Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q15. Ideas
Source context
- Theme
- divine ideas as archetypes of created things subsisting in the divine intellect
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 213, 1922-07-16Steiner discusses the Platonic position that ideas subsist independently and bear a family-likeness to one another, without any single idea such as the Good functioning as a governing principle over the rest — a structural contrast to Aquinas's placement of the divine ideas within the one divine intellect.
- GA 87, 1902-01-24Steiner identifies the Platonic ideas as the foundational concepts of Platonic mysticism, treating them as the most important entry-point for understanding how Plato's worldview relates to inner spiritual cognition.
- GA 18, p01c06Steiner traces how the experienced idea — the idea taken up consciously into the soul — emerges in Goethe, Fichte, and Schiller as a renewed capacity, distinguishing this from earlier, more passive reception of ideal content.
Cross-tradition
- Platonic traditionPlato's doctrine of separately subsisting Forms constitutes the historical antecedent Aquinas explicitly appropriates and transforms: Q15 relocates the ideas from a transcendent realm of Forms into the divine intellect, making them rationes (exemplar-reasons) rather than self-subsistent entities.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus)Plotinus places the Ideas within Nous (Intellect) as its self-thinking content, a structural anticipation of Aquinas's claim that the divine ideas are the divine essence itself as known by God in relation to possible creatures.
- Islamic Kalam / AvicennaAvicenna's doctrine of universals ante rem in the divine mind offers a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's exemplarism, locating ideal forms in an intellect prior to their instantiation in matter.
Q15. Ideas
Article 1
[I.q.15.a.1.arg.1] It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.
[I.q.15.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ideæ non sint. Dicit enim Dionysius, cap. vii De divin. nom., § 2, col. 870, t. 4, quod Deus non cognoscit res secundum ideam. Sed ideæ non ponuntur ad aliud nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo ideæ non sunt.
[I.q.15.a.1.arg.2] Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (14, 5). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.
[I.q.15.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Deus in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia.
[I.q.15.a.1.arg.3] Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
[I.q.15.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idea ponitur ut principium cognoscendi et operandi. Sed essentia divina est sufficiens principium cognoscendi et operandi omnia. Non ergo necesse est ponere ideas.
[I.q.15.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."
[I.q.15.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., quæst. xlvī, col. 29, t. 6: « Tanta vis in ideis constituitur, ut nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse nemo possit. »
[I.q.15.a.1.co] It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word Idea is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:
In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (46, 1), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
[I.q.15.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. 18 èæ enim græce, latine forma dicitur. Unde per ideas intelliguntur formæ alia-rum rerum præter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicujus rei præter ipsam existens ad duo esse potest: vel ut sit exemplar ejus cujus dicitur forma, vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formæ cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas, quod sic patet. In omnibus enim quæ non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse finem generationis cujuscum-que. Agens autem non ageret propter formam, nisi in quantum similitudo formæ esset in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: in quibusdam enim agentibus præexistit forma rei fiendæ secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quæ agunt per naturam: sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quæ agunt per intellectum; sicut similitudo domus præexistit in mente ædificatoris; et hæc potest dicii idea domus, quia artifex intendit domum assimilare formæ quam mente concepit. Quia igitur mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma, ad similitudinem cujus mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideæ.
[I.q.15.a.1.ad.1] God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.
[I.q.15.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus non intelligit res secundum ideam extra se existentem; et sic etiam Aristoteles, lib. III Metaph., a text. 10 ad fin. lib., improbat opinionem Platonis de ideis, secundum quod ponebat eas per se existentes non in intellectu.
[I.q.15.a.1.ad.2] Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
[I.q.15.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet Deus per essentiam suam se et alia cognoscat, tamen essentia ejus est principium operativum aliorum, non autem sui ipsius; ideo habet rationem ideæ, secundum quod ad alia comparatur, non autem secundum quod comparatur ad ipsum Deum.
[I.q.15.a.1.ad.3] God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
[I.q.15.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia.
Article 2
[I.q.15.a.2.arg.1] It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.
[I.q.15.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sint plures ideæ. Idea enim in Deo est ejus essentia. Sed essentia Dei est una tantum. Ergo et idea est una.
[I.q.15.a.2.arg.2] Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
[I.q.15.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut idea est principium cognoscendi et operandi, ita ars et sapientia. Sed in Deo non sunt plures artes et sapientia. Ergo nec plures ideæ. Sic cod.; incaute in non enim aliquarum tantummodo rerum, sed omnium rerum aliarum a Deo sunt ideæ. Plato posuit ideas ut subsistentes æternaliter extra Deum. Quidam tamen ab hoc errore Platonem excusant, juxta quos Plato posuisset ideas æternas ut subsistentes solummodo in mente divina. Quid sint autem ideæ in Deo? Scotus vult illas nihil aliud esse quam ipsas creaturas secundum quoddam esse diminutum quod extra Deum ab æterno per actum divini intellectus productum haberent. Sed si creaturæ sunt in Deo secundum istud esse diminutum, creaturæ sic Deus sunt, quia quidquid in Deo est, Deus est. Nulla insuper creatura ab æterno est. — Nec etiam sunt ideæ in Deo, ipsa divina essentia, ut speciei impressæ gerit vices, quia in mente operantis idea ut quid intellectum est, non ut species impressa, seu id quo intelligitur. — Ideæ in Deo sunt essentia divina ut 3. Si dicatur quod ideæ multiplicantur secundum respectus ad diversas creaturas; contra: pluralitas idearum est ab æterno. Si ergo ideæ sunt plures, creaturæ autem sunt temporales; ergo temporale erit causa æterni.
[I.q.15.a.2.arg.3] Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.
[I.q.15.a.2.arg.4] Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.
[I.q.15.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, respectus isti aut sunt secundum rem in creaturis tantum, aut etiam in Deo. Si in creaturis tantum, cum creaturæ non sint ab æterno, pluralitas idearum non erit ab æterno, si multiplicentur solum secundum hujusmodi respectus. Si autem realiter sunt in Deo, sequitur quod alia pluralitas realis sit in Deo quam pluralitas personarum; quod est contra Damascenum dicentem, lib. I De fid. orthod., cap. x, col. 838, t. 4 quod « in divinis omnia unum sunt præter ingenerationem, generationem et processionem. » Sic igitur non sunt plures ideæ.
[I.q.15.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."
[I.q.15.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., q. xlvi, col. 30, t. 6: « Ideæ sunt principales quædam formæ, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quia ipsæ formatæ non sunt; ac per hoc æternæ, ac semper eodem modo se habentes; quæ divina intelligentia continentur. Sed cum ipsæ neque oriantur, neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit. »
[I.q.15.a.2.co] It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
[I.q.15.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere plures ideas. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod in quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente, sicut ordo exercitus a duce. Illud autem quod est optimum in rebus existens, est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per Philosophum, in XII Metaph., text. 52. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium; prout quidam dixerunt quod Deus creavit primum creatum tantum, quod creatum creavit secundum creatum, et sic inde, quousque producta est tanta rerum multitudo; secundum quam opinionem Deus non haberet nisi ideam primi creati. Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se creatus ab eo, et species expressa, quatenus essentiam divinam secundum aliquem similitudinis modum a creaturis participabilem ac imitabilem exprimit. Nec inde sequitur Deum esse creaturam, quia essentia Dei sumitur in esse intelligibili, secundum quod prae-cise hoc particulare continet intelligendo in quo intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicu-jus totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriæ rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur; sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cujuslibet partium ejus. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriæ rationes omnium rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus, in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., quæst. xlvi, col. 30, t. 6, quod « singula propriis rationibus a Deo creata sunt. » Unde sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideæ. Hoc autem quomodo divinæ simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur, non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quæ est forma faciens intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente aedificatoris est aliquid ab co intellectum, ad cujus similitudinem domum in materia format. Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini intellectus quod multa intelligat, sed contra simplicitatem ejus esset, si per plures species ejus intellectus forma-retur. Unde plures ideæ sunt in mente divina ut intellectæ ab ipsa, quod hoc modo potest videri: ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit; unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquæque autem creatura habet propriam speciem secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinæ essentiæ similitudinem. Sic igitur in quantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam hujus creaturæ; et similiter de aliis. Et sic patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum quæ sunt plures ideæ.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.1] The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod idea non nominat divinam essentiam, in quantum est essentia, sed in quantum est similitudo, vel ratio hujus vel illius rei. Unde et Deum imitatur, et a perfectione Dei deficit. « Hæc omnia communiter in tota divinitate accipienda sunt, atque eodem modo..., omninoque conjunctim: distinctim autem... ingenium, genitum et procedens. » secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectæ ex una essentia, secundum hoc discuntur plures ideæ.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.2] By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sapientia et ars significantur ut quo Deus intelligit, sed idea, ut quod intelligit. Deus autem uno intellectu intelligit multa, et non solum intelligit multas res per essentiam suam, sed etiam intelligit se intelligere multa per essentiam suam. Sed hoc est intelligere plures rationes rerum, vel plures ideas esse in intellectu ejus ut intellectas.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.3] Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hujusmodi respectus, quibus multiplicantur ideæ, non causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino comparante essentiam suam ad res.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.4] Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.
[I.q.15.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod respectus multiplicantes ideas non sunt in rebus creatis, sed in Deo; non tamen sunt reales respectus, sicut illi quibus distinguuntur personæ, sed respectus intellecti a Deo.
Article 3
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.1] It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non omnium quæ cognoscit Deus, sint ideæ in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo: quia sequeretur malum esse in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quæ cognoscuntur a Deo sunt ideæ.
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.2] Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above (Article 9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Deus cognoscit ea quæ nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed horum non sunt ideæ, quia dicit Dionysius, De div. nomin., cap. v, § 8, col. 823, text. 1, quod « exemplaria sunt divinæ voluntates determinativæ et effectivæ rerum. » Ergo non omnium quæ a Deo cognoscuntur sunt ideæ in ipso.
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.3] Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Deus cognoscit materiam primam quæ non potest habere ideam, cum nullam habeat formam. Ergo idem quod prius.
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.4] Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
[I.q.15.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, constat quod Deus scit non solum species, sed etiam genera, et singularia, et accidentia. Sed horum non sunt ideæ, secundum positionem Platonis qui primus ideas introduxit, ut dicit Augustinus, lib. LXXXIII Quæst., quæst. xlvi, col. 29, t. 6. Non ergo omnium cognitorum a Deo sunt ideæ in ipso.
[I.q.15.a.3.sc] Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.
[I.q.15.a.3.sc] Sed contra, ideæ sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet, lib. De LXXXIII Quæst., quæst. xlvi, col. 30, t. 6. Sed omnium quæ cognoscit, Deus habet proprias rationes. Ergo omnium quæ cognoscit, habet ideam.
[I.q.15.a.3.co] As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.
[I.q.15.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum ideæ a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et generationis ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea, prout in mente divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium factionis rerum, exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet: secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur ratio, et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativam pertinere. Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia quæ a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus: secundum vero quod principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quæ cognoscuntur a Deo, etiamsi nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quæ a Deo cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et secundum quod cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis.
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.1] Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem, sed per rationem boni; et ideo malum non habet in Deo ideam, neque secundum quod idea est exemplar, neque secundum quod est ratio.
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.2] God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod eorum quæ neque sunt, neque erunt, neque fuerunt, Deus non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu eorum non est idea in Deo secundum quod idea significat exemplar, sed solum secundum quod significat rationem.
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.3] Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Plato, secun- In cod. deest: « secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed etiam secundum quod intellecta sunt; quod est intelligere plures rationes rerum; sicut artifex, dum intelligit formam domus in materia, dicitur intelligere domum; dum autem intelligit formam domus ut a se speculatam, ex eo quod intelligit se intelligere eam, intelligit ideam, vel rationem domus. Deus autem non solum. » Corderius « exemplaria vero dicimus esse rationes in Deo substantificas rerum et unite pra-existentes, quas divinus sermo vocat pra-definiiones, et divinas atque bonas voluntates, rerum definitrices et effectrices. » Non sunt concipiendæ in Deo plures ideæ realiter distinctæ divinam essentiam quasi formaliter efficientes. — Billuart. dum quosdam, posuit materiam non creatam; et ideo non posuit ideam esse materiae, sed materiae concausam. Sed quia nos po-nimus materiam creatam a Deo, non tamen sine forma, habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea compositi; nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est.
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.4] Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (22, 3).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.15.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar; quia nunquam genus fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae inseparabiliter concomitantur subjectum, quia hæc simul fiunt cum subjecto; accidentia autem quae superveniunt subjecto, specialem ideam habent. Artifex enim per formam domus facit omnia accidentia quae a principio concomitantur domum; sed ea quae superveniunt domui jam factæ, ut picturæ, vel aliquid hujusmodi, facit per aliquam aliam formam. Individua vero, secundum Platonem, non habebant aliam ideam quam ideam speciei; tum quia singularia individuantur per materiam, quam ponebat esse increatam, ut quidam dicunt, et concausam ideæ; tum quia intentio naturæ consistit in speciebus, nec particularia producit, nisi ut in eis species salventur. Sed providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species, sed ad singularia, ut infra dicetur.
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