Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Tertia Pars·Q62. The sacraments' principal effect, which is grace
Source context
- Theme
- sacramental grace as the principal effect of the sacraments, constituting a specific participatory elevation of human nature toward the divine
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic Christian (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae III, Q62)Aquinas distinguishes sacramental grace from common grace in that it adds to habitual grace a determinate instrumental power ordered to the sacrament's proper effect, situating the sacraments as efficient causes participating in divine power.
- Eastern Orthodox sacramental theology (theosis tradition)Cross-tradition congruence appears in the Eastern Orthodox concept of theosis, where the sacraments (especially the Eucharist) are understood as participatory vehicles of divinizing grace, structurally parallel to Aquinas's account of sacramental grace as a real elevation of human nature toward God.
- Neoplatonic participation metaphysics (Pseudo-Dionysius)Pseudo-Dionysius's sacramental theology frames the ecclesiastical hierarchies as graded participations in divine light, offering a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's instrumentalist account of grace flowing through sacramental form.
Q62. The sacraments' principal effect, which is grace
Article 1
[III.q.62.a.1.arg.1] It seems that the sacraments are not the cause of grace. For it seems that the same thing is not both sign and cause: since the nature of sign appears to be more in keeping with an effect. But a sacrament is a sign of grace. Therefore it is not its cause.
[III.q.62.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod propter fornicationem non liceat viro uxorem dimittere. Non enim est malum pro malo reddendum. Sed vir, dimittendo uxorem propter fornicationem, videtur malum pro malo reddere. Ergo hoc non licet.
[III.q.62.a.1.arg.2] Further, nothing corporeal can act on a spiritual thing: since "the agent is more excellent than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii). But the subject of grace is the human mind, which is something spiritual. Therefore the sacraments cannot cause grace.
[III.q.62.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, majus peccatum est, si uterque fornicetur, quam si alter tantum. Sed si uterque fornicetur, non poterit propter hoc fieri divortium. Ergo nec si unus tantum fornicatus fuerit.
[III.q.62.a.1.arg.3] Further, what is proper to God should not be ascribed to a creature. But it is proper to God to cause grace, according to Psalm 83:12: "The Lord will give grace and glory." Since, therefore, the sacraments consist in certain words and created things, it seems that they cannot cause grace.
[III.q.62.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fornication spiritualis et quædam alia peccata sunt graviora quam fornicatione carnalis. Sed propter illa non potest fieri separatio a toro. Ergo nec propter fornicationem carnalem.
[III.q.62.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.) that the baptismal water "touches the body and cleanses the heart." But the heart is not cleansed save through grace. Therefore it causes grace: and for like reason so do the other sacraments of the Church.
[III.q.62.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., v. Præterea, illi qui frangit fidem, non tenetur aliquis servare fidem. Sed conjux fornicando fidem frangit, quam alteri conjugi debet. Ergo alter potest alterum causa fornicationis dimittere.
[III.q.62.a.1.co] We must needs say that in some way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace. For it is evident that through the sacraments of the New Law man is incorporated with Christ: thus the Apostle says of Baptism (Galatians 3:27): "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ." And man is made a member of Christ through grace alone.
Some, however, say that they are the cause of grace not by their own operation, but in so far as God causes grace in the soul when the sacraments are employed. And they give as an example a man who on presenting a leaden coin, receives, by the king's command, a hundred pounds: not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own, caused him to be given that sum of money; this being the effect of the mere will of the king. Hence Bernard says in a sermon on the Lord's Supper: "Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crozier, a bishop by means of a ring, so by the various sacraments various kinds of grace are conferred." But if we examine the question properly, we shall see that according to the above mode the sacraments are mere signs. For the leaden coin is nothing but a sign of the king's command that this man should receive money. In like manner the book is a sign of the conferring of a canonry. Hence, according to this opinion the sacraments of the New Law would be mere signs of grace; whereas we have it on the authority of many saints that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but also cause grace.
We must therefore say otherwise, that an efficient cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The principal cause works by the power of its form, to which form the effect is likened; just as fire by its own heat makes something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace: since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Peter 1:4: "He hath given us most great and precious promises; that we may be [Vulgate: 'you may be made'] partakers of the Divine Nature." But the instrumental cause works not by the power of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent: for instance, the couch is not like the axe, but like the art which is in the craftsman's mind. And it is thus that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace: for they are instituted by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "All these things," viz. pertaining to the sacraments, "are done and pass away, but the power," viz. of God, "which works by them, remains ever." Now that is, properly speaking, an instrument by which someone works: wherefore it is written (Titus 3:5): "He saved us by the laver of regeneration."
[III.q.62.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Dominus dimittere uxorem concessit propter fornicationem in pœnam illius qui fidem fregit, et in favorem illius qui fidem servavit, ut non sit adstrictus ad reddendum ei debitum qui non servavit fidem. Excipiuntur tamen septem casus in quibus non licet viro uxorem dimittere fornicantem, in quibus vel uxor a culpa immunis est, vel utrique actualiter culpabiles sunt. Primus est, si ipse vir similiter fornicatus fuerit; secundus, si ipse uxorem prostituerit; tertius, si uxor virum suum probabiliter mortuum credens, propter longam ejus absentiam, alteri nupserit; quartus, si latenter cognita est ab aliquo sub specie viri lectum subintrante; quintus, si fuerit vi oppressa; sextus si reconciliaverit eam sibi post adulterium perpetratum, carnaliter eam cognoscens; septimus, si matrimonio in infidelitate utriusque contracto, vir dederit uxori libellum repudii, et uxor alteri nupserit; tunc enim si uterque convertatur, tenetur eam vir recipere 4.
[III.q.62.a.1.ad.1] The principal cause cannot properly be called a sign of its effect, even though the latter be hidden and the cause itself sensible and manifest. But an instrumental cause, if manifest, can be called a sign of a hidden effect, for this reason, that it is not merely a cause but also in a measure an effect in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. And in this sense the sacraments of the New Law are both cause and signs. Hence, too, is it that, to use the common expression, "they effect what they signify." From this it is clear that they perfectly fulfil the conditions of a sacrament; being ordained to something sacred, not only as a sign, but also as a cause.
[III.q.62.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vir si dimittat uxorem fornicantem livore vindictæ, peccat; si autem ad infamiam propriam cavendam, ne videatur particeps criminis, vel ad vitium uxoris corrigendum, vel ad evitandum prolis incertitudinem, non peccat.
[III.q.62.a.1.ad.2] An instrument has a twofold action; one is instrumental, in respect of which it works not by its own power but by the power of the principal agent: the other is its proper action, which belongs to it in respect of its proper form: thus it belongs to an axe to cut asunder by reason of its sharpness, but to make a couch, in so far as it is the instrument of an art. But it does not accomplish the instrumental action save by exercising its proper action: for it is by cutting that it makes a couch. In like manner the corporeal sacraments by their operation, which they exercise on the body that they touch, accomplish through the Divine institution an instrumental operation on the soul; for example, the water of baptism, in respect of its proper power, cleanses the body, and thereby, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the Divine power, cleanses the soul: since from soul and body one thing is made. And thus it is that Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that it "touches the body and cleanses the heart."
[III.q.62.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod divortium ex causa fornicationis fit uno accusante alium. Et quia nullus potest accusare qui in simili crimine existit, quando uterque fornicatur, divortium celebrari non potest; quamvis magis peccetur contra matrimonium utroque fornicante quam altero tantum. 1 Prosequitur Nicolai in textu: «Sic enim quoad primum extra. De divortiis cap. « Significasti, » et « Ex litteris tuis » Alexander III. Quoad secundum, extra. de eo qui cognovit consanguineam uxoris sux, cap. « Discretionem, » Innocentius IIf. Quoad tertium, extra De secundis nuptiis, cap. « Dominus ac Redemptor, » Lucius III, ut et cap. « Cum per bellicam » Leo papa, et « Cum in captivitate » Innocentius I, causa XXXIV, quam fornicatio, quæst 1. Quoad quartum, causa XXXIV, qu. II, cap. « In lectum, » concilium Triburiense. Quoad quintum, causa XXXII, quæst. v, cap. « Puto, » § « Cum ergo, » Gratianus. Quoad sextum, eadem causa, quæst. I, cap. « De Benedicto, » Pelagius pontifex. Quoad septimum, extra. De divortiis, cap. « Gaudemus, » Innocentius III, prope finem. »
[III.q.62.a.1.ad.3] This argument considers that which causes grace as principal agent; for this belongs to God alone, as stated above.
[III.q.62.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fornicatio directe est contra bonum matrimonii, quia tollitur per eam certitudo prolis, et fides frangitur, et significatio non servatur, dum unus conjugum pluribus carnem suam dividit. Etideo alia crimina, quamvis forte sint majora fornicatione, non tamen causant divortium. Sed quia infidelitas, quæ dicitur spiritualis fornicatio, etiam est contra bonum matrimonii, quod est proles educanda ad cultum Dei, etiam ipsa facit divortium; sed tamen aliter quam corporalis fornicatio quia propter unum actum fornicationis carnalis potest procedi ad divortium, non autem propter unum actum infidelitatis, sed propter consuetudinem, quæ pertinaciam ostendit, in qua infidelitas perficitur.
Article 2
[III.q.62.a.2.arg.1] It seems that sacramental grace confers nothing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts. For the grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the soul sufficiently, both in its essence and in its powers; as is clear from what was said in I-II, 110, 3,4. But grace is ordained to the perfecting of the soul. Therefore sacramental grace cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.
[III.q.62.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vir teneatur ex præcepto uxorem fornicantem dimittere. Vir enim cum sit caput uxoris, tenetur uxorem corrigere. Sed separatio a toro est inducta ad correctionem uxoris fornicantis. Ergo tenetur eam a se separare.
[III.q.62.a.2.arg.2] Further, the soul's defects are caused by sin. But all sins are sufficiently removed by the grace of the virtues and gifts: because there is no sin that is not contrary to some virtue. Since, therefore, sacramental grace is ordained to the removal of the soul's defects, it cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.
[III.q.62.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, qui consentit peccanti mortaliter, ipse etiam mortaliter peccat. Sed vir retinens uxorem fornicantem, consentire ei videtur, ut in Littera dicitur, IV, dist. xxxv. Ergo peccat, nisi eam a se ejiciat.
[III.q.62.a.2.arg.3] Further, every addition or subtraction of form varies the species (Metaph. viii). If, therefore, sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it follows that it is called grace equivocally: and so we are none the wiser when it is said that the sacraments cause grace.
[III.q.62.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, I Cor., vi, 16, dicitur: Qui adhæret meretrici, unum corpus efficiatur. Sed non potest aliquis simul esse membrum meretricis et Christi, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo vir uxori fornicanti adhærens membrum Christi esse desinit; et sic mortaliter peccat.
[III.q.62.a.2.sc] If sacramental grace confers nothing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it is useless to confer the sacraments on those who have the virtues and gifts. But there is nothing useless in God's works. Therefore it seems that sacramental grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.
[III.q.62.a.2.co] As stated in I-II, 110, 3,4, grace, considered in itself, perfects the essence of the soul, in so far as it is a certain participated likeness of the Divine Nature. And just as the soul's powers flow from its essence, so from grace there flow certain perfections into the powers of the soul, which are called virtues and gifts, whereby the powers are perfected in reference to their actions. Now the sacraments are ordained unto certain special effects which are necessary in the Christian life: thus Baptism is ordained unto a certain spiritual regeneration, by which man dies to vice and becomes a member of Christ: which effect is something special in addition to the actions of the soul's powers: and the same holds true of the other sacraments. Consequently just as the virtues and gifts confer, in addition to grace commonly so called, a certain special perfection ordained to the powers' proper actions, so does sacramental grace confer, over and above grace commonly so called, and in addition to the virtues and gifts, a certain Divine assistance in obtaining the end of the sacrament. It is thus that sacramental grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.
[III.q.62.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dimissio uxoris fornicantis introducta est ad corrigendum uxoris crimen per talem pœnam. Pœna autem corrigens non requiritur, ubi emendatio jam præcessit. Et ideo si mulier de peccato pœniteat, vir non tenetur eam dimittere; si autem non pœniteat, tenetur, ne peccato ejus consentire videatur dum correctionem debitam non apponit.
[III.q.62.a.2.ad.1] The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers of the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary conduct: but as regards certain special effects which are necessary in a Christian life, sacramental grace is needed.
[III.q.62.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccatum fornicationis in uxore potest corrigi non tantum tali pœna, sed etiam verbis et verbere; et ideo si alias ad correctionem sit parata, non tenetur vir prædictam pœnam ad ejus correctionem adhibere
[III.q.62.a.2.ad.2] Vices and sins are sufficiently removed by virtues and gifts, as to present and future time. in so far as they prevent man from sinning. But in regard to past sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas their guilt remains, man is provided with a special remedy in the sacraments.
[III.q.62.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod tunc vir uxori consentire videtur, quando eam tenet non cessantem a peccato præterito; si autem emendata fuerit, non ei consentit.
[III.q.62.a.2.ad.3] Sacramental grace is compared to grace commonly so called, as species to genus. Wherefore just as it is not equivocal to use the term "animal" in its generic sense, and as applied to a man, so neither is it equivocal to speak of grace commonly so called and of sacramental grace.
[III.q.62.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex quo de peccato fornicationis pœnituit, meretrix dici non potest. Et ideo vir, ei se conjungendo, membrum meretricis non fit. Vel dicendum, quod non conjungitur ei quasi meretrici, sed quasi uxori.
Article 3
[III.q.62.a.3.arg.1] It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace. For it seems that what is contained is in the container. But grace is not in the sacraments; neither as in a subject, because the subject of grace is not a body but a spirit; nor as in a vessel, for according to Phys. iv, "a vessel is a movable place," and an accident cannot be in a place. Therefore it seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace.
[III.q.62.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod proprio judicio vir uxorem fornicantem possit dimittere. Sententiam enim a judice latam absque alio judicio exequi licet. Sed Deus, judex justus, dedit hanc sententiam ut propter fornicationem vir uxorem dimittere possit: non ergo requiritur ad hoc aliud judicium.
[III.q.62.a.3.arg.2] Further, sacraments are instituted as means whereby men may obtain grace. But since grace is an accident it cannot pass from one subject to another. Therefore it would be of no account if grace were in the sacraments.
[III.q.62.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Matth., 1, 49, dicitur quod Joseph, cum esset justus, cogitavit occulte dimittere Mariam. Ergo videtur quod occulte vir possit divortium celebrare absque judicio Ecclesiæ.
[III.q.62.a.3.arg.3] Further, a spiritual thing is not contained by a corporeal, even if it be therein; for the soul is not contained by the body; rather does it contain the body. Since, therefore, grace is something spiritual, it seems that it cannot be contained in a corporeal sacrament.
[III.q.62.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si vir post fornicationem uxoris cognitam debitum ei reddit, amittit actionem quam contra fornicariam habebat. Ergo denegatio debiti, quæ ad divortium pertinet, debet Ecclesiæ judicium præcedere.
[III.q.62.a.3.sc] Hugh of S. Victor says (De Sacram. i) that "a sacrament, through its being sanctified, contains an invisible grace."
[III.q.62.a.3.sc] Sed contra, nullus debet seipsum vin-dicare. Sed si vir uxorem fornicantem proprio arbitrio dimitteret, ipse se vindicaret. Ergo hoc non debet fieri. Præterea, nullus in eadem causa est actor et judex. Sed vir est actor impetens uxorem de offensa in se commissa. Ergo ipse non potest esse judex; et sic non debet eam proprio arbitrio dimittere.
[III.q.62.a.3.co] A thing is said to be in another in various ways; in two of which grace is said to be in the sacraments. First, as in its sign; for a sacrament is a sign of grace. Secondly, as in its cause; for, as stated above (Article 1) a sacrament of the New Law is an instrumental cause of grace. Wherefore grace is in a sacrament of the New Law, not as to its specific likeness, as an effect in its univocal cause; nor as to some proper and permanent form proportioned to such an effect, as effects in non-univocal causes, for instance, as things generated are in the sun; but as to a certain instrumental power transient and incomplete in its natural being, as will be explained later on (4).
[III.q.62.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod vir potest uxorem dimittere dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad torum tantum, et sic potest eam dimittere, quam cito sibi constat de fornicatione uxoris, proprio arbitrio, nec tenetur reddere debitum exigenti, nisi per Ecclesiam compellatur, et taliter redens nullum præjudicium sibi facit. Alio modo quantum ad torum et cohabitatio nem, et hoc modo non potest dimitti nisi judicio Ecclesiæ; et si alias dimissa fuerit, debet cogi ad cohabitandum, nisi posset ei vir incontinenti fornicationem probare. Hæc autem dimissio divortium dicitur; et ideo concedendum est quod divortium non potest celebrari nisi judicio Ecclesiæ.
[III.q.62.a.3.ad.1] Grace is said to be in a sacrament not as in its subject; nor as in a vessel considered as a place, but understood as the instrument of some work to be done, according to Ezekiel 9:1: "Everyone hath a destroying vessel [Douay: 'weapon'] in his hand."
[III.q.62.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sententia est applicatio juris communis ad particulare factum. Unde Deus jus promulgavit, secundum quod jus sententia in judicio formari debet.
[III.q.62.a.3.ad.2] Although an accident does not pass from one subject to another, nevertheless in a fashion it does pass from its cause into its subject through the instrument; not so that it be in each of these in the same way, but in each according to its respective nature.
[III.q.62.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Joseph voluit B. Virginem dimittere, non quasi suspectam de fornicatione, sed ob reverentiam sanctitatis ejus, timens cohabitare ei. Nec tamen est simile, quia tunc ex adulterio non solum procedebatur ad divortium, sed ulterius ad lapidationem; non autem nunc, quando agitur judicio Ecclesiæ. Ad tertium patet solutio ex dictis.
[III.q.62.a.3.ad.3] If a spiritual thing exist perfectly in something, it contains it and is not contained by it. But, in a sacrament, grace has a passing and incomplete mode of being: and consequently it is not unfitting to say that the sacraments contain grace.
Article 4
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.1] It seems that there is not in the sacraments a power of causing grace. For the power of causing grace is a spiritual power. But a spiritual power cannot be in a body; neither as proper to it, because power flows from a thing's essence and consequently cannot transcend it; nor as derived from something else, because that which is received into anything follows the mode of the recipient. Therefore in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod vir et uxor non debeant in causa divortii ad paria judicari. Divortium enim tenetur in lege nova loco repudii, quod erat in lege veteri, ut patet Matth., v. Sed in repudio vir et uxor non judicaban-tur ad paria, quia vir poterat repudiare uxorem, et non e converso. Ergo nec in divortio debent ad paria judicari.
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.2] Further, whatever exists is reducible to some kind of being and some degree of good. But there is no assignable kind of being to which such a power can belong; as anyone may see by running. through them all. Nor is it reducible to some degree of good; for neither is it one of the goods of least account, since sacraments are necessary for salvation: nor is it an intermediate good, such as are the powers of the soul, which are natural powers; nor is it one of the greater goods, for it is neither grace nor a virtue of the mind. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, plus est contra legem naturæ quod uxor plures viros habeat, quam quod vir plures mulieres; unde hoc quandoque licuit, illud vero nun-quam. Ergo plus peccat mulier in adulterio quam vir, et ita non debent ad paria judicari.
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.3] Further, if there be such a power in the sacraments, its presence there must be due to nothing less than a creative act of God. But it seems unbecoming that so excellent a being created by God should cease to exist as soon as the sacrament is complete. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power for causing grace.
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ubi est majus nocumentum proximi, ibi est majus peccatum. Sed plus nocet uxor adultera viro quam vir adulter uxori, quia adulterium uxoris facit incertitudinem prolis, non autem adulterium viri. Ergo majus est peccatum uxoris, et sic non debent ad paria judicari.
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.4] Further, the same thing cannot be in several. But several things concur in the completion of a sacrament, namely, words and things: while in one sacrament there can be but one power. Therefore it seems that there is no power of causing grace in the sacraments.
[III.q.62.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, divortium inducitur ad crimen adulterii corrigendum. Sed magis pertinet ad virum, qui est caput mulieris, ut dicitur I Corinth., xi, corrigere uxorem quam e converso. Ergo non debent in divortio ad paria judicari, sed vir debet esse melioris conditionis. 5. Sed contra, videtur quod in hoc uxor debeat esse melioris conditionis, quia quanto est major fragilitas in peccante, tanto magis est peccatum venia dignum. Sed in mulieribus est major fragilitas quam in viris; ratione cujus dicit Chrysostomus in Sup. Oper. imperf. in Matth., hom. xL, parum a princ., quod « propria passio mulierum est luxuria; » et Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. vii, quod « mulieres non dicuntur continentes, proprie loquendo, propter facilem inclinationem ad concupiscentias, » quia nec bruta animalia possunt continere, propter hoc quod non habent aliquid quod concupiscentiis obviare possit. Ergo mulieribus in pœna divortii deberet magis parci.
[III.q.62.a.4.sc] Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): "Whence hath water so great power, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?" And Bede says that "Our Lord conferred a power of regeneration on the waters by the contact of His most pure body."
[III.q.62.a.4.co] Those who hold that the sacraments do not cause grace save by a certain coincidence, deny the sacraments any power that is itself productive of the sacramental effect, and hold that the Divine power assists the sacraments and produces their effect. But if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing about the sacramental effects. Now such power is proportionate to the instrument: and consequently it stands in comparison to the complete and perfect power of anything, as the instrument to the principal agent. For an instrument, as stated above (Article 1), does not work save as moved by the principal agent, which works of itself. And therefore the power of the principal agent exists in nature completely and perfectly: whereas the instrumental power has a being that passes from one thing into another, and is incomplete; just as motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.
[III.q.62.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in causa divortii vir et uxor ad paria judicantur, ut idem sit licitum et illicitum uni quod alteri: non tamen pariter judicantur ad illa, quia causa divortii est major in uno quam in alio, cum tamen in utroque sit sufficiens causa ad divortium. Divortium enim pœna est adulterii inquantum est contra matrimonii bona. Quantum autem ad bonum fidei, ad quam conjuges æqualiter sibi invicem tenentur, tantum peccat contra matrimonium adulterium unius, sicut adulterium alterius, et hæc causa in utroque sufficit ad divortium. Sed quantum ad bonum prolis plus peccat adulterium uxoris quam viri, et ideo major est causa divortii in uxore quam in viro. Et sic ad æqualia sed non ex æquali causa obligantur. Nec tamen injuste, quia in utroque est causa sufficiens ad hanc pœnam, sicut est etiam de duobus qui damnantur ad ejusdem mortis pœnam, quam vis alius altero gravius peccaverit.
[III.q.62.a.4.ad.1] A spiritual power cannot be in a corporeal subject, after the manner of a permanent and complete power, as the argument proves. But there is nothing to hinder an instrumental spiritual power from being in a body; in so far as a body can be moved by a particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular spiritual effect; thus in the very voice which is perceived by the senses there is a certain spiritual power, inasmuch as it proceeds from a mental concept, of arousing the mind of the hearer. It is in this way that a spiritual power is in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are ordained by God unto the production of a spiritual effect.
[III.q.62.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod repudium non permittebatur, nisi ad evitandum homicidium. Et quia in viris magis erat de hoc periculum quam in mulieribus, ideo viro per legem repudii permitebatur dimittere uxorem, non autem e converso. Ad secundum et tertium dicendum, quod rationes illæ procedunt secundum quod in comparatione ad bonum prolis major fit causa divortii in uxore adultera, quam in viro: non tamen sequitur quod non judicentur ad paria, ut ex dictis patet.
[III.q.62.a.4.ad.2] Just as motion, through being an imperfect act, is not properly in a genus, but is reducible to a genus of perfect act, for instance, alteration to the genus of quality: so, instrumental power, properly speaking, is not in any genus, but is reducible to a genus and species of perfect act.
[III.q.62.a.4.ad.3] Just as an instrumental power accrues to an instrument through its being moved by the principal agent, so does a sacrament receive spiritual power from Christ's blessing and from the action of the minister in applying it to a sacramental use. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (St. Maximus of Turin, Serm. xii): "Nor should you marvel, if we say that water, a corporeal substance, achieves the cleansing of the soul. It does indeed, and penetrates every secret hiding-place of the conscience. For subtle and clear as it is, the blessing of Christ makes it yet more subtle, so that it permeates into the very principles of life and searches the inner-most recesses of the heart."
[III.q.62.a.4.ad.4] Just as the one same power of the principal agent is instrumentally in all the instruments that are ordained unto the production of an effect, forasmuch as they are one as being so ordained: so also the one same sacramental power is in both words and things, forasmuch as words and things combine to form one sacrament.
[III.q.62.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis vir sit caput mulieris, quasi gubernator, non tamen quasi judex ipsius, sicut nec e converso. Et ideo in eis quæ per judicium facienda sunt, non plus potest vir in uxorem quam e converso.
Article 5
[III.q.62.a.5.arg.1] It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not derive their power from Christ's Passion. For the power of the sacraments is in the causing of grace which is the principle of spiritual life in the soul. But as Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.): "The Word, as He was in the beginning with God, quickens souls; as He was made flesh, quickens bodies." Since, therefore, Christ's Passion pertains to the Word as made flesh, it seems that it cannot cause the power of the sacraments.
[III.q.62.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod post divortium vir alteri nubere possit. Nullus enim tenetur ad perpetuam continentiam. Sed vir tenetur in aliquo casu uxorem fornicantem a se in perpetuum separare, ut patet ex dictis. Ergo videtur quod ad minus in tali casu alteram ducere possit.
[III.q.62.a.5.arg.2] Further, the power of the sacraments seems to depend on faith. for as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.), the Divine Word perfects the sacrament "not because it is spoken, but because it is believed." But our faith regards not only Christ's Passion, but also the other mysteries of His humanity, and in a yet higher measure, His Godhead. Therefore it seems that the power of the sacraments is not due specially to Christ's Passion.
[III.q.62.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccanti non est danda major occasio peccandi. Sed si ei qui propter culpam fornicationis dimittitur, non licet aliam copulam quærere, datur ipsi major occasio peccandi; non enim est probabile quod qui in matrimonio non continuit, postea continere possit. Ergo videtur quod liceat ei ad aliam copulam transire.
[III.q.62.a.5.arg.3] Further, the sacraments are ordained unto man's justification, according to 1 Corinthians 6:11: "You are washed . . . you are justified." Now justification is ascribed to the Resurrection, according to Romans 4:25: "(Who) rose again for our justification." Therefore it seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ's Resurrection rather than from His Passion.
[III.q.62.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, uxor non tenetur viro nisi ad debitum reddendum, et cohabitationem. Sed per divortium ab utroque absolvitur. Ergo soluta est a lege viri: ergo potest alteri nubere. Et eadem ratio est de viro.
[III.q.62.a.5.sc] on Romans 5:14: "After the similitude of the transgression of Adam," etc., the gloss says: "From the side of Christ asleep on the Cross flowed the sacraments which brought salvation to the Church." Consequently, it seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ's Passion.
[III.q.62.a.5.sc] Sed contra, I Corinth., vii, 10: Præcipio non ego sed Dominus, uxorem a viro non discedere; quod si discesserit manere innuptam. Præterea, nullus ex peccato debet reportare commodum. Sed reportaret, si liceret adulteræ ad aliud magis desideratum connubium transire, et esset occasio adulterandi volentibus alia matrimonia quærere. Ergo non licet aliam copulam quærere neque viro, neque uxori.
[III.q.62.a.5.co] As stated above (Article 1) a sacrament in causing grace works after the manner of an instrument. Now an instrument is twofold. the one, separate, as a stick, for instance; the other, united, as a hand. Moreover, the separate instrument is moved by means of the united instrument, as a stick by the hand. Now the principal efficient cause of grace is God Himself, in comparison with Whom Christ's humanity is as a united instrument, whereas the sacrament is as a separate instrument. Consequently, the saving power must needs be derived by the sacraments from Christ's Godhead through His humanity.
Now sacramental grace seems to be ordained principally to two things: namely, to take away the defects consequent on past sins, in so far as they are transitory in act, but endure in guilt; and, further, to perfect the soul in things pertaining to Divine Worship in regard to the Christian Religion. But it is manifest from what has been stated above (48, 1,2,6; 49, 1,3) that Christ delivered us from our sins principally through His Passion, not only by way of efficiency and merit, but also by way of satisfaction. Likewise by His Passion He inaugurated the Rites of the Christian Religion by offering "Himself--an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Ephesians 5:2). Wherefore it is manifest that the sacraments of the Church derive their power specially from Christ's Passion, the virtue of which is in a manner united to us by our receiving the sacraments. It was in sign of this that from the side of Christ hanging on the Cross there flowed water and blood, the former of which belongs to Baptism, the latter to the Eucharist, which are the principal sacraments.
[III.q.62.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nihil adveniens supra matrimonium potest ipsum dissolvere. Et ideo adulterium non facit quin sit verum matrimonium. Manet enim, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. I Denupt. et concupisc., cap. x, « inter viventes conjugale vinculum, quod nec separatio, nec cum altero copulatio potest auferre. » Et ideo non licet uni, altero vivente, ad aliam copulam transire.
[III.q.62.a.5.ad.1] The Word, forasmuch as He was in the beginning with God, quickens souls as principal agent; but His flesh, and the mysteries accomplished therein, are as instrumental causes in the process of giving life to the soul: while in giving life to the body they act not only as instrumental causes, but also to a certain extent as exemplars, as we stated above (56, 1, ad 3).
[III.q.62.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis per se nullus obligetur ad continentiam, tamen per accidens potest esse quod obligetur; sicut si uxor sua aegritudinem incurabilem incurrat, et talem quae carnalem copulam non patiatur; et similiter etiam est, si incorrigibiliter spirituali infirmitate, scilicet fornicatione, laboret.
[III.q.62.a.5.ad.2] Christ dwells in us "by faith" (Ephesians 3:17). Consequently, by faith Christ's power is united to us. Now the power of blotting out sin belongs in a special way to His Passion. And therefore men are delivered from sin especially by faith in His Passion, according to Romans 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His Blood." Therefore the power of the sacraments which is ordained unto the remission of sins is derived principally from faith in Christ's Passion.
[III.q.62.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsa confusio, quam reportat a divortio, debet eam cohibere a peccato: quod si cohibere non potest, minus malum est quod ipsa sola peccet, quam quod peccati ejus vir sit particeps.
[III.q.62.a.5.ad.3] Justification is ascribed to the Resurrection by reason of the term "whither," which is newness of life through grace. But it is ascribed to the Passion by reason of the term "whence," i.e. in regard to the forgiveness of sin.
[III.q.62.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis uxor post divortium non teneatur viro adultero ad debitum reddendum et cohabitandum: tamen adhuc manet vinculum matrimonii, ex quo ad hoc tenebatur: et ideo non potest ad aliam copulam transire, viro vivente; potest tamen continentiam vovere, viro invito, nisi videatur Ecclesia decepta fuisse per falsos testes, sententiando de divortio, quia in tali casu etiamsi votum professionis emisisset, restitueretur viro; et teneretur reddere debitum, sed non liceret ei exigere.
Article 6
[III.q.62.a.6.arg.1] It seems that the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace. For, as stated above (5, ad 2) the sacraments of the New Law derive their efficacy from faith in Christ's Passion. But there was faith in Christ's Passion under the Old Law, as well as under the New, since we have "the same spirit of faith" (2 Corinthians 4:13). Therefore just as the sacraments of the New Law confer grace, so did the sacraments of the Old Law.
[III.q.62.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod post divortium vir et uxor non possint reconciliari. Regula enim est in jure, l. V, ff. De decretis ab ord. faciend., « Quod semel bene definitum est, nulla debet iteratione retractari. » Sed judicio Ecclesia definitum est quod debent separari. Ergo non possunt ulterius reconciliari.
[III.q.62.a.6.arg.2] Further, there is no sanctification save by grace. But men were sanctified by the sacraments of the Old Law: for it is written (Leviticus 8:31): "And when he," i.e. Moses, "had sanctified them," i.e. Aaron and his sons, "in their vestments," etc. Therefore it seems that the sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace.
[III.q.62.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si posset esse reconciliatio, præcipue videtur quod post pœnitentiam uxoris vir teneatur eam recipere. Sed non tenetur, quia etiam uxor non potest pro exceptione proponere in judicio suam pœnitentiam contra virum accusantem de fornicatione. Ergo nullo modo potest fieri reconciliatio.
[III.q.62.a.6.arg.3] Further, Bede says in a homily on the Circumcision: "Under the Law circumcision provided the same health-giving balm against the wound of original sin, as baptism in the time of revealed grace." But Baptism confers grace now. Therefore circumcision conferred grace; and in like manner, the other sacraments of the Law; for just as Baptism is the door of the sacraments of the New Law, so was circumcision the door of the sacraments of the Old Law: hence the Apostle says (Galatians 5:3): "I testify to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to the whole law."
[III.q.62.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si posset esse reconciliatio, videtur quod uxor adultera teneretur redire ad virum ipsum revocantem. Sed non tenetur quia jam separati sunt judicio Ecclesia. Ergo, etc.
[III.q.62.a.6.sc] It is written (Galatians 4:9): "Turn you again to the weak and needy elements?" i.e. "to the Law," says the gloss, "which is called weak, because it does not justify perfectly." But grace justifies perfectly. Therefore the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace.
[III.q.62.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Corinth., VII, 14: Quod si discesserit, manere inuptam, aut viro suo reconciliari. Præterea, vir potest eam non dimittere post fornicationem. Ergo eadem ratione potest eam post divortium reconciliare sibi.
[III.q.62.a.6.co] It cannot be said that the sacraments of the Old Law conferred sanctifying grace of themselves, i.e. by their own power: since thus Christ's Passion would not have been necessary, according to Galatians 2:21: "If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain."
But neither can it be said that they derived the power of conferring sanctifying grace from Christ's Passion. For as it was stated above (5), the power of Christ's Passion is united to us by faith and the sacraments, but in different ways; because the link that comes from faith is produced by an act of the soul; whereas the link that comes from the sacraments, is produced by making use of exterior things. Now nothing hinders that which is subsequent in point of time, from causing movement, even before it exists in reality, in so far as it pre-exists in an act of the soul: thus the end, which is subsequent in point of time, moves the agent in so far as it is apprehended and desired by him. On the other hand, what does not yet actually exist, does not cause movement if we consider the use of exterior things. Consequently, the efficient cause cannot in point of time come into existence after causing movement, as does the final cause. It is therefore clear that the sacraments of the New Law do reasonably derive the power of justification from Christ's Passion, which is the cause of man's righteousness; whereas the sacraments of the Old Law did not.
Nevertheless the Fathers of old were justified by faith in Christ's Passion, just as we are. And the sacraments of the old Law were a kind of protestation of that faith, inasmuch as they signified Christ's Passion and its effects. It is therefore manifest that the sacraments of the Old Law were not endowed with any power by which they conduced to the bestowal of justifying grace: and they merely signified faith by which men were justified.
[III.q.62.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si uxor post divortium de peccato pœnitentiam agens emendata fuerit, potest eam sibi vir reconciliare; si autem in peccato incorrigibilis maneat, non debet reassumere eam, eadem ratione qua non licebat eam nolentem a peccato desistere retinere.
[III.q.62.a.6.ad.1] The Fathers of old had faith in the future Passion of Christ, which, inasmuch as it was apprehended by the mind, was able to justify them. But we have faith in the past Passion of Christ, which is able to justify, also by the real use of sacramental things as stated above.
[III.q.62.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sententia Ecclesia divortium celebrantis non fuit cogens ad separationem, sed licentiam præbens; et ideo absque retractatione præcedentis sententiæ potest reconciliatio fieri vel sequi.
[III.q.62.a.6.ad.2] That sanctification was but a figure: for they were said to be sanctified forasmuch as they gave themselves up to the Divine worship according to the rite of the Old Law, which was wholly ordained to the foreshadowing of Christ's Passion.
[III.q.62.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pœnitentia uxoris debet inducere virum ut uxorem fornicantem non accuset, aut dimittat; sed tamen non potest ad hoc cogi, nec potest per pœnitentiam eum uxor ab accusatione repellere, quia cessante culpa et quantum ad actum, et quantum ad maculam, adhuc manet aliquid de reatu, et cessante reatu quoad Deum, adhuc manet reatus quoad pœnam humano judicio inferendam, quia homo non videt cor, sicut Deus.
[III.q.62.a.6.ad.3] There have been many opinions about Circumcision. For, according to some, Circumcision conferred no grace, but only remitted sin. But this is impossible; because man is not justified from sin save by grace, according to Romans 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace."
Wherefore others said that by Circumcision grace is conferred, as to the privative effects of sin, but not as to its positive effects. But this also appears to be false, because by Circumcision, children received the faculty of obtaining glory, which is the ultimate positive effect of grace. Moreover, as regards the order of the formal cause, positive effects are naturally prior to privative effects, though according to the order of the material cause, the reverse is the case: for a form does not exclude privation save by informing the subject.
Hence others say that Circumcision conferred grace also as regards a certain positive effect, i.e. by making man worthy of eternal life, but not so as to repress concupiscence which makes man prone to sin. And so at one time it seemed to me. But if the matter be considered carefully, this too appears to be untrue; because the very least grace is sufficient to resist any degree of concupiscence, and to merit eternal life.
And therefore it seems better to say that Circumcision was a sign of justifying faith: wherefore the Apostle says (Romans 4:11) that Abraham "received the sign of Circumcision, a seal of the justice of faith." Consequently grace was conferred in Circumcision in so far as it was a sign of Christ's future Passion, as will be made clear further on (70, 4).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[III.q.62.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod inducitur in favorem alicujus, non facit ei præjudicium. Unde cum divortium sit inductum in favorem viri, non aufert ei jus petendi debitum, vel revocandi uxorem. Unde uxor tenetur ei reddere, et ad eum redire, si fuerit revocata, nisi de licentia ejus votum continentiæ emiserit.
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