. » Ergo in defectu ludi non est aliquod peccatum.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.arg.2] Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it is written (Jeremiah 15:17): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and (Tobit 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullum peccatum ponitur in commendatione sanctorum. Sed in commendatione quorumdam ponitur quod a ludo abstinuerunt: dicitur enim Lombardus sub Augustini nomine transtulerunt, jam Augustino abjudicatur, et inter spuria rejicitur. Genuini quidem auctoris nomen adhuc latet. Jerem., xv, 47: Non sedi in concilio ludentium; et Tob., iii, 47, dicitur: Nunquam cum ludentibus, miscui me, neque cum his qui in levitate ambulant, participem me præbui. Ergo in defectu ludi non potest esse peccatum.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.arg.3] Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Andronicus ponit austeritatem, quam inter virtutes numerat, esse habitum, secundum quem aliqui nec afferunt aliis delectationes collocutionum, nec ab aliis recipiunt. Sed hoc pertinet ad defectum ludi. Ergo defectus ludi magis pertinet ad virtutem quam ad vitium.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.sc] The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in II Ethic., cap. vii, et in IV, cap. viii, ponit defectum in ludo esse vitiosum.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.co] In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca [Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8).
Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): "We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat."
[II-II.q.168.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omne quod est contra rationem in rebus humanis, vitiosum est. Est autem contra rationem ut aliquis se aliis onerosum exhibat, puta dum nihil delectabile exhibet, et etiam aliorum delectationes impedit. Unde Seneca dicit, lib. De quatuor virtutib., cap. « De continentia, » ante med.: « Sic te geras sapienter quod nullus te habeat tamquam asperum, nec contemnat quasi vilem. » Illi autem qui in ludo deficiunt, nec ipsi dicunt aliquid ridiculum, et dicentibus molesti sunt, quia scilicet moderatos aliorum ludos non recipiunt. Et ideo tales vitiosi sunt, et dicuntur « duri et agrestes, » ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. viii. Sed quia ludus est utilis propter quietem et delectationem; delectatio autem et quies non propter se quæruntur in humana vita, sed propter operationem, ut dicitur X Ethic., cap. vii; ideo « defectus ludi minus est vitiosus quam ludi superexcessus. Unde Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. x, ante med., quod « pauci amici propter delectationem sunt habendi, quia parum de delectatione sufficit ad vitam quasi pro condimento, sicut parum de sale sufficit in cibo. »
[II-II.q.168.a.4.ad.1] Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia pœnitentibus luctus indicitur pro peccatis, ideo interdicitur eis ludus. Nec hoc pertinet ad vitium defectus; quia hoc ipsum est secundum rationem quod in eis ludus diminuatur.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.ad.2] Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: "I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The words of Tobit 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness."
[II-II.q.168.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Jeremias ibi loquitur secundum congruentiam temporis, cujus status magis actum requirebat: unde subdit: Solus sedebam, quoniam amaritudine replesti me. Quod autem dicitur Tob., iii, pertinet ad ludum superfluum; quod patet ex eo quod se quitur: Neque cum his qui in levitate ambulant, participem me præbui.
[II-II.q.168.a.4.ad.3] Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls "friendliness," or eutrapelia, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.168.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod austeritas, secundum quod est virtus, non excludit omnes delectationes, sed superfluas et inordinatas: unde videtur pertinere ad affabilitatem, quam Philosophus, lib. IV Ethic., cap. vi, « amicitiam » nominat, vel ad eutrapeliam, sive jocunditatem: et tamen nominat et definit eam sic secundum convenientiam ad temperantiam cujus est delectationes reprimere.
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