Q85. Penance as a virtue

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Source context

Theme: Penance as a moral virtue: the habitual disposition of the will toward reparation for sin
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

not engaged in the GA corpus

Cross-tradition

Eastern Orthodox metanoia doctrineOrthodox theology treats metanoia as a sustained turning of the entire person toward God, structurally paralleling Aquinas's claim that penance is not a transient act but a stable virtuous disposition of the will.
Stoic habituation ethics (Aristotelian stream)Aristotle's account of virtue as a stable hexis acquired through repeated acts underlies Aquinas's formal argument that penance can constitute a genuine virtue rather than a mere sequence of penitential acts.

Article 1

[III.q.85.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that penance is not a virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above (84, 1; 65, 1). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue.

[III.q.85.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem non erunt impassibilia. Omne enim mortale est passibile. Sed homo post resurrectionem erit « animal rationale mortale; » hæc est enim definitio hominis, quæ nunquam ab eo separabitur. Ergo corpus erit passibile.

[III.q.85.a.1.arg.2] Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9), "shame is not a virtue," both because it is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "penance consists in deploring past sins": moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

[III.q.85.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne quod est in potentia ad formam alterius passibile est ab alio, quia secundum hoc aliquid est passivum ab alio, ut dicitur in I De Gen., text. 54. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem erunt in potentia ad aliam formam. Ergo erunt passibilia. Probatio media: Quæcumque communicant in materia, unum eorum est in potentia ad formam alterius: materia enim, secundum quod est sub una forma, non amittit potentiam ad aliam formam. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem communicabunt cum elementis in materia, quia ex eadem materia reparabuntur ex qua nunc sunt. Ergo erunt in potentia ad aliam formam; et sic erunt passibilia.

[III.q.85.a.1.arg.3] Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "no virtuous man is foolish." But it seems foolish to deplore what has been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

[III.q.85.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « contraria nata sunt agere et pati ad invicem », ut in I De Gener., text. 41 et seq., dicit Philosophus. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem erunt ex contrariis composita, sicut et nunc sunt. Ergo erunt passibilia.

[III.q.85.a.1.sc] The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because "a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous" (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Matthew 4:17: "Do penance," etc. Therefore penance is a virtue.

[III.q.85.a.1.sc] Sed contra, omne passibile est corruptibile, quia passio magis facta abjicit a substantia. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem erunt incorruptibilia, ut dicitur I ad Cor, xv, 42: Seminatur in corruptione, resurget in incorruptione. Ergo erunt impassibilia. Præterea, fortius non patitur a debiliori. Sed nullum corpus erit fortius corporibus sanctorum, de quibus dicitur I ad Cor, xv, 43: Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute. Ergo erunt impassibilia.

[III.q.85.a.1.co] As stated above (Objection 2; 84, 10, ad 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above (84, 9) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue.

[III.q.85.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passio dupliciter dicitur: uno modo communiter, et sic omnis receptio passio dicitur; sive illud quod recipitur sit conveniens recipienti et perfectivum ipsius, sive contrarium et corruptivum. Et ab hujusmodi passionis remotione corpora gloriosa impassibilia non dicuntur; cum nihil quod est perfectionis, ab eis sit auferendum. Alio modo passio dicitur proprie, quam sic definit Damascenus in II lib. Orth. fid., cap. xxii, col. 942, t. 4: « Passio est motus præter naturam. » Unde immoderatus motus cordis passio ejus dicitur, sed moderatus dicitur ejus operatio. Cujus ratio est, quia omne quod patitur trahitur ad terminos agentis, quia agens assimilat sibi patiens; et ideo patiens, inquantum hujusmodi, trahitur extra terminos proprios in quibus erat. Sic ergo proprie accipiendo passionem, non erit in corporibus resurgentium sanctorum potentialitas ad passionem; et ideo impassibilia dicentur. Hujus autem impassibilitatis ratio a diversis diversimode assignatur. Quidam enim eam attribuunt conditioni elementorum quæ aliter tunc se habebunt in corpore quam nunc. Dicunt enim quod elementa remanebunt ibi secundum substantiam, sed qualitates activæ et passivæ ab elementis auferentur. Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia qualitates activæ et passivæ sunt de perfectione elementorum: unde si sine eis repararentur elementa in corpore resurgentis, essent minoris perfectionis quam modo sint. Et præterea, cum qualitates illæ sint propria accidentia elementorum ex forma et materia ipsorum causata, videtur valde absurdum quod causa maneat, et effectus tollatur. Et ideo alii dicunt quod manebunt qualitates, sed non habebunt proprias actiones, divina virtute id faciente ad conservationem humani corporis. Sed hoc etiam non videtur posse stare; quia ad mixtionem requiritur actio et passio activarum et passivarum qualitatum, et secundum prædominium unius vel alterius mixta efficiuntur diversæ complexionis: quod oportet ponere in corpore resurgentis, quia erunt ibi carnes et ossa, et hujusmodi partes, quibus omnibus non competit una complexio. Et præterea secundum hoc impassibilitas non posset poni dos in eis, quia non poneret aliquam dispositionem in substantia impassibili, sed solum prohibitionem passionis ab exteriori, scilicet divina virtute, quae etiam posset idem facere de corpore hominis in statu hujus vitæ. Et ideo alii dicunt quod in ipso corpore erit aliquid prohibens passionem corporum gloriosorum, scilicet natura quinti corporis, vel cælestis, quam ponunt venire in compositione humani corporis, ad conciliandum elementa in harmoniam quamdam, per quam possint esse debita materia animæ rationalis; sed tamen in statu hujus vitæ propter dominium elementaris naturæ corpus humanum patitur ad similitudinem aliorum elementorum: sed in resurrectione dominabitur natura quinti corporis: et ideo corpus humanum reddetur impassibile ad similitudinem corporis cælestis. Sed hoc non potest stare, quia corpus quintum non venit materialiter ad compositionem corporis humani, ut in II libro ostensum est. Et præterea, impossibile est dicere quod aliqua virtus naturalis, qualis est virtus corporis cælestis, transferat corpus humanum ad proprietatem gloriæ, qualis est impassibilitas corporis gloriosi, cum immutationem corporis humani Apostolus attribuat virtuti Christi, quia qualis cælestis, tales et cælestes, I Cor., xv, 48; et Philip., 111, 24: Reformabit corpus humilitatis nostræ configuratum corpori claritatis suæ, secundum operationem, qua sibi possit subjicere omnia, etc. Et præterea, non potest natura cælestis ita dominari in corpore humano quin natura elementaris remaneat, cui ex essentialibus suis principiis passibilitas inest. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod omnis passio fit per victoriam agentis super patiens; alias non traheret ipsum ad terminos suos. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid dominetur supra patiens, nisi inquantum debilitatur dominium formæ propriæ supra materiam patientis, Juxta Scotum impassibilitas corporis gloriosi non provenit ex pleno dominio animæ super corpus, nec ex cessatione motus cæeli. Juxta Aureolum nec provenit ex aliqua forma passiva. loquendo de passione quæ est contra naturam, de qua nunc loquimur; non enim materia subjicitur uni contrariorum, sine hoc quod tollatur dominium alterius super ipsam, vel saltem diminuatur. Corpus autem humanum, et quicquid in eo est, erit perfecte subjectum animæ rationali, sicut anima perfecte erit subjecta Deo. Et ideo in corpore glorioso non poterit esse aliqua mutatio contra dispositionem illam qua perficitur ab anima, et ita corpora illa erunt impassibilia.

[III.q.85.a.1.ad.1] As stated above (84, 1, ad 1; 2,3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.

[III.q.85.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, secundum Anselmum, lib. II Cur Deus homo, cap. xi, col. 410, t. 4: « Mortale ponitur in definitione hominis a philosophis, qui non crediderunt totum hominem aliquando posse esse immortalem; quia non viderunt homines, nisi secundum hujus mortalitatis statum. Vel potest dici quod, secundum Philosophum, in VIII Metaph., text. 3 et 7, et lib. VII, text. 41, quia differentiæ essentiales sunt nobis incognitæ, utimur quandoque differentiis accidentalibus ad significandum differentias essentiales, quæ sunt accidentalium causæ. Unde « mortale » in definitione hominis non ponitur, quasi ipsa mortalitas ad essentiam hominis pertineat; sed quia illud quod est causa passibilitatis et mortalitatis, secundum præsentem statum, scilicet compositio ex contrariis, est de essentia hominis; sed tunc non erit causa ejus propter victoriam animæ super corpus.

[III.q.85.a.1.ad.2] Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous.

[III.q.85.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est potentia, ligata et libera. Et hoc non solum est verum de potentia activa, sed etiam de passiva. Forma enim ligat potentiam materiae, determinando ipsam ad unum; et secundum hoc dominatur super eam. Et quia in rebus corruptibilibus non perfecte dominatur forma supra materiam, non perfecte potestligare ipsam quin accipiat interdum per aliquam passionem dispositionem contrariam formæ. Sed in sanctis post resurrectionem omnino anima dominabitur supra corpus; nec illud dominium aliquo modo poterit auferri, quia ipsa erit immutabiliter Deo subjecta, quod non fuit in statu innocentiæ. Et ideo in corporibus illis manet eadem potentia ad formam aliam quæ nunc inest, Nec est, juxta Durandum, per aliquam formam inhærentem, sed solum per divinam virtutem assistentem beatis, et prohibentem actionem cujuslibet extrinseci inferentis passionem. quantum ad substantiam potentiae; sed erit ligata per victoriam animæ supra corpus, ut nunquam in actum passionis exire possit.

[III.q.85.a.1.ad.3] It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done. But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish.

[III.q.85.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod qualitates elementares sunt instrumenta animæ, ut patet in II De anima, text. 38 et seq., quia calor ignis in corpore animalis regulatur in actu nutriendi per virtutem animæ. Quando autem agens principale est perfectum, et non est aliquis defectus in instrumento, nulla actio procedit ab instrumento nisi secundum dispositionem principalis agentis. Et ideo in corporibus sanctorum post resurrectionem nulla actio vel passio poterit provenire a qualitatibus elementaribus quæ sit contra dispositionem animæ, quæ intendit conservare corpus.

Article 2

[III.q.85.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity.

[III.q.85.a.2.arg.2] Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.

[III.q.85.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, negationes non recipiunt magis et minus. Sed impassibilitas est quædam negatio vel privatio passibilitatis. Ergo non potest esse major in uno quam in alio.

[III.q.85.a.2.arg.3] Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special virtue.

[III.q.85.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, magis album dicitur quod est nigro impermixtius. Sed nulli corporum sanctorum admiscebitur aliquid de passibilitate. Ergo omnia erunt æqualiter impassibilia.

[III.q.85.a.2.sc] The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated above (84, 5,7).

[III.q.85.a.2.sc] Sed contra, merito debet respondere præmium proportionaliter. Sed sanctorum quidam fuerunt aliis majores merito. Ergo, cum impassibilitas sit quoddam præmium, videtur quod in quibusdam sit major quam in aliis. Præterea, impassibilitas dividitur contra dotem claritatis. Sed illa non erit æqualis in omnibus, ut patet I Corinth., xv. Ergo nec impassibilitas.

[III.q.85.a.2.co] As stated in I-II, 54, 1, ad 1, 2, habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.

[III.q.85.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impassibilitas potest dupliciter considerari, vel secundum se, vel secundum causam suam. Si secundum se consideretur, quia solam negationem vel privationem importat, non suscipit magis et minus, sed erit æqualis in omnibus beatis. Si autem consideretur secundum suam causam, sic erit in uno major quam in alio. Causa autem ejus est dominium animæ super corpus; quod quidem dominium causatur ex hoc quod ipsa anima fruitur Deo immobiliter: unde in illo qui perfectius fruitur Deo est major impassibilitatis causa.

[III.q.85.a.2.ad.1] An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity.

[III.q.85.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de impassibilitate secundum se, et non secundum causam suam.

[III.q.85.a.2.ad.2] In point of fact, penance has indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with God for his justification.

[III.q.85.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quam-ruptione. » vis negationes et privationes secundum se non intendantur nec remittantur, ta-men intenduntur et remittuntur excausis suis; sicut dicitur esse locus magis tenebrosus qui habet plura et majora obstacula lucis.

[III.q.85.a.2.ad.3] Every special virtue removes formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue.

[III.q.85.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliqua non solum intenduntur per recessum a contrario, sed etiam per accessum ad terminum, sicut lux intenditur. Et prima etiam impassibilitas est major in uno quam in alio; quamvis in nullo aliquid passibilitatis remaneat.

Article 3

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the II-II, 62, 3. But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod impassibilitas sensum in actu a corporibus gloriosis excludat, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus in I De anima, text. 118, « sentire est quoddam pati. » Corpora autem gloriosa erunt impassibilia. Ergo non sentient in actu.

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.2] Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jeremiah 6:26: "Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation." Therefore penance is not a species of justice.

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, immutatio naturalis præcedit immutationem animalem, sicut esse naturale præcedit esse intentionale. Sed corpora gloriosa ratione impassibilitatis non immutabuntur immutatione naturali. Ergo nec immutatione animali, quæ requiritur ad sentiendum.

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.3] Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative." But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quandocumque fit sensus in actu cum nova receptione, fit novum judicium. Sed ibi non erit novum judicium, quia « non eruntibi cogitationes volubiles. » Ergo non fiet ibi sensus in actu.

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.4] Further, a gloss on Luke 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things." But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice.

[III.q.85.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quando anima est in actu intenso unius potentiæ, remittitur actus alterius potentiæ. Sed anima summe erit intenta ad actum virtutis intellectivæ, qua Deum contemplabitur. Ergo non erit aliquo modo in actu virtutis sensitivæ.

[III.q.85.a.3.sc] Augustine says in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done." But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.

[III.q.85.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc., 1, 7: Videbit eum omnis oculus. Ergo erit ibi sensus in actu. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, in I De anima, text. 19, « animatum ab inanimato distinguitur sensu et motu. » Sed ibi erit in actu motus quia tanquam scintillæ in arundineto discurrent, Sap., 11, 7. Ergo et sensus in actu.

[III.q.85.a.3.co] As stated above (1, ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.

It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Psalm 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to Luke 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jeremiah 3:1: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord."

[III.q.85.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquem sensum esse in corporibus beatorum omnes ponunt; alias corporalis vita sanctorum post resurrectionem assimilaretur magis somno quam vigiliæ; quod non competit illi perfectioni, eo quod in somno corpus sensibile non est in ultimo actu vitæ; propter quod somnus dicitur vitæ dimidium, I Ethic., cap. xiii, in med. Sed in modo sentiendi diversi diversa opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt quod corpora gloriosa erunt impassibilia, et propter hoc non receptibilia peregrinæ impressionis, et multo minus quam corpora cælestia; quia non erit ibi sensus in actu per receptionem alicujus speciei sensibilibus, sed magis extra mittendo. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia in resurrectione natura speciei manebit eadem in homine et in omnibus partibus ejus. Hujusmodi autem est natura sensus, ut sit potentia passiva, ut in II De anima, text. 51 et 54, probat Philosophus. Unde si in resurrectione sancti sentirent extra mittendo, et non recipiendo, non esset sensus in eis virtus passiva, sed activa, et sic non esset ejusdem speciei cum sensu qui nunc est, sed esset aliqua alia virtus eis data: sicut enim materia nunquam fit forma, ita potentia passiva nunquam fit activa. Et ideo alii dicunt quod sensus in actu fiet per susceptionem non quidem ab exterioribus sensibilibus, sed per effluxum a superioribus viribus; ut sicut nunc superiores vires accipiunt ab inferioribus, ita e contrario tunc inferiores accipient a superioribus. Sed iste modus receptionis non facit vere sentire; quia omnis potentia passiva secundum suæ speciei rationem determinatur ad aliquid activum speciale: quia potentia, inquantum hu-jusmodi, habet ordinem ad illud respectu cujus dicitur. Unde cum proprium activum in sensu exteriori sit res existens extra animam et non intentio ejus existens in imaginatione vel ratione, si organum sentiendi non moveatur a rebus extra, sed ex imaginatione vel a superioribus viribus aliis, non erit vere sentire. Unde non dicimus quod phrenetici et alii mente capti, in quibus propter victoriam imaginativæ virtutis fit hujusmodi defluxus specierum ad organa sentiendi, vere sentiant, sed quod videtur eis quod sentiant. Et ideo dicendum est cum aliis quod sensus corporum gloriosorum erit per susceptionem a rebus quæ sunt extra animam. Sed sciendum est quod organa sentiendi immutantur a rebus quæ sunt extra animam, dupliciter: uno modo immutatione naturali, quando scilicet organum disponitur eadem qualitate naturali qua disponitur res extra animam quæ agit in ipsum, sicut cum manus fit calida ex tactu rei calidæ vel odorifera ex tactu rei odoriferæ: alio modo immutatione spirituali, quando recipitur qualitas sensibilis in instrumento secundum esse spirituale, id est, species sive intentio qualitatis, et non ipsa qualitas: sicut pupilla recipit speciem albedinis, et tamen ipsa non efficitur alba. Prima ergo receptio non causat sensum, per se loquendo, quia sensus est susceptivus specierum in materia præter materiam, id est, præter esse materiale quod habebant extra animam, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 121. Et hæc receptio immutat naturam recipientis, quia recipitur hoc modo qualitas secundum esse suum materiale. Unde ista receptio non erit in corporibus gloriososis, sed secunda, quæ per se facit sensum in actu, et non immutat naturam recipientis.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.1] As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, ut jam patet ex dictis, per hanc passionem quæ est in actu sentiendi, quæ non est aliud quam receptio prædicta, non trahitur corpus extra naturalem suam qualitatem, sed spiritualiter perficitur. Unde impassibilitas gloriosorum corporum hanc passionem non excludit.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.2] The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic. v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod omne passivum recipit actionem agentis secundum suum modum. Si ergo aliquid sit quod sit natum immutari ab activo naturali et spirituali immutatione, immutatio naturalis præcedit immutationem spiritualem, sicut esse naturale præcedit esse intentionale. Si autem natum sit immutari spiritualiter tantum non oportet quod immutetur naturaliter, sicut patet de aere qui non est receptivus coloris secundum esse naturale sed solum secundum esse spirituale, et ideo hoc solum modo immutatur; sicut e converso corpora inanimata immutantur per qualitates sensibles solum naturaliter, et non spiritualiter. In corporibus autem gloriosis non poterit esse aliqua immutatio naturalis; et ideo ibi erit spiritualis immutatio tantum.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.3] As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut erit nova receptio speciei in organo sentiendi, ita erit novum judicium sensus communis, non autem erit novum judicium intellectus de hoc, sicut fit in eo qui videt aliquid quod prius scivit. Quod autem dicit Augustinus, lib. XV De Trinit., cap. xv1, col. 1079, t. 8, quod « non erunt ibi cogitationes volubiles, » intelligitur de cogitationibus intellectivæ partis. Unde non est ad propositum.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.4] Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.

[III.q.85.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quando unum duorum est ratio alterius, occupatio animæ circa unum non impedit nec remittit occupationem ejus circa aliud: sicut medicus dum videt urinam non minus potest considerare artis regulas de coloribus urinarum, sed magis. Et quia Deus apprehenditur a sanctis ut ratio omnium quæ ab eis agentur vel cognoscentur; ideo occupatio eorum circa sensibilia sentienda, vel quæcumque alia contemplanda, aut agenda, in nullo impediet divinam contemplationem nec e converso. Vel dicendum, quod ideo una potentia impeditur in actu suo quando alia vehementer operatur, quia una potentia de se non sufficit ad tam intensam operationem nisi ei subveniatur per id quod erat aliis potentiis vel membris influendum a principio vitæ. Et quia in sanctis erunt omnes potentiae perfectissimæ, una poterit intense operari, ita quod ex hoc nullum impedimentum præstabitur actioni alterius potentiae, sicut et in Christo fuit.

Article 4

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty.

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sint ibi omnes sensus in actu. Tactus enim est primus inter omnes sensus, ut dicitur in lib. II De anima, text. 27, et lib. II, text. 65. Sed corpora gloriosa carebunt actu sensus tactus, quia sensus tactus fit in actu per immutationem corporis animalis ab aliquo exteriori corpore prædominante in aliqua qualitatum activarum vel passivarum, quarum est tactus discretivus; qualis tunc immutatio esse non poterit. Ergo non erunt ibi omnes sensus in actu.

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.2] Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part.

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sensus gustus deservit actui virtutis nutritivæ. Sed post resurrectionem hujusmodi actus non erit, ut dictum est. Ergo frustra esset ibi gustus.

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.3] Further, the past is the proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (1, ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory.

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, post resurrectionem nihil corrumpetur, quia tota creatura vestietur quadam virtute incorruptionis. Sed sensus odoratus in actu suo esse non potest nisi aliqua corruptione facta, quia odor non sentitur sine aliqua fumali evaporatione, quæ in quadam resolutione consistit. Ergo sensus odoratus non erit ibi in suo actu.

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.4] Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not only in the will.

[III.q.85.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, auditus deservit disciplinæ, ut dicitur in lib. De sensu et sensato, cap. 1, in fin. Sed non erit post resurrectionem beatis necessaria aliqua disciplina per sensibilia, quia divina sapientia replebuntur ex ipsius Dei visione. Ergo non erit ibi auditus.

[III.q.85.a.4.sc] Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Psalm 50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Psalm 53:8: "I will freely sacrifice to Thee." Therefore penance is in the will.

[III.q.85.a.4.sc] Sed contra, potentia conjuncta actui est perfectior quam non conjuncta. Sed natura humana erit in beatis in maxima perfectione. Ergo erunt ibi omnes sensus in suo actu. Præterea, vicinius se habent ad animam potentiæ sensitivæ quam corpus. Sed corpus præmiabitur vel punietur propter merita vel demerita animæ. Ergo et omnes sensus præmiabuntur in beatis et punientur in malis secundum delectationem et dolorem vel tristitiam, quae in operatione sensus consistunt.

[III.q.85.a.4.co] We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above (Article 3), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in I-II, 56, 6, is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God.

[III.q.85.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod in corporibus gloriosis erunt omnes potentiæ sensuum, non tamen erunt in actu nisi duo sensus, scilicet tactus et visus; nec hoc erit ex defectu sensuum, sed ex defectu medii et objecti; nec tamen erunt frustra, quia erunt ad integritatem humanæ naturæ, et ad commendandam sapientiam Creatoris. Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia illud quod est medium in istis sensibus est etiam in aliis medium. In visu enim est medium aer, qui etiam est medium in auditu et odoratu, sicut patet in II De anima, text. 76 et 97. Similiter etiam gustus habet medium conjunctum, sicut et tactus, cum gustus sit tactus quidam, ut in eodem libro, text. 28 et 94, dicitur. Odor etiam erit ibi qui est objectum odoratus; cum Ecclesia cantet quod odor suavissimus erunt corpora sanctorum. Laus etiam vocalis erit in patria: unde dicitur in Glossa, Super illud psal. cxlix: Exaltationes Dei in gutture eorum, quod « corda et linguæ non desinent laudare Deum. » Et idem etiam habetur per Glossam, Super illud II Esdræ, xii: In cantico et cymbalis, etc. Et ideo secundum alios dicendum quod odoratus et auditus erunt ibi in actu; sed gustus non erit in actu, ita quod immutetur ab aliquo cibo vel potu sumpto, ut patet ex dictis. Nisi forte dicatur quod erit ibi gustus in actu per immutationem linguæ ab aliqua humiditate adjuncta.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.1] This argument considers penance as a passion.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod qualitates quas tactus percipit, sunt illæ ex quibus constituitur animale corpus. Unde per qualitates tangibiles corpus animalis secundum statum præsentem natum est immutari immutatione naturali et spirituali ab objecto tactus. Et ideo tactus dicitur maxime materialis inter alios sensus, quia habet plus de materiali immutatione adjunctum. Non tamen immutation materialis se habet ad actum sentiendi qui perficitur spirituali immutatione, nisi per accidens. Et ideo in corporibus gloriosis, a quibus impassibilitas excludit naturalem immutationem, erit immutatio a qualitatibus tangibilibus spiritualibus tantum; sicut etiam in corpore Adæ fuit, quod nec ignis urere, nec gladius scindere potuisset; et tamen horum sensum habuisset.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.2] To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod gustus, secundum quod est sensus alimenti non erit in actu, sed secundum quod est judicativus saporum esse poterit forte per modum prædictum.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.3] The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt quod odor nihil aliud est quam quædam fumalis evaporatio. Sed hæc positio non potest esse vera, quod patet ex hoc quod vultures currunt ex odore percepto ad cadavera ex locis remotissimis; cum tamen non esset possibile quod evaporatio aliqua pertingeret a cadavere ad tam remota loca, etiamsi totum resolveretur in vaporem, et præcipue cum sensibilia in aequali distantia ad quamlibet partem immutent, unde odor immutat medium quando et instrumentum sentiendi spirituali immutatione sine aliqua evaporatione pertingente ad organum. Sed quod aliqua evaporatio requiratur, hoc est eo quod odor in corporibus est humiditate aspersus: unde oportet resolutionem fieri, ad hoc quod percipiatur. Sed in corporibus gloriosis erit odor in sua ultima perfectione, nullo modo per humidum repressus: unde immutabit spirituali immutatione; sicut odor fumalis evaporationis facit. Et sic erit sensus odoratus in sanctis, quia nulla humiditate impedietur: et cognoscet non solum excellentias odorum sicut nunc in nobis contingit propter nimiam cerebri humiditatem, sed etiam minimas odorum differentias.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.4] The will, as stated above (I, 82, 4; I-II, 9, 1]), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul.

[III.q.85.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in patria erit laus vocalis, quamvis quidam aliter dicant, et sola immutatione spirituali organum auditus immutabit in beatis: nec erit propter disciplinam qua scientiam acquirant, sed propter perfectionem sensus et delectationem. Quomodo autem vox ibi formari poterit, dictum est in II lib.

Article 5

[III.q.85.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that penance does not originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear.

[III.q.85.a.5.arg.2] Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Matthew 3:2 and Matthew 4:17: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear.

[III.q.85.a.5.arg.3] Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of God, according to Jeremiah 31:19: "After Thou didst convert me I did penance." Therefore penance does not result from fear.

[III.q.85.a.5.sc] It is written (Isaiah 26:17): "As a woman with child, when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth out in her pangs, so ere we become," by penance, to wit; and according to another [the Septuagint] version the text continues: "Through fear of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and have brought forth the spirit of salvation," i.e. of salutary penance, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear.

[III.q.85.a.5.co] We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first principle [Cf. I-II, 113] of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lamentations 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted"; the second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make amends to God through fear of Him.

Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.

[III.q.85.a.5.ad.1] Sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.

[III.q.85.a.5.ad.2] When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Matthew 3:7): "Ye brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?"

[III.q.85.a.5.ad.3] Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Deuteronomy 5:29): "Who shall give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?" And so the fact that penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God in turning the heart.

Article 6

[III.q.85.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues. Because, on Matthew 3:2, "Do penance," etc., a gloss says: "The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance."

[III.q.85.a.6.arg.2] Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that penance precedes all the other virtues.

[III.q.85.a.6.arg.3] Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the others by expelling sin.

[III.q.85.a.6.sc] Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as already stated (2,5). Therefore penance is not the first of the virtues.

[III.q.85.a.6.co] In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are connected with one another, as stated in I-II, 65, 1, they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear; while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated in I-II, 113, 7,8, in the justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the second.

Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above (Question 55, Article 2), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments aforesaid.

[III.q.85.a.6.ad.1] This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of the other virtues.

[III.q.85.a.6.ad.2] In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii.

[III.q.85.a.6.ad.3] Penance opens the door to the other virtues, because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace all the virtues, as stated in I-II, 65, 3,5.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

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