Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q181. The active life
Source context
- Theme
- distinction and value of the active life (vita activa) as ordered toward the common good and external works of charity
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics — practical virtueAristotle's treatment of praxis as the domain of moral virtue directed toward the polis provides the philosophical substrate Aquinas draws upon in distinguishing the active life's proper object as external deeds ordered to the neighbor.
- Vedanta — karma-yogaThe Bhagavad Gita's karma-yoga disciplines action in the world without attachment to fruits, presenting a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that the active life, rightly ordered, does not obstruct but serves the ultimate spiritual end.
Q181. The active life
Article 1
[II-II.q.181.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (58, 2 and 8; I-II, 60, 2 and 3). Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non omnes actus virtutum moralium pertineant ad vitam activam. Vita enim activa videtur consistere solum in his quæ sunt ad alterum: dicit enim Gregorius Super Ezech., hom. II, l. II, § 8, col. 953, t. 2, quod « activa vita est panem esurientitribuere; » et in fine, multis enumeratis quæ ad alterum pertinent, subdit: « Et quæ singulis quibusque expediat, dispensare. » Sed non per omnes actus virtutum moralium ordinarum ad alios, sed solum secundum justi-tiam, et partes ejus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non ergo actus omnium virtutum moralium pertinent ad vitam activam.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.arg.2] Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit Super Ezech., ibidem, § 10, quod « per Liam, quæ fuit lippa, sed fecunda, significatur vita activa, quæ dum occupatur in opere minus videt: sed dum modo per verbum modo per exemplum ad imitationem suam proximos ascendit, multos in opere bono filios generat. » Hoc autem magis videtur pertinere ad charitatem, per quam diligimus proximum, quam ad virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod actus virtutum moralium non pertineant ad vitam activam.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.arg.3] Further, as stated above (Question 180, Article 2), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales disponunt ad vitam contemplativam. Sed dispositio et perfectio pertinent ad idem. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales non pertineant ad vitam activam.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.sc] Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit in lib. III De summo bono sive Sent., c. xv, § 3, col. 690, t. 6: « In activa vita prius per exercitium boni operis cuncta exhaurienda sunt vitia, ut in contemplativa jam pura mentis acie ad contemplandum Deum quisque pertranseat. Sed cuncta vitia non exhauriuntur nisi per actus virtutum moralium. Ergo actus virtutum moralium ad vitam activam pertinent.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 179, Article 1) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed.
Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, vita activa et contemplativa distinguuntur secundum diversa studia hominum intendentium ad diversos fines: quorum unum est consideratio veritatis, quæ est finis vitae contemplativa; aliud autem est exterior operatio ad quam ordinatur vita activa. Manifestum est autem quod in virtutibus moralibus non principaliter quæritur contemplatio veritatis, sed ordinantur ad operandum. Unde Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. 11, circa princ., et lib. X, cap. ult., quod « ad virtutem quidem scire parum aut nihil prodest. » Unde manifestum est quod virtutes morales pertinent essentialiter ad vitam activam. Unde et Philosophus, in X Ethic., cap. VII et VIII, virtutes morales ordinat ad felicitatem activam.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.ad.1] The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in these things, not exclusively, but principally.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod inter virtutes morales præcipua est justitia, qua aliquis ad alterum ordinatur, ut Philosophus probat in V Ethic., cap. 1, a med. Unde vita activa describitur per ea quæ ad alterum ordinatur, non quia in his solum, sed quia in his principalius consistit.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.ad.2] It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per actus omnium virtutum moralium potest aliquis proximos suo exemplo dirigere ad bonum; quod Gregorius ibi attribuit vitæ activæ.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.ad.3] Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues belong to the active life.
It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life.
[II-II.q.181.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut virtus quæ ordinatur in finem alterius virtutis, transit quodammodo in speciem ejus, ita etiam quando aliquis utitur his quæ sunt vitæ activæ, solum prout dispo-nunt ad contemplationem, comprehenduntur sub vita contemplativa. In his autem qui operibus virtutum moralium intendunt, tamquam secundum se bonis, non autem tamquam disponentibus ad vitam contemplativam, virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam activam. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod vita activa dispositio sit ad vitam contemplativam.
Article 2
[II-II.q.181.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod prudentia non pertineat ad vitam activam. Sicut enim vita contemplativa pertinet ad vim cognitivam, ita activa ad vim appetitivam. Prudentia autem non pertinet ad vim appetitivam, sed magis ad cognitivam. Ergo prudentia non pertinet ad vitam activam.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.arg.2] Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit Super Ezech., ubi supra, § 10, quod « activa vita, dum occupatur in opere, minus videt; » unde significatur per Liam quæ lippos oculos habebat. Prudentia autem requirit oculos claros ut recte judicet homo de agendis. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non pertineat ad vitam activam.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.arg.3] Further, prudence stands between the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (Article 1), so do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).
[II-II.q.181.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prudentia media est inter virtutes morales et intellectuales. Sed sicut virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam activam, ut dictum est, ita intellectuales ad contemplativam. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non pertineat neque ad vitam activam, neque ad contemplativam, sed ad medium vivendi genus, quod Augustinus ponit XIX De civit. Dei, cap 11 et xix, col. 624 et 647, t. 7.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in X Ethic., cap. VII, prudentiam pertinere dicit ad felicitatem activam, ad quam pertinent virtutes morales.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.co] As stated above (1, ad 3; I-II, 18, 6), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is "right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (1, ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.
If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. On this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise."
[II-II.q.181.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, præcipue in moralibus, trahitur ad speciem ejus ad quod ordinatur; sicut « ille qui mœchatur, ut furetur, magis dicitur fur quam mœchus, » secundum Philosophum, in V Ethic., cap. 11, parum a princ. Manifestum est autem quod cognitio prudentiae ordinatur ad operationes virtutum moralium sicut ad finem; est enim « recta ratio agibilium, » sicut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v, unde et fines virtutum moralium sunt principia prudentiae, sicut in eodem libro Philosophus dicit. Sicut ergo dictum est, quod virtutes morales in eo qui ordinat eas ad quietem contemplationis, pertinent ad vitam contemplativam; ita cognitio prudentiae, quæ de se ordinatur ad operationes virtutum moralium, directe pertinet ad vitam activam; si tamen prudentia proprie sumatur, secundum quod Philosophus de ea loquitur. Si autem sumatur communius, prout scilicet comprehendit qualemcumque humanam cognitionem, sic prudentia quantum ad aliquam sui partem pertinet ad vitam contemplativam; secundum quod Tullius dicit in I De offic., in tit. « De qua-tuor virtutibus unde omnia officia manant, » quod « qui acutissime et celerrime potest et videre verum, et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet. »
[II-II.q.181.a.2.ad.1] Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (I-II, 18, 4,6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active life.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod operationes morales specificur ex fine, ut supra habitum est, ideo ad vitam comtemplativam illa cognitio pertinet quæ finem habet in ipsa cognitione veritatis. Cognitio autem prudentiae, quæ magis habet finem in actu appetitivæ virtutis, pertinet ad vitam activam.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.ad.2] External occupation makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes [Bell. Catilin., LI].
[II-II.q.181.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod occupatio exteriorum rerum facit hominem minus videre in rebus intelligibilibus, quæ sunt separatæ a sensibilibus, in quibus operationes activæ vitæ consistunt, sed tamen occupatio exterior activæ vitæ facit hominem magis clare videre in judicio agibilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, tum propter experientiam tum propter mentis attentionem, quia « ubi intenderis, ibi ingenium valet, » ut Sallustius dicit in Conjur. Catil., circa princ. orat. Cæsaris.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.ad.3] Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
[II-II.q.181.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod prudentia dicitur esse media inter virtutes intellectuales et morales quantum ad hoc quod in subjecto convenit cum virtutibus intellectualibus, in materia autem totaliter convenit cum moralibus. Illud autem tertium vivendi genus medium est inter activam vitam et contemplativam, quantum ad ea circa quæ occupatur, quia quandoque occupatur in contemplatione veritatis, quandoque autem occupatur circa exteriora.
Article 3
[II-II.q.181.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod docere non sit actus vitæ activæ, sed contemplativæ. Dicit enim Gregorius Super Ezech., hom. vi, § 13, col. 827, t. 2, quod « viri perfecti bona cælestia, quæ saltem per speculum contemplari potuerunt, fratribus denuntiant, eorumque animos in amorem intimæ claritatis ascendunt. » Sed hoc pertinet ad doctrinam. Ergo docere est actus vitæ contemplativæ.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.arg.2] Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad idem genus vitæ videtur reduci actus et habitus. Sed docere est actus sapientiae: dicit enim Philosophus in princ. Metaphys., cap. 1, a med., quod « signum scientis est posse docere. » Cum ergo sapientia vel scientia pertineat ad vitam contemplativam, videtur quod etiam doctrina ad vitam contemplativam pertineat.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.arg.3] Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut contemplatio est actus vitæ contemplativæ, ita et oratio. Sed oratio, qua quis orat pro alio, nihilominus pertinet ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo quod aliquis veritatem meditatam in alterius notitiam per doctrinam deducat, videtur ad vitam contemplativam pertinere.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.sc] Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."
[II-II.q.181.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit Super Ezech., hom. ii, l. II, § 8, col. 953, t. 2: « Activa vita est panem esurienti tribuere, verbo sapientiae nescientem docere. »
[II-II.q.181.a.3.co] The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life.
The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actus doctrinæ habet duplex objectum: fit enim doctrina per locutionem, locutio autem est signum audibile interioris conceptus. Est ergo unum objectum doctrinæ id quod est materia, sive objectum interioris conceptionis: et quantum ad hoc objectum quandoque doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, quandoque ad contemplativam. Ad activam quidem quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem, ut per eam in exteriori actione dirigatur; ad contemplativam autem quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem intelligibilem, in cujus consideratione et amore delectatur. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De verb. Domini, serm. civ, cap. 1, col. 616, t. 5: « Eligant sibi partem meliorem, » scilicet vitæ contemplativæ « vacent verbo, inhibent doctrinæ dulcedini, occupentur circa scientiam salutarem, » ubi manifeste dicit doctrinam ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Aliud vero objectum doctrinæ est ex parte sermonis audibilis: et sic objectum doctrinæ est ipse audiens: et quantum ad hoc objectum omnis doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, ad quam pertinent exteriores actiones.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.ad.1] The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de doctrina quantum ad materiam, prout versatur circa considerationem et amorem veritatis.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.ad.2] Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod habitus et actus communicant in objecto: et ideo manifeste illa ratio procedit ex parte materiae interioris conceptionis. Intantum enim ad sapientem vel scientem pertinet posse docere, in quantum potest interiorem conceptum verbis exprimere, ad hoc quod possit alium adducere ad intellectum veritatis.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.ad.3] He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.
[II-II.q.181.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui orat pro alio, nihil agit erga illum pro quo orat, sed solum erga Deum, qui est intelligibilis veritas; sed ille qui alium docet, aliquid circa eum agit exteriori actione. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque.
Article 4
[II-II.q.181.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (Article 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains after this life.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vita activa maneat post hanc vitam. Ad vitam enim activam pertinent actus moralium virtutum, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes morales permanent post hanc vitam, ut Augustinus dicit in XIV de Trinit., cap. ix, col. 1045, t. 8. Ergo videtur quod vita activa permaneat post hanc vitam.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.arg.2] Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above (Article 3). But in the life to come when "we shall be like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [Coel. Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this life.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, docere alios pertinet ad vitam activam, ut dictum est. Sed in futura vita, in qua similes erimus angelis, poterit esse doctrina; sicut et in angelis esse videtur, quorum unus alium illuminat, purgat et perficit; quod refertur ad scientiæ assumptionem, ut patet per Dionysium, vii cap. De cæl. hier., § 3, col. 210, t. 4. Ergo videtur quod vita activa remaneat post hanc vitam.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.arg.3] Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after this life.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod de se est durabilius, magis videtur posse post hanc vitam remanere. Sed vita activa videtur esse de se durabilior: dicit enim Gregorius, Super Ezech., hom. v, § 12, col. 825, t. 2, quod « in vita activa fixi permanere possumus; in contemplativa autem intentam mentem tenere nullo modo valemus. » Ergo multo magis vita activa post manere post hanc vitam quam contemplativa.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.sc] Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly home."
[II-II.q.181.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit Super Ezech., hom. ii, l. II, § 9, col. 954, t. 2: « Cum præsenti sæculo vita aufertur activa; contemplativa autem hic incipitur, ut in cælesti patria perficiatur. »
[II-II.q.181.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 1), the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, "there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity."
[II-II.q.181.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, vita activa habet finem in exterioribus actibus; qui si referantur ad quietem contemplationis jam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam; in futura autem vita beatorum cessabit occupatio exteriorum actuum: et si qui actus exteriores sint, referentur ad finem contemplationis. Ut enim Augustinus dicit in fine De civit. Dei, col. 804, t. 7, « ibi vacabimus, et videbimus, et amabimus, et laudabimus. » Et in eodem libro præmittit, col. 802, quod « ibi Deus sine fine videbitur, sine fastidio amabitur, sine fatigatione laudabitur: hoc munus, hic affectus, hic actus erit omnibus. »
[II-II.q.181.a.4.ad.1] As stated above (136, 1, ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales manebunt non secundum actus quos habent circa ea quæ sunt ad finem, sed secundum actus quos habent circa finem. Hujusmodi autem actus sunt secundum quod constituunt quietem contemplationis, quam Augustinus in præmissis verbis significat per vacationem, quæ est intelligenda non solum ab exterioribus tumultibus, sed etiam ab interiori perturbatione passionum.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.ad.2] The contemplative life, as stated above (Question 180, Article 4), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Matthew 18:10, "the little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest."
But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the ladder--which refers to contemplation--and "descending" --which refers to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vita contemplativa, sicut supra dictum est, præcipue consistit in contemplatione Dei; et quantum ad hoc unus angelus alium docet: quia ut dicitur Matth., xviii, 10, de angelis pusillorum, qui sunt inferioris ordinis, quod semper vident faciem Patris; sic et in futura vita nullus hominum alium docebit de Deo, sed omnes videbimus eum, sicuti est, ut habetur I Joan., iii, 2. Et hoc est quod Jerem., xxxi, 34, dicitur: Non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, dicens: Cognosce Dominum. Omnes enim cognoscent me a minimo eorum usque ad maximum. Sed de his quæ pertinent ad dispensationem mysteriorum Dei, unus angelus docet alium purgando, illuminando et perficiendo: et secundum hoc habent aliquid de vita activa, quamdiu mundus durat, ex hoc quod administrationi inferioris creaturæ intendunt; quod significatur per hoc quod Jacob vidit angelos in scala ascendentes, quod pertinet ad contemplationem, et descendentes, quod pertinet ad actionem. Sed, sicut dicit Gregorius II Moral., cap. iii, § 3, col. 556, t. 4, « non sic a divina visione foras exeunt, ut internæ contemplationis gaudiis privenur. » Et ideo in eis non distinguitur vita activa contemplativa, sicut in nobis, qui per opera vitæ activæ impedimur a contemplatione. Non autem promittitur nobis similitudo angelorum quantum ad administrationem inferioris creaturæ, quæ nobis non competit secundum ordinem naturæ nostræ, sicut competit angelis, sed quantum ad visionem Dei.
[II-II.q.181.a.4.ad.3] That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height recoils on itself."
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.181.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod durabilitas vitæ activæ in statu præsenti exceedens durabilitatem vita contemplativa, non provenit ex proprietate utriusque vita secundum se consideratæ, sed ex defectu nostri, qui ex corporis gravitate retrahimur ab altitudine contemplationis. Unde ibidem, col. 826, subdit Gregorius, quod « ipsa sua infirmitate ab immensitate tantæ celsitudinis animus repulsus in semetipso relabitur. »
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