Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q167. Curiosity
Source context
- Theme
- curiosity as a deficient or disordered appetite for knowledge, distinct from genuine love of truth
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 196, 1920-01-18Steiner distinguishes genuine interest in all things from mere curiosity, warning that the two are easily confused and that curiosity is an insufficient and distorting motive for approaching supersensible knowledge.
- GA 68d, 1906-04-07Steiner identifies curiosity driving participation in spiritualist séances as a form of selfishness, even when participants believe their motives are noble.
- GA 96, 1906-10-08Steiner states that satisfying curiosity or thirst for sensation cannot be the mission of spiritual science, noting this as a deficiency present among some theosophists.
- GA 156, 1914-10-04Steiner cautions that any attempt to contact the dead motivated merely by curiosity will find that curiosity is not satisfied, implying that the proper motive must exceed curiosity entirely.
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic moral theology (Aquinas, ST II-II Q167)Aquinas treats curiosity (curiositas) as a vice opposed to studiousness, consisting in the disordered desire to know — seeking knowledge for improper ends or by improper means, including knowledge that puffs up rather than edifies.
- Augustinian traditionAugustine identifies concupiscentia oculorum — lust of the eyes — as the root of curiosity in the Confessions, framing it as desire that scatters attention outward rather than directing it toward God; Aquinas inherits this analysis structurally.
Q167. Curiosity
Article 1
[II-II.q.167.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod circa cognitionem intellectivam non possit esse curiositas. Quia secundum Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. vi, a med., in his quæ secundum se sunt bona vel mala, non possunt accipi medium et extrema. Sed cognitio intellectiva secundum se est bona; in hoc enim perfectio hominis videtur consistere, ut intellectus ejus de potentia reducatur in actum, quod fit per cognitionem veritatis; dicit enim Dionysius 4 iv cap. De div. nom., § 32, col. 734, t. 1, quod « bonum animæ humanæ est secundum rationem esse, » cujus perfectio in cognitione veritatis consistit. Ergo circa cognitionem intellectivam non potest esse vitium curiositatis.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.arg.2] Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, according to Sirach 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord God," and Wisdom 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Hebrews 4:13), and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Samuel 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud per quod homo assimilatur Deo, et quod a Deo consequitur, non potest esse malum. Sed quæcumque abundantia cognitionis a Deo est, secundum illud Eccli., 1, 1: Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est; et Sap., vii, 17, dicitur: Ipse dedit mihi horum quæ sunt scientiam veram, ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum, et virtutes elementorum, etc. Per hoc etiam homo Deo assimilatur, quod veritatem cognoscit, quia omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis ejus, ut habetur ad Hebraeos, iv, 13; unde I Reg., ii, 3, dicitur quod Deus scientiarum Dominus est. Ergo quantumcumque abundet cognitio veritatis, non est mala, sed bona. Appetitus autem boni non est vitiosus. Ergo circa intellectivam cognitionem veritatis non potest esse vitium curiositatis.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.arg.3] Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si circa aliquam intellectivam cognitionem posset esse curiositatis vitium, præcipue esset circa philosophicas scientias. Sed eis intendere non videtur esse vitiosum: dicit enim Hieronymus Supra Danielem, c. i, v. 8. col. 497, t. 52,: « Qui de mensa et vino regis noluerunt comedere, ne polluantur, si sapientiam atque doctrinam Babyloniorum scirent esse peccatum, nunquam acquiescerent dicere quod non licebat. » Et Augustinus dicit in II De doctrina christiana, cap. xl, col. 63, t. 3, quod « si qua vera philosophi dixerunt, ab eis sunt, tamquam injustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda. » Non ergo circa cognitionem intellectivam potest esse curiositas vitiosa.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.sc] Jerome [Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17 says: "Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit Sup. illud Ephes., iv: Non ambuletis in vanitate, col. 504, t. 7: « Nonne vobis videtur in vanitate sensus et obscuritate mentis ingredi, qui diebus ac noctibus in dialectica arte torquetur, qui physicus perscrutator oculos trans cælum levat? » Sed vanitas sensus et obscuritas mentis est vitiosa. Ergo circa intellectivas scientias potest esse curiositas vitiosa.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.co] As stated above (166, 2, ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Corinthians 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.
On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue." On like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of Jeremiah 9:5, "They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity."
Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says [Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the demons."
Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."
Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Sirach 3:22): "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Sirach 3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity."
[II-II.q.167.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, studiositas non est directe circa ipsam cognitionem, sed circa appetitum et studium cognitionis acquirendæ. Aliter autem est judicandum de ipsa cognitione veritatis, et aliter de appetitu et studio veritatis cognoscendæ. Ipsa enim veritatis cognitio per se loquendo, bona est; potest autem per accidens esse mala, ratione scilicet alicujus consequentis, vel inquantum aliquis de cognitione veritatis superbit, secundum illud, I ad Cor., viii, 4: Scientia inflat, vel inquantum homo utitur cognitione veritatis ad peccandum. Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendæ veritatis potest habere recitudinem vel perversitatem: uno quidem modo, prout aliquis tendit suo studio in cognitionem veritatis, prout per accidens conjungitur ei malum; sicut illi qui student ad scientiam veritatis ut exinde superbiant. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De morib. Eccles., c. xxi, col. 4327, t. 4: « Sunt qui desertis virtutibus et nescientes quid sit Deus, et quanta majestas semper 1 Equivalenter sub his verbis: « Animo malum est quod a ratione deflexerit. » 2 Habetur cap. « Qui de Mensa, » dist. xxxvii, col. 205. eodem modo manentis naturæ, magnum aliquid se agere putant, si universam istam corporis molem, quam mundum nuncupamus, curiosissime, intensissimeque perquirant. Unde tanta etiam superbia gignitur, ut in ipso cælo, de quo sæpe disputant, sibimet habitare videantur. » Similiter etiam illi qui student addiscere aliquid ad peccandum, vitiosum studium habent, secundum illud Jeremiæ, ix, 5: Docuerunt linguam suam loqui mendacium; ut inique agerent, laboraverunt. Alio autem modo potest esse vitium ex ipsa inordinatione appetitus, et studii ad discendam veritatem; et hoc quadrupliciter: uno modo inquantum per studium minus utile retrahuntur a studio quod eis ex necessitate incumbit; unde Hieronymus dicit Ep. xxI, § 43, col. 386, t. 4: « Sacerdotes, omissis Evangeliis et Prophetis, videmus comædias legere, amatoria bucolicorum versuum verba canere. » Alio modo inquantum studet aliquis addiscere ab eo a quo non licet: sicut patet de his qui aliqua futura a dæmonibus perquirunt; quæ est superstitiosa curiositas: unde Augustius dicit in libro De vera religione, c. iv, col. 426, t. 3: « Nescio an philosophi præpedirentura fide vitio curiositatis in percunctandis dæmonibus. » Tertio, quando homo appetit cognoscere veritatem circa creaturas, non referendo ad debitum finem, scilicet ad cognitionem Dei: unde Augustinus dicit in libro De vera religione, cap. xxIX, t. 3, quod « in consideratione creaturarum non est vana et peritura curiositas exercenda; sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus. » Quarto modo inquantum aliquis studet ad cognoscendam veritatem supra proprii ingenii facultatem, quia per hoc homines de facili in errores labuntur: unde dicitur Eccli., 22: Altiora te ne quæsieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris, et in pluribus operibus ejus ne fueris curiosus; et postea sequitur: Multos enim supplantavit suspicio eorum * et in vanitate detinuit sensus eorum.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.ad.1] Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonum hominis consistit in cognitione veri; non tamen summum hominis bonum consistit in cognitione cujuslibet veri, sed in perfecta cognitione summæ veritatis, ut patet per Philosophum in X Ethic., cap. VII et VIII. Et ideo potest esse vitium in cognitione aliquorum verorum, secundum quod talis appetitus non debito modo ordinatur ad cognitionem summæ veritatis, in qua consistit summa felici-tas.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.ad.2] Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should be regulated in due manner.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, etsi ratio illa ostendit quod cognitio veritatis secundum se bona sit, non tamen per hoc excluditur quin possit aliquis cognitione veritatis abuti ad malum, vel etiam inordinate cognitionem veritatis appetere, quia etiam oportet appetitum boni debito modo regulatum esse.
[II-II.q.167.a.1.ad.3] The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them, as stated in Romans 1:19. Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (Colossians 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according to Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God."
[II-II.q.167.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod studium philosophiæ secundum se est licitum et laudabile propter veritatem quam philosophi perceperunt, Deo illis revelante, ut dicitur ad Rom., 1. Sed quia quidam philosophi abutuntur ad fidei impugnationem, ideo Apostolus dicit ad Coloss., II, 8: Videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam secundum traditionem hominum, et non secundum Christum; et Dionysius dicit in Epistola VII, ad Polycarpum, col. 1079, t. 4, de quibusdam philosophis, quod « divinis non sancte contra divina utuntur, per sapientiam Dei tentantes expellere divinam venerationem. »
Article 2
[II-II.q.167.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vitium curiositatis non sit circa sensitivam cognitionem. Sicut enim aliqua cognoscuntur per sensum visus, ita etiam aliqua cognoscuntur per sensus tactus et gustus. Sed circa tangibilia et gustabilia non ponitur vitium curiositatis, sed magis vitium luxuriæ et gulæ. Ergo videtur quod nec circa ea quæ cognoscuntur per visum sit vitium curiositatis.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.arg.2] Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, curiositas videtur esse in inspectione ludorum; unde Augustinus dicit in VI Confess., c. VIII, col. 726, t. 4, quod « quodam pugnæ casu cum clamor ingens totius populi vehementer Alipium pul- 1 sasset, curiositate victus aperuit oculos. » Sed inspectio ludorum non videtur esse vitiosa, quia hujusmodi inspectio delectabilis redditur propter repraesentationem, in qua homo naturaliter delectatur, ut Philosophus dicit in sua Poetica, cap. 11: non ergo circa sensibilium cognitionem est vitium curiositatis. 3. Praeterea, ad curiositatem pertinere videtur actus proximorum perquirere, ut dicit Beda Sup. illud I Joan., Concupiscentia carnis, col. 92, t. 4. Sed perquirere facta aliorum non videtur esse vitiosum, quia, sicut dicitur Eccli., xvii, 12, mandavit unicuique Deus de proximo suo. Ergo vitium curiositatis non est in hujusmodi particularibus sensibilibus cognoscendis.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.arg.3] Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [Comment. in 1 John 2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to Sirach 17:12, God "gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible objects.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that "concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 John 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera relig., c. xxxviii, col. 153, t. 3, quod concupiscentia oculorum reddit homines curiosos. Ut autem dicit Beda, loco cit., « concupiscentia oculorum est non solum in discendis magicis artibus, sed etiam in contemplandis spectaculis, et in dignoscendis et carpendis vitiis proximorum; » quae sunt quædam particularia sensibilia. Cum ergo concupiscentia oculorum sit quoddam vitium, sicut etiam superbia vitæ et concupiscentia carnis, contra quæ dividitur, I Joan., 11, videtur quod vitium curiositatis sit circa sensibilium cognitionem.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.co] The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. On the second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is directed to detraction. on the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad duo: uno enim modo tam in hominibus quam in aliis animalibus ordinatur ad corporis sustentationem, quia per hujusmodi cognitionem homines et alia animalia vitant nociva, et conquirunt ea quæ sunt necessaria ad corporis sustentationem; alio modo specialiter in homine ordinatur ad cognitionem intellectivam, vel speculativam vel practicam. Apponere ergo studium circa sensibilia cognoscenda, dupliciter potest esse vitiosum: uno modo inquantum cognitio sensitiva non ordinatur in aliquid utile, sed potius avertit hominem ab aliqua utili consideratione: unde Augustinus dicit in X Confess., c. xxxv, col. 803, t. 4: « Canem currentem post leporem jam non specto, cum in circo fit. At vero in agro, si casu transeam, avertit me fortassis ab aliqua magna cogitatione, atque ad se convertit illa venatio: et nisi jam mihi demonstrata infirmitate mea, cito admoneas, aut ex ipsa visione per aliquam considerationem in te assurgere, aut totum contemnere atque transire, vanus hebesco. » Alio modo in quantum cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquod noxium; sicut inspectio mulieris ordinatur ad concupiscentum; et diligens inquisitio eorum quæ ab aliis fiunt, ordinatur ad detra-hendum. Si quis autem cognitioni sensibilium intendit ordinate propter necessitatem sustentandæ naturæ, vel propter studium intelligendæ veritatis, est virtuosa studiositas circa sensibilium cognitionem.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.ad.1] Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes" because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge."
[II-II.q.167.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod luxuria et gula sunt circa delectationes quæ sunt in usu rerum tangibilium; sed circa delectationem cognitionis omnium sensuum est curiositas; et vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, quia « oculi sunt ad cognoscentum in sensibus principales, unde omnia sensibilia videri dicuntur, » ut Augustinus dicit in X lib. Confess., c. xxxv, § 54, col. 802, t. 4: et sicut Augustinus ibidem subdit, « ex hoc evidenius discernitur, quid voluptatis, quid curiositatis agatur per sensus, quod voluptas pulchra, canora, suavia, sapida, lenia sectatur; curiositas autem etiam his contraria tentandi causa, non ad subeundam molestiam, sed experiendi, noscendique libidine. »
[II-II.q.167.a.2.ad.2] Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees represented. Hence Chrysostom says [Hom. vi in Matth.] that such sights make men adulterers and shameless.
[II-II.q.167.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod inspectio spectaculorum vitiosa redditur, inquantum per hoc homo fit pronus ad vitia vel lasciviæ, vel crudelitatis, per ea quæ ibi repræsentantur. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, Hom. vi in Matth., § 8, col. 373, t. 44, quod « adulteros et inverecundos constituent tales inspectiones. »
[II-II.q.167.a.2.ad.3] One may watch other people's actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for one's own good--that is in order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor--or for our neighbor's good--that is in order to correct him, if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Hebrews 10:24, "Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works." But to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Proverbs 24:15), "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest."
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.167.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod prospicere facta aliorum, bono animo, vel ad utilitatem propriam, ut scilicet homo ex bonis operibus proximi provocetur ad melius, vel etiam ad utilitatem illius, ut scilicet corrigatur, si quid ab eo agitur vitiose, secundum regulam charitatis et debitum officii, est laudabile, secundum illud ad Hebr., x, 24: Considerate vos invicem in non quærendo quid reprehendas, sed videndo quid corrigas. » Unde hic consulto S. Doctor omisit: « vel inquirere. » Infra autem, loco hujus vocis « inquirendum » Cod. habent: « inquietandum. » provocationem charitatis et bonorum operum. Sed quod aliquis intendat ad consideranda vitia proximorum, ad despiciendum, vel detrahendum, vel saltem inutiliter inquietandum est vitiosum. Unde dicitur Proverb., xxiv, 15: Ne insideris et quæras impietatem in domo justi, neque vastes requiem ejus.
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