Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q4. The perfection of God
Source context
- Theme
- divine perfection as ontological and causal ground of all creaturely goodness
Steiner
- GA 151, 1914-01-20Steiner examines the Anselmian-Thomistic claim that God, conceived as the most perfect being, cannot coherently be thought not to exist, treating this as a structural feature of how perfection-concepts operate in philosophical theology.
- GA 74, 1920-05-23Steiner describes how Dionysius the Areopagite — a key source for Aquinas on divine perfection — proposes that any perfection observed in worldly things may be predicated of God, a method Steiner contextualises within the broader Thomistic approach to God-knowledge.
- GA 18, p01c07Steiner argues that a perfect God would not create beings requiring constant helpless direction, implying that divine perfection entails a creation capable of independent self-unfolding — a position structurally adjacent to Aquinas's account of how God's perfection is communicated to creatures.
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Pseudo-Dionysius)Dionysius's cataphatic method — ascending through creaturely perfections to their divine source — directly informs Aquinas's treatment in Q4, establishing a cross-tradition congruence between Neoplatonic emanationism and scholastic analogy-of-being.
- Aristotelian theologyAristotle's Unmoved Mover is characterised by pure actuality (energeia) and self-thinking intellect, providing the philosophical substrate for Aquinas's claim that God, lacking all potentiality, possesses perfection in the most eminent degree.
Q4. The perfection of God
Article 1
[I.q.4.a.1.arg.1] It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
[I.q.4.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod esse perfectum non conveniat Deo. Perfectum enim dicitur quasi totaliter factum. Sed Deo non convenit esse factum. Ergo nec esse perfectum.
[I.q.4.a.1.arg.2] Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
[I.q.4.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Deus est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur qua ab alio non exceditur. Iste modus ultimus perfecti et ad mala transfertur; dicimus enim: talis est perfectus deceptor, perfectus lairo, etc. Secundum finem, perfectum est quod finem suum ad quem ordinatur assecutum est: sic homo salutem adeptus est perfectus. Iste modus perfecti pariter malis per translationem applicatur, ut cum dicimus: hoc est perfecte perditum. Altera perfecti distributio est cui ipse D. Thomas alludit. Perfectum namque dicitur vel secundum id a quo nomen imponitur, et idem est ac totaliter factum; vel secundum id ad quod significandum nomen transmovetur, et est id cui nihil deest secundum modum suæ perfectionis; de perfecto ultimo illo sensu accepto hic agitur. esse imperfecta; semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.
[I.q.4.a.1.arg.3] Further, as shown above (Question 3, Article 4), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect.
[I.q.4.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ostensum est supra, quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum et accipiens omnium additiones. Ergo Deus non est perfectus.
[I.q.4.a.1.sc] It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48).
[I.q.4.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., v, 48: Estote perfecti, sicut et Pater vester cælestis perfectus est.
[I.q.4.a.1.co] As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.
[I.q.4.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus narrat, XII Metaph., text. 40, quidam antiqui philosophi, scilicet Pythagorici, et Speusippus non attribuerunt optimum et perfectissimum primo principio. Cujus ratio est, quia philosophi antiqui consideraverunt principium materiale tantum; primum autem principium materiale imperfectissimum est. Cum enim materia, inquantum hujusmodi, sit in potentia, oportet quod primum principium materiale sit maxime in potentia, et ita maxime imperfectum. Deus autem ponitur primum principium, non materiale, sed in genere causæ efficientis; et hoc oportet esse perfectissimum; sicut enim materia, in quantum hujusmodi, est in potentia; ita agens, in quantum hujusmodi, est in actu: unde primum principium activum oportet maxime esse in actu, et per consequens maxime perfectum; secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse perfectum quod est actu: nam perfectum dicitur cui nihil deest secundum modum suæ perfectionis.
[I.q.4.a.1.ad.1] As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
[I.q.4.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, V Moral., c. xxvi, col. 715, § 66, t. 1, — et XXIX Moral., c. 1, col. 477, t. 2, « balbutiendo, ut possumus, excelsa Dei resonamus: quod enim factum non est, perfectum proprie dici non potest. » Sed quia, in his quæ fiunt, tunc dicitur esse aliquid perfectum, cum de potentia educitur in actum, transumitur hoc nomen « perfectum » ad significandum omne illud cui non deest esse in actu, sive hoc habeat per modum factionis, sive non.
[I.q.4.a.1.ad.2] The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual.
[I.q.4.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod principium materiale, quod apud nos imperfectum inventur, non potest esse simpliciter primum, sed praeceditur ab alio perfecto. Nam semen, licet sit principium animalis generati ex semine, tamen habet ante se animal, vel plantam, unde deciditur. Oportet enim ante id quod est in potentia, esse aliquid in actu: cum ens in potentia non reducatur in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu.
[I.q.4.a.1.ad.3] Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.
[I.q.4.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus; nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum; unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens; cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cujus-cumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse. 4 sed in Matthaei textus ad perfectum secundum virtu-tem pertinet. « Leucippus vel Speusippus. » — Legitur in codicibus Speusippus, quod conformius est juxta Nicolaï sententiam textui græco in quo Σπούσιππος inventur. De Leucippo tamen loquitur quoque Aristoteles in suis Metaphysicis; immo Aristotelis antiqua versio Leucippum, non Speusippum ut versio recens, nominat in loco Metaphysicorum quem hic D. Thomas videtur intendere, in lectione scilicet octava libri duodecimi, sanctusque doctor hanc lectionem interpretando non Speusippum sed Leucippum introducit. Utrum autem in vetustis quibusdam codicibus græcis Leucippus non inscriberetur, etsi allii græci codices Speusippum habeant, hoc eruditorum inquisitioni relinquimus. Quidquid sit, Leucippi istius existentiam ut fictitiam negavit Epicurus, omniaque opera ipsius vel latent vel periere. Scimus tamen ex diversis nec contemnen-dis testimoniis Leucippum Democriti magistrum fuisse ac primum systematis atomorum inventorem; docebat atomos in vacuum cadentes sese invicem adunasse, corporaque efformasse cælestia.
Article 3
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.1] It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (Psalm 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God.
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nulla creatura possit esse similis Deo. Dici- In editis: « perfectius. » Ex versione Joan. Sarrasini. — Corderius « si enim sol ille noter rerum sensibilium substantias ac qualitates, quantumvis multæ sint ac diversæ, simul ille, cum sit unicus, et uniformiter diffundat lumen suum, omnes renovat...; et quodlibet ex iis, modo cuique proprio, unius ejusdemque solis particeps existit, et plurimarum se participantium causas sol unicus in seipso uniformiter anticipavit; potiori utique ratione concedendum est, in ipsiusmet solis ac rerum omnium causa, secundum unicam supra essentialem copulationem, rerum omnium exemplaria præextitisse. » Noli oblivisci quod antea diximus perfectum dividi in perfectum simpliciter et perfectum secundum quid; unde perfectionum aliæ sunt perfectiones simpliciter, et aliæ perfectiones secundum quid; primas quidam scholastici vocant simpliciter simplices, et alteras simplices. Pater autem Perrone vocat perfectiones simpliciter perfectiones simplices, quamvis hoc nomine designatæ sint olim perfectiones secundum quid, perfectiones autem secundum quid perfectiones mixtas appellat. Ideo quando theologus sive antiquus, sive coætaneus, in hac materia consultur, necesse est ut attente terminologia ipsius prius investigetur. — Sensus autem præsentis articuli obvius est: « Deus omnium rerum, seclusis quibuscumque imperfectionibus, perfectiones continet. » Quædam nihilominus scholasticorum voces non inutiliter hic ex-tur enim in psalmo lxxxv, 8: Non est similis tui in diis, Domine. Sed inter creaturas excelsiores sunt quæ dicuntur dii participatione. Multo ergo minus aliæ creaturæ possunt dici Deo similes.
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.2] Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (Question 3, Article 5). Therefore no creature is like God.
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, similitudo est comparatio quædam. Non est autem comparatio eorum quæ sunt diversorum generum. Ergo nec similitudo; non enim dicimus, quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est ejusdem generis cum Deo: cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo nulla creatura est similis Deo.
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.3] Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, similia dicuntur quæ conveniunt in forma. Sed nihil convenit cum Deo in forma: nullius enim essentia rei est ipsum esse, nisi solius Dei. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse similis Deo.
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.4] Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" (Isaiah 40:18).
[I.q.4.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, in similibus est mutua similitudo; nam simile est simili simile. Si igitur aliqua creatura est similis Deo, et Deus esset similis alicui creaturæ: quod est contra id quod dicitur lsa., xL, 18: Cui similem fecistis Deum?
[I.q.4.a.3.sc] It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Genesis 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" (1 John 3:2).
[I.q.4.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen., 1, 26: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et Joan., 11, 2: Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus.
[I.q.4.a.3.co] Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.
[I.q.4.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo secundum multos modos communicandi in forma. Quædam enim dicuntur similia, quæ communicant in eadem forma secundum eamdem rationem, et secundum eumdem modum; et hæc non solum dicuntur similia, sed aequalia in sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba dicuntur similia in albedine: et hæc est perfectissima similitudo. Alio modo dicuntur similia, quæ communicant in forma secundum eamdem rationem, et non secundum eumdem modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut minus album dicitur simile magis albo, et hæc est similitudo imperfecta. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid simile alteri quia communicant in eadem forma, sed non secundum eamdem rationem, ut patet in agentibus non univocis. Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile, in quantum est agens; agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in effectu sit similitudo formæ agentis. Si ergo agens sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens et factum in forma, secundum eamdem rationem speciei, sicut homo generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit similitudo, sed non secundum eamdem rationem speciei: sicut ea quæ generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam similitudinem solis; non tamen ut recipiant formam solis secundum similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis. Si igitur sit aliquod agens quod non in genere contineatur, effectus ejus adhuc magis remote accedent ad similitudinem formæ agentis; non tamen ita quod participent similitudinem formæ agentis secundum eamdem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quæ sunt a Deo assimilantur ei, in quantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse.
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.1] As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, cap. ix De div. nom., § 7, col. 915, t. 4, cum sacra Scriptura dicit aliquid non esse simile Deo, non est contra-rium assimilationi ad ipsum. « Eadem enim sunt similia Deo et dissimilia; similia quidem, secundum quod imitantur ipsum, prout contingit eum imitari, qui non perfecte imitabilis est; dissimilia vero, secundum quod deficiunt a sua causa; » non solum secundum intensionem et remissionem, sicut minus album deficit a magis albo; sed quia non est communicantia nec secundum speciem, nec secundum genus.
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.2] God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the principle of all "genera."
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus non se habet ad creaturas sicut res diversorum generum; sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus et principium omnium generum.
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.3] Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturæ ad Deum per communicantiam in forma secundum eamdem rationem generis et speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et alia per participationem.
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.4] Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.4.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo, nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturæ; quia, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. ix De div. nom., § 6, col. 914, t. 4, in his quæ unius ordinis sunt recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa et causato; dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e converso; et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit similis Deo, non tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturæ.
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