Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Tertia Pars·Q86. The effect of Penance, as regards the pardon of mortal sin
Source context
- Theme
- sacramental pardon of mortal sin through the act of Penance
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Eastern Orthodox sacramental theologyThe Orthodox rite of Holy Confession treats absolution as a pneumatic restoration of the soul's standing before God, structurally parallel to Aquinas's account of Penance as removing the guilt and eternal punishment of mortal sin while restoring sanctifying grace.
- Jewish teshuvah doctrineThe rabbinic concept of teshuvah (return) posits that sincere repentance annuls the heavenly record of deliberate transgression, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's thesis that genuine contrition mediated by the sacrament fully pardons mortal sin.
Q86. The effect of Penance, as regards the pardon of mortal sin
Article 1
[III.q.86.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that not all sins are taken away by Penance. For the Apostle says (Hebrews 12:17) that Esau "found no place of repentance, although with tears he had sought it," which a gloss explains as meaning that "he found no place of pardon and blessing through Penance": and it is related (2 Maccabees 9:13) of Antiochus, that "this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain mercy." Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by Penance.
[III.q.86.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod subtilitas non sit proprietas corporis gloriosi. Proprietas enim gloriæ excedit proprietatem naturæ, sicut gloriæ claritas claritatem solis, quæ est maxima in natura. Si ergo subtilitas sit proprietas corporis gloriosi, videtur quod corpus gloriosum sit subtilius futurum omni quod est subtile in natura; et ita ventis erit aereque subtilius, quod est hæresis a Gregorio in Constantinopolitana urbe damnata, ut ipse narrat in XIV lib. Moral., cap. LVI, col. 1077, t. 1.
[III.q.86.a.1.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that "so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin." Therefore not every sin can be taken away by Penance.
[III.q.86.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut caliditas et frigiditas sunt quædam qualitates simplicium corporum, scilicet elementorum, ita et subtilitas. Sed calor et aliæ qualitates elementorum non intendentur in gloriosis corporibus magis quam nunc; imo magis ad medium reducentur. Ergo neque subtilitas in eis erit major quam nunc sit.
[III.q.86.a.1.arg.3] Further, our Lord said (Matthew 12:32): "He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come." Therefore not every sin can be pardoned through Penance.
[III.q.86.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, subtilitas inventur in corporibus propter paucitatem materiae, unde corpora quæ habent minus de materia sub aequalibus dimensionibus, dicimus magis subtilia; ut ignem aere, et aerem aqua, et aquam terra. Sed tantum de materia erit in corporibus gloriosis, quantum nunc est; nec dimensions erunt majores. Ergo tunc non erunt magis subtilia quam modo sint.
[III.q.86.a.1.sc] It is written (Ezekiel 18:22): "I will not remember" any more "all his iniquities that he hath done."
[III.q.86.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor., xv, 44: Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale, id est, spiritui simile. Sed subtilitas spiritus excedit omnem subtilitatem corporis. Ergo corpora gloriosa erunt subtilissima. Præterea, corpora quanto sunt subti- 4 Hactenus cum veteribus edit. Nicolai. Edit. Patav. addit quæ sequuntur: « Quia propter naturam humidi, quod male terminatur termino proprio, bene autem alieno, sequitur suum tan- VI. Sed corpora gloriosa sunt nobilissima. Ergo erunt subtilissima.
[III.q.86.a.1.co] The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wisdom 5:3: "Repenting, and groaning for anguish of spirit." Consequently such Penance brings no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil. Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will, secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent, according to Proverbs 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is "gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil"; for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1 John 2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world."
Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be blotted out by true Penance.
[III.q.86.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen subtilitatis a virtute penetrandi est assumptum. Unde dicitur in II De generat., text. 10, quod « subtile est repletivum partibus, et partium partibus 4. » Quod autem aliquod corpus sit penetrativum, contingit ex duobus. Primo ex parvitate quantitatis, præcipue secundum profunditatem et latitudinem, non autem secundum longitudinem, quia penetratio fit in profundum: unde longitudo penetrationi non obstat. Secundo ex paucitate materiae: unde rara « subtilia » dicimus: et quia in corporibus raris forma prædominatur materiae magis, ideo translatum est nomen subtilitatis ad illa corpora quæ optime substant formæ, et perficiunt ab ea completissimo modo; sicut dicimus subtilitatem esse in sole et luna et aliis hujusmodi; sicut etiam aurum, vel aliquid hujusmodi, potest dici subtile, quando perfectissime completur in esse et virtute suæ speciei. Et quia res incorporeæ quantitate carent et materia, ideo nomen subtilitatis ad eas transfertur, non solum ratione suæ substantiae, sed etiam ratione suæ virtutis. Sicut enim « subtile » dicitur penetrativum, quia pertingit usque ad intima rei, ita etiam dicitur aliquis intellectus « subtilis, » quia pertingit ad inspicienda intrinseca principia, et proprietates naturales rei latentes. Et similiter dicitur aliquis habere visum subtilem, quia aliquid minimum potest visu percipere. Et similiter est de aliis sensibus. Et secundum hoc diversi diversimode subtilitatem corporibus gloriosis attribuerunt. Quidam enim hæretici, ut Augustinus narratlib. XIII De civ. Dei, cap. xx, col. 393, t. 7, attribueruut eis subtilitatem secundum modum quo spirituales substantiae subtiles dicuntur; dicentes quod in resurrectione corpus vertetur in spiritum; et ratione hujus corpora resurgentium Apostolus spiritualia nominat, I Corinth., xv. Sed hoc non potest stare. Primo quia corpus in spiritum transire non potest, cum non communicent in materia; quod etiam Boetius ostendit in libro De gens, et fluit undique ad suum capiens, et sua subtilitate quamlibet ejus partem minimam subintrat. » duabus naturis, c. vi, col. 1349, t. 2. Secundo quia si hoc esset possibile, corpore in spiritum converso, non resurgeret homo, qui ex anima et corpore naturaliter constat. Tertio quia si Apostolus sic intelligeret, sicut nominat corpora, spiritualia pari ratione nominaret corpora animalia, quae in animam sunt conversa, quod patet esse falsum. Unde quidam hæretici dixerunt quod corpus in resurrectione remanebit, sed habebit subtilitatem secundum modum rarefactionis; ita quod corpora humana in resurrectione erunt aeri vel vento similia, ut Gregorius narrat, XIV lib. Moral., cap. LVI, col. 1077, t. 4. Sed hoc etiam non potest stare, quia corpus post resurrectionem palpabile habuit Dominus, ut patet Lucæ, ult., quod præcipue subtile credendum est. Et præterea corpus humanum cum carnibus et ossibus resurget, sicut corpus Domini, ut dicitur Lucæ, ult., 39: Spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere; et Job, xix, 26, dicitur: In carne mea videbo Deum Salvatore meum. Natura autem carnis et ossis prædictam raritatem non patitur. Et ideo est assignandus corporibus gloriosis alius modus subtilitatis, ut dicantur subtilia propter completissimam corporis perfectionem. Sed hanc completionem quidam eis attribuunt ratione quintæ, id est cælestis, essentiæ, quæ in eis tunc maxime dominabitur: quod esse non potest: primo quia nihil de quinta essentia potest venire in compositionem corporis, ut in II lib. Sent., dist. xii, quæst. 1, art. 1, ostensum est; secundo quia dato quod veniret in compositionem corporis humani, non posset intelligi quod dominaretur magis tunc quam nunc supra naturam elementarem; nisi ita quod tunc esset in corporibus humanis plus secundum quantitatem de natura cælesti; et sic corpora humana non essent ejusdem staturæ; nisi forte minuereturmateria elementaris in homine, quod repugnat integrati resurgentium; vel ita quod natura elementaris indueret proprietates naturæ cælestis ex ejus dominio in corpore; et sic naturalis virtus esset causa proprietatis gloriosæ, quod videtur absurdum. Et ideo alii dicunt quod dicta completeio ex qua corpora humana subtilia dicuntur, erit ex dominio animæ glorificatæ, quæ est forma corporis, super ipsum, ratione cujus corpus gloriosum spirituale dicitur, quasi omnino spiritui subjectum. Prima autem subjectio, qua corpus animæ subjicitur, est ad participandum esse specificum, prout subjicitur ipsi ut materia formæ; deinde subjicitur ei ad alia opera animæ, prout anima est motor. Et ideo prima ratio spiritualitatis in corpore est ex subtilitate, et deinde ex agilitate, et aliis proprietatibus corporis gloriosi. Et propter hoc Apostolus in spiritualitate teigit dotem subtilitatis, ut Magistri exponunt. Unde etiam Gregorius dicit, XIV Moralium, ubi supr., quod « corpus gloriosum dicitur subtilite per effectum spiritualis potentiæ. » Et per hoc patet solutio ad objecta quæ procedunt de subtilitate quæ est per rarefactionem.
[III.q.86.a.1.ad.1] Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from his saying (Genesis 27:41): "The days will come of the mourning of my father, and I will kill my brother Jacob." Likewise neither did Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he suffered in his body.
[III.q.86.a.1.ad.2] These words of Augustine should be understood thus: "So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble himself in prayer," i.e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal him. Yet this is possible by the power of God's grace, which sometimes turns men even "into the depths of the sea" (Psalm 67:23).
[III.q.86.a.1.ad.3] The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi), which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended, there is no pardon of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is unpardonable, i.e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the II-II, 14, 3.
Article 2
[III.q.86.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that sin can be pardoned without Penance. For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance. Therefore He also pardons adults without penance.
[III.q.86.a.2.arg.2] Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God's power sin can be pardoned without Penance.
[III.q.86.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, corpora gloriosa erunt nobiliora omnibus aliis corporibus. Sed quædam nunc ratione suæ nobilitatis possunt esse simul cum aliis corporibus, scilicet radii solares. Ergo multo fortius hoc conveniet corporibus gloriosis.
[III.q.86.a.2.arg.3] Further, God's mercy is greater than man's. Now man sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting: wherefore our Lord commanded us (Matthew 5:44): "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Much more, therefore, does God pardon men for offending him, without their repenting.
[III.q.86.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, corpus cæleste non potest dividi, ad minus quantum ad substantiam sphærarum: unde dicitur Job, xxxvii, dum qualitas inhærens corpori glorioso. 18, quod cæli velut ære solidissimi firmati sunt. Si ergo corpus gloriosum non poterit simul esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco ratione subtilitatis, nunquam ad cælum empyreum ascendere poterit, quod est erroneum.
[III.q.86.a.2.sc] The Lord said (Jeremiah 18:8): "If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil" which they have done, "I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them," so that, on the other hand, if man "do not penance," it seems that God will not pardon him his sin.
[III.q.86.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit in lib. De Trin., c. 1, col. 1249, t. 2: « In numero differentiam varietas accidentium facit. Nam tres homines neque genere, neque specie, sed suis accidentibus distant. Nam si omnino cuncta ab his accidentia separamus, tamen locus est cunctis diversus, quem unum fingere nullo modo possumus. Ergo si ponatur duo corpora esse in uno loco, erit unum corpus numero. Præterea, corpora gloriosa majorem convenientiam habebunt cum loco quam spiritus angelici. Sed spiritus angelici, ut quidam dicunt, non possunt distingui numero, nisi essent in diversis locis: et propter hoc ponunt quod necesse est esse eos in loco et quod ante mundum creari non potuerunt. Ergo multo magis debent dicere quod duo corpora qualiacumque non possunt simul esse in eodem loco.
[III.q.86.a.2.co] It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in I-II, 110, 1, the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is denoted by the word "grace," is the cause of all created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended with someone, without any change in the latter's will; but it is impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man's will being turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is necessary for man's will to be so changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner, together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue.
But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (Question 88, Article 3), is perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as related in John 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang.), "He drew inwardly by grace," i.e. by penance, "her whom He received outwardly by His mercy."
[III.q.86.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non potest dici quod corpus gloriosum, ratione suæ subtilitatis, habeat quod possit esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco, nisi per subtilitatem auferatur ab eo id per quod prohibeturnunc esse simul cum alio corpore in eodem loco. Dicunt autem qui dam quod prohibetur ab hoc in isto statu ratione corpulentiæ, per quam habet quod replet locum; quae quidem corpulentia ab eo per subtilitatis dotem toletur. Sed non hoc potest stare propter duo. Primo quia corpulentia, quam dos subtilitatis aufert, est ad defectum pertinens; puta aliqua inordinatio materiæ non perfecte substantis suæ formæ. Totum enim quod ad integritatem corporis pertinet, in corpore resurget tam ex parte formæ, quam ex parte materiæ. Quod autem aliquod corpus sit repletivum loci, hoc habet per illud quod est de integritate naturæ ejus, et non ex aliquo defectu naturæ. Cum enim plenum opponatur vacuo, illud solum non replet locum, quo posito in loco nihilominus remanet vacuus locus. Vacuum autem definitur in IV Physic., text. 57 et 58, quod est « locus non plenum sensibili corpore. » Dicitur autem aliquod corpus esse sensibile ex materia et forma, et naturalibus accidentibus, quae omnia ad integritatem naturæ pertinent. Constat etiam quod corpus gloriosum erit sensibile etiam secundum tactum, ut patet in corpore Domini, Luc., ult.; nec enim ei deerit materia, aut forma, aut naturalia accidentia, scilicet calidum, et frigidum, et hujusmodi. Unde patet quod corpus gloriosum, non obstante subtilitatis dote, replebit locum. Insania enim videtur dicere quod locus ubi erit corpus gloriosum, esset vacuus. Secundo ratio eorum prædicta non valet, quia coexistentiam corporis impedire in eodem loco est plus quam replere locum. Si enim ponamus dimensions esse separatas sine materia, illæ dimensions non replent locum. Unde quidam ponentes vacuum, dixerunt vacuum esse locum in quo sunt hujusmodi dimensions sine aliquo sensibili corpore: et tamen illæ dimensions prohibent ne sint simul cum alio corpore in eodem loco ut patet per Philosophum in IV Physic., text. 8 et 76, et in III Metaph. text. 17, ubi habet pro inconvenienti quod corpus mathematicum, quod nihil est aliud quam dimensions separatæ, sit simul cum alio corpore naturali sensibili. Unde dato quod subtilitas corporis gloriosi auferret ab eo hoc quod est replere locum, non tamen sequeretur quod propter hoc posset esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco, quia remoto eo quod minus est, non propter hoc removetur quod plus est. Dicendum est ergo quod illud quod impedit corpus nostrum nunc ne simul cum alio corpore sit in eodem loco, nullo modo poterit ab eo removeri per dotem subtilitatis. Nihil enim potest prohibere corpus aliquod ne sit simul situatum cum alio corpore in eodem loco nisi hoc quod in eo requirit diversum situm; nihil enim est impedimentum identitatis, nisi quod est causa diversitatis. Hanc autem distinctionem situs non requirit aliqua corporis qualitas, quia corpori non debetur aliquis situs ratione suæ qualitatis: unde remoto a corpore sensibili quod sit calidum aut frigidum, aut grave aut leve, nihilominus in eo remanet necessitas prædictæ distinctionis, ut patet per Philosophum, in IV Physic., et etiam per se planum est. Similiter etiam materia non potest inducere necessitatem prædictæ distinctionis, quia materiæ non advenit situs nisi mediante quantitate dimensiva. Similiter etiam neque forma situm habet, nisi ex materia situm habeat. Restat ergo quod necessitas distinctionis duorum corporum in situ causetur a natura quantitatis dimensivæ, cui per se convenit situs. Cadit enim in definitione ejus, quia quantitas dimensiva est quantitas habens situm. Et inde est quod remotis omnibus aliis quæ sunt in re, talis distinctionis necessitas inventur in sola quantitate dimensiva. Si enim accipiatur linea separata, oportet, si sint duæ lineæ, vel duæ partes unius lineæ, quod sint distinctæ in situ; alias linea addita lineæ non efficeret majus, quod est contra communem animi conceptionem. Et similiter est de superficiebus et corporibus mathematicis. Et quia materiæ debetur situs inquantum substat dimensioni, exinde prædictæ necessitas ad materiam situatam derivatur; ut sicut non est possibile esse duas lineas, vel duas partes lineæ, nisi sint distinctæ secundum situm, ita impossibile sit esse duas materias, vel duas partes materiæ, nisi sit distinctio situs. Et quia distinctio materiæ est principium distinctionis individuorum, inde est quod Boetius dicit in lib. De Trin., c. 1, col., 1249, t. 2, quod «duobus corporibus unum locum fingere nullo modo possumus;» ut hanc saltem accidentium varietatem distinctio individuorum requirat. Subtilitas autem a corpore glorioso dimensionem non aufert: unde nullo modo aufert ipsi prædictam necessitatem distinctionis situs ab alio corpore. Et ideo corpus gloriosum non habebit ratione suæ subtilitatis quod possit esse simul cum alio corpore, sed poterit simul cum alio corpore esse ex operatione virtutis divinæ; sicut etiam corpus Petri non habuit ex aliqua proprietate indita quod ad umbram ejus sanarentur infirmi: sed hoc fiebat virtute divina ad ædificationem fidei. Ita faciet virtus divina ut corpus gloriosum possit simul cum alio corpore esse ad perfectionem gloriae.
[III.q.86.a.2.ad.1] In children there is none but original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature, as explained in I-II, 82, 1, and so in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the will, which is the effect of Penance.
[III.q.86.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod corpus Christi non habuit ex subtilitatis dote quod posset esse simul cum alio corpore in eodem loco; sed hoc factum est virtute divinitatis post resurrectionem, sicut in nativitate. Unde Gregorius in Hom. xxvi in Evang., §1, col. 1497, t. 2, dicit: «Illud corpus Domini intravit ad discipulos januis clausis, quod ad humanos oculos per nativitatem suam clauso exiiit utero Virginis. » Unde non oportet quod ratione suæ subtilitatis hoc conveniat corporibus gloriosis.
[III.q.86.a.2.ad.2] This argument takes Penance as a sacrament.
[III.q.86.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod lumen non est corpus, ut in secundo lib. dictum est. Unde objectio procedit ex falsis.
[III.q.86.a.2.ad.3] God's mercy is more powerful than man's, in that it moves man's will to repent, which man's mercy cannot do.
[III.q.86.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpus gloriosum transibit sphæras cælorum sine earum divisione, non ex vi subtilitatis, sed ex divina virtute, quæ eis ad nutum in omnibus subveniet.
Article 3
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another. For it is written (Amos 4:7): "I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered." These words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech.): "When a man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in others." Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nec etiam per miraculum fieri possit quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco. Non enim potest fieri per miraculum quod duo corpora sint simul duo et unum, quia hoc esset facere contradictoria esse simul. Sed si ponatur duo corpora esse simul, sequeretur illa duo corpora esse unum. Ergo non est possibile hoc per miraculum fieri. Probatio media: Sint duo corpora in eodem loco, quorum unum dicatur A, et aliud B. Aut ergo dimensiones A erunt eædem cum dimensionibus loci, aut aliæ. Si aliæ, ergo erunt aliæ dimensiones separatæ; quia non potest poni quod dimensiones quæ sunt inter terminos loci, non sunt in aliquo subjecto, nisi sint in corpore locato. Si autem sint eædem, ergo eadem ratione dimensiones B erunt eædem cum dimensionibus loci. Sed «quæcumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. » Ergo dimensiones A et B sunt eædem. Sed duorum corporum non possunt esse eædem dimensiones, sicut nec eadem albedo. Ergo A et B sunt unum corpus et erant duo. Ergo sunt simul unum et duo.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.2] Further, Ambrose in commenting on Psalm 118, "Blessed are the undefiled in the way," after expounding verse 136 ("My eyes have sent forth springs of water"), says that "the first consolation is that God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us up." Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of unbelief remains.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, contra communes animi conceptiones non potest aliquid miraculose fieri, ut scilicet pars non sit minor toto, quia contraria communibus conceptionibus directe contradictionem includunt: similiter nec contra conclusiones geometriæ, quæ a communibus animi conceptionibus infallibiliter deducuntur, sicut quod triangulus non habeat tres angulos æquales duobus rectis: similiter nec aliquid potest fieri in linea contra definitionem lineæ, quia separare definitionem a definito est ponere duo contradictoria esse simul. Sed du corpora esse in eodem loco est contra communes animi conceptiones, et contra conclusiones geometriæ, et contra definitionem lineæ. Ergo non potest fieri per miraculum. Probatio media: Conclusio est geometriæ, quod duo circuli non se tangant nisi in puncto. Si autem duo corpora circularia essent in eodem loco, duo circuli designati in eis se tangerent secundum totum. Similiter etiam est contra definitionem lineæ, quod intra duo puncta sit plus quam una linea recta; quod fieret, si duo corpora essent in eodem loco, quia intra duo puncta signata in diversis superficiebus loci essent duæ lineæ rectæ duorum corporum locatorum.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.3] Further, when several things are not necessarily together, one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in I-II, 73, 1 that sins are not connected together, so that one sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by Penance without another being taken away.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, hoc videtur non posse fieri per miraculum quod corpus inclusum in alio corpore non sit in loco, quia sic haberet locum communem et non proprium, quod non potest esse. Sed hoc sequeretur, si duo corpora essent in eodem loco. Ergo hoc non potest fieri per miraculum. Probatio media: sint duo corpora in eodem loco, quorum unum secundum quamliabet dimensionem sit majus alio: corpus minus erit inclusum in corpore majore, et locus corporis majoris erit locus ejus communis: locum autem proprium non habebit, quia non erit aliqua superficies corporis actu signata quæ contineat ipsum, quod est de ratione loci. Ergo non habebit locum proprium.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.4] Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon when we say in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses," etc. Now man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another. Therefore God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, locus proportionaliter respondet locato. Sed nunquam potest fieri per miraculum quod idem corpus sit simul in diversis locis nisi per aliquam conversionem, sicut accidit in sacramento altaris. Ergo nullo modo potest fieri per miraculum quod duo corpora sint simul in eodem loco.
[III.q.86.a.3.arg.5] Further, man's sins are forgiven him through the love of God, according to Jeremiah 31:3: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee." Now there is nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another.
[III.q.86.a.3.sc] Augustine says in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "There are many who repent having sinned, but not completely; for they except certain things which give them pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us that we are never healed unless it be from all sins."
[III.q.86.a.3.sc] Sed contra, beata Virgo filium miraculose peperit. Sed in illo benedicto partu oportuit duo corpora esse simul in eodem loco, quia corpus pueri exiens claustra pudoris non fregit. Ergo potest miraculose fieri quod duo corpora sint simul in eodem loco. Præterea, hoc idem potest ostendi per hoc quod Dominus ad discipulos intra-vit clausis januis, Joan., xx.
[III.q.86.a.3.co] It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the offense against God. Wherefore it was stated in I-II, 109, 7; I-II, 113, 2 that without grace no sin can be forgiven. Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. Secondly, because, as shown above (Article 2) mortal sin cannot be forgiven without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to the perfection of God's mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated in Deuteronomy 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether. Hence Augustine says [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown, that "it is irreverent and heretical to expect half a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself."
[III.q.86.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, propter hoc necesse est duo corpora in duobus locis esse, quia diversitas materiæ requirit distinctionem in situ. Et ideo videmus quod quando conveniunt duo corpora in unum, destruitur esse distinctum utriusque, et acquiritur utrique simul esse unum distinctum $^4$, ut patet in mixtionibus. Non potest ergo esse quod duo corpora remaneant duo, et tamen sint simul, nisi utrumque conservet esse distinctum quod prius habebat, secundum quod utrumque erat ens indivisum in se, et divisum ab aliis. Hoc autem esse distinctum dependet a principiis essentialibus rei sicut a causis proximis, sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Et quia causa prima potest conservare rem in esse, cessantibus causis secundis, ut patet per primam propositionem libri De causis; ideo divina virtute, et ea sola, fieri potest ut accidens sit sine subjecto, ut patet in sacramento altaris: et similiter virtute divina fieri potest, et ea sola, quod corpori remaneat esse distinctum ab alio corpore, quamvis ejus materia non sit distincta in situ ab alterius corporis materia; et sic miraculose fieri potest quod duo corpora sint simul in eodem loco ($a$). Ad primum ergo dicemdum, quod ratio illa est sophistica, quia procedit ex suppositione falsi, vel petit principium. Procedit enim ratio illa, ac si inter duas superficies oppositas loci alicujus esset aliqua dimensio propria loco cui oporteret quod uniretur dimensio corporis locati advenientis. Sic enim sequeretur quod dimensiones duorum corporum locatorum fierent una dimensio, si utrumque unum fieret cum dimensione loci. Hæc autem suppositio falsa est, quia secundum hoc quandocumque corpus acquireret novum locum, oporteret aliquam immutationem fieri in dimensionibus loci, vel locati. Non enim potest esse quod aliqua duo fiant de novo unum, nisi altero eorum immutato. Si autem, sicut se rei veritas habet, loco non debentur aliæ dimensiones quam dimensions locati, patet quod ratio nihil prohibet, sed petit principium, quia secundum hoc nihil est aliud dictum quam quod dimensions locati sint eædem cum dimensionibus loci; nisi quod dimensiones locati continentur intra terminum loci, et secundum earum mensuram distant termini loci sicut distarent propriis dimensionibus, si eas haberent: et sic dimensiones corporum duorum esse dimensiones unius loci, nihil est aliud quam duo corpora esse in eodem loco, quod est principale propositum.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.1] These words of Gregory do not refer to the forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin, renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God's assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.2] In this saying of Ambrose "faith" cannot denote the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on John 15:22, "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin" (viz. unbelief): "for this is the sin which contains all others": but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment which he bears patiently.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod posito quod duo corpora sint simul in eodem loco per miraculum, non sequitur aliquid neque contra communes animi conceptiones neque contra definitionem lineæ, neque contra conclusiones aliquas geometriæ; quia, sicut supra dictum est, quantitas dimensiva in hoc differt ab omnibus aliis accidentibus, quod habet specialem rationem individuationis et distinctionis, scilicet ex situ partium, praeter rationem individuationis et distinctionis quæ est ipsi et omnibus aliis accidentibus communis, scilicet ex materia subjecta. Sic ergo una linea potest intelligi diversa ab alia, vel quia est in alio subjecto, quæ consideratio est de linea materiali, vel quia distat situ ab alia, quæ consideratio est de linea mathematica quæ intelligitur praeter materiam. Si ergo removeatur materia, non potest esse distinctio linearum, nisi secundum situm diversum; et similiter nec punctorum, nec superficierum, aut quarumcumque dimensionum: et sic geometria non potest ponere quod una linea addatur alteri tamquam distincta ab ea, nisi sit distincta in situ ab ea. Sed supposita distinctione subjecti sine distinctione situs ex divino miraculo, intelliguntur diversæ lineæ, quæ non distant situ, propter diversitatem subjecti, et similiter diversa puncta: et sic diversæ lineæ designatæ in duobus corporibus quæ sunt in eodem loco, trahuntur a diversis punctis ad diversa puncta, ut non accipiamus punctum signatum in loco, sed in ipso corporore locato, quia linea non dicitur trahi nisi a puncto, quod est terminus ejus: et similiter etiam duo circuli designati in duobus corporibus sphæricis existentibus in eodem loco, sunt duo, non propter diversitatem situs, alias non possent se tangere secundum to tum, sed sunt duo ex diversitate subjectorum; et propter hoc se totaliter tangentes adhuc manent duo: sicut etiam circulus signatus in corpore locato sphærico, tangit secundum totum alium circulum signatum in corpore locante.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.3] Although sins are not connected in so far as they turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in common. and it is thus that they have the character of an offense which needs to be removed by Penance.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus posset facere aliquod corpus non esse in loco; et tamen illa positione facta, non sequitur quod aliquod corpus non sit in loco, randus qui solubiles esse contendit rationes pro parte opposita allatas. Aliii quos recitat Scotus idem ac Durandus sentiunt. quia corpus majus est locus corporis minoris ratione illius superficiei quæ designatur ex contactu terminorum corporis minoris.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.4] Debt as regards external things, e.g. money, is not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned. hence one debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not pardoned without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man to forgive him one offense and not another.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod unum corpus esse simul localiter in duobus locis, non potest fieri per miraculum, corpus enim Christi non est in altari localiter, quamvis miraculose possit fieri quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco, quia esse in pluribus locis simul repugnat individuo ratione ejus quod est esse indivisum in se; sequeretur enim quod esset distinctum in situ. Sed esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco, repugnat ei quantum ad hoc quod est esse divisum ab alio. Ratio autem unius perficitur in divisione: ut patet in V Metaphysic., text. 2, sed divisio ab aliis est de consequentibus ad rationem unius. Unde quod idem corpus sit localiter simul in diversis locis, includit contradictionem, sicut quod homo careat ratione; sed duo corpora esse in eodem loco, non includit contradictionem, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo non est simile.
[III.q.86.a.3.ad.5] The love whereby God loves man's nature, does not ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any mortal sin. but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven, ordains man to eternal life, according to Romans 6:23: "The grace of God (is) life everlasting." Hence there is no comparison.
Article 4
[III.q.86.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that no debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of punishment can remain.
[III.q.86.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod corpus gloriosum possit esse cum alio glorioso in eodem loco. Quia ubi est major subtilitas, ibi est minor resistentia. Si ergo gloriosum est subtilius quam non gloriosum, minus resistet corpori glorioso; et ita si corpus gloriosum poterit esse cum corpore non glorioso in eodem loco, multo fortius cum corpore glorioso.
[III.q.86.a.4.arg.2] Further, according to the Apostle (Romans 5) the gift of Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same time the debt of punishment remitted.
[III.q.86.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut corpus gloriosum erit subtilius non glorioso, ita unum gloriosum erit subtilius alio. Si ergo corpus gloriosum poterit esse simul cum non glorioso, et corpus gloriosum magis subtilite poterit esse cum glorioso magis subtili.
[III.q.86.a.4.arg.3] Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Romans 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Blood . . . for the remission of former sins." Now Christ's Passion made satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above (Q48,49,79, 5). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of punishment remains.
[III.q.86.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, corpus cæli est subtile, et erit tunc glorificatum. Sed corpus gloriosum alicujus sanctipoterit simul esse cum corpore cæli, quia sancti poterunt ad terram descendere et ascendere pro libito voluntatis. Ergo duo corpora gloriosa poterunt esse simul.
[III.q.86.a.4.sc] It is related (2 Samuel 12:13) that when David penitent had said to Nathan: "I have sinned against the Lord," Nathan said to him: "The Lord also hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die. Nevertheless . . . the child that is born to thee shall surely die," which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven.
[III.q.86.a.4.sc] Sed contra, corpora gloriosa erunt spiritualia, id est, spiritibus quantum ad aliqid similia. Sed duo spiritus non possunt esse simul in eodem loco, quamvis corpus et spiritus possint esse in eodem loco; ut in I libro dictum est. Ergo nec duo corpora gloriosa poterunt esse in eodem loco. Præterea, duorum corporum existentium simul unum ab alio penetratur. Sed penetrari ab alio corpore est ignobilitatis, quæ omnino a corporibus gloriosis aberit. Ergo non poterunt esse duo corpora gloriosa simul.
[III.q.86.a.4.co] As stated in I-II, 87, 4, in mortal sin there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice, except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apocalypse 18:7): "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her."
Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of temporal punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace, the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain.
[III.q.86.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod corpus gloriosum ratione suæ proprietatis non habet quod possit esse cum alio corpore glorioso in eodem loco, sicut nec ut sit simul cum corpore non glorioso. Divina autem virtute fieri posset ut duo corpora vel duo gloriosa essent simul non gloriosa, sicut gloriosum et non gloriosum. Sed tamen non est conveniens quod corpus gloriosum sit simul cum alio corpore glorioso, tum quia in eis servabitur debitus ordo, qui dictinctionem requirit, tum quia unum corpus gloriosum non se opponet alteri. Et sic nunquam duo corpora gloriosa erunt simul.
[III.q.86.a.4.ad.1] Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to a created good. But, as stated in I-II, 71, 6, the turning away from God is as its form while the turning to created good is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due.
[III.q.86.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ac si corpori glorioso inesset ratione suæ subtilitatis quod posset esse simul in eodem loco cum alio corpore, quod falsum est. Et similiter dicendum ad secundum.
[III.q.86.a.4.ad.2] As stated in I-II, 109, 7,8; I-II, 111, 2, it belongs to grace to operate in man by justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man that his work may be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment. Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment, since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the latter, from grace and free-will.
[III.q.86.a.4.ad.3] Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of his share in the power of Christ's Passion. Now in Baptism man shares the Power of Christ's Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of Christ's Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above (84, 1,3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed.
[III.q.86.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpus cæli et alia corpora æquivoce dicentur gloriosa, in quantum participabunt aliquid gloriae, et non quod eis conveniant dotes corporum humanorum glorificatorum.
Article 5
[III.q.86.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that all the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Our Lord never healed anyone without delivering him wholly; for He wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from all disease, and his soul from all taint." Now the remnants of sin belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned.
[III.q.86.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ex sua subtilitate removetur a corpore glorificato necessitas existendi in æquali loco. Corpora enim gloriosa erunt conformia corpori Christi, ut patet ad Philipp., 111. Sed corpus Christi non coarctatur hac necessitate, ut sit in loco æquali: unde continetur totum sub parvis vel magnis dimensionibus hostiæ consecratæ. Ergo et hoc idem erit in corporibus gloriosis.
[III.q.86.a.5.arg.2] Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "good is more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of some good." Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once. Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all remnants of sin.
[III.q.86.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus probat in IV Physic., text. 53, 76, quod duo corpora non sunt in eodem loco, quia sequeretur quod maximum corpus obtineret minimum locum, quia diversæ partes ejus poterunt esse in eadem parte loci; non enim differt, utrum duo corpora vel quot-cumque sint in eodem loco. Sed corpus gloriosum erit simul in eodem loco cum alio corpore, ut dicitur communiter. Ergo poterit esse in quovis parvo loco.
[III.q.86.a.5.arg.3] Further, God's work is more efficacious than man's. Now by the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of guilt, which is a work of God.
[III.q.86.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut corpus ratione sui caloris videtur, ita commensuratur loco ratione suæ quantitatis. Sed corpus gloriosum ita subjectum erit spiritui, quod poterit videri et non videri, præcipue ab oculo non glorioso pro suæ libito voluntatis, ut in Christo patuit. Ergo ita quantitas subjicitur nutui spiritus quod poterit esse in parvo vel in magno loco, et habere parvam vel magnam quantitatem ad libitum.
[III.q.86.a.5.sc] We read (Mark 8) that the blind man whom our Lord enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he said (Mark 8:24): "I see men, as it were trees, walking"; and afterwards he was restored perfectly, "so that he saw all things clearly." Now the enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner. Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of his past sin.
[III.q.86.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in IV Physic., text. 30, quod « omne quod est in loco est in loco æquali sibi. » Sed corpus gloriosum erit in loco. Ergo erit in loco æquali sibi. Præterea, eædem sunt dimensiones loci et locati, ut probatur in IV Physic., ibid., et text. 76 et 77. Ergo si locus esset major locato, esset idem majus et majus seipso, quod est inconveniens.
[III.q.86.a.5.co] Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above (Article 4) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above (Article 4). Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they are after the manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the "fomes" which remains after Baptism.
[III.q.86.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod corpus non comparatur ad locum nisi mediantibus dimensionibus propriis, secundum quas corpus locatum circumscribitur ex contactu corporis locantis. Unde quod corpus aliquod sit in minori loco quam sit sua quantitas, hoc non potest esse nisi per hoc quod quantitas corporis propria efficitur aliquo modo minor seipsa. Quod quidem non potest intelligi nisi dupliciter. Uno modo ex variatione quantitatis circa eamdem materiam; ut scilicet materia quæ primo subest magnæ quantitati, postea subsit parvæ. Et hoc quidam posuerunt in corporibus gloriosis, dicentes quod quantitas eis subest ad nutum, ita quod cum voluerint, possint habere magnam quantitatem, et cum voluerint, parvam. Sed hoc non potest esse; quia nullus motus qui fit secundum aliquid intrinsecum rei, potest esse sine passione abjiciente a substantia. Et ideo in corporibus incorruptibilibus, scilicet cæles-tibus, est solus motus localis, qui non est secundum aliquid intrinsecum. Unde patet quod mutatio quantitatis circa materiam repugnaret impassibilitati corporis gloriosi et incorruptibilati. Et præterea sequeretur quod corpus gloriosum quandoque esset rarius et quandoque spissius, quia, cum nihil dividi possit ab eo de materia sua, quandoque eadem materia esset sub parvis dimensionibus et quandoque sub magnis; et ita rarefie-ret et densaretur, quod non potest esse. Alio modo potest intelligi quod quantitas corporis gloriosi efficiatur minor seipsa per variationem situs; ita scilicet quod partes corporis gloriosi subintrent se invicem, et sic redeat ad quantam-cumque parvam quantitatem. Et hoc quidam posuerunt, dicentes quod ratione suæ subtilitatis corpus gloriosum habebit quod possit esse simul cum alio corpore non glorioso in eodem loco. Et similiter potest una pars esse intra aliam, in tantum quod totum corpus gloriosum poterit intrare per minimum porum alterius corporis; et sic ponunt quod corpus Christi exivit de utero virginali, et intravit januis clausis ad discipulos. Sed hoc non potest esse, tum quia corpus gloriosum non habebit quod sit cum alio corpore simul ratione subtilitatis, tum quia etiamsi haberet ut esset simul cum alio corpore; non tamen cum alio corpore glorioso, ut multi dicunt; tum quia re-pugnaret rectæ dispositioni corporis humani, quæ requirit determinatum situm, et distantiam partium. Unde nec per miraculum hoc unquam fiet. Et ideo dicendum, quod corpus gloriosum semper erit in loco sibi æquali.
[III.q.86.a.5.ad.1] God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes suddenly, as Peter's mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect health, so that "rising she ministered to them" (Luke 4:39), and sometimes by degrees, as we said above (44, 3, ad 2) about the blind man who was restored to sight (Matthew 8). And so too, He sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but all remnants of sin being removed as was the case with Magdalen (Luke 7); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the remnants of sin by degrees.
[III.q.86.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod corpus Christi in altaris sacramento non est localiter, ut dictum est.
[III.q.86.a.5.ad.2] Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger disposition, the result of many acts.
[III.q.86.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod probatio Philosophi procedit ex hoc quod una pars eadem ratione subintraret aliam. Sed talis subintratio partium corpus gloriosi in invicem non potest esse, ut dictum est. Et ideo ratio non sequitur.
[III.q.86.a.5.ad.3] One human act does not remove all the remnants of sin, because, as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. viii) "a vicious man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good as to acquired virtue." But God's grace does this much more effectively, whether by one or by several acts.
[III.q.86.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpus videtur ex hoc quod agit in visum; quod autem agat in visum, vel non agat, nihil variat in ipso corpore. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si possit, quando vult, videri, et quando vult, non videri. Sed esse in loco non est actio aliqua procedens ab eo ratione suæ quantitatis, sicut videri ratione sui caloris. Et ideo non est simile.
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