Q14. God's knowledge

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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q14. God's knowledge

Source context

Theme: divine omniscience: the nature, scope, and mode of God's knowing
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

not engaged in the GA corpus

Cross-tradition

Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads V)The One's self-intellection as the ground of all intelligible reality offers a structural parallel to Aquinas's account of God knowing all things through knowledge of His own essence.
Vedanta (Advaita, Brahman as pure cit)Brahman as undivided consciousness (cit) knowing itself and thereby encompassing all possible objects exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's divine self-knowledge as the cause and measure of created beings.
Islamic Kalam (al-Ghazali, divine 'ilm)Al-Ghazali's treatment of God's comprehensive and eternal knowledge (ilm) as logically prior to creation parallels Aquinas's structuring of divine ideas as the archetypes of creatures in God's intellect.

Article 1

[I.q.14.a.1.arg.1] It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.

[I.q.14.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Deo non sit scientia. Scientia enim habitus est qui Deo non competit, cum sit medius inter potentiam et actum. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.

[I.q.14.a.1.arg.2] Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.

[I.q.14.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, scientia, cum sit conclusio-num, est quædam cognitio ab alió causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.

[I.q.14.a.1.arg.3] Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (3, 5). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

[I.q.14.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo in Deo non est scientia.

[I.q.14.a.1.sc] The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Romans 11:33).

[I.q.14.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Rom., xi, 33: O altitudo divitiarum sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei!

[I.q.14.a.1.co] In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Question 7, Article 1) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Question 7, Article 1), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

[I.q.14.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in Deo perfectissima est scientia. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum, sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius: nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde mani-festum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata; natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet majorem amplitudinem et extensionem, propter quod dicit Philosophus, III De anima, text. 37, quod « anima est quodam modo omnia. » Coarctatio autem formæ est per materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formæ secundum quod sunt magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quamdam infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicujus rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva, et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis. Unde in II De anima, text. 424, dicitur quod plantæ non cognoscent propter suam materialitatem. Sensus autem cognoscitivus est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia; et intellectus adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia, et immixtus, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 4, usque ad 7. Unde cum Deus sit in summo immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis.

[I.q.14.a.1.ad.1] Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (4, 2), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.

[I.q.14.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod quandocumque nomen sumptum a quacumque perfectione creaturæ Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab ejus significatione omne illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum, qui competit creaturæ. Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia et actus purus.

[I.q.14.a.1.ad.2] Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (13, 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (7). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).

[I.q.14.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ea quæ sunt divisim et multipliciter in creaturis, in Deo sunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est. Homo autem secundum diversa cognita habet diversas cognitiones. Nam secundum quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere intelligentiam; scientiam vero, secundum quod cognoscit conclusiones; sapientiam, secundum quod cognoscit causam altissimam; consilium, vel prudentiam, secundum quod cognoscit agibilia. Sed hæc omnia Deus una simplici cognitione cognoscit, ut infra patebit. Unde simplex Dei cognitio omnibus istis nominibus nominari potest; ita tamen quod ab unoquoque eorum, secundum quod in divinam prædicationem venit, secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quod est perfectionis. Et secundum hoc dicitur Job, xii, 43: Apud ipsum est sapientia et fortitudo; et ipse habet consilium et intelligentiam.

[I.q.14.a.1.ad.3] Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.

[I.q.14.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia est secundum modum cognoscentis; scitum enim est in sciente secundum modum scientis. Et ideo cum modus divinæ essentiae sit altior quam modus quo creaturæ sunt, scientia divina non habet modum scientiae creaturæ, ut scilicet sit universalis vel particularis, vel in habitu vel in potentia vel secundum aliquem talem modum disposita.

Article 2

[I.q.14.a.2.arg.1] It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.

[I.q.14.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non intelligat se. Dicitur enim in lib. De causis, prop. 13, in princ., quod « omnis sciens qui scit suam essentiam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa. » Sed Deus non exit extra essentiam suam, nec aliquo modo movetur; et sic non competit sibi redire ad essentiam suam. Ergo ipse non est sciens essentiam suam.

[I.q.14.a.2.arg.2] Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. ii.), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.

[I.q.14.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, intelligere est quoddam pati et moveri, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 12 et 28; scientia etiam est assimilatio ad rem scitam; et scitum etiam est perfectio scientis. Sed nihil movetur vel patitur vel perficitur a se ipso, « neque similitudo sibi ipsi est, » ut Hilarius dicit, lib. III De Trinit., § 23, col. 92, t. 2. Ergo Deus non intelligit se.

[I.q.14.a.2.arg.3] Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.

[I.q.14.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præcipue Deo sumus similes secundum intellectum, quia secundum intellectum sumus ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed intellectus noster non intelligit se, nisi sicut intelligit alia, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 15. Ergo Deus non intelligit se, nisi forte intelligendo alia.

[I.q.14.a.2.sc] It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Corinthians 2:11).

[I.q.14.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor., ii, 14: Quæ sunt Dei, nemo novit⁺, nisi Spiritus Dei.

[I.q.14.a.2.co] God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.

Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself.

[I.q.14.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus se per seipsum intelligit. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod, licet in operationibus quæ transeunt in exteriorem effectum, objectum operationis quod significatur ut terminus, sit aliquid extra operantem; tamen in operationibus quæ sunt in operante, ob- « Imago sola (hoc est solitaria) non est, et similitudo non sibi est. » Sic lib. XV De Trin., c. 1, col. 1057, t. 8: « Jam pervenimus ad ejus imaginem, quod est homo, in eo quo cæteris animalibus antecellit, id est, ratione vel intelligentia, et quidquid aliud de anima rationali vel intellectuali dici potest, quod pertineat ad eam rem quæ mens vocatur vel animus. » Expressius lib. VI De Gen. ad litt., c. xii, § 21, col. 348, t. 3: « Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod ei dedit mentem intellectualem. » Ex Dei immaterialitate vim intelligendi et cognoscendi in Deo D. Thomas demonstrat: hoc fundamentum a pluribus impugnatur propter rationes quæ sequuntur. 1. Multa sunt immaterialia non cognoscitiva, ut voluntas, gratia, charitas, etc. 2. Si principium et causa cognoscendi esset immaterialitas, αqualis virtus cognoscendi foret ubi αqualis immaterialitas est; sed angeli αque immateriales non αqua vi cognoscendi pollent. 3. Sunt quædam materialia cognoscitiva, ut anima sensitiva. Responde ad primum: non agitur hic de accidentibus, sed de substantiis immaterialibus; operari enim subsistentium est; — ad secundum: angeli sunt quidem omnes immateriales, sed non αque immateriales si Dei immaterialitas pro exemplari immaterialitatis sumatur, ut par est; nam alii plus aliis natura sua spirituali Dei spiritualem naturam imitantur; — ad tertium: anima sensitiva non intelligit, et pro eo cognoscitiva est quo supra conditionem communem materiae elevatur. Hic nimis curiose investigatur utrum implicaret substantiam immaterialem non cognoscitivam a Deo creari. Ni fallimur, quia potentia cognoscitiva est quædam essentiae proprietas, proprietas autem ab essentia cujus est absolute separabilis est, Deus potentiam cognoscendi a substantia immateriali absolute separare posset; illa tamen substantia, quia immaterialis, semper esset cognoscitiva radicaliter. Vasquez scientiam proprie dictam in Deo dari negat, scientiam proprie dictam supponens discursum importare formalem, et ideo imperfectionem. Errat in hoc Vasquez. Scientia proprie dicta nihil aliud est quam cognitio certa et evidens rerum per causas, nec discursum formalem exigit. Angeli enim scientiam proprie dictam habent, nec formaliter discurrunt. Instat Vasquez quia de ratione scientiae est quod minus notum per aliquid notius cognoscatur; atqui Deo omnia sunt αqualiter nota; ergo. — Non est de ratione scientiae ut minus notum per aliquid notius cognoscatur, sed bene ut ex parte rei cognitæ quædam videantur minus vel magis in seipsis cognoscibilia; et sic res a Deo videntur; ergo. — Dicimus tamen scientiam Dei rationem scientiae non habere respectu suæ essentiae, quia essentiae Dei nulla causa est. De attributis controvertitur etiam inter Thomistas, quidam scientiam Dei respectu attributorum negantes, quidam e contra illam affirmantes. Hi ultimi causam virtualem ad scientiae rationem sufficere contendunt; porro juxta ipsos, quamvis multa sit attributorum Dei causa actualis, essentia Dei nihilominus ut attributorum Dei causa virtualis considerari posset. Prior opinio nobis præeligenda videtur, et hanc propter summam ac αternam Dei simplicitatem amplectimur. jectum quod significatur ut terminus operationis, est in ipso operante; et secundum quod est in eo, sic est operatio in actu. Unde dicitur in lib. III De anima, text. 36 et 37, quod « sensibile in actu est sensus in actu et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. » Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod intellectus noster vel sensus informatur per speciem sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibilis, quia utrumque est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis; ita scilicet ut neque careat specie intelligibilis, sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potentia: neque species intelligibilis sit aliud a substantia intellectus divini, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro, cum est actu intelligens; sed ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus divinus, et sic se ipsum per se ipsum intelligit.

[I.q.14.a.2.ad.1] Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.

[I.q.14.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa. Forma enim, in quantum perficit materiam dando ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur; in quantum vero in seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit. Virtutes igitur cognoscitivæ quæ non sunt subsistentes, sed actus aliquorum organorum, non cognoscunt seipsas, sicut patet in singulis sensibus; sed virtutes cognoscitivæ per se subsistentes cognoscunt seipsas: et propter hoc dicitur in libro De causis, quod « sciens essentiam suam redit ad essentiam suam. » Per se autem subsistere maxime convenit Deo. Unde secundum hunc modum loquendi ipse est maxime rediens ad essentiam suam, ut cognoscens seipsum.

[I.q.14.a.2.ad.2] Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.

[I.q.14.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod moveri et pati sumuntur æquivoce, secundum quod intelligere dicitur esse quoddam moveri vel pati, ut dicitur in III De anima, loc. cit. in argum. Non enim intelligere est motus qui est actus imperfecti, qui est ab alio in aliud; sed actus perfecti existens in ipso agente. Similiter etiam quod intellectus perficiatur ab intelligibili, vel assimiletur ei, hoc contingit intellectui qui quando est in potentia, quia per hoc quod est in poten-tia, differt ab intelligibili, et assimilatur ei per speciem intelligibilem, quæ est similitudo rei intellectæ, et perficitur per ipsam, sicut potentia per actum. Sed intellectus divinus, qui nullo modo est in potentia, non perficitur per intelligibile, neque assimilatur ei, sed est sua perfectio et suum intelligere.

[I.q.14.a.2.ad.3] Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

[I.q.14.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod esse naturale non est materiæ primæ, quæ est in potentia, nisi secundum quod est reducta in actum per formam. Intellectus autem noster possibilis se habet in ordine intelligibilium sicut materia prima in ordine rerum naturalium, eo quod est in potentia ad intelligibilia sicut materia prima ad naturalia. Unde intellectus noster possibilis non potest habere intelligibilem operationem, nisi in quantum perficitur per speciem intelligibilem alicujus; et sic intelligit seipsum per speciem intelligibilem, sicut et alia. Manifestum est autem quod ex eo quod cognoscit intelligibile, intelligit ipsum suum intelligere, et per actum cognoscit potentiam intellectivam. Deus autem est sicut actus purus tam in ordine existentium quam in ordine intelligibilium; et ideo per seipsum seipsum intelligit.

Article 3

[I.q.14.a.3.arg.1] It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.

[I.q.14.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non comprehendat seipsum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in lib. LXXXIII Quæstionum, quæest. xv, col. 14, 15, t. 6, « quod comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. » Sed Deus est omnibus modis infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se. 2. Si dicatur quod Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus; contra. Verius est unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum quam infinitum; quod est contra determinata. Non ergo Deus comprehendit seipsum.

[I.q.14.a.3.arg.2] If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above (Question 7, Article 1). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.

[I.q.14.a.3.sc] Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.

[I.q.14.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit ibidem: « Omne quod intelligit se, comprehendit se. » Sic cod.; in editis: « et; » sed rectius codices.

[I.q.14.a.3.co] God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above (Question 1, Article 2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

[I.q.14.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet: tunc enim dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis ipsius; et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte sicut cognoscibilis est; sicut propositio demonstrabilis comprehenditur quando sciitur per demonstrationem, non autem quando cognoscitur per aliquam rationem probabilem. Manifestum est autem quod Deus ita perfecte cognoscit seipsum sicut perfecte cognoscibilis est; est enim unumquodque cognoscibile secundum modum sui actus. Non enim cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaph., text. 20. Tanta est autem virtus Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas ejus in existendo; quia per hoc quod actu est et ab omni materia et potentia separatus, Deus cognoscitivus est, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est; et propter hoc seipsum perfecte comprehendit.

[I.q.14.a.3.ad.1] The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."

[I.q.14.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod comprehendere, si proprie accipiatur, significat aliquid habens et includens alterum: et sic oportet quod omne comprehensum sit finitum, sicut omne inclusum. Non sic autem comprehendi dicitur Deus a seipso, ut intellectus suus sit aliud quam ipse, et capiat ipsum et includat; sed hujusmodi locutiones per negationem sunt exponendæ. Sicut enim Deus dicitur esse in seipso, quia a nullo exteriori continetur, ita dicitur comprehendi a seipso, quia nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De videndo Deum, epist. cxLvii, ad Paulin., c. ix, col. 606, t. 2, quod « totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil ejus lateat videntem. »

[I.q.14.a.3.ad.2] When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.

[I.q.14.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum dicitur: Deus finitus est sibi, intelligendum est secundum quamdam similitudinem proportionis; quia sic se habet in non exceedendo intellectum suum, sicut se habet aliquid finitum in non exceedendo intellectum finitum; non autem dicitur finitus sibi, quia ipse intelligat se esse finitum.

Article 5

[I.q.14.a.5.arg.1] It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.

[I.q.14.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia se. Quæcumque enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., q. xlvi, col. 30, t. 6, quod « neque quidquam Deus extra se ipsum intuetur. » Ergo non cognoscit alia a se. 2. Praeterea, intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso; quod est impossibile. 3. Praeterea, ipsum intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius actus a suo objecto. Unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius, quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid aliud a se; Plures Thomistæ, non omnes, intellectionem et intellectum in Deo absque distinctione virtuali quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a se.

[I.q.14.a.5.arg.2] Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.

[I.q.14.a.5.arg.3] Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.

[I.q.14.a.5.sc] It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (Hebrews 4:13).

[I.q.14.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Hebr., iv, 43: Omnia autem nuda et aperta sunt oculis ejus.

[I.q.14.a.5.co] God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (2, 3), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause--viz. God--is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.

Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.

[I.q.14.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim quod seipsum perfecte intelligit; alioquin suum esse non esset perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus ejus perfecte cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quæ virtus se extendit. Unde cum virtus divina se extendit ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa effectiva entium, ut ex supradictis patet, necesse est quod Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si adjungatur quod ipsum esse causæ agentis primæ, scilicet Dei, est ejus intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus præexistunt in Deo, sicut in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso ejus intelligere, et quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem. Nam omne quod est in altero, est in eo secundum modum ejus in quo est. Ad sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod dupli-citer aliquid cognoscitur: uno modo in seipso, alio modo in altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur per speciem propriam adæquatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus videt hominem per speciem hominis; in alio autem videtur id quod videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia seipsum videt per essentiam suam; alia autem a se videt non in ipsis, sed in seipso, in quantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso.

[I.q.14.a.5.ad.1] The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.

[I.q.14.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum non intuetur nisi in seipso, ut dictum est. unum et idem esse dicunt. Scotista intellectum divinum formaliter distingui tum ab essentia, tum ab intellectione asserunt. Recole quæ de distinctio-nibus prænotavimus.

[I.q.14.a.5.ad.2] The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence.

[I.q.14.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio ejus. Lapis enim non est in anima, sed species ejus, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 38. Ea vero quæ sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo, in quantum essentia Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est in corp. art.; unde non sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus quam ipsa essentia Dei.

[I.q.14.a.5.ad.3] The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.

[I.q.14.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum in quo alia intelliguntur. In tantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per objectum suum, in quantum forma intelligibilis est principium intellectualis operationis. Nam omnis operatio specificatur per formam quæ est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur intellectualis operatio, quæ facit intellectum in actu. Et hæc est species principalis intellecti, quæ in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.

Article 6

[I.q.14.a.6.arg.1] It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (5), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.

[I.q.14.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in prima causa communi et universali. Ergo alia cognoscuntur a Deo sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus cognoscit 1 Sic cod.; in edit.: « Sed communem; nam cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res solum in communi. » 2 Juxta Epicureos, cognitione sui contentus, Deus cætera nec curabat, nec videbat. Circa cardines cæli perambulat, nec nostra considerat. Job., xxii. Nisi in communi — Hæc Averroes et Algazel. Petrus Abaylardus, in hoc, ut refert Bannès, a concilio senonensi damnatus, extra Deum aliquid esse docuit, quod neque creator, neque creatura esset. Sic antiqui philosophi materiam æternam finxerant. perfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut patet in I Physic., text. 2, in princ. comm. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se esset in universali tantum et non in speciali, sequeretur quod ejus intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per consequens nec ejus esse; quod est contra ea quæ superius ostensa sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria cognitione, non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis, sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad hujus evidentiam considerandum est quod quidam volentes ostendere quod Deus cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis; ut puta quod si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas progredientes a centro: vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam, cognosceret omnes colores. Sed hæc exempla, licet quantum ad aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem, deficiunt quantum ad hoc quod multitudo et diversitas non causantur ab illo uno principio universali quantum ad id quod principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo communicant. Non enim diversitas coloris causatur ex luce solum, sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis; et similiter diversitas linearum est ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod hujusmodi diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non sic est. Supra enim ostensum est, quod quidquid perfectionis est in quacumque creatura, totum præexistit et continetur in Deo secundum modum excelentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturæ communicant, scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet, sed etiam ea per quæ creaturæ ab invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere et intelligere, et hujusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma per quam quælibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio quædam est. Et sic omnia in Deo præexistunt, non solum quantum ad id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quæ res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos; ut si dicerem, homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti non solum in communi, sed etiam propria cognitione; sicut qui cognoscit hominem, cognoscit animal propria cognitione; et qui cognoscit senarium, cognoscit trinarium, propria cognitione. Sic igitur cum essentia Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cujuscumque rei alterius et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura unius-cujusque consistit secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat. Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognoscet, nisi cognoscet quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio. Nec etiam ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognoscet omnes modos essendi. Sic igitur manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria cognitione, et cum ab aliis distinguitur.

[I.q.14.a.6.arg.2] Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (12/2). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge of it.

[I.q.14.a.6.arg.3] Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.

[I.q.14.a.6.sc] To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Hebrews 4:12-13).

[I.q.14.a.6.co] Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.

But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (Question 4, Article 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.

Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (Question 4, Article 2) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being--belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.

As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.

[I.q.14.a.6.ad.1] So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.

We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.

[I.q.14.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est, potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo secundum quod hoc adverbium sicut, importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitæ; et sic falsum est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud esse quod habet in cognoscente: oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet in oculo: sed per speciem lapidis quam habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum esse quod habet extra cognoscentem; sicut intellectus cognoscit lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu, in quantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod lta codd. Alcan. et Cam. Numerus senarius est primus numerus perfectus. Numerus autem perfectus est juxta antiquos cujus partium summa summæ totius nec major, nec minor, sed æqualis reperitur. Medietas senarii est 3, hoc: « sicut, » importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in cognoscente; quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente, tanto perfection est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura, et tanto perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.

[I.q.14.a.6.ad.2] The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.

[I.q.14.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia creaturæ comparatur ad essentiam Dei ut actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturæ non sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinæ, sed e converso.

[I.q.14.a.6.ad.3] The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.

[I.q.14.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum adæquationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid exceedens omnes creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscujusque, secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a diversis creaturis.

Article 7

[I.q.14.a.7.arg.1] It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.

[I.q.14.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim Dei non est secundum scire in habitu sed secundum intelligere in actu. Sed secundum Philosophum in II Topic., cap. iv, in declaratione loci 33: « Scire in habitu contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. » Cum ergo Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud discurrat.

[I.q.14.a.7.arg.2] Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.

[I.q.14.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cognoscere effectus per causam est scientiæ discurrentis. Sed Deus cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo cognitio sua est discursiva.

[I.q.14.a.7.arg.3] Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.

[I.q.14.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, perfectius Deus scit unam-quamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus; et sic de causis ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in Deo.

[I.q.14.a.7.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once."

[I.q.14.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XV De Trinit., cap. xiv, col. 1077, t. 8, quod « Deus non particulatim vel sigillatim omnia videt, velut alternante conceptu hinc illuc, inde huc; sed omnia videt simul. »

[I.q.14.a.7.co] In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God.

First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

[I.q.14.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus, quod sic patet: in scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus: unus secundum successionem tantum; sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud: alius discursus est secundum causalitatem; sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non potest. Multa enim quæ successive intelligimus, si unum-quodque eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus, si in aliquo uno ea intelligamus: puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno, quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul et non successive omnia videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non potest. Primo quidem quia secundus discursus præsupponit primum; procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones non simul utrum-que considerant. Deinde quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod quando cognoscitur primum, adhuc ignoratur secundum; et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo resolutis effectibus in causas; et tunc cessat discursus. Unde cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, ejus cognitio non est discursiva.

[I.q.14.a.7.ad.1] Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as shown above.

[I.q.14.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen contingit multa intelligere in uno, ut dictum est.

[I.q.14.a.7.ad.2] God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.

[I.q.14.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus non cognoscit per causam, quasi prius cognitam, effectus incognitos; sed eos cognoscit in causa: undee jus cognitio est sine discursu, ut dictum est.

[I.q.14.a.7.ad.3] God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not discursive.

[I.q.14.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in ipsis causis multo melius quam nos; non tamen ita quod cognitio effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut in nobis; unde ejus scientia non est discursiva.

Article 8

[I.q.14.a.8.arg.1] It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Romans 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists."

[I.q.14.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit enim Origenes, Super Epist. ad Rom., in illud: Quos vocavit, hos et justificavit, col. 1126, t. 4: «Non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus esse futurum: sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat. »

[I.q.14.a.8.arg.2] Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

[I.q.14.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, posita causa, ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est æterna. Si ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturæ sint ab æterno.

[I.q.14.a.8.arg.3] Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.

[I.q.14.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, «scibile est prius scientia, et mensura ejus,» ut dicitur in VIII Metaph., text. 9. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.

[I.q.14.a.8.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are."

[I.q.14.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. xiii, col. 1076, t. 8: «Universas creaturas, et spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo sunt, quia novit.»

[I.q.14.a.8.co] The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of approbation."

[I.q.14.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum. Unde oportet quod forma intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis, in quantum est forma movens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat principium actionis, sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad effectum; et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adjungatur ei inclination ad effectum; quæ est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat, cum sit eadem scientia oppositorum, non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaph., text. 40. Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere: unde necesse est quod sua scientia sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem conjunctam. Unde scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari scientia approbationis.

[I.q.14.a.8.ad.1] Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.

But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.

[I.q.14.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiæ, cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adjuncta voluntate, ut dictum est. Sed quod dicit, ideo præscire Deum aliqua, quia sunt futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiæ, non secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod Deus ea præscierit; non tamen res futuræ sunt causa quod Deus sciat.

[I.q.14.a.8.ad.2] The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

[I.q.14.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei quod res essent ab æterno: unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit æterna, non sequitur tamen quod creaturæ sint ab æterno.

[I.q.14.a.8.ad.3] Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.

[I.q.14.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram. Nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est: unde, sicut scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura ejus; ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura ipsarum; sicut etiam aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui ejus cognitionem ex ipsa jam facta capit.

Article 9

[I.q.14.a.9.arg.1] It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.

[I.q.14.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium. Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.

[I.q.14.a.9.arg.2] Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.

[I.q.14.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea quæ non sunt non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum, qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quæ non sunt, non possunt sciri a Deo.

[I.q.14.a.9.arg.3] Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.

[I.q.14.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet scientiam de non entibus.

[I.q.14.a.9.sc] The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (Romans 4:17).

[I.q.14.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus ad Rom., iv, 17: Qui vocat ea quæ non sunt, tanquam ea quæ sunt.

[I.q.14.a.9.co] God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.

Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

[I.q.14.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus scit omnia quæcumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem prohibet ea quæ non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. Simpliciter enim supponit, prima decretum approbativum, altera decretum solummodo permissivum. Scientia causa rerum directiva modos proponit quibus res fieri possint aut debeant, potentiasque dirigit effectrices. Scientia causa rerum effectiva quod interius concipit exterius efficit. His positis, Thomistæ docent scientiam in Deo esse rerum causam effectivam, et de scientia approbationis, quæ ad scientiam visionis refertur, loqui intendunt, ut habet illa scientia voluntatem adjunctam.

[I.q.14.a.9.ad.1] Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God.

[I.q.14.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem ea quæ non sunt actu; verum est enim ea esse in potentia; et sic sciuntur a Deo.

[I.q.14.a.9.ad.2] Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.

[I.q.14.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum Deus sit ipsum esse, in tantum unumquodque est, in quantum participat de Dei similitudine; sicut unumquodque in tantum est calidum, in quantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quæ sunt in potentia, etiamsi non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a Deo.

[I.q.14.a.9.ad.3] The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible.

[I.q.14.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Dei scientia est causa rerum voluntate adjuncta. Unde non oportet quod quæcumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel futura sint; sed solum ea quæ vult esse, vel permittere esse. Et iterum non est in scientia Dei quod illa sint, sed quod esse possint.

Article 10

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.1] It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (2), it seems that God does not know evil things.

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III De anima, t. 25, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed « malum est privatio boni, » ut dicit Augustinus, Enchir., c. xi, col. 236, t. 6. Igitur cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala.

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.2] Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.3] Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (5). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur; divinæ enim essentiae nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, lib. XII De civitate Dei, c. II, col. 350, t. 7. Ergo Deus non cognoscit mala.

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.4] Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.

[I.q.14.a.10.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quod cognoscitur per alium et non per seipsum, imperfecte cognoscitur. Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente. Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte cognoscitur: quod est impossible, quia nulla cognitio Dei est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.

[I.q.14.a.10.sc] It is written (Proverbs 15:11), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulgate: 'the Lord']."

[I.q.14.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov., xv, 11: Infernus et perditio coram Domino.

[I.q.14.a.10.co] Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light."

[I.q.14.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat omnia quæ possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quædam bona quibus accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur; unde Deus non perfecte cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est; unde cum hoc sit esse mali quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit bona, cognoscit mala, sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. Unde dicit Dionysius, c. vii De div. nomin., § 2, col. 870, t. 4, quod « Deus per semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras quam a lumine. »

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.1] The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per privationem in ipso existentem: et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formæ simplices et indivisibles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed in potentia tantum; nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non per privationem cognoscenterur; et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per privationem in seipso existentem, sed per bonum oppositum.

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.2] The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, per quod cognoscitur malum.

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.3] Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet malum Partim ex verbis propriis D. Thomæ, partim ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius: « sicut et lux secundum causam tenebrarum notionem » non opponatur essentiæ divinæ, quæ non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei quos per essentiam suam cognoscit; et eos cognoscens, mala opposita cognoscit.

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.4] To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good.

[I.q.14.a.10.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectæ cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se; sed malum non est per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est quod sit privatio boni; et sic neque definiri neque cognosci potest nisi per bonum.

Article 11

[I.q.14.a.11.arg.1] It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things.

[I.q.14.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia. Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus humanus. Sed intellectus humanus propter suam immaterialitatem non cognoscit singularia; sed, sicut dicitur in II De anima, text. 60, ratio est universalium, sensus vero particularium. Ergo Deus non cognoscit singularia.

[I.q.14.a.11.arg.2] Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.

[I.q.14.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illæ solæ virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivæ, quæ recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed res in Deo sunt maxime abstractæ ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus non cognoscit singularia.

[I.q.14.a.11.arg.3] Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.

[I.q.14.a.11.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo singularium, in quantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo; quia principium singularatis est materia; quæ, cum sit ens in potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus. Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.

[I.q.14.a.11.sc] It is written (Proverbs 16:2), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."

[I.q.14.a.11.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov., xvi, 2: Omnes viæ hominis patent oculis ejus.

[I.q.14.a.11.co] God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (4, 2). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above (Article 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (44, 2), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

[I.q.14.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in creaturis inventæ in Deo præexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia cognoscat. Nam et Philosophus pro inconvenienti habet quod aliquid cognoscatur a nobis quod non cognoscatur a Deo: unde contra Empedoclem arguit in I De anima, text. 80, et in III Metaph., text. 15, quod accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed perfectiones quæ in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et unite existunt; unde licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia; Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed qualiter hoc esse possit quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales. Nam nihil est in aliquo singularium quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur universali. Et ponunt exemplum: sicut si aliquis astrologus cognosceret omnes motus universales cæli, posset prænuntiare omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit; quia singularia ex causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quæ, quantumcumque ad invicem conjungantur, non individuantur, nisi per materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod est albus, vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur, non cognosceret ipsum in quantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum prædictum Deus non cognoscceret singularia in sua singularitate. Aliii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia applicando causas universales ad singulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est, quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud præcognoscat; unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium præ-supponit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod cum Deus sit causa rerum per suam scientiam, ut dictum est, in tantum se extendit scientia Dei in quantum se extendit ejus causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur, necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quæ per materiam individuan-tur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam 1 Sic cod.; in edit.: « particulares. » Cadente sæculo octavo Manichæorum impia dogmata renovarunt Albanenses. Deum non ex se, sed ex adversario suo dæmone malum præscire dicebant. suam, in quantum est similitudo rerum, velut principium activum earum; necesse est quod essentia ejus sit principium sufficiens cognoscendi omnia quæ per ipsum sunt, non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si esset productiva totius rei, et non formæ tantum.

[I.q.14.a.11.ad.1] Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.

[I.q.14.a.11.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum. quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a principiis individuantibus. Unde species intelligibilis nostri intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium; et propter hoc intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quæ est Dei essentia, non est immaterialis per abstractionem sed per se ipsam, principium existens omnium principiorum quæ intrant rei compositionem, sive sint principia speciei, sive principia individui; unde per eam Deus cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.

[I.q.14.a.11.ad.2] Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.

[I.q.14.a.11.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptæ in imaginatione et sensu, tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et materialia, ut dictum est.

[I.q.14.a.11.ad.3] Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.

[I.q.14.a.11.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod materia, licet precedat a Dei similitudine secundum suam potentialitatem, tamen in quantum vel sic esse habet, similitudinem quamdam retinet divini esse.

Article 12

[I.q.14.a.12.arg.1] It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.

[I.q.14.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita. Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum; quia infinitum est « cujus quantitatem accipiendo semper est aliquid extra sumere, » ut dicitur in III Phys., 1 In codd. deest: « et finiti, quod sit pertransibile. » Empedocles Agrigentinus se olim virginem, t. 63. Augustinus etiam dicit, XII De civitate Dei, cap. xviii, col. 368, t. 7, quod « quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur. » Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.

[I.q.14.a.12.arg.2] Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge, which is infinite.

[I.q.14.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si dicatur quod ea quæ in se sunt infinita, scientiæ Dei finita sunt; contra: ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile, ut dicitur in III Phys., text. 34. Sed infinitum non potest transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Phys., a text. 40 ad 66. Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam infinito; et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiæ Dei, quæ est infinita.

[I.q.14.a.12.arg.3] Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.

[I.q.14.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, scientia Dei est mensura sciitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti est quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a Deo.

[I.q.14.a.12.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."

[I.q.14.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XII De civitate Dei, cap. xviii, col. 368, t. 7: « Quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non tamen est incomprehensibilis ei cujus scientiæ non est numerus. »

[I.q.14.a.12.co] Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (Article 9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.

The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.

[I.q.14.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum Deus sciat non solum ea quæ sunt actu, sed etiam ea quæ sunt in potentia, vel sua vel creaturæ, ut ostensum est, hæc autem constet esse infinita, necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita. Et licet scientia visionis, quæ est tantum eorum quæ sunt, vel erunt, vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non ponamus mundum ab æterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in æternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur; tamen, si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes et affectiones cordium, quæ in infinitum multiplicabuntur, creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo est quia cognitio cujuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum modum formæ quæ est principium cognitionis. Species enim sensibilis, quæ est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius individui; unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest. Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei quantum ad natu-adolescentem, avem, arbustum fuisse affirmabat. Deum discordiam ignorare dicebat. Averroes et Algazel Deum singularia in propria forma ignorare credebant. ram speciei, quæ est participabilis a particularibus infinitis; unde intellectus noster per speciem intelligibilem hominis cognoscit quodammodo homines etiam infinitos; sed tamen non in quantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quæ sunt vel esse possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum ad principia propria unius-cujusque, ut ostensum est; unde sequitur quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita etiam secundum quod sunt ab invicem distincta.

[I.q.14.a.12.ad.1] The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above (Article 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.

[I.q.14.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod infinitum congruit quantitati, secundum Philosophum, in I Physicorum, text. 15. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est cognoscere partem post partem; et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem, cum cognoscat omnia simul, sine successione, ut supra dictum est. Unde nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.

[I.q.14.a.12.ad.2] Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable.

[I.q.14.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod transitio importat quamdam successionem in partibus; et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest neque a finito, neque ab infinito; sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit adæquatio; quia id comprehendi dicitur, cujus nihil est extra comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti quod comprehendatur ab infinito: et sic quod in se est infinitum, potest dici finitum scientiæ Dei tanquam comprehensum, non tamen tanquam pertransibile.

[I.q.14.a.12.ad.3] The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.

[I.q.14.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum non quantitativa, qua quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et veritatem rei. Unum-quoque enim in tantum habet de veritate suæ naturæ, in quantum imitatur Dei scientiam, sicut artificiatum, in quantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines, vel secundum quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui dixerunt; tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.

Article 13

[I.q.14.a.13.arg.1] It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (Article 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

[I.q.14.a.13.arg.2] Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

[I.q.14.a.13.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis conditionalis cujus antecedens est necessarium absolute, consequens est necessarium absolute; sic enim se habet antecedens ad consequens, sicuti principia ad conclusionem. Ex principiis autem necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster., text. 18, probatur. Sed hæc est quædam conditionalis vera: « Si Deus scivit hoc contingens futurum esse, hoc erit; » quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum. Hujus autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum quia est æternum, tum quia significatur ut præteritum. Ergo et consequens est necessarium absolute. Ergo quidquid scitur a Deo, est necessarium; et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.

[I.q.14.a.13.arg.3] Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.

[I.q.14.a.13.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis necesse est esse; cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.

[I.q.14.a.13.sc] It is written (Psalm 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.

[I.q.14.a.13.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. xxxii, 15: Qui finxit singillatim* corda eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum, scilicet hominum. Sed opera hominum sunt contin- Sic cod.; in edit. satis inepte: « qua mensugentia, utpote libero arbitrio subjecta. Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.

[I.q.14.a.13.co] Since as was shown above (Article 9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.

[I.q.14.a.13.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum supra ostensum sit, quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quæ actu sunt, sed etiam quæ sunt in potentia sua vel creaturæ, horum autem quædam sunt contingentia nobis futura, sequitur quod Deus contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo in seipso, secundum quod jam in actu est; et sic non consideratur ut futurum, sed ut præsens, neque ut ad utrumlibet contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum; et propter hoc sic infallibiliter subdi potest certæ cognitioni, utpote sensui visus, sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari contingens ut est in sua causa; et sic consideratur ut futurum, et ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se habet ad opposita; et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi conjecturalem cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo esse, sicut nos, sed simul; quia ejus cognitio mensuratur æternitate, sicut et suum esse; æternitas autem tota simul existens ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quæ sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab æterno præsentia, non solum ea ratione quia habet rationes rerum apud se præsentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia ejus intuitus fertur ab æterno supra omnia, prout sunt in sua præsentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, in quantum subduntur divino conspectui secundum suam præsentialitatem, et sunt futura contingentia, suis causis comparata.

[I.q.14.a.13.ad.1] Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.

[I.q.14.a.13.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus potest esse contingens propter causam proximam contingentem; sicut germinatio plantæ est contingens propter causam proximam; licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit necessarius; et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit necessaria.

[I.q.14.a.13.ad.2] Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass will grow."

Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.

[I.q.14.a.13.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens: Deus scivit hoc contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens; quia licet sit præteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc non tollit ei necessitatem; quia id quod habuit respectum ad futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia est compositum ex necessario et contingenti, sicut istud dictum est contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est; quia cum dicitur: Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens, contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut principalis pars propositionis. Unde contingentia ejus vel necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum, me dixisse hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse, Socratem currere, vel Deum esse; et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde dicendum est quod antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset enim conditionalis falsa, cujus antecedens esset causa remota necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens; ut puta si dicerem: si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animæ, consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est in anima. Aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et esse rei in anima; ut puta si dicam: si anima intelligit aliquid, illud est immateriale; intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso. Et similiter si dicam: si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit; consequens intelligendum est prout est in sua præsentialitate. Et sic ne- Cod. Romanus « immediatis. » In cod. deest: « prout subest divinæ scientiae, scilicet. » cessarium est, sicut et antecedens. Quia « omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse, » ut dicitur in I Perih., cap. vi.

[I.q.14.a.13.ad.3] Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."

Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.

[I.q.14.a.13.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ea quæ temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in æternitate, quæ est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia ut talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cujus intelligere est in æternitate supra tempus: sicut ille qui vadit per viam non videt illos qui post eum veniunt; sed ille qui ab aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quæ in se sunt contingentia futura a nobis sciri non possunt; sed ea quæ sunt scita a Deo oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo subsunt divinæ scientiæ, ut dictum est, non autem absolute, secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et hæc propositio: Omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit distingui; quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de re, est divisa et falsa; et est sensus: omnis res quam Deus scit, est necessaria. Vel potest intelligigi de dicto, et sic est composita et vera; et est sensus: hoc dictum, scitum a Gravissimæ occasione hujus articuli controversiae exortæ sunt. Quædam prænotare licebit: I. Ens aliud est necessarium quod non potest non esse, et aliud contingens quod esse vel non esse potest. II. Respectu Dei omnia entia creata contingentia sunt. Respectu causæ secundæ vel necessaria sunt utpote a causis necessariis, v. g., calor ab igne, vel sunt contingentia utpote a causis liberis. III. Futurum est id quod ad habendam existentiam pro duratione sequenti in causa determinatum est. Futurum est vel necessarium vel liberum, primum a necessaria, alterum a libera causa. Porro non omnes hanc futuri traditam a nobis definitionem admittunt. Futurum juxta illos per habitudinem ad esse tempore sequenti constituitur. Sed habitudinem istam futurum unde possidet? Vel a se, vel a causa. Non a se, alioquin antequam etiam conciperetur Deus existens, futurum esset absolute necessarium. Ergo a causa. IV. Futurum proprie contingens est aliud absolutum ab aliqua conditione non ponenda non dependens, et aliud conditionatum a conditione non ponenda dependens. Conditionatum est vel pertinens vel impertinens, prout cum conditione quamdam vel moralem vel physicam connexionem, vel nullam habet. Exempla: Judas, si pœnitentiam egerit, salvabitur; — si capra saltet, arbor florebit. Deo, esse est necessarium. Sed obstant qui-dam dicentes quod ista distinctio habet locum in formis separabilibus a subjecto, ut si dicam: album possibile est esse nigrum; quæ quidem de dicto est falsa; et de re est vera. Res enim quæ est alba potest esse nigra; sed hoc dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis autem inseparabilibus a subjecto non habet locum prædicta distinctio; ut si dicam: corvum nigrum possibile est esse album, quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem sci-tum a Deo est inseparabile a re; quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non sci-tum. Hæc autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem re subjecto inhærentem; sed cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitæ, licet semper sciatur, potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei in quantum stat sub actu sciendi; sicut esse materiale attribuitur lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est intelligibile.

Article 14

[I.q.14.a.14.arg.1] It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

[I.q.14.a.14.arg.2] Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

[I.q.14.a.14.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis cognitio fit per ali-quam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia. Alii futurorum veritatem ante decretum, sive objectivam, sive formalem; Alii essentiam divinam, ut ante decretum speciei intelligibilis rationem habet; Alii efficaciam præscientiæ divinæ; Alii decretum Dei prævisum ut futurum; Alii essentiam divinam post decretum; Alii causam secundam per decretum determinatam. Non abs re forsitan erit has opiniones saltem breviter attingere. I. Ideæ divinæ res omnes factibiles, abstrahendo a futuritione vel non futuritione earum, repræsentant; non ergo ex eis simpliciter, si nihil eis addatur, Deus futura contingentia cognoscere potest, quidquid e contra senserit Ægidius Romanus, si tamen ita senserit. II. Dispositio causæ proximæ ante decretum est certa quidem ut dispositio, sed nihil ex ea, et præcise quia certa est, pro certitudine futuri contingentis concludi potest. Nam causa proxima futuri contingentis nonne est libera? dispositio certa igitur hujus causæ nil aliud est quam dispositio causæ certo liberæ; posita autem causa certo libera, absque ullo additamento, potest adhuc effectus poni vel non poni. Quis hæc non videret? Dispositio enim quantumque certa non est determinatio, et ideo systematis hujus inventor a paucioribus secutus Molina somniavit. III. Coexistentia realis futurorum contingentium in æternitate est incerta; a Thomistis communiter quibus ex Societate Molina, Fonseca, Tiphanius et alii consentiunt propugnata, ab aliis plurimis negatur. Supponit etenim existentiam realem realis coexistentia; sed ab æterno non realiter existunt futura contingentia; ergo nec realiter ab æterno coexistere possunt. Istud argumentum distinguendo majorem Thomistæ solvunt; manet tamen coexistentiam realem in æternitate futurorum contingentium non esse adeo certam, ut possit haberi pro formali ratione cognitionis futurorum illorum qua gloriatur ab æterno Deus. IV. Ante decretum Dei concursum causæ secundæ præbentis, nil causa secunda producit, cum independenter a quovis alio agere proprium solius Dei sit. Non igitur, ut Theophilus Raynaudus imaginatus est, in causa secunda in his vel illis circumstantiis sibi relicta Deus futura contingentia cognoscit. V. Veritas objectiva est veritas rei; veritas formalis est veritas propositionis rem affirmantis; unde veritas formalis veritatem objectivam consequitur. Ante decretum Dei neque veritas objectiva neque veritas formalis existit. Nam Deus est causa prima et libera futuri. Quomodo prima, si futurum ante Dei decretum determinatur? Quomodo libera, si determinatur ex futuritione rei, nedum rei futuritionem determinet? Non igitur in futurorum veritate sive objectiva, sive formali, Deus futura contingentia cognoscit, ut quidam Societatis docuere professores, et novitas illa, fatente ipso Vasquesio, apud veteres theologos, uno Scoto excepto, si tamen sit excipiendus, prorsus inaudita, vix discutienda est. VI. Ante decretum essentia divina non repræsentat res ut futuras. In ea igitur, ut speciei intelligibilis rationem habet, Deus non potest futura contingentia cognoscere. VII. Nec etiam in efficacia præscientiæ suæ, ita ut hæc efficacia cognitionis futurorum sit formalis ratio. Nam quæritur præcise quæ sit hujus efficacia ratio. Si diceres: cognoscit quia cognoscit, nihil ad quæsitum responderes. VIII. Decretum Dei non est in Deo futurum, sed æternum. Cum insuper Deus nil falsum prævideat, decretum istud esset omnino certum et determinatum. Ergo Deus in hoc decreto futura contingentia non cognoscit, quidquid Suarez affirmet. IX. Deus in sua essentia post decretum futura contingentia cognoscit. Essentia enim Dei omnia ut sunt repræsentabilia repræsentat; sed post decretum Dei futura contingentia sunt repræsentabilia ut certo futura; ergo. Si dicas cum Molinistis futura libera a libertate creaturarum dependere, nec consequenter per solius Dei decretum cognosci posse; Thomistæ replicant Deum futuritionem rerum per causam liberam decernere, quando de futuris liberis agitur, ita ut ex hoc decreto sequatur non solum quod res futura sit, sed etiam quod ad rei productionem libertatis actio necessario sit certa. Deus enim nostræ libertatis, sicut et omnium facultatum nostrarum auctor est, et in decreto suo libertatem nostram ponit; ergo indubie libertas nostra salvatur, immo causatur. Inter scientiam visionis quæ decretum Dei supponit, et scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ quæ pro objecto habet res ut mere possibiles, Patres Societatis tertiam adducunt scientiam, quam Molina scientiam medium vocavit. Per illam Deus non absolute quidem, sed sub conditione ab æterno cognoscit quid homines et angeli pro sua libertate essent facturi, si cum hac vel ista gratia, in his vel istis circumstantiis, in tali vel tali rerum ordine collocarentur. Scientia media nullum Dei decretum antecedens supponit. In medium adducta est a Patribus Societatis ad dirigendum Deum in suis decretis circa actiones creaturarum liberas, illæsa creaturarum libertate. Non videbant enim quo modo non tolleretur libertas, si antequam per scientiam medium quid sit homo in tali vel tali statu acturus prævideat, Deus aliquid ab ipso

[I.q.14.a.14.sc] It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (Psalm 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.

[I.q.14.a.14.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. xcIII, 11: Dominus scit cogitationes hominum. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus hominum: ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.

[I.q.14.a.14.co] Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above (Article 9), it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.

Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.

[I.q.14.a.14.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri, Deus autem sciat quidquid est in potentia sua, vel creaturæ, ut supra dictum est, necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia quæ formari possunt. Sed sicut scit materialia immaterialiter et composita simpliciter; ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum enuntiabilium, quod scilicet in intellectu ejus sit compositio vel divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscujusque; sicut si nos in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia quæ de homine prædicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod species intelligibilis sic repræsentat unum quod non repræsentat aliud. Unde intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quæ ei insunt, intelligimus, sed secundum quamdam successionem. Et propter hoc ea quæ seorsum et divisim intelligimus, oportet nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet ejus essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde intelligendo essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quæcumque eis accidere possunt.

[I.q.14.a.14.ad.1] This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.

[I.q.14.a.14.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium. homine agendum decerneret. Videant nunc, si possint, quomodo, illæsa hominis libertate, Deus certo quid sit homo in tali vel tali statu acturus prævidebit. Si Deus hoc certo prævidere potest, sequitur quod in tali vel tali statu posita certo libertas sic aget; ergo libertas in tali vel tali statu posita jam non est libera, sed determinata; et hoc videt Deus, aliter non certo videret. Sed unde libertati determinatio sua venit? Ex seipsa solummodo, siquidem Deus nil adhuc decreverat. Sed si ex seipsa, ergo ex seipsa in tali vel tali statu posita non est libera. Si autem in statu isto non est ex seipsa libera, ergo non ex seipsa, sed ex alia causa determinatur. Illa alia causa non est Deus, quia Deus nihil decrevit. Estne fatum? Si fatum, quomodo libertas? De prærogativa Dei qui est prima causa universalis, nec tamen determinationis libertatis esset causa prima in isto systemate, non loquor. Illud unum assero: nil aliud hoc systema dicit, nisi absque Dei decreto humanam in tali vel tali statu cogi

[I.q.14.a.14.ad.2] Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.

[I.q.14.a.14.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei; et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est ejus essentia, est similitudo omnium eorum quæ per enuntiabilia significantur.

Article 15

[I.q.14.a.15.arg.1] It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.

[I.q.14.a.15.arg.2] Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.

[I.q.14.a.15.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quidquid potest plura facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et diminutionem.

[I.q.14.a.15.arg.3] Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.

[I.q.14.a.15.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Deus scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum, quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit, scit; et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.

[I.q.14.a.15.sc] It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" (James 1:17).

[I.q.14.a.15.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jacobi, 1, 17, quod apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque vicissitudinis obumbratio.

[I.q.14.a.15.co] Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing (4), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (Question 9, Article 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.

[I.q.14.a.15.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum scientia Dei sit ejus substantia, ut ex dictis patet, sicut substantia ejus est omnino immutabilis, libertatem; si etenim non cogitur, quomodo infallibiliter sic potius quam sic aget? Aget tamen sic potius quam sic. Aliter Deus quomodo infallibiliter agenda prævideret? Respondes in doctrina Thomistarum libertatem cogi non in tua. Dico tibi: si non cogatur in tua doctrina libertas, incerta est ipsius determinatio; in mea autem doctrina certa est determinatio libertatis, non eo sensu quod libertas cogatur, sed eo sensu quod libertas, quæ est causa secunda, a Deo qui est prima causa, in sua determinatione causatur et illæsa conservatur. Nonne Deus et causat et conservat omnia? Si omnia, ergo libertatem; si libertatem, ergo Dei prima et infallibilis causalitas in libertatis actibus libertatem non tollit, sed e contra salvat, ita ut absque illa prima causalitate libertas in nihilum redigere retur ac omnino periret. In cod. deest: « ut Dominus, creator et hujusmodi. » ut supra ostensum est, ita oportet scientiam ejus omnino invariabilem esse.

[I.q.14.a.15.ad.1] "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.

[I.q.14.a.15.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dominus, et creator, et hujusmodi, important relationes quæ consequuntur actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas, secundum quod in seipsis sunt; et ideo hujusmodi relationes varie de Deo dicuntur secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia, et amor, et hujusmodi, important relationes quæ consequuntur actus qui intelliguntur in Deo esse; et ideo invariabili ter prædicantur de Deo.

[I.q.14.a.15.ad.2] God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.

[I.q.14.a.15.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus scit etiam ea quæ potest facere et non facit. Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod posset plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam visionis; secundum quam dicitur scire ea quæ sunt in actu secundum aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse quæ non sunt, vel non esse quæ sunt, non sequitur quod scientia sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si tamen aliquod esset cujus esse Deus prius nesciret, et postea scire, esset ejus scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest; quia quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in æterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc quod ponitur aliquid esse secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab æterno sit scitum a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam sciat, quia hæc propositio implicat quod quando neciverit, et postea sciat.

[I.q.14.a.15.ad.3] The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three--viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.

[I.q.14.a.15.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod antiqui Nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile, Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum; quia eadem res significatur per hæc tria, scilicet nativitas Christi: et secundum hoc sequitur quod Deus, quidquid scivit, sciat; quia modo scit Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse nasciturum. Sed hæc opinio falsa est, tum quia diversitas partium orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat, tum etiam quia sequeretur quod propositio quæ semel est vera, esset semper vera; quod est contra Philosophum, in Prædicam., cap. 1 de Substantia, post med., qui dicit quod hæc oratio: 1 Deest in cod: « important relationes ad creaturas, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia Dei importat relationem ad creaturas, secundum quod sunt in Deo; quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu, secundum quod est Socrates sedet, vera est eo sedente; et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et ideo concedendum est quod hæc non est vera: quidquid Deus scivit, scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinæ scientiæ est quod sciat unam et eadem rem quandoque esse, et quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinæ scientiæ est quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra variatur vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta, si mutata re eadem opinionem de re illa retineamus; vel secundum diversas opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur eum non sedere: quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.

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Prima Pars

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