6. Epistemology without Presuppositions and Fichte's Theory of Science

GA 3/l06/p011 · MP1993 MediumMedium alignmentSome paragraph re-numbering between this translation and the German original — the locus may slip by a paragraph or two.

It is not the first form in which reality approaches the "I” that is its true one, but rather the final one that the “I” makes out of the first. That first form has no significance at all for the objective world and has that form only as a basis for the process of knowledge. Therefore, it is not the form of the world given it by knowledge that is subjective, but rather the first form “given” to the “I” that is so. If, like Volkelt and others, we call this “given” world “experience,” then one must say: Science restores the world picture — which, owing to the constitution of our consciousness, appears in subjective form, as experience — to what it essentially is.

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Cite: GA 3/l06/p011 · edition MP1993