4. The Starting Point of Epistemology

GA 3/l04/p016 · MP1993 MediumMedium alignmentSome paragraph re-numbering between this translation and the German original — the locus may slip by a paragraph or two.

To do anything else, however, is also utterly impossible. The world content as "given,” after all, is entirely without characterization. No part, of itself, can give the impetus to take it as the starting place for an ordering of this chaos. Therefore, cognitive activity must make a decree and say: The nature of this part must be such and such. A decree of this kind also does not encroach in any way upon the “given” in its qualitative aspect. It does not bring any arbitrary assertion into science. It actually asserts nothing at all, but says only: If knowledge is to be declared possible, then a region must be sought such as was described above. If such a region is present then there is an explanation of knowing> otherwise not. Whereas we took the “given” in general as the starting place of epistemology, we now limit our requirement to focusing attention on one particular point of the “given.”

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