35. Chaos

If I wanted to discuss all the mathematically conceived details that Paul Mongré presents, I would have to write a book myself, at least as comprehensive as his. But I only want to characterize his way of thinking. To do this, it will suffice to deal with as simple a matter as possible in the sense that dominates his entire way of looking at things. In the world of experience in which we live, we see the son following the father, the son following the grandson. This succession occurs in the course of time. If we now look at this time sequence, no other sequence is conceivable in it than this: Father - son - grandson? Another is also conceivable. We can imagine that there is some observer of the world who does not see forwards as we do, but backwards, that is: grandson - son - father. We could think of another observer who sees the following sequence: son - grandson - father, another one: grandson - father - son. Thus, what we see is only a special case of other possible, abstractly conceivable cases. If we now extend this observation in the most manifold way to the whole world of experience before us, we can imagine that all the regularity which we perceive as a cosmic connection is only a special individual case of an infinite number of conceivable worlds. All laws, all concepts that we apply to our world are only special cases. Where do we end up if we imagine all cosmic lawfulness in this way as a special case? We come to the conclusion that in the vast number of general worlds none of the laws that apply in ours apply, that none of our concepts apply in them. We come to the conclusion that when we leave our world and enter another, we enter into lawlessness and lawlessness, into chaos. And finally we go even further. Nothing compels the various possibilities that exist apart from us (in our example: son - grandson - father; grandson - father - son and so on) to take on the particular form of existence given to us (in our example: to become father - son - grandson). Indeed, none of the conceivable possibilities need exist at all. And since for thinking ours has no preference over the other conceivable ones, ours does not necessarily have to exist either. Our entire world, which we perceive, therefore does not need to exist before a higher instance (in the transcendental sense, as Paul Mongré's terminology puts it). "Why shy away from the name? Our idealism here, if the last consequence applies, runs out into the sharp and dangerous point of a transcendental nihilism" (p. 188).