Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q3. The simplicity of God
Source context
- Theme
- Divine simplicity: the absence of composition, potentiality, and accident in God's being
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads VI.9)Plotinus holds that the One is absolutely simple, beyond all predication and composition, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's argument that God admits no real distinction between essence and existence.
- Vedanta (Advaita, Mandukya Upanishad)Shankara's nirguna Brahman — without qualities, parts, or internal differentiation — displays structural cross-tradition congruence with Q3's claim that God is pure act with no admixture of potentiality.
- Jewish Philosophy (Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed I.50–60)Maimonides's doctrine of negative attributes, which denies all positive composition of God, provides a Judaic philosophical analogue to Aquinas's eight articles on divine simplicity.
Q3. The simplicity of God
Article 1
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.1] It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job 11:8-9). Therefore God is a body.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam dimensionem: dicitur enim Job, xi, 8 et 9: Excelsior cælo est et quid facies? profundior inferno, et unde cognosces? longior terra mensura ejus, et latior mari. Ergo Deus est corpus. 1 Mss. Alcan., « utrum Deus sit corpus quod compositur ex partibus quantitatis. » Idololatræ, Sadducæi, Manichæi corpus quadrum inferiori parte hians, superiori parte apertum ips. Deo, teste Augustino, lib. Cont. Epist. fund., cap. xxiii, tribuenes, Anthropomorphitæ, monachi scilicet quidam Egypti imperii et incauti sub finem sæculi quarti degentes, Spinosistæ, Sansimoniani, Salvador Judæus, alique recentiores Deum corporeum esse finxerunt. Sed numquid pariter Audæus Syrus, ejusque discipuli Audiani non Vadiani, ut minus recte scribit Augustinus? Affirmativam Theodoretus et Augustinus tenent; verius tamen asseritur Audæum et Audianos hæc verba: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram, durius interpretantes imaginem Dei in corpore collocasse, Deum nihilominus corporeum non prædicasse. De
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.2] Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Genesis 1:26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (Hebrews 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne figuratum est corpus; cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem. Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit, Gen., i, 26: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; figura enim imago dicitur, secundum illud Hebr., i, 3: Cum sit splendor gloriæ, et figura substantiæ ejus, id est, imago. Ergo Deus est corpus.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.3] Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Psalm 33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Psalm 117:16). Therefore God is a body.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne quod habet partes corporeas est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit Deo partes corporeas; dicitur enim Job, xL, 4: Si habes brachium ut* Deus; et in Ps. xxxiii, 16, et cxvii, 16: Oculi Domini super justos; et: Dextera Domini fecit virtutem. Ergo Deus est corpus.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.4] Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" (Isaiah 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Isaiah 3:13). Therefore God is a body.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, situs non competit nisi corpori. Sed ea quæ ad situm pertinent, in Scripturis dicuntur de Deo: dicitur enim Isa., vi, 1: Vidi Dominum sedentem; et Isa., iii, 13: Stat ad judicandum Dominus. Ergo Deus est corpus.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.5] Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (Psalm 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jeremiah 17:13). Therefore God is a body.
[I.q.3.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, nihil potest esse terminus localis « a quo » vel « ad quem » nisi sit corpus, vel aliquid corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus localis ut « ad quem, » secundum illud Ps. xxxiii, 6: Accedite ad eum, et illuminamini; ut « a quo, » secundum illud Jerem., xvii, 13: Recedentes a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus.
[I.q.3.a.1.sc] It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24): "God is a spirit."
[I.q.3.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., iv, 24: Spiritus est Deus.
[I.q.3.a.1.co] It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways.
First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (2, 3), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body.
Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.
[I.q.3.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, absolute Deum non esse corpus; quod quidem tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra, quod Deus est primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est corpus. Melitone, sardicensi episcopo, non admittitur quod docuerit Deum esse corporeum, quamvis hoc ipsi tribuit Origenes; probabilius enim de Deo incarnato Melito locutus est. Tertullianus in eadem causa et ab Augustino qui suam postea videtur accusationem retractasse, et a D. Thoma, I Cont. gent., cap. xx, reprehenditur. Sed a quibusdam antiquis et a Tertulliano præcipue vox corpus dupliciter accipitur: proprie pro mole materiali extensa, et improprie pro omni eo quod nihilo opponitur. Præterea, juxta Tertulliani doctrinam, omne corporale passibile est; atqui Deum impassibilem esse Tertullianus tenet; dicendum est ergo probabiliter Tertullianum vel non sensisse Deum esse corporeum, vel saltem sententiam illam erroneam revocasse. Secundo vero modo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim, in uno et eodem quod exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus; simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia: quia quod est in potentia non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in potentia: quia continuum, in quantum hujusmodi, divisibile est. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus. Tertio, quia Deus est id quod est nobilissimum in entibus, ut ex dictis patet. Impossibile est aliquod corpus esse nobilissimum in entibus: quia corpus aut est vivum, aut non vivum. Corpus autem vivum manifestum est quod est nobilius corpore non vivo; corpus autem vivum non vivit in quantum corpus; quia sic omne corpus viveret. Oportet igitur quod vivat per aliquid aliud; sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam. Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.1] As we have said above (Question 1, Article 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium; unde cum trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatem virtualem ipsius designat; utpote per profunditatem, virtutem ad cognoscendum occulta; per altitudinem, excellentiam virtutis super omnia; per longitudinem, durationem sui esse; per latitudinem affectum dilectionis ad omnia. Vel, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. ix De div. nom., § 5, col. 914, t. 1: « Per profunditatem Dei, intelligitur incomprehensibilitas ipsius essentiae; per longitudinem, processus virtutis ejus omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem vero, superextensio ejus ad omnia, in quantum scilicet sub ejus protectione omnia continentur. »
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.2] Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Genesis 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excedit alia animalia; unde, Gen., 1, 26, postquam dictum est: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, subditur, et præsit piscibus maris, etc. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum ad rationem et intellectum; unde secundum intellectum et rationem, quæ sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.3] Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod partes corporeæ attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum actuum secundum quamdam similitudinem; sicut actus oculi est videre; unde oculus de Deo dictus significat virtutem ejus ad videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibilii; et similiter est de aliis partibus.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.4] Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod etiam ea quæ ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi secundum quamdam similitudinem; sicut dicitur sedens propter suam immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans propter suam fortitudinem ad debellandum omne quod adversatur ei.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.5] We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.
[I.q.3.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, sed affectibus mentis; et eodem modo ab eo receditur; et sic accessus et recessus sub similitudine localis motus designant spiritualem affectum.
Article 2
[I.q.3.a.2.arg.1] It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Hebrews 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
[I.q.3.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formæ et materiæ. Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma; quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo; introducitur enim ad Hebr., x, 38, ex persona Dei: Justus autem meus ex fide vivit: quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animæ meæ. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma.
[I.q.3.a.2.arg.2] Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" (Psalm 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
[I.q.3.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ira, gaudium, et hujusmodi sunt passiones conjuncti, ut dicitur I De anima, text. 12, 14 et 15. Sed hujusmodi visibilitatem corporum in infinitum non admittit. Corderius, apud Migne: « Divina quidem latitudio dicenda est, latissima ad universas res progressio; longitudo autem, potentia quæ sugra omnia expanditur; profundum vero arcanum illud omnibus inaccessum, ejusdemque ignoratio. » attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura; dicitur enim in Ps. cv, 40: Iratus est furore Dominus in populum suum. Ergo Deus ex materia et forma est compositus.
[I.q.3.a.2.arg.3] Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
[I.q.3.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse individuum; non enim de multis prædicatur. Ergo Deus est ex materia et forma.
[I.q.3.a.2.sc] Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.
[I.q.3.a.2.sc] Sed contra, omne compositum ex materia et forma est corpus; quantitas enim dimensiva est quæ primo inhæret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.
[I.q.3.a.2.co] It is impossible that matter should exist in God.
First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (I:2:3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.
Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best--viz. God--is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.
Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
[I.q.3.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia materia id quod est in potentia est. Ostensum est autem, quod Deus est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam; unde oportet quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam. Primum autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per participationem; quia bonum per essentiam prius est bono per participationem. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam formam; unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad formam, sic se habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum est et per se agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem est primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est igitur per essentiam suam forma, et non compositus ex materia et forma.
[I.q.3.a.2.ad.1] A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
[I.q.3.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus: si enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est: unde illud dicitur esse placitum animæ Dei quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.
[I.q.3.a.2.ad.2] Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.
[I.q.3.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ira et hujusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus; quia enim proprium est irati punire, ejus punitio ira metaphorice vocatur.
[I.q.3.a.2.ad.3] Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.
[I.q.3.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod formæ quæ sunt receptibiles in materia, individuantur per materiam, quæ non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subjectum; forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud impediat, recipi potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quæ non est receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso individuatur quod non potest recipi in alio; et hujusmodi forma est Deus; unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.
Article 3
[I.q.3.a.3.arg.1] It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God--i.e. the Godhead--is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.
[I.q.3.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia, vel natura. Nihil enim est in se ipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quæ est Deitas, dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit idem quod sua essentia vel natura.
[I.q.3.a.3.arg.2] Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
[I.q.3.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, effectus assimilatur suæ causæ; quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura; non enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod sua Deitas. Etsi D.
[I.q.3.a.3.sc] It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.
[I.q.3.a.3.co] God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to "this" matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
[I.q.3.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia, vel natura. Ad cujus intellectum, sciendum est quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum; quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei; sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis; his enim homo est homo: et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam non cadit in definitione speciei; non enim cadunt in definitionem hominis hæ carnes et hæc ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid hujusmodi; unde hæ carnes et hæc ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam non conclusuntur in humanitate; et tamen in eo qui est homo, includuntur: unde illud quod est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas; et propter hoc non totaliter idem est homo, et humanitas; sed humani- Id est: in natura, suppositum et natura non differunt; in ratione tamen differunt. Essentia definitur id per quod et in quo intrinsece res habet esse. Suppositum definitur id quod supponitur essentia; essentia namque, nisi in supposito subsistat, per se seorsim existere non potest. Sed in Deo suppositum idem est ac essentia. Nota diligenter per hoc nomen Deus quod suppositum importat, S. Doctorem intelligere id quod veram deitatem habet, sive sit individuum deitatis, ut indivisum et praeintellectum tribus personis, sive sit persona incommunicabilis, vel Pater, vel Filius, vel Spiritus sanctus; in Deo enim Patre, in Deo Filio, in Deo Spiritu sancto, sicut in Deo tribus personis praeintellecto, idem est suppositum ac essentia. Nota insuper subtilissimam quamdam distinctionem. Essentia suppositum duo superaddit: 1° principia individuantia; 2° subsistentiam seu existentiam per se.
[I.q.3.a.3.ad.1] We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.
[I.q.3.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accepimus; et ideo de Deo loquentes utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus ejus subsistentiam; quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita; et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus ejus simplicataem. Quod ergo dicitur Deitas, vel vita, vel aliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri, et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.
[I.q.3.a.3.ad.2] The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.
[I.q.3.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod effectus Dei non per materiam, individuantur, suppositum nil includit aliud quod non includat essentia; unde in eis naturis sicut et in Deo suppositum et essentia non differunt intrinsece, per aliquid videlicet superadditum quod ex principiis rei petatur; in eis nihilominus naturis suppositum et essentia differre possunt et differunt extrinsece, puta per ipsum esse quod naturæ advenit ab extrinseca causa. Sic in hac re a Deo substantiæ separata distinguunt; Deus etenim, ut infra patebit, habet esse per essentiam, quod in substantiis separatis non verificatur; igitur in Deo nec intrinsece, nec extrinsece suppositum et essentia differunt. « Oportet quod Deus sit deitas. »— Sæculo duodecimo, Gilbertus Porretanus, pictaviensis episcopus, vir aliunde conspicuus ac venerabilis, de Deo nolebat abstracta prædicari in concreto, negabat quod Deus esset proprie loquendo veritas, vel deitas, et consequenter illam propositionem: Deus est veritas, interpretabatur per hanc aliam: Deus est verus. Error iste Gilberti damnatus est anno 1147, in concilio remensi, definitione quadam cui Gilbertus ipse subscripsit humiliter. Sæculo quartodecimo, Græci nonnulli schismatici, Palamitæ scilicet, Gregorii Palamæ, thessalonicensis archiepiscopi, discipuli, virtutem et operationes Dei ab essentia divina realiter esse distinctas somniaverunt. « Ad diversitatem. »— Quarto sæculo Anomæi post Eunomium et Aetium nullam distinctionem agnoscere vollebant inter essentiam et attributa Dei; distinctionem etiam rationis pertinaciter respuebant: hos Ecclesia reprobavit. imitantur ipsum non perfecte, sed secundum quod possunt; et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet, quod id quod est simplex et unum, non possunt repræsentare nisi per multa; et sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in eis non est idem suppositum quod natura.
Article 4
[I.q.3.a.4.arg.1] It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wisdom 14:21). Therefore God's existence is not His essence.
[I.q.3.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia, et esse. Si enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui nulla fit additio, est esse commune, quod de omnibus prædicatur. Sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune prædicabile de omnibus. Hoc autem est falsum secundum illud Sap., xiv, 21: Incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus* imposuerunt. Ergo esse Dei non est ejus essentia.
[I.q.3.a.4.arg.2] Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (I:2:2); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or nature.
[I.q.3.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, de Deo scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est ejus, sive quidditas vel natura.
[I.q.3.a.4.sc] Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.
[I.q.3.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit, in VII De Trinit., § 11, col. 208, t. 2: « Esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas. » Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est suum esse.
[I.q.3.a.4.co] God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways.
First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent--as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence.
Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (Article 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.
Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above (Article 3) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
[I.q.3.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed est suum esse; quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo, quod est præter essentiam ejus, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem, causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab ejus essentia, D. Thomas hic sumit esse pro existentia. Hilarius Pictaviensis, nobili sed infideli prosapia ortus, ex matrimonio Apram seu Abram filiam habuit. Mox ad religionem christianam conversus, cum uxore et filia baptisatus est. Anno 333, communi consensu pictaviensis episcopus effectus, catholicam doctrinam contra Arianos strenue pro-necesse est quod ipsum esse illius rei sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus ejusdem rei. Imposibile est autem quod esse sit causatum a principiis tantum essentialibus rei; quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud cujus esse est aliud ab essentia sua habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo: quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Imposibile est ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud ejus essentia. Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formæ vel naturæ; non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quæ est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem, et non est ignis, est ignitum per participationem; ita illud quod habet esse et non est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus autem est ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per participationem et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens, quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum sua essentia.
[I.q.3.a.4.ad.1] A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.
[I.q.3.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid cui non fit additio, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione ejus sit quod non fiat ei additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; sed neque de ratione ejus ut careat ratione. Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione est esse divinum; secundo modo esse sine additione est esse commune.
[I.q.3.a.4.ad.2] "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects (I:2:2).
[I.q.3.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod esse duplipugnavit, ob hoc in Phrygiam exulatus; inde revocatus pro fide legitime certavit usque ad mortem. Duodecim libros Trinitatis in exilio suo conscripsit; multa alia edidit opera propter quæ novissime doctorum Ecclesiæ catalogo annumeratus est. Vitam autem Hilarii Reverentius episcopus exaravit. « Non est accidens nomen. » citer dicitur. Uno modo significat actum essendi; alio modo significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit conjungens prædicatum subjecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec ejus essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim, quod hæc propositio, quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus, Deus est, vera est; et hoc scimus ex ejus effectibus, ut supra dictum est.
Article 5
[I.q.3.a.5.arg.1] It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
[I.q.3.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere aliquo. Substantia enim est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus est in genere substantiae.
[I.q.3.a.5.arg.2] Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
[I.q.3.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis, sicut longitudines per longitudinem, et numeri per numerum. Sed Deus est mensura omnium substantiarum, ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphysic. Ergo Deus est in genere substantiae.
[I.q.3.a.5.sc] In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus.
[I.q.3.a.5.sc] Sed contra, genus est prius secundum intellectum eo quod genere continetur. Sed nihil est prius Deo nec secundum rem nec secundum intellectum. Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere.
[I.q.3.a.5.co] A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways.
First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species.
Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus.
Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity--i.e. essence--must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.
[I.q.3.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter; uno modo simpliciter, et proprie, sicut species, et quæ sub eis continentur; alio modo per reductionem, sicut principia et privationes; sicut punctum et unitas reducuntur ad genus quantitatis sicut principia; cæcitas autem et omnis privatio reducuntur ad genus sui habitus. Neutro autem modo Deus est in genere. Quod enim non possit esse species alicujus generis, tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia species constituitur ex genere et differentia; semper autem id a quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam: animal enim sumitur a natura sensitiva per modum concretionis; hoc enim dicitur animal quod naturam sensitivam habet: rationale vero sumitur a natura intellectiva; quia rationale est quod naturam intellectivam habet; intellectivum autem comparatur ad sensitivum sicut actus ad potentiam; et similiter manifestum est in aliis. Unde cum in Deo non adjungatur potentia actui, impossibile est quod sit in genere tanquam species. Secundo, quia cum esse Dei sit ejus essentia, ut ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret quod genus ejus esset ens; nam genus significat essentiam rei, cum prædicetur in eo quod quid est. Ostendit autem Philosophus, in III Metaph., text. 10, quod ens non potest esse genus alicujus: omne enim genus habet differentias, quæ non participant essentiam generis; nulla autem differentia posset inveniri quæ esset extra ens, quia non ens non potest esse differentia. Unde relinquitur quod Deus non sit in genere. Tertio, quia omnia quæ sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditate, vel essentia generis, quod prædicatur de eis in eo quod Concordat Cyrillus Alexandrinus, dial. II De Trin., dicens aberrare qui genus ullum in Deo nominat, cum nullum sit ens ante ipsum vel cum ipso, quasi diceret: Deus non est in genere cum sit transcendens omnia. Conclusio illa scholasticis communis est, quamvis Albertus, Gregorius, Holkot et Ockam teneant cum simplicitate Dei stare posse quod Deus, vel aliquid dictum formaliter de Deo, dicat conceptum generis, sive in prædicamento reponatur. Nota sedulo quod quinque sint universalia de quibus medio aevo decurrente maxima controversia fuit. Primum universalium nihil aliud est quam genus, et definitur: unum aptum inesse multis specie differentibus, et prædicari de illis ut vaga et incompleta determinatio; v. g.: homo est animal; animal est genus, si quidem aptum est inesse multis specie differentibus, et est hominis sicut omnium animalium vaga et incompleta determinatio. Quoad hominem, determinatio completa exigit hanc additionem: rationale; homo etenim est animal rationale. Hinc intelligige vim argumenti scholasticorum: Deus non potest esse in genere, quia nil in Deo aptum est inesse multis specie differentibus. Deus enim abusive vocatur substantia, ut Augustinus docet, et quæ de Deo et creatura dicuntur sunt indifferentia ad finitum et infinitum, unde sub eodem genere non includuntur. Si objicias cum nonnullis antiquis compositionem ex genere et differentia simplicitati non obstare, dum angeli in genere positi simplices remaneant, tibi respondetur angelorum simplicitatem non esse eamdem ac simplicitatem Dei. Si instes ex Boetio qui, lib. III De Trin.; in divinis duo genera, substantiam scilicet et relationem, ponere videtur, male Boetium capis, qui non duo genera sed duos modos prædicandi, ad se videlicet et ad aliud, ponit in divinis. quid; differunt autem secundum esse; non enim idem est esse hominis, et equi; nec hujus hominis, et illius hominis: et sic oportet quod quæcumque sunt in genere, differant in eis esse, et quod quid est, id est essentia. In Deo autem non differunt, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est in genere sicut species; et ex hoc patet quod non habet genus, neque differentias, neque est definitio ipsius, neque demonstratio, nisi per effectum; quia definitio est ex genere, et differentia; demonstrationis autem medium est definitio. Quod autem Deus non sit in genere per reductionem ut principium, manifestum est ex eo quod principium, quod reducitur in aliquod genus, non se extendit ultra genus illud; sicut punctum non est principium nisi quantitatis continuæ, et unitas quantitatis discretæ. Deus autem est principium totius esse, ut infra ostendetur; unde non continetur in aliquo genere sicut principium.
[I.q.3.a.5.ad.1] The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.
[I.q.3.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod substantia nomen non significat hoc solum quod est per se esse; quia hoc quod est esse non potest per se esse genus, ut ostensum est, sed significat essentiam, cui competat sic esse, id est, per se esse; quod tamen esse non sit ipsa ejus essentia: et sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantia.
[I.q.3.a.5.ad.2] This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him.
[I.q.3.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de mensura proportionata; hanc enim oportet esse homogeneam mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura proportionata alicui; dicitur tamen mensura omnium ex eo quod unumquodque tantum habet de esse, quantum ei appropinquavit.
Article 6
[I.q.3.a.6.arg.1] It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.
[I.q.3.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. « Substantia enim nulli est accidents, » ut dicitur in Physic., text. 27 et 30. Quod ergo in uno est accidents, non potest in alio esse substantia; Accidens quintum et ultimum universalium est, et definitur: id quod accidit substantia, et potest adesse vel abesse, quin aliquid essentiale rei accedat, vel ab ipsa auferatur.
[I.q.3.a.6.arg.2] Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God--which is absurd.
[I.q.3.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera accidentium. Si ergo prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt multa prima extra Deum; quod est inconveniens.
[I.q.3.a.6.sc] Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
[I.q.3.a.6.sc] Sed contra, omne accidens est in subjecto, Deus autem non potest esse subjectum, quia « forma simplex non potest esse subjectum, » ut dicit Boetius, in lib. De Trinit., c. II, col. 1250, t. 2. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens. Respondeo secundum præmissa quod manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subjectum comparatur ad accidens sicut potentia ad actum; subjectum enim secundum accidens est aliquo modo in actu; esse autem in potentia omnino removetur a Deo, ut ex prædictis patet. Secundo, quia Deus est suum esse. Sed, ut Boetius dicit, in lib. De hebd., col. 1341, t. 2, licet id quod est aliquid aliud posset habere adjunctum, tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud adjunctum habere potest; sicut quod est calidum, potest habere aliud extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem; sed ipse calor nihil habet præteter calorem. Tertio, quia omne quod est per se, est prius eo quod est per accidens. Unde cum Deus sit simpliciter primum ens, nihil in eo potest esse per accidens. Sed nec accidentia per se in eo esse possunt, sicut risibile est per se accidens hominis; quia hujusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis subjecti. In Deo autem nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa prima. Unde relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens.
[I.q.3.a.6.co] From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God.
First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown (2, 3).
Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat.
Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.
[I.q.3.a.6.ad.1] Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us.
[I.q.3.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod sint accidentia in Deo sicut in nobis.
[I.q.3.a.6.ad.2] Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.
[I.q.3.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia accidentium reducuntur in principia substantia sicut in priora; quamvis Deus non sit pri- « Formæ subjectæ esse non possunt, » et inferius « forma quæ est sine materia non poterit esse subjectum. » mum contentum in genere substantiae, sed primum extra omne genus respectu totius esse.
Article 7
[I.q.3.a.7.arg.1] It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.
[I.q.3.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quæ sunt a Deo imitantur ipsum; unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quæ sunt a Deo, nihil est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex.
[I.q.3.a.7.arg.2] Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.
[I.q.3.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino simplex.
[I.q.3.a.7.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple."
[I.q.3.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI De Trin., cap. vi et vii, col. 928, t. 8, quod Deus vere et summe simplex est.
[I.q.3.a.7.co] The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways.
First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple.
Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (Question 2, Article 3).
Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Question 2, Article 3), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."
[I.q.3.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit compositio neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; neque compositio formæ et materiæ; neque in eo sit aliud natura et suppositum; neque aliud essentia et esse; neque in eo sit compositio generis et differentia; neque subjecti et accidentis; manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino simplex. Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis componentibus, et dependens ex eis; Deus autem est primum ens, ut supra ostensum est. Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet; quæ enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in unum nisi per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa; Deus autem non habet causam, ut supra ostensum est, cum sit prima causa efficiens. Sic codices; editio autem gothica nurembergensis ann. 1496 habet: «Animalia suis partibus.» Sed partes animalium non sunt simplicia quædam; partes vero quantitativæ elementorum, quamvis elementa sint simplicia, elementis tamen sunt quædam simpliciora, scilicet sub respectu quantitatis. Quarto, quia in omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum; quod in Deo non est: quia vel partium una est actus alterius vel saltem omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius. Quinto, quia omne compositum est aliquid quod non convenit alicui suarum partium. Et quidem in totis dissimilium partium manifestum est; nulla enim partium hominis est homo, neque aliqua partium pedis est pes. In totis vero similium partium, licet aliquid quod dicitur de toto, dicatur de parte, sicut pars aeris est aer, et aquæ aqua; aliud tamen dicitur de toto quod non convenit alicui partium; non enim si tota aqua est bicubita, et pars ejus. Sic igitur in omni composito est aliquid quod non est ipsum. Hoc autem etsi possit dici de habente formam, quod scilicet habeat aliquid quod non est ipsum, puta in albo est aliquid et non pertinet ad rationem albi; tamen in ipsa forma nihil est alienum. Unde cum Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII De Trinit., § 27, col. 223, t. 2, dicens: «Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur; neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur.»
[I.q.3.a.7.ad.1] Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (4, 3).
[I.q.3.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea quæ sunt a Deo imitantur ipsum, sicut causata primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati quod sit aliquo modo compositum; quia ad minus esse ejus est aliud quam quod quid est, ut infra patebit.
[I.q.3.a.7.ad.2] With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (4, 1 and 6, 2).
[I.q.3.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia perfectio bonitatis creaturæ non invenitur in uno sed in multis; sed perfectio divinæ bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici, ut infra ostendetur.
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