Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q19. The will of God
Source context
- Theme
- the will of God: its freedom, necessity, and relation to divine goodness and creation
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 305, 1922-08-16Steiner states that genuine education requires not merely acknowledging God but actively willing God's will and enacting divine intentions in the world.
- GA 40Steiner's prayers identify God's will as a living force operative within human movement and action, distinct from but coordinate with divine wisdom, love, and power.
Cross-tradition
- Islamic kalam (Ash'ari voluntarism)Ash'ari theologians hold that God's will is absolutely free and unconstrained by any prior standard of goodness, creating a structural contrast with Aquinas's position that divine will follows necessarily upon divine goodness.
- Vedanta (Ishvara-will)Advaita treatments of Ishvara's creative will as lila (free divine play) exhibit cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that God wills creation freely rather than by necessity of nature.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads VI.8)Plotinus's analysis of the One as self-willed and self-caused parallels Aquinas's claim that God's will is identical with God's essence and is not moved by any external end.
Q19. The will of God
Article 1
[I.q.19.a.1.arg.1] It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.
[I.q.19.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Objectum enim voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo. 2. Praeterea, voluntas est appetitus qui-dam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non habitæ, imperfectionem designat, quod Deo non competit. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo. 3. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in III De anima, tex. 54, voluntas est movens motum. Sed Deus est primum movens immobile, ut probatur VIII Physic., text. 49. Ergo in Deo non est voluntas.
[I.q.19.a.1.arg.2] Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
[I.q.19.a.1.arg.3] Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.
[I.q.19.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 12:2): "That you may prove what is the will of God."
[I.q.19.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus, Rom., xii, 2: Ut probetis quæ sit voluntas Dei.
[I.q.19.a.1.co] There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His will.
[I.q.19.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut in eo est intellectus; voluntas enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus est intelligens actu per formam intelligibilem. Quælibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam, et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea; et idem est de qualibet perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturæ. Et hæc habitudo ad bonum in rebus carentibus cognitione vocatur appetitus naturalis. Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam intelligibilem similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet cum habet ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quærat ipsum: et utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in 1 —2 et infra: «illa.» 3 In cod. deest: «nobilius esse habet in mente artificis quam in materia; sed tamen verius dicitur domus,» etc. 4 Ita Nicolaï. Al. omittitur «est.» 5 In cod.; omittitur «suam.» Voluntas est appetitus rationalis bonum juxta apprehensionem intellectus in universali prosequens. Appetitus vero est cujuscümque rei inclinatio ad persequendum bonum, et fugiendum malum. Appetitus est vel naturalis, vel elicitus. Appetitus naturalis est innatus, absque cognitione propria, cæcus cum natura omnibus rebus impressus. Appetitus elicitus juxta apprehensionem quam-dam sive imaginationis pro appetitu sensibili, sive intellectus pro appetitu rationali seu voluntate, est eductus. Mirum plane quod auctores Dictionnarii gallice de Trévoux hanc vocem «elicitus» a Scholas-ticis asseruerint fuisse retentam e verbo quodam barbaro «elicere;» verbum etenim illud barbarum de facili in Ovidii carminibus et in litteris Cicero-nis ad Atticum reperetur. quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas, sicut in quolibet habente sensum est appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit in eo intellectus; et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita suum velle.
[I.q.19.a.1.ad.1] Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Question 6, Article 3): for the end has the aspect of good.
[I.q.19.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt, et hoc per suam essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est. Finis enim habet rationem boni.
[I.q.19.a.1.ad.2] Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.
[I.q.19.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem; quae, licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et delectetur in illo; et quantum ad Rationem hanc nonnu impugnant, qui falsum reputant quod res ad formam per quam in actu constituitur tendat, quando eam formam non habet; si enim eam non habeat, res non est. Præterea inclinatio formam non præcedit sed sequitur. Hi non intellexerunt argumentationem doctoris Angelici ex forma nondum habente totam perfectionem sibi debitam ad quam tendit, non ex forma nullo modo habita procedere. Dei voluntas respectu effectus ab ipso sive ad intra sive ad extra procedentis potentiæ rationem habet.
[I.q.19.a.1.ad.3] A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.
[I.q.19.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas, cujus objectum principale est bonum quod est extra volentem, oportet quod sit mota ab alio; sed objectum divinæ voluntatis est bonitas sua, quæ est ejus essentia; unde cum voluntas Dei sit ejus essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus. Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet seipsum, ut jam supra.
Article 2
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.1] It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim divinum est ejus esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult aliud a se.
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.2] Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, volitum movet volentem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 54. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur ejus voluntas ab aliquo alio; quod est impossibile.
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.3] Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cuicumque volenti sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quærit extra illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas ejus ex ea satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.4] Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
[I.q.19.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, actus voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis ejus sit multiplex, et per consequens ejus esse, quod est ejus velle. Hoc autem est impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.
[I.q.19.a.2.sc] The Apostle says (1 Thessalonians 4:3): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."
[I.q.19.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I Thessalonic., iv, 3: Hæc est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra.
[I.q.19.a.2.co] God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above (Article 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.
[I.q.19.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se; quod apparet ex simili prius inducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni ut acquirat ipsum, cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo, cum habet; sed etiam ut proprium bonum in alia diffundat secundum quod possibile est. Unde videmus quod omne agens, in quantum est actu et perfectum, facit sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis su ut bonum quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et hoc præcipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua per quamdam similitudinem redundat omnis perfectio. Unde si res naturales, in quantum perfectæ sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis pertinet ad voluntatem divinam ut bonum suum aliis per similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur vult et se et alia, sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, in quantum condecet divinam bonitatem, etiam alia ipsam participare.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.1] The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (13, 4). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet divinum velle sit ejus esse secundum rem, tamen differt ratione secundum diversum modum intelligendi et significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico, Deum esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico, Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen aliquid aliud a se.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.2] In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in his quæ volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi su est finis; et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet in his quæ volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem; et hoc solum est quod movet ejus voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit nisi propter finem, qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem ejus nisi bonitas sua; et sic, sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a se vult volendo bonitatem suam.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.3] From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinæ sufficit sua bonitas, non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi ratione suæ bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus licet sit perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea cognoscit alia.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.4] As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.
[I.q.19.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non videt nisi in uno, ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas sua.
Article 3
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.1] It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit. 1. — 2. — 3. — 4. — 5. Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab aeterno vult, alias voluntas ejus esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.2] Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Deus vult alia a se in quantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.3] Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (2, 3). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium; quia Deus est per se necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult; quia in Deo nihil potest esse præter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 6. Ergo quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.4] Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, non necesse esse, et possibile non esse aquipollent. Si igitur non necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quæ vult, possibile est etiam eum non velle illud, et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult. Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet, et sic imperfecta; quia omne contingens est imperfectum.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.5] Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.5] 5. Præterea, ab eo quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit commentator, in Physic., text. 48. Si ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad affectum, et sic habet aliquam causam priorem.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.6] Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
[I.q.19.a.3.arg.6] 6. Præterea, quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina est ejus essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult ex necessitate vult.
[I.q.19.a.3.sc] The Apostle says (Ephesians 1:11): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
[I.q.19.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus, Eph., 1, 41: Qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suæ. Quod autem operam consilio voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate vult.
[I.q.19.a.3.co] There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
[I.q.19.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter; scilicet absolute, et ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute judicatur aliquid ex habitudine terminorum, utpote quia prædicatum est in definitione subjecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia subjectum est de ratione prædicati, sicut est hoc necessarium numerum esse parem, vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dicii necessarium ex suppositione; supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse est eum sedere, dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc considerandum est quod Deum velle aliquid volitum, scilicet seipsum est necessarium absolute; non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quæ vult. Voluntas enim divina necessarium habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quæ est proprium ejus objectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex necessitate vult, sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult beatitudinem; sicut et quælibet alia potentia necessarjam habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale objectum ut visus ad colorem, quia de sui ratione est ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a se Deus vult, in quantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem. Ea autem quæ sunt ad finem non ex necessitate volumus volentes' finem, nisi sint talia sine quibus finis esse non potest; sicut volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitæ; et navem, volentes transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde cum bonitas Dei sit et perfecta esse possit sine aliis; cum nihil ei perfectionis ex aliis accrescat, sequitur quod alia a se eum velle non sit necessarium absolute; et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione. Supposito enim quod velit non potest non velle, quia non potest voluntas ejus mutari.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.1] From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex hoc quod Deus vult ab aeterno quidquid vult, non sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex suppositione.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.2] Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non tamen ex necessitate vult ea quæ vult propter bonitatem suam, quia bonitas ejus potest esse sine aliis. At tertium dicendum, quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum quæ non ex necessitate vult; neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam, sed est voluntarium.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.3] It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.4] Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, In Parmensi: «et mutabile;» sed in cod. deest. Sic cod.; in Sic cod.; in quod est propter defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causæ. Sicut virtus solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quæ contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris, sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis. Et similiter quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quæ vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinæ, sed ex defectu qui competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale ut sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus consequitur omne bonum creatum.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.5] A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod causa quæ est ex se contingens, oportet quod determinatur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum; sed voluntas divina, quæ ex se necessitatem habet, determinat se ipsam ad volitum, ad quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.6] As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
[I.q.19.a.3.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum velle, et divinum scire; sed divinum scire habet necessariam habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita; quod ideo est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente; voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis. Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse, secundum quod sunt in Deo, non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis habent necessitatem absolutam, ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter hoc Deus quæcumque scit, ex necessitate scit; non autem quæcumque vult, ex necessitate vult.
Article 4
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.1] It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. 1 Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini, sed abbreviate. Corderius: « Quemadmodum enim sol ille noter non cogitatione aut voluntate, sed eo ipso quod est, illuminat universa quæ quoquo modo lucis ejus sunt capacia; sic etiam ipsum bonum (quod non secus præstat soli quam primæva species ima- Dicit enim Dionysius, cap. iv De divinis nominibus, § 1, col. 694, t. 4: « Sicut noter sol non ratiocinans aut præeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis divinæ radios. » Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et eligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem: ergo voluntas Dei non est causa rerum.
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.2] Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, id quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine; sicut in ordine ignitorum est primum quod est ignis per essentiam. Sed Deus est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quæ est natura ejus. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem; voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.3] Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quidquid est causa alicujus per hoc quod est tale, causa est per naturam, et non per voluntatem; ignis enim causa est calefactionis, quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I De doctrina christiana, cap. xxxii, col. 32, t. 3, quod « quia Deus bonus est sumus. » Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa rerum, et non per voluntatem.
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.4] Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (14, 8). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
[I.q.19.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, unius rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.
[I.q.19.a.4.sc] It is said (Wisdom 11:26), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"
[I.q.19.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Sapient., xi, 26: Quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu voluisses?
[I.q.19.a.4.co] We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature. This can be shown in three ways:
First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (7, 2). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.
[I.q.19.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturæ, ut quidam existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripli-citer. Primo quidem ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem agant intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physicorum, text. 49, necesse est ut agenti per naturam prædeterminentur finis et media necessaria ad finem ab aliquo superiori intellectu, sicut sagittæ prædeterminatur finis gini obscuræ) ipsamet substantia sua, rebus omnibus, pro cujusque captu, totius bonitatis suæ radios affundit. » 2 In Arnoldistæ Deum agere ex necessitate naturæ dixerunt. et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem sit prius agente per naturam. Unde cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat; quia natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur; et hoc ideo, quia secundum quod est tale agit; unde quamdiu est tale, non facit nisi tale; omne enim agens per naturam habet esse determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod agat per necessitatem naturæ, nisi forte causaret aliquid indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturæ, sed effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt secundum determina-tionem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod præexistunt in ea; quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Præexistunt autem effectus in causa secundum modum causæ. Unde cum esse divinum sit ipsum ejus intelligere, præexistunt in eo effectus ejus secundum modum intelligibilem; unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo, et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis. Nam inclinatio ejus ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem. Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.1] Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum scilicet non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quamdam importat.
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.2] Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia essentia Dei est ejus intelligere et velle, ex hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum intellectus et voluntatis.
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.3] Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (2, ad 2).
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum est objectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo dicitur quod « quia Deus bonus est sumus, » in quantum sua bonitas est ei ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.4] Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these things are one.
[I.q.19.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod unius et ejusdem effectus etiam in nobis est causa scientia ut dirigens, quia concipitur forma operis; et voluntas ut imperans; quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis. Sed hæc omnia in Deo unum sunt.
Article 5
[I.q.19.a.5.arg.1] It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.
[I.q.19.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntatis divinæ sit assignare aliquam causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xlvi, col. 30, t. 6: « Quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? » Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.
[I.q.19.a.5.arg.2] Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown (4). If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.
[I.q.19.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in his quæ fiunt a volente, qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult, non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur voluntatis ejus non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus rebus naturalibus aliam causam quærere nisi solam voluntatem divinam; et sic omnes scientiæ essent supervacuæ, quæ causas aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur; quod videtur inconveniens. Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinæ.
[I.q.19.a.5.arg.3] Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
[I.q.19.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quod fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici voluntate ejus. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam, sequitur quod 1 Sed « modus » in cod. est. 2 Hic doctor Angelicus inquirit solummodo utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum; non autem inquirit utrum prima causa sit. De hoc ultimo temporibus ex antiquis Thomistæ cum Scotistis disceptationem magnam habent, primi primam causam esse intellectum, Scotistæ vero esse voluntatem contendentes. Nos Thomistis libenter adhæ-remus quia, ut nobis videtur, primo semper ab intellectu, Deus nil irrationabiliter agens, nil nisi propter finem agens, incipere debet. omnia quæ fiunt, dependeant ex simplici ejus voluntate, et non habeant aliquam causam aliam, quod est inconveniens.
[I.q.19.a.5.sc] Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
[I.q.19.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xxviii, col. 18, t. 6: « Omnis causa efficiens major est eo quod efficitur; nihil autem majus est voluntate Dei. Non ergo causa ejus quærenda est. »
[I.q.19.a.5.co] In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.
[I.q.19.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem modo contingit esse causam alicujus volentis, ut velit, et alicujus intelligentis, ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est, quod si seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem, intelligentia principii est causa scientiæ conclusionis. Sed si intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non esset causa sui ipsius; sed tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quæ sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quæ sunt ad finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quæ sunt ad finem. Sed, si uno actu velit finem et ea quæ sunt ad finem, hoc esse non poterit: quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum dicere quod ea quæ sunt ad finem, velit ordinari in finem. Deus autem sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde sicut in Deo intelligere causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quæ sunt ad finem; sed tamen vult ea quæ sunt ad finem ordinari in finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult.
[I.q.19.a.5.ad.1] The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.
[I.q.19.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi, sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud.
[I.q.19.a.5.ad.2] Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."
[I.q.19.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis certis provenient, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est supervacuum etiam cum voluntate Dei alias causas quærere. Esset tamen supervacuum, si aliæ causæ quærentur ut primæ, et non dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus, in III De Trinit., cap II, col. 871, t. 8: « Placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis effectus contingentes tribuere; cum omnino videre non possent superiorem cæteris omnibus causam, id est voluntatem Dei. »
[I.q.19.a.5.ad.3] Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.
[I.q.19.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas, quicumque effectus præsupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio; sed primi effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent; utpote si dicamus quod Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deserviret intellectui operando diversa opera et voluit eum habere intellectum ad hoc quod esset homo; et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel ad complementum universi. Quæ quidem non est reducere ad alios fines creatos ulteriores. Unde hujusmodi dependent ex simplici voluntate Dei; alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.
Article 6
[I.q.19.a.6.arg.1] It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Timothy 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
[I.q.19.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Tim., II, 4, quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire. Sed hoc non ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impleatur.
[I.q.19.a.6.arg.2] Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
[I.q.19.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit; multa enim bona possunt fieri, quæ non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei semper impleatur. Augustini textus sic habet: « Omnis causa efficiens est. Omne autem efficiens majus est quam id quod efficitur. Nihil autem, » etc. In Ita codd.; sed in edit: « propter hoc vult hoc. » Hic de causa Deo ipso extranea D. Thomas loquitur.
[I.q.19.a.6.arg.3] Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
[I.q.19.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut dictum est. Sed effectus causæ primæ potest impediri per defectum causæ secundæ, sicut effectus virtutis motivæ impeditur propter debilitatem tibiæ. Ergo et effectus divinæ voluntatis potest impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum; non ergo voluntas Dei semper impletur.
[I.q.19.a.6.sc] It is said (Psalm 13:11): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."
[I.q.19.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in ps. cxiii, 3: Omnia quæcumque voluit Deus fecit.
[I.q.19.a.6.co] The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.
[I.q.19.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus quæ est in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma universali nihil deficere potest. Potest enim esse aliquid, quod non est homo vel vivum: non autem potest esse aliquid, quod non sit ens. Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet: potest enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicujus causæ particularis agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicujus causæ universalis, sub qua omnes causæ particulares comprehenduntur. Quod si aliqua causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam aliam causam particularem impedientem, quæ continetur sub ordine causæ universalis. Unde effectus ordinationem causæ universalis nullo modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum; sed tamen quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas medias in universalem virtutem primi cæli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam secundum alium; sicut peccator, qui quantum est in se recedit a divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinæ voluntatis, dum per ejus justitiam punitur.
[I.q.19.a.6.ad.1] The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways.
First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will."
Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.
Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
[I.q.19.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud verbum Apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit accommodata distributio secundum hunc sensum: Deus vult salvos fieri omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit quem non velit salvum fieri, ut dicit Augustinus, in Enchirid., cap. cii, col. 280, t. 6. Secundo, potest intelligi, ut fiat distributio pro generibus singulorum et non pro singulis generum, secundum hunc sensum. Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos fieri, mares et feminas, Judeos et Gentiles, parvos et magnos, non tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum, lib. II De orthod. fid., cap xxix, col. 970, t. 4, intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate consequente. Quæ quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius voluntatis divinæ in qua nihil est prius vel posterius, sed ex parte volitorum. Ad cujus intellectum sciendum est quod unumquodque secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo. Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum: quod tamen prout cum aliquo adjuncto consideratur, quæ est consequens consideratio ejus, e contrario se habet: sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem; sed si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida vel vivens in periculum multitudinis; sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum vivere; unde potest dici quod judex justus antecedenter vult omnem hominem vivere, sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari, sed consequenter vult quosdam damnari secundum exigentiam suæ justitiæ. Neque tamen id quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quod in seipsis sunt: in seipsis autem sunt in particulari. Unde simpliciter volumus aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde potest dici quod judex justus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi, sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet in quantum est homo. Unde magis potest dici velleitas quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit, licet illud quod antecedenter vult, non fiat.
[I.q.19.a.6.ad.2] An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.
[I.q.19.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod actus cognoscitivæ virtutis est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivæ est ordinatus ad res secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo, sed non totum existit in rebus creatis: et ideo Deus cognoscit omne verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi in quantum vult se, in quo virtualiter omne bonum existit.
[I.q.19.a.6.ad.3] A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.
[I.q.19.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per defectum causæ secundæ, quando non est universaliter prima, sub se omnes causas comprehendens; quia sic effectus nullo modo posset suum ordinem evadere; et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum est.
Article 7
[I.q.19.a.7.arg.1] It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (Genesis 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.
[I.q.19.a.7.arg.2] Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jeremiah 18:7-8) Therefore God has a changeable will.
[I.q.19.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Jerem., xviii, 7, ex persona Domini dicitur: Loquar adversus gentem et adversus regnum ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed* si pœnitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego pœnitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei. Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.
[I.q.19.a.7.arg.3] Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.
[I.q.19.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem facit; nam quandoque præcepit legalia observari, quandoque prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.
[I.q.19.a.7.arg.4] Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before (3). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.
[I.q.19.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Deus non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita, est mutabile; sicut quod potest esse et non esse est mutabile secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse et non esse hic, est mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum voluntatem.
[I.q.19.a.7.sc] It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Numbers 23:19).
[I.q.19.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Num., xxiii, 19: Non est Deus quasi homo, ut mentiatur, nec ut filius hominis, ut mutetur.
[I.q.19.a.7.co] The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (9, 1; 14, 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
[I.q.19.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc considerandum est quod aliud est mutare voluntatem, et aliud est velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis eadem voluntate immobiliter permanente velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur si aliquis inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi præsupposita mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo si de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum, quod non est absque mutatione ejus; sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo si de novo cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset. Ad hoc enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est autem supra, quod tam substantia Dei, quam ejus scientia est omnino immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem ejus omnino esse immutabilem.
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.1] These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had made.
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud verbum Domini metaphorice intelligendum est secundum similitudinem nostram. Cum enim nos pœnitet, destruimus quod fecimus; quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis; cum etiam aliquis homo absque mutatione voluntatis interdum velit aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur Deus pœnituisse dicitur secundum similitudinem operis, in quantum hominem, quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terræ delevit.
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.2] The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (Isaiah 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"--that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus producantur. Sed quia omnes causæ medias non adæquant virtutem causæ primæ, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate divina, quæ non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum, Ita codd. Alcan., Camer., Rom. et Tarrac., quibus concinunt Nicolaï et Patav.; edit. Rom.: « vountatis. » Edit.: « sic quod de novo, » et idem infra. sicut resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores dicere poterat: Lazarus non resurget; respiciens vero ad causam primam divinam poterat dicere: Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quando sit futurum secundum causas inferiores, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam superiorem, vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod Deus aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum secundum quod continetur in ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturæ, vel meritorum, quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa superiori divina. Sicut cum prædixit Ezechiae: Dispone domui tuæ, quia morieris* et non vives, ut habetur Isaiæ, xxxviii, 4; neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab æterno aliter fuit in scientia et voluntate divina, quæ immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit Gregorius, Moral., lib. XVI, cap. x, col. 1127, t. 2, quod « Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat consilium, » scilicet voluntatis suæ. Quod ergo dicit: Pœnitentiam agam et ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum; nam homines, quando non implent quod comminati sunt, pœnitere videntur.
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.3] It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat mutabilem voluntatem, sed quod mutationem velit.
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.4] Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (Article 3).
[I.q.19.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione propter immutationem divinæ voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.
Article 8
[I.q.19.a.8.arg.1] It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
[I.q.19.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchir., cap. cii, col. 280, t. 6: « Nullus fit salvus, nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit; quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit. »
[I.q.19.a.8.arg.2] Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Romans 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.
[I.q.19.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis causa quæ non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum producit; quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic., text. 84. Sed voluntas Dei non potest impediri; dicit enim Apostolus ad. Rom., ix, 19: Voluntati enim ejus quis resistit? Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis necessitatem.
[I.q.19.a.8.arg.3] Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely.
[I.q.19.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute; sicut animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed res creatæ a Deo comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem: cum hæc conditionalis sit vera: « Si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; » omnis autem conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.
[I.q.19.a.8.sc] All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
[I.q.19.a.8.sc] Sed contra, omnia bona quæ fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur ejus voluntas imponat rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate eveniunt; et sic perit liberum arbitrium, et consilium, et omnia hujusmodi.
[I.q.19.a.8.co] The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent. This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect.
Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
[I.q.19.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non autem omnibus. Cujus quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex causis mediis; quia ea quæ producit per causas necessarias, sunt necessaria, ea vero quæ producit per causas contingentes, sunt contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum propter duo. Primo quidem, quia effectus alicujus primæ causæ est contingens propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causæ primæ per defectum causæ secundæ; sicut virtus solis per defectum plantæ impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causæ secundæ impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo, quia si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse præter intentionem et voluntatem divinam; quod est inconveniens. Sic cod.; sed edit.: « causam inferiore. » Porro causæ inferiores sunt plures. Deus etsi plerumque mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam. » Al.; « immutabilitatem. » Et ideo melius dicendum est, quod hoc contingit per efficaciam divinæ voluntatis. Cum enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur causam, non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed secundum modum fiendi, vel essendi. Ex debilitate enim virtutis activæ in semine contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus quæ pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quæ Deus vult fieri, sed quod eo modo fiant quo Deus fieri vult. Vult autem Deus quædam fieri necessario, quædam contingenter, ut sit ordo in rebus ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus aptavit causas necessarias, quæ deficere non possunt, ex quibus effectus de necessitate provenirent, quibusdam aptavit causas contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingentes eveniant. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo eveniunt contingenter, quia causæ proximæ sunt contingentes, sed propterea quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad eos præparavit.
[I.q.19.a.8.ad.1] By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
[I.q.19.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo non absoluta, sed conditionalis: necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse: si Deus hoc vult, necesse est hoc esse.
[I.q.19.a.8.ad.2] From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
[I.q.19.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinæ resistit, sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quæ Deus vult fieri, sed quod fiant contingenter vel necessario, quæ sic fieri vult.
[I.q.19.a.8.ad.3] Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.
[I.q.19.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus secundum modum priorum. Unde et ea quæ fiunt a voluntate divina, talem necessitatem habent qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet vel absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic non omnia sunt necessaria absolute.
Article 9
[I.q.19.a.9.arg.1] It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.
[I.q.19.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est; dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchir., cap. xcv1, col. 276, t. 6: « Quamvis ea quæ mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen ut non solum sint bona, sed etiam ut sint mala, bonum est fieri. » Ergo Deus vult mala.
[I.q.19.a.9.arg.2] Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
[I.q.19.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dicit Dionysius, De div. nom., cap. iv, § 19, col. 718, t. 4: « Erit malum ad omnis; » id est universi, « perfectionem conferens; » et Augustinus dicit in Enchir., cap. x et x1, col. 236, t. 6: « Ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabiliora sint dum comparantur malis. » Sed Deus vult omne illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult mala.
[I.q.19.a.9.arg.3] Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
[I.q.19.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, mala fieri et non fieri sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quædam fiant, non semper voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala fieri.
[I.q.19.a.9.sc] Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.
[I.q.19.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., q. 11, col. 41, t. 6: « Nullo sapiente homine auctore fit homo deterior. Est autem Deus omni sapiente homine præstantior. Multo igitur minus Deo auctore fit aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore fit aliquid, quod fit illo volente. » Non ergo volente Deo fit homo deterior. Constat autem quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult mala.
[I.q.19.a.9.co] Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (5, 1), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
[I.q.19.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum ratio boni 1 2 In 3 In 4 Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius: « Malum hoc modo ad universi plenitudinem conducet, ac per se faciet, ut rerum universitas non sit imperfecta. » 5 « Nullo sapiente homine auctore fit homo deterior. Non enim parva ista culpa est, imo tanta est quæ in sapientem quem vis hominem cadere nequeat. Est autem Deus omni homine sapiente præstantior. Multo enim præstantior Dei voluntas, quam hominis sapientis est. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur. Est ergo vitium voluntatis quo est homo deterior: quod vitium si longe abest a Dei voluntate, ut ratio docet, in quo sit quærendum est. » 6 In sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est, malum autem opponatur bono, impossibile est quod aliquid malum, in quantum hujusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum appetitur per accidens, in quantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum: et hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit privationem vel corruptionem, sed formam, cui conjungitur privatio alterius formæ; et generationem unius, quæ est corruptio alterius. Leo etiam occidens cervum intendit cibum, cui conjungitur occisio animalis; similiter fornicator intendit delectationem, cui conjungitur deformitas culpæ. Malum autem quod conjungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui conjungitur malum magis appeteretur quam quoddam aliud bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem; vult tamen aliquod bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpæ, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum Deus nullo modo vult; sed malum naturalis defectus, vel malum pœnæ vult, volendo aliquod bonum cui conjungitur tale malum; sicut volendo justitiam vult pœnam, et volendo ordinem naturæ salvari, vult quædam naturaliter corrumpi.
[I.q.19.a.9.ad.1] Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.
[I.q.19.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult tamen mala esse vel fieri; quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quæ in se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum: quem quidem ordinem importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur mala esse vel fieri. Sed hoc non recte dici videtur, quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se, sed per accidens. Præter intentionem enim peccantis est quod ex hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut præter intentionem tyrannorum fuit quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum. Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ad bonum importetur per hoc quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum: quia nihil judicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed secundum illud quod competit ei per se.
[I.q.19.a.9.ad.2] Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
[I.q.19.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem vel decorem universi, nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit Dionysius, quod « malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens, » concludit ducendo quasi ad inconveniens.
[I.q.19.a.9.ad.3] The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
[I.q.19.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, licet mala fieri et mala non fieri, contradictorie opponantur, tamen velle mala fieri et velle mala non fieri non opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus enim neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri, et hoc est bonum.
Article 10
[I.q.19.a.10.arg.1] It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."
[I.q.19.a.10.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam voluntatem ponantur quinque signa; scilicet « prohibitio, præceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. » Nam eadem quæ nobis præcipit Deus, vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur; et eadem quæ prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito dividi.
[I.q.19.a.10.arg.2] Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said (9). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
[I.q.19.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil Deus operatur nisi volens, ut dicitur Sapient., xi. Sed voluntas signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo « operatio » sub voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.
[I.q.19.a.10.sc] Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."
[I.q.19.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, in lib. II De fide, cap. vi, § 48, col. 592, t. 3: « Spiritus sanctus dividit singulis prout vult, id est, pro libero voluntatis arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio. » Sic cod.; et rectius quam edit. ubi deest « quod-dam aliud. » Sic cod.; sed Parm. et edit. habent: « quia licet mala non sint bona, bonum tamen est mala esse, vel fieri. » Ita omnes fere edit. — Nicolaï: « Dixit: bonum est mala esse vel fieri. » Anthropomorphitæ, Audeani, et Manes Deum dixerunt nec ignem nec tenebras creasse; Colluthus, parochus alexandrinus, qui sese retractavit, Deum nec homines malos, nec hujus vitæ pœnas et afflictiones produxisse; Calvinus, Melanctho et alii Deum esse malorum et peccatorum auctorem.
[I.q.19.a.10.co] We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (Article 3), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
[I.q.19.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hujusmodi signa dicuntur ea quibus consuevimus demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se velle aliquid vel per seipsum vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem, in quantum facit aliquid vel directe, vel indirecte et per accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur; et quantum ad hoc dicitur esse signum « operatio. » Indirecte autem, in quantum non impedit operantem; nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic., text. 32. Et quantum ad hoc dicitur signum « permissio. » Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle, in quantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum, vel necessaria inductione, quod fit præcipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad « consilium. » Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid, propter ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis divinæ, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim « præceptum, consilium et probitio » dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur Matth., vi, 10: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in cælo et in terra. Quod autem « permissio » vel « operatio » dicantur Dei voluntas patet per Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchir., cap. xcv, col. 276, t. 6: « Nihil fit, nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo. » Vel potest dici quod « permissio et operatio » referantur ad præsens; « permissio » quidem ad malum, « operatio » vero ad bonum; ad futurum vero « prohibitio » respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, « præceptum; » respectu vero superabundantis boni, « consilium. »
[I.q.19.a.10.ad.1] Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.
[I.q.19.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil prohibet circa eamdem rem aliquem diversimode declarare se aliquid velle; sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subjacere præcepto et operationi et prohibitioni vel permissioni.
[I.q.19.a.10.ad.2] Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
[I.q.19.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta; ita potest metaphorice significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem præceptum, vel consilium; tum quia hæc est de præsenti, illud de futuro, tum quia hæc per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem per alium, ut dictum est.
Article 11
[I.q.19.a.11.arg.1] It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
[I.q.19.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia. Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinæ scientiæ. Ergo neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinæ voluntatis.
[I.q.19.a.11.arg.2] Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
[I.q.19.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne signum quod non concordat ei cujus est signum, est falsum. Si igitur signa quæ assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non concordant divinæ voluntati, sunt falsa; si autem concordant, superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa voluntatem divinam assignanda.
[I.q.19.a.11.sc] The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Psalm 110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.
[I.q.19.a.11.sc] Sed contra est quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia; quandoque autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, psalm. cx, 2: Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates ejus. Ergo oportet quod aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.
[I.q.19.a.11.co] Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (13, 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Matthew 6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.
[I.q.19.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in Deo quædam dicuntur proprie, et quædam secundum metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquæ passiones humanæ in divinam prædicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit secundum similitudinem effectus. Unde illud quod est signum talis passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice significatur. Sicut apud nos irati punire consueverunt; unde ipsa punitio est signum iræ; et propter hoc ipsa punitio nomine iræ significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas dicitur, sicut cum aliquis præcipit aliquid, signum est quod velit illud fieri. Unde præceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth., vi, 10: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in cælo et in terra. Sed hoc distat inter voluntatem et iram; quia ira de rabile est, quod immutabilitati et simplicitati Dei est contrarium; si posterius, ergo per eam liber Dei actus constitui non potest. Ideo solutio illa nec communior, nec antiquor inter Thomistas est. Quibusdam probabilis, quibusdam non improbabilis, a pluribus, inter quos Contenson et Goudin eminent, impugnatur. Hi, D. Thomæ positionem retinentes, nodum aliter dirimunt: illa terminatio est ipse actus divinus comparatus et terminatus ad Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in suo principali intellectu includat passionem; voluntas autem proprie de Deo dicitur; et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas proprie et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta vocatur voluntas beneplaciti; voluntas autem metaphorice dicta est voluntas signi; eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas dicitur.
[I.q.19.a.11.ad.1] Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.
[I.q.19.a.11.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod scientia non est causa eorum quæ fiunt, nisi per voluntatem; non enim quæ scimus, facimus, nisi velimus; et ideo signum non attribuitur scientiæ, sicut attribuitur voluntati.
[I.q.19.a.11.ad.2] Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.
[I.q.19.a.11.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinæ, non quia sunt signa quod Deus velit; sed quia ea quæ in nobis solent esse signa volendi, in Deo divinæ voluntates dicuntur; sicut punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira; sed punitio, eo ipso quod in nobis est signum iræ, in Deo dicitur ira.
Article 12
[I.q.19.a.12.arg.1] It seems that five expressions of will--namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission--are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
[I.q.19.a.12.arg.2] Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (Wisdom 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.
[I.q.19.a.12.arg.3] Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.
[I.q.19.a.12.arg.4] Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil--namely, prohibition--and two--namely, counsel and precept--in the case of good.
[I.q.19.a.12.co] By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of Matthew 6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."
Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.
[I.q.19.a.12.ad.1] There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.
[I.q.19.a.12.ad.2] As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
[I.q.19.a.12.ad.3] Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.
[I.q.19.a.12.ad.4] All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
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