Q13. The names of God

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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q13. The names of God

Source context

Theme: Divine naming: the semantics, limits, and analogical structure of names predicated of God
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

GA 55, 1906-10-25Steiner identifies the Hebrew unutterable name of God with the word 'I', treating divine ineffability as rooted in the identity between the innermost human self-designation and the divine ground.
GA 68a, 1907-03-06Steiner states that the I is the ineffable name of God — the divine begins to speak in the human soul — linking divine naming directly to the mystery of self-consciousness.
GA 100, 1907-06-18Steiner notes that in the Jewish religious tradition the inner being of the human was referred to as the unspeakable name of God, because when the I is to be expressed, only God can be named.
GA 90b, 1905-01-16Steiner observes that the actual name Yahweh was used only in restricted cultic contexts because the name was identified with the divine essence itself, not merely a label.
GA 108, 1908-12-02Steiner notes that in the Old Testament the name 'I' is equivalent to the name of God, and that only the priest was permitted to pronounce the divine name on appointed occasions.
GA 95, 1906-08-22Steiner reports that Hebrew initiates spoke of the inexpressible name of God as the God who dwells in the human being, because that name could be uttered only from within the deepest stratum of the self.
GA 265a, 1912-09-24Steiner distinguishes between the name of God and the presence of God, indicating that naming points toward but does not exhaust divine reality.

Cross-tradition

Jewish Kabbalistic tradition (Tetragrammaton theology)Kabbalistic analysis of the divine names — particularly the fourfold YHWH and the seventy-two names — treats each name as a distinct mode of divine self-disclosure, structurally parallel to Aquinas's analogical predication of divine names from creature to Creator.
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Divine NamesDionysius's treatise argues that every divine name is simultaneously affirmable and deniable, establishing the apophatic-cataphatic polarity that Aquinas inherits and systematizes in Q13.
Vedantic tradition (nāmarūpa doctrine)Advaita Vedānta treats nāma (name) and rūpa (form) as the structural constituents of manifest existence while affirming that Brahman as such exceeds all naming, a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that no name predicated of creatures is univocally predicated of God.
Sufi theology (asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā)Islamic Sufi theology enumerates the ninety-nine beautiful names of God as relational attributes disclosed to creation while the divine essence (dhāt) remains beyond all names, a structural parallel to Aquinas's distinction between what names signify and the mode in which they signify it.

Article 1

[I.q.13.a.1.arg.1] It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Proverbs 30:4).

[I.q.13.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullum nomen Deo conveniat. Dicit enim Dionysius, De divin. nomin., c. 1, § 5, col. 594, t. 4, quod « neque nomen ejus est, neque opinio; » et Prov., xxx, 4, dicitur: Quod nomen* ejus, et quod nomen Filii ejus, si nosti?

[I.q.13.a.1.arg.2] Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.

[I.q.13.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. Sed nomina significantia in concreto non competunt Deo, cum simplex sit: neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant aliquid perfectum subsistens. Ergo nullum nomen potest dici de Deo.

[I.q.13.a.1.arg.3] Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.

[I.q.13.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate; verba autem et participia significant cum tempore; pronomina autem cum demonstratione, vel relatione: quorum nihil competit Deo, quia sine qualitate est, et sine omni accidente, et sine tempore, et sentiri non potest, ut demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum relativa sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum, vel participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. Ergo Deus nullo modo potest nominari a nobis.

[I.q.13.a.1.sc] It is written (Exodus 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name."

[I.q.13.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod., xv, 3: Quasi vir pugnator; Omnipotens nomen ejus.

[I.q.13.a.1.co] Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (12, 11, 12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.

[I.q.13.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum, I Perier., cap 1, in princ., voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines; et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas mediate conceptione intellectus. Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra, quod Deus in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam, sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiæ et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis; non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum exprimat divinam essentiam, secundum quod est; sicut hoc nomen, homo, exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis, secundum quod est; significat enim ejus defini- 1 Rom. edit.: « perfectionem. » 2 Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius « nec tionem declarantem ejus essentiam; ratio enim, quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur IV Metaph.

[I.q.13.a.1.ad.1] The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word.

[I.q.13.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea ratione dicitur Deus non habere nomen vel esse supra nominationem, quia essentia ejus est supra id quod de Deo intelligimus, et voce significamus.

[I.q.13.a.1.ad.2] Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

[I.q.13.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum nominamus; nomina quæ Deo tribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in hujusmodi creaturis ea quæ sunt perfecta et subsistentia, sunt composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens, sed magis quo aliquid est; inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant in concretione, prout competit compositis: quæ autem imponuntur ad significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo significat ut quo aliquid est album. Quia igitur Deus simplex et etiam subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta ad significandam simplicitatem ejus, et nomina concreta ad significandam subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc vitam.

[I.q.13.a.1.ad.3] To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.

[I.q.13.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod significare substantiam cum qualitate, est significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata, in qua subsistit. Unde, sicut de Deo dicuntur aliqua in concretione ad significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, sicut jam dictum est, ita dicuntur de Deo nomina significantia substantiam cum qualitate. 1 Edit. Rom.: « Nomina simplicia, et nomina abstracta. » 2 Edit. cit. in textu, « substantiam, » in margine « subsistentiam. » 3 4 « Sic itaque existimandum est ea omnia quæ de Deo dicuntur, non quid ratione substantiae sit significare, sed, aut quid non sit explicare, aut relationem quamdam ad aliquid eorum, quæ ab ipso distinguuntur, aut quidpiam eorum quæ naturam aut operationem sequuntur. » Nomen non significat res nisi mediante conceptu imponentis seu loquentis.

Article 2

[I.q.13.a.2.arg.1] It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."

[I.q.13.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo substantialiter. Dicit enim Damascenus, lib. I De fide orth., cap. ix, col. 835, t. 1: « Oportet singula eorum quæ de Deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam significare, sed quid non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quamdam, aut aliquid eorum quæ assequuntur naturam vel operationem. » 2. Præterea, dicit Dionysius, De div. nom., c. 1, § 4, col. 590, t. 1: « Omnium sancto-in extensione sui majori vel minori, sed a majori vel minori audientis cognitione circa rem. Sic, inquiunt, rex Ludovicus urbi a se nondum visæ nomen imponit, et minus perfecte quam urbis istius habitatores nominis a se impositi significationem habet. Sed hæc ad quid? Voluntne dicere quod quando nomen imponimus ad significandum Deum, angeli, et Deus præsertim, rem, id est Deum ipsum, melius cognoscunt quam nos cognoscimus? Thomista nullus hoc ambiget? Voluntne quod aliquod nomen ab aliquo impositum, rei quidditatem, inscio imponente, significet, ita ut nos ad significandum Deum nomen forsitan imponeremus quod, nobis insciis, Dei quidditatem, prout Deus seipsum quidditative, et etiam comprehensive cognoscit, exprirum theologorum hymnum invenies ad beatus thearchiae processus manifestative et laudative Dei nominationes dividentem. » Et est sensus quod nomina quæ in divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum processus ipsius Dei distinguuntur. Sed quod significat processum alicujus rei, nihil significat ad ejus essentiam pertinens. Ergo nomina dicta de Deo non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.

[I.q.13.a.2.arg.2] Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

[I.q.13.a.2.arg.3] Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

[I.q.13.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum hoc nominatur aliquid nobis, secundum quod intelligitur. Sed non intelligitur Deus a nobis in hac vita secundum suam substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen impositum a nobis dicitur de Deo secundum suam substantiam.

[I.q.13.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

[I.q.13.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI De Trinitat., cap. iv, col. 927, t. 8: « Deo hoc est esse quod fortem esse, vel sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplicitate dixeris, qua ejus substantia significatur. » Ergo omnia hujusmodi significant divinam substantiam.

[I.q.13.a.2.co] Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.

First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter.

Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy.

Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (Question 4, Article 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (Question 4, Article 3), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are."

[I.q.13.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod de nominibus quæ de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quæ relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod substantiam ejus nullo modo significant, sed remotionem alicujus ab ipso, vel relationem ejus ad alium, vel potius alicujus ad ipsum. Sed de nominibus quæ absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur, sicut bonus, sapiens, et hujusmodi multipliciter aliqui sunt opinati. Quidam enim dixerunt quod hæc omnia nomina, licet affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt quod, cum dicimus Deum esse viventem, significamus quod Deus non hoc modo est sicut res inanimatæ; et similiter accipiendum est in aliis; et hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses.

[I.q.13.a.2.ad.1] Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

[I.q.13.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Damascenus ideo dicit quod hæc nomina non significant quid est Deus, quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur quid est Deus perfecte, sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significant, sicut et creaturæ imperfecte eum repræsentant.

[I.q.13.a.2.ad.2] In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

[I.q.13.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in significance nominum aliud est quando a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et aliud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur; sicut hoc nomen « lapis » imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens pedem, sed ad significandam quamdam speciem corporum; alioquin omne laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod hujusmodi divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis: sicut enim secundum diversos processus perfectionum creaturæ Deum repræsentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster secundum unumquemque processum Deum cognoscit, et nominat; sed tamen hæc nomina non imponuntur ad significandum ipsos processus, ut cum dicitur: Deus est vivens, sit sensus: a Deo procedit vita; sed ad significandum ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo pra-existit vita, licet eminentior modo quam intelligatur, vel significetur.

[I.q.13.a.2.ad.3] We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

[I.q.13.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod essentiam Dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus, secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod repræsentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum; et sic nomina a nobis imposita eam significant.

Article 3

[I.q.13.a.3.arg.1] It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above (Article 1). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

[I.q.13.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia enim nomina quæ de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, sicut cum dicitur Deus lapis, vel leo, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Ergo nomina dicta de Deo dicuntur metaphorice.

[I.q.13.a.3.arg.2] Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.

[I.q.13.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullum nomen proprie dicитur de aliquo, a quo verius removetur quam de eo prædicetur. Sed omnia hujusmodi nomina, « bonus, sapiens, » et similia, verius removentur a Deo quam de eo prædicentur, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. 11 Cælestis hierarchiæ, § 3, col. 142, t. 4. Ergo nullum istorum nominum proprie dicитur de Deo.

[I.q.13.a.3.arg.3] Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

[I.q.13.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nomina corporum non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice, cum sit incorporeus. Sed omnia hujusmodi nomina implicant quasdam corporales conditiones: significant enim cum tempore, et cum compositione, et cum aliis hujusmodi, quæ sunt conditiones corporum. Ergo omnia hujusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice.

[I.q.13.a.3.sc] Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.

[I.q.13.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, in lib. II De fide, prolog., § 2, col. 583, t. 3: « Sunt quædam nomina quæ evidenter proprietatem divinitatis ostendunt, et quædam quæ perspicuam divinæ majestatis exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt quæ translative per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur. » « Quia bonus est, sumus. » Sic cod.; in editis: « dicitur: Deus est lapis. » Nullibi in sacra Scriptura dicitur expresse: « Deus est lapis; » Deus tamen ibi dicitur et lapis et leo. « Lapidem quem reprobaverunt aedificantes, hic factus est in caput angeli. » Ps. cxvii, 22. « Vicit leo de tribu Juda. » Apoc., v, 5. « Sunt enim evidentia indicia quæ proprietatem divinitatis ostendunt; sunt quæ similitudinem Patris et Filii; sunt etiam quæ perspicuam divinæ majestatis exprimunt unitatem. » Non igitur omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur proprie.

[I.q.13.a.3.co] According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God--viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

[I.q.13.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quæ quidem perfectiones in Deo sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis; intellectus autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas secundum quod sunt in creaturis; et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina. In nominibus igitur quæ Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare; scilicet perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et hujusmodi, et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant hujusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo; habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.

[I.q.13.a.3.ad.1] There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.

[I.q.13.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quædam nomina significant hujusmodi perfectiones a Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus imperfectus, quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso nominis significato includitur; sicut lapis significat aliquid materialiter ens; et hujusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi metaphorice. Quædam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum, vivens, et alia hujusmodi; et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo.

[I.q.13.a.3.ad.2] Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.

[I.q.13.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ideo hujusmodi nomina dicit Dionysius negari a Deo, quia id quod significatur per nomen non convenit eo modo ei quo nomen significat, sed excellentiori modo. Unde ibidem dicit Dionysius quod Deus « est super omnem substantiam et vitam. »

[I.q.13.a.3.ad.3] These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

[I.q.13.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ista nomina quæ proprie dicuntur de Deo, important conditiones corporales non in ipso significato nominis, sed quantum ad modum significandi; ea vero quæ metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo significato.

Article 6

[I.q.13.a.6.arg.1] It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

[I.q.13.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc illud nominamus, cum « nomina », secundum Philosophum, lib. I Perich., cap. 1, « sint signa intellectuum. » Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo omnia nomina a nobis imposita per prius conveniunt creaturis quam Deo.

[I.q.13.a.6.arg.2] Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.

[I.q.13.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Dionysium, in lib. De divin. nom., cap. 1, § 6, col. 595, t. 4, Deum ex creaturis nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in Deum, per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo, sicut leo, lapis et hujusmodi. Ergo omnia nomina per prius de creaturis quam de Deo dicuntur.

[I.q.13.a.6.arg.3] Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.

[I.q.13.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnia nomina quæ communiter de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit Dionysius, De myst. theol., c. 1, § 2, col. 999, t. 4. Sed quod dicitur de aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur; per prius enim dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quæ est causa sanitatis. Ergo hujusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo.

[I.q.13.a.6.sc] It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" (Ephesians 3:14-15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.

[I.q.13.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes., III, 14: Flecto genua mea ad Patrem Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ex quo omnis paternitas in cælo* et in terra nominatur; et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quæ de Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo hujusmodi nomina per prius de Deo quam de creaturis dicuntur.

[I.q.13.a.6.co] In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (Article 2), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (Article 3).

[I.q.13.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in omnibus nominibus quæ de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum. Et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaph., text. 28, necesse est quod illud nomen primo dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis, vel minus; sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quæ dicitur sana, in quantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quæ dicitur sana, in quantum est signum sanitatis animalis. Sic ergo omnia nomina quæ metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo nihil aliud significant quam similitudinem ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim ridere dictum de prato nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem proportionis: sic nomen leonis dictum de Deo nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet quod secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. De aliis autem nominibus quæ non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset etiam eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam posuerunt. Sic enim cum dicitur: Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset quam: Deus est causa bonitatis creaturæ; et sic hoc nomen, bonum, dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturæ. Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo. Sed supra ostensum est, quod hujusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur: Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod hæc in eo eminentius præexistunt. Unde secundum hoc dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia a Deo hujusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant; sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi habent qui competit, ut supra dicunt est.

[I.q.13.a.6.ad.1] This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

[I.q.13.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem nominis.

[I.q.13.a.6.ad.2] The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

[I.q.13.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quæ metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est.

[I.q.13.a.6.ad.3] This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.

[I.q.13.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod objectio illa procederet, si hujusmodi nomina solum de Deo causaliter prædicarentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de medicina.

Article 7

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.1] It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nomina quæ important relationem ad creaturas, non dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Omnia enim hujusmodi nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. Unde et Ambrosius, lib. I De fide, c. 1, § 7, col. 553, t. 3, dicit quod hoc nomen, Dominus, est nomen potestatis, quæ est divina substantia: et Creator, significat Dei actionem quæ est ejus essentia. Sed divina substantia non est temporalis, sed æterna. Ergo hujusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore sed ab æterno.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.2] Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest dici factum; quod enim ex tempore est album, fit album. Sed Deo non convenit esse factum. Ergo de Deo nihil prædicatur ex tempore.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.3] Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jeremiah 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore propter hoc quod important relationes ad creaturas, eadem ratio videtur de omnibus quæ relationem ad creaturas important. Sed quædam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturas dicuntur de Deo ab æterno; ab æterno enim scivit creaturam et dilexit, secundum illud Jerem., xxxi, 3: In charitate perpetua dilexi te. Ergo et alia nomina quæ important relationem ad creaturas, ut Dominus et Creator, dicuntur de Deo ab æterno.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.4] Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, hujusmodi nomina relationem significant. Oportet igitur quod relatio illa vel sit aliquid in Deo, vel in creatura tantum. Sed non potest esse quod sit in creatura tantum, quia sic Deus denomina-retur Dominus a relatione opposita, quæ est in creaturis; nihil autem denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod relatio est aliquid in Deo. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse ex tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur quod hujusmodi nomina non dicantur de Deo ex tempore.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.5] Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.5] 5. Præterea, secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative, puta secundum dominium dominus, sicut secundum albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio dominii non est in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter dominus, quod patet esse falsum.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.6] Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.

[I.q.13.a.7.arg.6] 6. Præterea, in relativis quæ non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse altero non existente: sicut scibile existit non existente scientia, ut dicitur in Prædic., cap. vii, text. 5. Sed relativa quæ dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, non sunt simul natura. Ergo potest aliquid dici relative de Deo ad creaturam, etiam creatura non existente: et sic hujusmodi nomina Dominus et Creator, dicuntur de Deo ab æterno, et non ex tempore.

[I.q.13.a.7.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.

[I.q.13.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, V De Trinit., cap. xvi, col. 922, t. 8, quod hæc relativa appellatio Dominus, Deo convenit ex tempore.

[I.q.13.a.7.co] The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

[I.q.13.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, quædam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore de Deo dicuntur, et non ab æterno. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturæ, sed rationis tantum. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum ex hoc quod ipsæ res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem. Verumtamen sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se habet ad hoc quod sit res naturæ aut rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua nisi secundum apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quamdam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quæ sunt inter ens et non ens, quas format ratio, in quantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quæ consequuntur actum rationis, ut genus, et species, et hujusmodi. Quædam vero relationes sunt quantum ad utrumque extremum res naturæ, quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique; sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quæ consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et hujusmodi: nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum: et simile est de relationibus quæ consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia. Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturæ, et in altero est res rationis tantum: et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis; sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile; quæ quidem, in quantum sunt res quædam in esse naturali existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis. Et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsæ in se consideratæ sunt extra ordinem hujusmodi; unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum, sed secundum rationem tantum, in quantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientia et sensus. Unde Philosophus dicit in V Metaph., text. 20, quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa. Et similiter dextrum non dicitur de columna, nisi in quantum ponitur animali ad dexteram. Unde hujusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali. Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturæ, et omnes creaturæ ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso; manifestum est quod creaturæ realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, in quantum creaturæ referuntur ad ipsum. Et sic nihil prohibet hujusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam prædicari de Deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem ipsius, sed propter creaturæ mutationem, sicut columna fit dextera animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali translato.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.1] Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod relativa quædam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines reiativas, ut dominus et servus, pater et filius, et hujusmodi; et hæc dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quædam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quædam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia hujusmodi; quæ dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur et circa nomina divina hæc differentia est consideranda dupliciter. Nam quædam significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut Dominus: et hujusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed indirecte, in quantum præsupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium præsupponit potestatem, quæ est divina substantia. Quædam vero significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important habitudinem, sicut Salvator, Creator, et hujusmodi significant actionem Dei, quæ est ejus essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex tempore de Deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important vel principaliter, vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod significant essentiam vel directe vel indirecte.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.2] As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Psalm 89:1).

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut relationes quæ de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, non sunt in Deo, nisi secundum rationem; ita nec fieri nec factum esse dicitur de Deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa ipsum existente, sicut est id: Domine, refugium factus es nobis, Ps. lxxxix, 1.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.3] The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante: et ideo nomina quæ significant relationes consequentes actionem intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno; quæ vero consequuntur actiones procedentes secundum modum intelligendi ad exteriores effectus, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut Salvator, Creator et hujusmodi.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.4] Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod relationes significatæ per hujusmodi nomina quæ dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum; oppositæ autem relationes in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est inconveniens quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re Deus denomineur; tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per intellectum nostrum oppositæ relationes in Deo; ut sic Deus dicatur relative ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, sicut Philosophus dicit in V Metaph., text. 2, quod scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia refertur ad ipsum.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.5] Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod, cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam, qua creatura refertur ad ipsum, cum relatio subjectionis realiter sit in creatura, sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed realiter sit Dominus; eo enim modo dicitur Dominus quo creatura ei subjecta est.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.6] To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.

[I.q.13.a.7.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod ad cognoscendum utrum relativa sint simul natura, vel non, non oportet considerare ordinem rerum de quibus relativa dicuntur, sed significationes ipsorum relativorum. Si enim unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud, et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura; sicut duplum, dimidium, et pater et filius, et similia. Si autem unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul natura. Et hoc modo se habent scientia et scibile; nam scibile dicitur secundum potentiam, scientia autem secundum habitum, vel secundum actum. Unde scibile secundum modum suæ significationis præexistit scientiae, sed si accipiatur scibile secundum actum, tunc est simul cum scientia secundum actum; nam scitum non est aliquid, nisi sit ejus scientia. Licet igitur Deus sit prior creaturis, quia tamen in significatione domini clauditur quod habeat servum, et e converso, ista duo relativa, dominus et servus, sunt simul natura. Unde Deus non fuit dominus antequam haberet creaturam subjectam.

Article 8

[I.q.13.a.8.arg.1] It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God Theos is so called from the theein [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the aithein, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from theasthai, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature.

[I.q.13.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hoc nomen, Deus, non sit nomen naturæ. « Secundum nomen est Θέος (id est Deus) quae vox vel a verbo ἐπέων ducta est, quia currat et omnia circumobat: vel ab αὐθω, id est urere: Deus enim ignis consumens est: vel denique ἀπὸ Dicit enim Damascenus, in lib. I Orth. fidei, cap. 1x, col. 838, t. 4. quod « dicitur a ἐπέων, quod est curare et fovere universa; vel ab αὐθω, id est ardere; Deus enim noster ignis consumens est; vel a ἐπέωσηθαι, quod est considerare omnia. » Hæc autem omnia ad operationem pertinent. Ergo hoc nomen, Deus, operationem significat, et non naturam.

[I.q.13.a.8.arg.2] Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not signify the divine nature.

[I.q.13.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum hoc aliquid nominatur a nobis, secundum quod cognoscitur. Sed divina natura est nobis ignota. Ergo hoc nomen, Deus, non significat naturam divinam.

[I.q.13.a.8.sc] Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature.

[I.q.13.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, lib. II De fide, in prologo, § 2, col. 583, t. 3, quod Deus est nomen naturæ.

[I.q.13.a.8.co] Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.

Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in 1; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.

[I.q.13.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus ejus cognoscimus; ita substantiam rei denominatus quando ab aliqua ejus operatione vel proprietate; sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua actione ejus, quia lædit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, albedo et hujusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum. Quia igitur Deus non est notus nóbis in sui natura, sed innotescit nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus ejus; ex his possumus eum nominare, ut supra dictum est; unde hoc nomen, Deus, est nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo quid imponitur ad significandum. Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali rerum providentia. Omnes enim loquentes de Deo hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet providentiam universalem de rebus: unde dicit Dionysius, De divin. nominibus, c. xii, § 2, col. 970, t. 1, quod « deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et bonitate perfecta. » Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen, Deus, assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam. τοῦ ἐπέωσηθαι, hoc est, quia omnia conspiciat. » Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius « deitas autem idem est atque omnium conspicax providentia, omnigena bonitate cuncta circumspiciens continensque. »

[I.q.13.a.8.ad.1] All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God."

[I.q.13.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnia quæ posuit Damascenus, pertinent ad providentiam, a qua imponitur hoc nomen, Deus, ad significandum.

[I.q.13.a.8.ad.2] We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (Question 12, Article 12). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.

[I.q.13.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum quod naturam alicujus rei ex ejus proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine possumus significare. Unde quia substantiam lapidis ex ejus proprietate possumus cognoscere secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est lapis; hoc nomen, lapis, ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se est, significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam scimus quid est lapis; ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaph., text. 28. Sed ex effectibus divinis divinam naturam non possumus cognoscere secundum quod in se est, ut sciamus de ea quid est, sed per modum eminentiae et causaliatis, et negationis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc nomen, Deus, significat naturam divinam: impositum est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et remotum ab omnibus: hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes Deum. Conclusio: — Hoc nomen, Deus, quoad id ad quod imponitur divinam substantiam importat; operationem vero quoad id a quo nomen imponitur.

Article 9

[I.q.13.a.9.arg.1] It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulgate: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulgate: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.

[I.q.13.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hoc nomen, Deus, sit communicabile. Cui cumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen, Deus, ut dictum est, significat divinam naturam, quæ est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II Petri, 1, 4: Magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc efficiamur* divinæ consortes naturæ. Ergo hoc nomen, Deus, est communicabile.

[I.q.13.a.9.arg.2] Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Psalm 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is communicable.

[I.q.13.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sola nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen, Deus, non est nomen proprium, sed appellativum: quod patet ex hoc quod habet plurale, secundum illud psalm. Lxxxi, 6: Ego dixi: Dii estis. Ergo hoc nomen, Deus, est communicabile.

[I.q.13.a.9.arg.3] Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable.

[I.q.13.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, hoc nomen, Deus, imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia no mina quæ imponuntur Deo'ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens, et hujusmodi. Ergo hoc nomen, Deus, est communicabile.

[I.q.13.a.9.sc] It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" (Wisdom 14:21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.

[I.q.13.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Sapient., xiv, 24: Incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus* imposuerunt; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen, Deus, est nomen incommunicabile.

[I.q.13.a.9.co] A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above (Article 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (Question 11, Article 3), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Galatians 4:8), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Psalm 81:6).

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

[I.q.13.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter: uno modo proprie; alio modo per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile est quod secundum totam significationem nominis est communicabile multis; per similitudinem autem communicabile est quod est communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quæ includuntur in nominis significatione. Hoc enim nomen, leo, proprie communicatur omnibus illis in quibus inventur natura quam significat hoc nomen, leo; per similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant quid leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quæ nomina proprie sunt communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis vel secundum rem, vel secundum rationem saltem; sicut natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem; natura autem solis non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens, et hoc ideo quia intellectus intelligit naturam cujuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari. Unde esse in uno supposito singulari vel in pluribus est praeter intellectum naturæ speciei. Unde servato intellectu naturæ speciei potest intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare ex hoc ipsó quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare est incommunicabile et re et ratione. Non enim potest in apprehensionem cadere pluralitas hujus individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod individuum est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, in quantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet fortitudinem. Formæ vero quæ non individuantur per aliud suppositum, sed per seipsas, quia scilicet sunt formæ subsistentes, si intelligereur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, non possent communicari nec re, neque ratione, sed forte per similitudinem, sicuti dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus quæ a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum compositarum, et de nominibus quæ a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde cum hoc nomen, Deus, impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est, natura autem divina multiplicabilis non sit, ut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod hoc nomen, Deus, incommunicabile quidem sit secundum rem, sed communicabile secundum opinionem; sicut hoc nomen, sol, esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Galat., iv, 8: His* qui natura non sunt dii, serviebatis; Glossa interlinearis ibi: «Non sunt dii natura, sed opinione hominum. » Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen, Deus, non secundum totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid ejus per quamdam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur qui participant aliquid divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud psalm. lxxxi, 6: Ego dixi: Dii estis. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum Deum, non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod consideratur ut hoc aliquid; illud nomen esset omnibus modis incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud Hebræos; et est simile, si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc individuum.

[I.q.13.a.9.ad.1] The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.

[I.q.13.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum similitudinis participationem.

[I.q.13.a.9.ad.2] This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name "sun."

[I.q.13.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc nomen, Deus, est nomen appellativum et non proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente, licet ipse Deus secundum rem non sit nec universalis nec particularis. Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen secundum rei veritatem est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc nomine, sol.

[I.q.13.a.9.ad.3] These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.

[I.q.13.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hæc nomina, bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas; non tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute; et ideo etiam secundum rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen, Deus, impositum est ab operatione propria Deo et quam experimur continue, ad significandam divinam naturam.

Article 11

[I.q.13.a.11.arg.1] It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.

[I.q.13.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hoc nomen, « qui est, » non sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen, Deus, est nomen incommunicabile, ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen, « qui est, » non est nomen incommunicabile. Ergo hoc nomen, « qui est, » non est proprium nomen Dei.

[I.q.13.a.11.arg.2] Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS.

[I.q.13.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Dionysius dicit, cap. Ⅲ De divin. nomin., § 4, col. 679, t. 4, quod « boni nominatio excellenter est manifestativa omnium Dei processionum. » Sed hoc maxime Deo convenit quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen, « bonum, » est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen, « qui est. »

[I.q.13.a.11.arg.3] Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.

[I.q.13.a.11.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen « qui est » nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen, « qui est, » non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.

[I.q.13.a.11.sc] It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (Exodus 3:13-14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.

[I.q.13.a.11.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod., Ⅲ, 13, quod Moysi quærenti: Si dixerint mihi: Quod est nomen ejus? quid dicam eis? respondit ei Dominus: Sic dices eis*: Qui est, misit me ad vos. Ergo hoc nomen, « qui est, » est maxime proprium nomen Dei.

[I.q.13.a.11.co] This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:

First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (3, 4), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).

[I.q.13.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc nomen, « qui est, » triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde cum esse Dei sit ipsa ejus essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat Deum; unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. 1 Sic cod.; in editis: non est « maxime » proprium. At ex argumento sequitur quod nomen « qui est » nedum sit proprium Deo. Proprium namque est quod convenit omni soli et semper, ut risibilitas homini. 2 Sensum reddit D. Thomas propriis verbis, neutram antiquiorum translationum adhibens. Corderius: « Perfectum et quod omnes Dei emana-tiones manifestat, boni nomen expendamus. » 3 etc. Secundo, propter ejus universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus communia, vel si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliquid supra ipsum secundum rationem. Unde quodam modo informant et determinant ipsam. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam cognoscere in statu vitæ, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et ideo quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde Damascenus, lib. I Orth. fid., cap. Ⅺ, col. 835, t. 4, dicit quod « principalius omnibus, quæ de Deo dicuntur, nominibus est, qui est; totum enim Ⅲ in se ipso comprehendens habet ipsum esse velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum. » Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei: sed hoc nomen, « qui est, » nullum modum essendi determinat, quia se habet indeterminate ad omnes: et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae infinitum. Tertio vero ex ejus significatione; significat enim esse in præsenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo dicitur, cujus esse non novit præteritum vel futurum, ut dicit Augustinus, in V De Trinit., cap. Ⅰ, col. 912, t. 8.

[I.q.13.a.11.ad.1] This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.

[I.q.13.a.11.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc nomen, « qui est, » est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen, « Deus, » quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. Sed quantum ad id ad quod significandum imponitur nomen, est magis proprium hoc nomen, Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam; et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragammaton, quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem. 5 Sic cod.; in editis: « sed se habet. » 6 Sic loco citato: « Sine tempore sempiternum. » Melius autem, lib. De Lxxxiii Quæst., q. xvii, col. 15, t. 6, ubi dicitur « nec præteritum igitur, nec futurum, sed omne præsens est apud Deum. »

[I.q.13.a.11.ad.2] This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

[I.q.13.a.11.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc no men, bonum, est principale nomen Dei, in quantum est causa, non tamen simpliciter; nam esse absolute, praeintelligitur causæ.

[I.q.13.a.11.ad.3] It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.

[I.q.13.a.11.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est necessarium quod omnia divina importent habitudinem ad creaturas, sed sufficit quod imponantur ab aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, inter quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen, « qui est. »

Article 12

[I.q.13.a.12.arg.1] It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague."

[I.q.13.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativæ non possint formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, Cæl. hierar., c. 11, § 3, col. 142, t. 1, quod « negationes de Deo sunt veræ, affirmationes autem incompactæ. »

[I.q.13.a.12.arg.2] Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

[I.q.13.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Boetius dicit, in lib. De Trinit., c. 11, col. 1250, t. 2, quod « forma simplex subjectum esse non potest. » Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subjectum. Sed omne illud de quo propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subjectum. Ergo de Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.

[I.q.13.a.12.arg.3] Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above (Question 3, Article 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.

[I.q.13.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo formari non possit.

[I.q.13.a.12.sc] What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.

[I.q.13.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quædam affirmativæ subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus, et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativæ possunt vere formari de Deo.

[I.q.13.a.12.co] True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.

God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

[I.q.13.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod propositiones affirmativæ possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione affirmativa vera opor- Ex versione J. Scoti Erigenæ. Corderius: « Negationes in divinis veræ, affirmationes vero incongruæ sunt. » et quod prædicatum et subjectum significant idem secundum rem aliquo modo et diversum secundum rationem. Et hoc patet tam in propositionibus quæ sunt de prædicato accidentali, quam in illis quæ sunt de prædicato substantiali. Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subjecto, et differunt ratione; alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico: homo est animal; illud enim ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo: unde et hic etiam prædicatum et subjectum sunt idem supposito, sed diversa sunt ratione. Sed in propositionibus, in quibus idem prædicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo inventur, in quantum intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subjecti, trahit ad partem suppositi: quod vero ponit ex parte prædicati, trahit ad naturam formæ in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod prædicata tenentur formaliter, et subjecta materialiter. Huic vero diversitati quæ est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas prædicati et subjecti; identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem, Deus autem in se consideratus est omnino unus et simplex; sed tamen intellectus noter secundum diversas conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum, ut in seipso est videre. Sed quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res simplex. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quæ est secundum rationem repræsentat per pluralitatem prædicati et subjecti; unitatem vero repræsentat intellectus per compositionem.

[I.q.13.a.12.ad.1] Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.

[I.q.13.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse incompactas vel inconvenientes, secundum aliam translationem, in quantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut supra dictum est.

[I.q.13.a.12.ad.2] Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

[I.q.13.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus noter non potest formas simplices subsistentes, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, comprehendere; sed apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid « Forma quæ est sine materia non poterit esse subjectum. » « Inconvenientes » habetur in versione Joannis Sarrasini. quod subjicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit formam simplicem in ratione subjecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.

[I.q.13.a.12.ad.3] This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[I.q.13.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hæc propositio: « Intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus, » est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium, « aliter, » potest determinare hoc verbum, « intelligens, » vel ex parte intellecti, vel ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera est, et est sensus: Quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito, quia intellectus noter formans propositionem de Deo non dicit eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis, sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in intelligendo quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod intellectus noter res materiales infra se existentes intelligit immaterialiter, non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter cum intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum modum suum composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea esse composita. Et sic intellectus noter non est falsus formans compositionem de Deo.

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