Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q18. The life of God
Source context
- Theme
- Divine life as self-subsistent actuality within the Godhead
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta: sat-cit-anandaThe Advaita identification of Brahman as pure being-consciousness-bliss offers cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that life belongs to God essentially as self-subsistent act, not as an acquired predicate.
- Neoplatonism: the One as self-thinking lifePlotinus's account of the One as the source from which life emanates without diminution shares structural congruence with Aquinas's argument that God does not merely possess life but is life in the highest degree.
Q18. The life of God
Article 1
[I.q.18.a.1.arg.1] It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.
[I.q.18.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit enim Philosophus, in VIII Physicorum, text. 1, quod motus est ut vita quædam natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam.
[I.q.18.a.1.arg.2] Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
[I.q.18.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, plantæ dicuntur vivere in quantum habent in seipsis principium motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut probatur in VIII Physicor., text. 56 et 57. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora naturalia vivant.
[I.q.18.a.1.arg.3] Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
[I.q.18.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur vita: dicuntur enim aquæ vivæ. Ergo multo magis alia corpora naturalia vitam habent.
[I.q.18.a.1.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.
[I.q.18.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, De divin. nom., cap. vi, § 1, col. 855, t. 1, quod « plantæ, secundum ultimam resonantiam vitæ, habent vivere; » ex quo potest accipi, quod ultimum gradum vitæ obtinent plantæ. Sed corpora inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere.
[I.q.18.a.1.co] We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.
[I.q.18.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ex his quæ manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus, quorum sit vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus convenit. Dicitur enim in libro De vegetabilibus, Aristot., in lib. I De plantis, cap. 1, in princ., quod vita in animalibus manifesta est. Unde Sic cod.; non inepte ut in Parmensi, et in edit: « contraria sunt falso et malo. » Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius « ex ipsa etiam habent germina quod ultimo vitæ gradu gaudeant. » secundum illud oportet distinguere viventia a non viventibus, secundum quod animalia dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere quando incipit ex se motum habere; et tamdiu judicatur animal vivere, quamdiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero jam ex se non habet aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio, tunc dicitur animal mortuum per defectum vitæ. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia quæ seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, id est, existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 28, et lib. I, text. 148, ut sic viventia dicantur quæcumque se agunt ad motum, vel operationem aliquam; ea vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel operationem, viventia dici non possunt nisi per aliquam similitudinem.
[I.q.18.a.1.ad.1] These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.
[I.q.18.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum illud Philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu primo, scilicet corporum cælestium, vel de motu communiter; et utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium per similitudinem, et non per proprietatem. Nam motus cæli est in universo corporalium naturarum sicut motus cordis in animali, quo conservatur vita. Similiter etiam qui-cumque motus naturalis hoc modo se habet ad res naturales ut quædam similitudo vitalis operationis. Unde si totum universum corporale esset unum animal ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium corporum.
[I.q.18.a.1.ad.2] To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.
[I.q.18.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri, nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suæ naturæ, utpote cum sunt extra ocum proprium: cum enim sunt in loco proprio et naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantæ et aliæ res viventes moventur motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali: non autem in accedendo ad eam, vel in recedendo ab ea; imo secundum quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et præterea corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco, vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur in VIII Physicor., text. 32.
[I.q.18.a.1.ad.3] Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.
[I.q.18.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aquæ vivæ dicuntur quæ habent continuum fluxum. Aquæ enim stantes, quæ non continuantur ad principium continue fluens, dicuntur mortuæ, ut aquæ cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc dicitur per similitudinem; in quantum enim videntur se movere, habent similitudinem vitæ; sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio vitæ, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante eas, sicut acci-dit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium.
Article 3
[I.q.18.a.3.arg.1] It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated (2). But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.
[I.q.18.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim dicuntur aliqua, secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.
[I.q.18.a.3.arg.2] Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
[I.q.18.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in omnibus quæ vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium: unde dicitur in II De anima, text. 36, quod « anima est viventis corporis causa, et principium. » Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi non competit vivere.
[I.q.18.a.3.arg.3] Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.
[I.q.18.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, principium vitæ in rebus viventibus quæ apud nos sunt, est anima vegetabilis, quæ non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus incorporalibus non competit vivere.
[I.q.18.a.3.sc] It is said (Psalm 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
[I.q.18.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in ps. Lxxxiii, 3: Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum.
[I.q.18.a.3.co] Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.
Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
[I.q.18.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur a seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota, quanto perfectius competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo finis movet agentem: agens vero principale est quod per suam formam agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum quod non agit ex virtute suæ formæ, sed ex virtute principalis agentis: cui instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur quædam quæ movent seipsa, solum quantum ad executionem motus; sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt, determinantur eis a natura: et hujusmodi sunt plantæ quæ, secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum augmentum et decrementum. Quædam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad formam, quæ est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt: et hujusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quæ non habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilata-tionis et constrictionis, ut ostrea parum excedentia motum plantæ. Quæ vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam non solum ad cognoscendum conjuncta tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis hujusmodi animalia formam, quæ est principium motus, per sensum acci-piant, non tamen per seipsa præstituunt sibi finem suæ operationis vel sui motus, sed est eis inditus a natura, cujus instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam. Unde supra alia animalia sunt illa quæ movent seipsa, etiam habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi præstituunt. Quod quidem non fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cujus est cognoscere proportionem finis, et ejus quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in alterum. 1 2 In codibus omnibus quos vidimus deest: « non habito respectu ad formam, vel finem, quæ inest eis a natura, sed, » etc. 3 Edit. Rom.: « moventur solum infra seipsa motu, etc. » Nostram lectionem habent editi reli- Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quæ habent intellectum; hæc enim perfectius movent seipsa, et hujus est signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet potentias sensitivas, et potentiæ sensitivæ per suum imperium movent organa, quæ exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus videmus, quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars gubernatoria, præcipit ei quæ inducit formam navis; et hæc præcipit illi quæ habet executionem tantum in disponendo materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noter ad aliqua se agat, tamen aliqua sunt ei præstituata a natura, sicut sunt prima principia, circa quæ non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non potest non velle. Unde licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cujus sua natura est ipsum ejus intelligere, et id quod naturaliter habet non determinari ab alio, hoc quidem obtinet summum gradum vitae: tale autem est Deus: unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde Philosophus, in XII Metaph., text. 54, ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens, concludit quod habet vitam perfectissimam et sem-piternam, quia intellectus ejus est perfectissimus et semper in actu.
[I.q.18.a.3.ad.1] As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.
[I.q.18.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaph., text. 46, duplex est actio: una quæ transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare; alia quæ manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle: quarum hæc est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est perfectio agentis. Unde quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda actio, in quantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus ejus ex hac simili-tudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita hujusmodi actio est actio agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, hujusmodi autem actio sit actus perfecti, id est existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 28. Hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit dicitur se movere; et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet se qui omnes, et Mss. Alcan. 4 — 5 In Parm. et in edit. « talia. » — 6 In Parm. et in edit.: « cui id. » 7 Sensus est: « cujus sua natura est id quod naturaliter habet non determinari ab alio. » 8 In ipsum non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.
[I.q.18.a.3.ad.2] As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life.
[I.q.18.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere, ita et suum vivere; et propter hoc sic vivit, quod non habet vivendi principium.
[I.q.18.a.3.ad.3] Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.
[I.q.18.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura corruptibili, quæ indiget et generatione ad conservationem speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui; et propter hoc in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus.
Article 4
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.1] It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim Act., xvii, 28: In ipso vivimus*, movemur et sumus. Sed non omnia in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt vita.
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.2] Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnia sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent in Deo 1 conformari exemplari; cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis, videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.3] Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in lib. De vera religione, cap. xxix, col. 145, t. 3, substantia vivens est melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quæ in se ipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res in Deo quam in seipsis; quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in se sint in actu; in Deo vero in potentia.
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.4] Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.
[I.q.18.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quæ fiunt secundum aliquod tempus, ita mala et ea quæ Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo omnia sunt vita, in Deo, in quantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod etiam mala, et quæ nunquam fiunt, sint vita in Deo, in quantum sunt scita ab eo; quod videtur inconveniens.
[I.q.18.a.4.sc] (John 1:3-4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.
[I.q.18.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., 1, 4: Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat*. Sed omnia prætter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita.
[I.q.18.a.4.co] In God to live is to understand, as before stated (3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
[I.q.18.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est ejus intelligere: in Deo autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur et ipsum intelligere ejus. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita ejus. Unde cum omnia quæ facta sunt a Deo, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa vita divina.
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.1] Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod creaturæ in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo in quantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina; sicut dicimus ea esse in nobis quæ sunt in nostra potestate; et sic creaturæ dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis; et hoc modo intelligendum est verbum Apostoli dicentis: In ipso vivimus, movemur*, et sumus; quia etiam et nostrum esse et nostrum vivere et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente; et sic sunt in Deo per proprias rationes, quæ non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res hoc modo loquendi in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita.
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.2] The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum rationem formæ, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius modi esse habet forma quandoque in exemplari et in exemplato; sicut forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et intelligibile, in domo autem, quæ est extra animam, habet esse materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quæ in seipsis non vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse divinum.
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.3] If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia, sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales in mente divina per suas ideas quam in seipsis, propter quod et Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse habent simpliciter in mente divina quam in seipsis, quia in mente divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum; sed esse hoc, utpote homo, vel equus, verius habent in propria natura quam in mente divina, quia ad veri- 1 Sic cod.; in editis deest: « in Deo. » 2 3 Ita codd. Alcan. et Tarrac. cum plurimis edit. tatem hominis pertinet esse materiale, quod non habent in mente divina; sicut domus quæ est in materia, quam quæ est in mente; quia hæc est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.4] Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.18.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, in quantum sub Dei scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo, vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo. Cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici, quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quæ secundum nullum tempus sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo secundum quod vivere nominat intelligere tantum, in quantum intelliguntur a Deo; non autem secundum quod vivere importat principium operationis.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-pars/q018.json