Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q17. Falsity
Source context
- Theme
- the ontological and logical status of falsity as a mode of being and cognition
Steiner
- GA 87, 1902-04-19Steiner identifies falsity and error as arising from the incompleteness of apparent connections within the world, giving falsity an ontological ground in concealment rather than mere negation.
- GA 4, chapter VSteiner argues that demonstrating the falsity of a proof does not by itself establish that the doctrine under examination is erroneous, distinguishing logical invalidity from ontological falsity.
- GA 184, 1918-10-11Steiner observes that half-truths are often more harmful than outright falsities, implying that falsity admits of degrees and that partial truth constitutes a distinct and dangerous epistemic category.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian logicAristotle's treatment of falsehood in Metaphysics IV and De Interpretatione locates falsity in the composition or division of terms in judgment, a structural parallel to Aquinas's analysis of falsity as a privation of the conformity between intellect and thing.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus)Plotinus in the Enneads treats falsity as a deficiency of being rather than a positive ontological reality, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's privative account of falsitas in Q17.
- Vedanta (Advaita)Advaita Vedanta's doctrine of mithyā frames apparent false appearances as neither fully real nor absolutely non-existent, a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's distinction between absolute and relative falsity in creatures.
Q17. Falsity
Article 2
[I.q.17.a.2.arg.1] It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.
[I.q.17.a.2.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
[I.q.17.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., text. 24, quod falsitas non est propria sensui, sed phantasiæ.
[I.q.17.a.2.arg.3] Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
[I.q.17.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est falsitas.
[I.q.17.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
[I.q.17.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in lib. II Soliloq., cap. vi, col. 890, t. 4: « Apparet nos in omnibus sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli. »
[I.q.17.a.2.co] Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (Question 16, Article 2), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are.
The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it.
Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense.
Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.
Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.
[I.q.17.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod falsitas non est quærenda in sensu, nisi sicuti ibi est veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, quod sensus cognoscat veritatem; sed in quantum veram apprehensionem habet de sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod qui dem contingit eo quod apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu ex hoc quod apprehendit vel judicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem se habet sensus ad cognoscendum res, in quantum similitudo rerum est in sensu. Similitudo autem alicujus rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo coloris, et « Quo pacto enim iste quem commemoravi verus tragædus esset, si nollet esse falsus Hector. » « Ergo apparet nos... eas res falsas nominare quas verisimiles deprehendimus. » In cod. deest: « quoddam non esse, ita in his quæ sunt invenitur; » et in principio, loco « sic » ponitur « sicut » in editis. aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo per se, sed non primo; sicut in visu est similitudo figuræ vel magnitudinis, et aliorum communium sensibilium omnium. Tertio modo nec primo, nec per se, sed per accidens, sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non in quantum est homo, sed in quantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et ideo circa propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod propter indispositionem organi non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem; sicut et alia passiva propter suam indispositionem deficienter recipiunt impressionem agentium; et inde est quod propter corruptionem linguæ infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens potest esse falsum judicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, in quantum refertur ad alia.
[I.q.17.a.2.ad.1] The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
[I.q.17.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sensum affici est ipsum ejus sentire. Unde per hoc quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non decipiamur in judicio, quo judicamus nos sentire aliquid; sed ex eo quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit; et ex hoc fallimur per sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire.
[I.q.17.a.2.ad.2] Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.
[I.q.17.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non decipitur circa proprium objectum. Unde in alia translatione planius dicitur, quod « sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non est. » Phantasiæ autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repræsentat similitudinem rei etiam absentis. Unde quando aliquis convertitur ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali apprehensione falsitas; unde etiam Philosophus, in V Metaphys., text. 34, dicit quod umbræ et picturæ et somnia dicuntur falsa, in quantum non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem.
[I.q.17.a.2.ad.3] This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
[I.q.17.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu sicut in agnoscente verum et falsum.
Article 3
[I.q.17.a.3.arg.1] It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.
[I.q.17.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim Augustinus, in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., quæst. xxxii, col. 22, t. 6: « Omnis qui fallitur, id in quo fallitur non intelligit. » Sed falsum dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur. Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas.
[I.q.17.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.
[I.q.17.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit, in III De anima, text. 54, quod intellectus semper est rectus. Non ergo intellectus est falsitas.
[I.q.17.a.3.sc] It is said in De Anima iii, 21, 22 that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.
[I.q.17.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in III De anima, text. 21 et 22, quod « ubi compositio intellectuum est, ibi verum et falsum est. » Sed compositio intellectuum est in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu.
[I.q.17.a.3.co] Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said (2) that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (16, 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above (Article 2).
But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.
[I.q.17.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem propriam rei cognitæ. Res autem naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus, vel consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem; ita etiam virtus cognoscitiva non deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cujus similitudine informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad ipsam, vel accidens ei; sicut est dictum, quod visus non decipitur circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quæ consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens. Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine proprium sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur directe similitudine quidditatis rei. Unde circa quod quid est, intellectus non decipitur, sicut neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei, cujus quidditatem intelligit, aliquid quod eam con- 1 Ita plurimæ edit.; in cod. Alcan. aliisque deest « omnium. » 2 Sic cod.; in edit. deest: « propriam. » 3 Sic cod.; in edit. deest: « directe. » sequitur, vel ei opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad judicandum de hujusmodi, sicut sensus ad judicandum de sensibilibus communibus, vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quæ supra circa veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam cognoscit, sicut et veritatem; in sensu autem falsitas non est ut cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus solum circa compositionem intellectus est; per accidens etiam in operatione intellectus, qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse falsitas, in quantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod intellectus definitionem unius attribuit alteri, ut si definitionem circuli attribuat homini; unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera. Alio modo secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem, quæ simul sociari non possunt; sic enim definitio non est solum falsa respectu alicujus rei, sed est falsa in se; ut si formet talem definitionem: animal rationale quadrupes; falsus est enim intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando hanc compositionem: aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et propter hoc in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil intelligit.
[I.q.17.a.3.ad.1] Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
[I.q.17.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia quidditas rei est proprium objectum intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere, quando reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo judicamus; sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod « omnis qui fallitur, non intelligit id in quo fallitur; » non autem ita quod in nulla operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur.
[I.q.17.a.3.ad.2] The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
[I.q.17.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod intellectus est principiorum, circa quæ non decipitur ex eadem causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se nota sunt illa quæ statim intellectis terminis cognoscuntur ex eo quod prædicatum poni-tur in definitione subjecti.
Article 4
[I.q.17.a.4.arg.1] It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
[I.q.17.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum enim et falsum opponuntur, sicut quod est et quod non est; nam « verum est id quod est, » ut dicit Augustinus, lib. II Soliloq., cap. v, col. 889, t. 4. Sed quod est et quod non est non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria.
[I.q.17.a.4.arg.2] Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
[I.q.17.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unum contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero: quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, Soliloq., lib. II, cap. x, col. 893, t. 4, « tragædus non esset falsus Hector, si non esset verus tragædus. » Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria.
[I.q.17.a.4.arg.3] Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jeremiah 8:5), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
[I.q.17.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in Deo non est contrarietas aliqua. « Nihil enim divinæ substantiae est contrarium, » ut dicit Augustinus, De civit. Dei, lib. XII, cap. II, col. 350, t. 7. Sed Deo opponitur falsitas; nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur, Jerem., viii, 5: Apprehenderunt mendacium; Glossa Hieronymi in hunc locum: « Id est idola. » Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria.
[I.q.17.a.4.sc] The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.
[I.q.17.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus in II Periher., cap. ult.; ponit enim falsam opinionem veræ contrariam.
[I.q.17.a.4.co] True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.
[I.q.17.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid neque determinat sibi aliquod subjectum; et propter hoc potest dici tam de ente quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subjectum; « est » enim « negatio in subjecto, » ut dicitur IV Metaphys., text. 41, et lib. V, text. 27; cæcum enim non dicitur nisi de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium Deus est justus, Deus non est malus; et decipi potest sive quoad id quod consequitur, sive quoad id quod opponitur. « Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est. » « Deo, id est, summæ essentiae et auctori omvero et aliquid ponit, et subjectum determinat; nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris. Falsum autem aliquid ponit; est enim falsum, ut dicit Philosophus, IV Metaphys., text. 27, ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem adæquatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adæquatam. Unde manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt contraria.
[I.q.17.a.4.ad.1] What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."
[I.q.17.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei; sed id quod est ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas. Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere autem esse et non esse contrarietatem habet; sicut probat Philosophus, in II Perih., cap. ult., quod huic opinioni: Bonum est bonum, contraria est: Bonum non est bonum.
[I.q.17.a.4.ad.2] Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.
[I.q.17.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec malum in bono sibi contrario, sed in eo quod sibi subjicitur. Et hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et convertuntur cum ente. Unde sicut omnis privatio fundatur in subjecto, quod est ens; ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et omne falsum in aliquo vero.
[I.q.17.a.4.ad.3] Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.17.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid contrarium neque ratione suæ bonitatis, neque ratione suæ veritatis; quia in intellectu ejus non potest esse falsitas aliqua; sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium; nam veræ opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia dicuntur opposita veritati divinæ, in quantum falsa opinio de idolis contraria-tur veræ opinioni de unitate Dei.
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