Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q23. Predestination
Source context
- Theme
- divine election, foreknowledge, and the ordering of rational creatures to eternal life
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 13, chapter 6Steiner argues that foreknowledge and predestination of future cosmic conditions are compatible with human freedom, because free action in the future depends on inner capacities that are themselves in the process of becoming, not on an external decree.
- GA 270, 1924-05-02Steiner treats certain lines of a human life-path as karmically predestined while maintaining that free spiritual striving operates within and alongside that predestination.
Cross-tradition
- Calvinist Reformed theology (Westminster Confession, 1646)The double-predestination formulation — some elect to life, others foreordained to death — presents a structurally sharper form of the same divine-will problematic that Aquinas resolves through the distinction between predestination and reprobation, and is quoted as a doctrinal foil in GA 41b.
- Islamic Ash'arite kalam (qadar / qada')Cross-tradition congruence appears in the Ash'arite doctrine that God's eternal decree encompasses all acts while human 'acquisition' (kasb) preserves a formal category of moral responsibility — a structurally analogous tension to Aquinas's reconciliation of divine providence with secondary causation.
- Stoic fate (heimarmenê) and providential orderThe Stoic account of rational nature participating in universal logos-governed fate offers a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that predestination is part of providence, both treating alignment with a cosmic rational order as the condition of the highest good.
Q23. Predestination
Article 1
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.1] It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away.
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homines non prædestinentur a Deo. Dicit enim Damascenus, in II lib. Orth. fid., cap. xxx, col. 974, t. 4: « Oportet cognoscere quod omnia quidem præcognoscit Deus, non Differunt prædestinatio, electio et vocatio: vocatio est ad finem, electio est præoptatio alicujus ad finem, prædestinatio est præparatio finis alicui; in Dei intentione prædestinatio electioni et vocationi præintelligitur; in executione vocatio prior est. Prædestinatio proprie futurum in prædestinato connotat, et non convenit nisi viatoribus; sed si pro fuisse prædestinatum in communi accipiatur, etiam angelis et beatis convenit. Prædestinationem negarunt pagani, Valentinus, Basilides, Marcionitæ, Manichæi, Pelagiani, Semipelagiani, etc. Origenes eam sicut et reprobationem a factis quae animæ nondum corporibus unitæ ante mundum conditum gesserant, dependere finxit. Molina, Suarez et quidam ejusdem scholæ theologi saltem fieri potuisse docent, ut per communem providentiam plures salutem consequerentur aeternam; contendunt igitur prædestinationem non esse necessariam ad salutem, quamvis de facto, propter expressa Patrum et Scripturæ sacræ testimonia, eam ut certam et infallibilem admittant. Ambrosius Catharinus B. Virginem, apostolos, et quosdam alios insignes sanctitate viros prædestinari, alios non per prædestinationem voluit salvari, sed per solam generalem Dei providentiam supernaturalem, ac antecedentem voluntatem omnes salvandi homines. Tournely tamen Cathari-num assertit non absolute prædestinationem, sed hanc solummodo a prævisis meritis independen-tem negasse. Quidquid sit, juxta Scholasticos communiter, nullus absque prædestinatione salvari potest. Quæritur utrum sit aliquid ex parte hominis, quodcumque sit, cujus intuitu Deus, cæteris tandem perituris, aliquos præ aliis diligit, et ad salutem perducendos eligit? Notus est error Origenis. Manichæi quosdam natura bonos, quosdam natura malos dicebant: Inde prædestinatio et reprobatio. Pelagiani gratiam excludentes merita propriis viribus comparata causam prædestinationis facie-bant. Semipelagiani gratiae necessitatem agnos-centes initium et præparationem a nobis esse contendebant, et pro causa prædestinationis habe-bant prævisionem perseverantiae usque in finem in accepta gratia, propria libertate, absque dono perseverantiae speciali. Addebant Deum decrevisse autem omnia prædeterminat. Præcognoscit enim ea quæ in nobis sunt, non autem prædeterminat ea. » Sed merita et demerita humana sunt in nobis, in quantum sumus nostrorum actuum domini per liberum arbitrium. Ea ergo quæ pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum non prædestinantur a Deo; et sic hominum prædestinatio tollitur.
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.2] Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (22, 1, 2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnes creaturæ ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut supra dictum est. Sed aliæ creaturæ non dicuntur prædestinari a Deo. Ergo nec homines.
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.3] Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [See 22, 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed angelis non competit prædestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit miseria; prædestinatio autem est propositum miserendi, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo homines non prædestinatur.
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.4] Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
[I.q.23.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, beneficia hominibus a Deo collata per Spiritum sanctum viris sanctis revelantur, secundum illud Apostoli, I Cor., 11, 12: Nos autem non spiritum hujus mundi accepimus, sed Spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quæ a Deo donata sunt nobis. Si ergo homines prædestinarentur a Deo, cum prædestinatio sit Dei beneficium, esset prædestinatis nota sua prædestinatio; quod patet esse falsum.
[I.q.23.a.1.sc] It is written (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."
[I.q.23.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., viii, 30: Quos prædestinavit, hos et vocavit.
[I.q.23.a.1.co] It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Question 22, Article 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (22, 1, 2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (Question 12, Article 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
[I.q.23.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deum conveniens est homines prædestinare. Omnia enim divinæ providentiae subjacent, ut supra ostensum est. Ad providentiam autem pertinet res in finem ordinare, ut dictum est. Finis autem ad quem res creatæ ordinantur est duplex. Unus, qui excedit proportionem naturæ creatæ et facultatem; et hic finis est se iis gratiam dare quos se ad illam naturaliter initialibus operibus præparatus præviderat. Ex prævisione bonorum vel malorum operum quæ fecissent si vixissent, Deus parvulos præmature morientes vel prædestinabat, vel reprobabat. — Dixerunt alii Deum dare et se gratiam daturum prædestinasse iis quos bene gratia usuros præsci-vit. — Docent alii moderni ex prævisis gratia meritis prædestinationem esse, differenter tamen; nam juxta Lessium, Molinam, Becanum, et plures ex Societate, prædestinatio ad gratiam communem prædestinatis et reprobis gratuita est; prædestinatio vero ad gloriam est ex præviso bono usu gratia; juxta Congruistas communiter, prædestinatio ad gratiam propriam electis et salvantem gratuita est, ad gloriam ex prævisis gratia meritis est. Ultima sententia communior in scholis antiquis prævita aeterna, quæ in divina visione consistit; quæ est supra naturam cujuslibet creaturæ, ut supra habitum est. Alius autem finis est naturæ proportionatus, quem scilicet res creata potest contingere secundum virtu-tem suæ naturæ. Ad illud autem ad quod non potest aliquid virtute suæ naturæ per-venire, oportet quod ab alio transmittatur, sicut sagitta a sagittante mittitur ad signum. Unde, proprie loquendo, rationalis creatura quæ est capax vitæ aeternæ, perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo transmissa. Cujus quidem transmissionis ratio in Deo præexistit, sicut et in eo est ratio ordinis omnium in finem, quam diximus esse providentiam. Ratio autem alicujus fiendi in mente actoris existens, est quædam præexistentia rei fiendæ in eo. Unde ratio prædictæ transmissionis creaturæ rationalis in finem vitæ aeternæ, prædestinatio nominatur; nam destinare est mittere. Et sic patet quod prædestinatio, quantum ad objecta, est quædam pars providentiae.
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.1] Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Damascenus nominat prædestinationem impositionem necessitatis; sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quæ sunt determinatæ ad unum. Quod patet ex eo quod subdit: « Non enim vult malitiam, neque compellit virtutem. » Unde prædestinatio non excluditur.
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.2] Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod creaturæ irrationales non sunt capaces illius finis qui facultatem humanæ naturæ excedit. Unde non proprie dicuntur prædestinari, etsi aliquando abusive prædestinatio nominetur respectu cujuscumque alterius finis.
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.3] Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (21, 3 and 4).
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod prædestinari convenit angelis, sicut et hominibus, licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Nihil enim refert, quantum Quoad reprobationem, omnes catholici contra Calvinum et Prædestinatianos ex prævisis demeritis esse dicunt tam angelorum quam hominum reprobationem positivam. Sententiam contrariam Scotus non posse sine crudelitate excogitari asse-rit; illam Catharinus horribilem, Wiguerius justitiæ divinæ repugnantem vocat. — Non « prædeterminationem, » ut in editis, quia S. Thomas et sciebat et aperte ab omnibus videri credebat, quod in textu Damasceni « prædeterminat » nil aliud dicit quam « prædestinat. » Sic cod. in edit.: « prædeterminatæ. » « Nec etiam malitiam patrari vult; nec rursus virtuti vim affert. » ad rationem dealbationis, utrum ille qui dealbatur fuerit niger, aut pallidus vel rubeus; et similiter nihil refert ad rationem prædestinationis, utrum aliquis destinetur in vitam æternam a statu miseriæ, vel non. Quamvis dici possit quod omnis collatio boni supra debitum ejus cui confertur, ad misericordiam pertinet, ut supra dictum est.
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.4] Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
[I.q.23.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, etiamsi aliquibus ex speciali privilegio sua prædestinatio reveletur, non tamen convenit ut reveletur omnibus; quia sic illi qui non sunt prædestinati desperarent, et securitas in prædestinatis negligentiam pareret.
Article 2
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.1] It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prædestinatio ponat aliquid in prædestinato. Omnis enim actio ex se passionem infert. Si ergo prædestinatio actio est in Deo, oportet quod prædestinatio passio sit in prædestinatis.
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.2] Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (Romans 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Origenes dicit super illud Rom., 1, v. 4: Qui prædestinatus est, etc., col. 849, t. 4: « Prædestinatio ejus est qui non est, sed destinatio ejus est qui est; » sed Augustinus dicit, in lib. De prædestinatione sanctorum: « Quid est prædestinatio nisi destinatio alicujus existentis. » Ergo prædestinatio non est nisi alicujus existentis; et ita ponit aliquid in prædestinato.
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.3] Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præparatio est aliquid in præparato. Sed prædestinatio est « præparatio beneficiorum Dei, » ut dicit Augustinus, in lib. De dono persever., cap. xiv, col. 1014, § 35, t. 40. Ergo prædestinatio est aliquid in prædestinatis.
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.4] Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.
[I.q.23.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, temporale non ponitur in definitione æterni. Sed gratia, quæ est aliquid temporale, ponitur in definitione prædestinationis; nam prædestinatio dicitur esse præparatio gratiae in præsenti, et gloriæ in futuro. Ergo prædestinatio non est aliquid æternum: et ita oportet quod non sit in Deo, sed in prædestinatis; nam quidquid est in Deo est æternum.
[I.q.23.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.
[I.q.23.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, lib. De dono perseverantia, cap. xiv, col. 1014, § 35, t. 10, quod prædestinatio est « præscientia beneficiorum Dei. » Sed præscientia non est in præscitis, sed in præsciente. Ergo nec prædestinatio est in prædestinatis, sed in prædestinante.
[I.q.23.a.2.co] Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Question 22, Article 1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
[I.q.23.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prædestinatio non est aliquid in prædestinatis, sed in prædestinante tantum. Dictum est enim quod prædestinatio est quædam pars providentiæ. Providentia autem non est in rebus provisis, sed est quædam ratio in intellectu provisoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed executio providentiæ, quæ gubernatio dicitur, passive quidem est in gubernatis, active autem est in gubernante. Unde manifestum est quod prædestinatio est quædam ratio ordinis aliquorum in salutem æternam in mente divina existens; executio autem hujus ordinis est passive quidem in prædestinatis, active autem est in Deo. Est autem executio prædestinationis vocatio, et magnificatio, secundum illud Apostoli, Rom., viii, 30: Quos prædestinavit, hos et vocavit, et quos vocavit, hos et magnificavit⁺.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.1] Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion--for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (14, 2; 18, 3, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes inferunt ex se passionem, ut calefactio et siccatio, non autem actiones in agente manentes, ut sunt intelligere et velle, ut supra dictum est; et talis actio est prædestinatio. Unde prædestinatio non ponit aliquid in prædestinatis, sed executio ejus quæ transit in exteriores res, ponit in eis aliquem effectum.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.2] Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Maccabees 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod destinatio aliquando sumitur pro reali missione alicujus ad aliquem terminum; et sic destinatio non est nisi ejus quod est. Alio modo sumitur destinatio pro missione quam aliquis mente concipit, secundum quod dicimur destinare quod mente firmiter proponimus. Et hoc modo dicitur in II Mach., vi, 20, quod Eleazarus destinavit non admit- — « Destinatur enim ille qui est, prædestinatur vero ille qui nondum est. » Non inventur in lib. De prædestinatione sanctorum, nec in libro De dono perseverantia, ut olim notabatur ad marginem. Liber De dono perseverantia, de quo sumpta est auctoritas prædicta, a veteribus dicebatur liber II De prædestinatione sanctorum, sub quo nomine a Nicolaï et ab editione parmensi notatur: nobis autem lex est nomen ab editore Migne adoptatum referre. tere illicita propter vitæ amorem. Et sic destinatio potest esse ejus quod non est. Tamen prædestinatio ratione antecessionis quam importat, potest esse ejus quod non est, qualitercumque ejus destinatio sumatur.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.3] Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est præparatio. Quædam patientis, ut patiatur, et hæc præparatio est in præparato. Alia est præparatio agentis, ut agat, et hæc est in agente; et talis præparatio est prædestinatio, prout aliquod agens per intellectum dicitur se præparare ad agendum, in quantum præconcipit rationem operis fiendi. Et sic Deus ab æterno præparavit prædestinando, concipiens rationem ordinis aliquorum in salutem.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.4] Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.
[I.q.23.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod gratia non ponitur in definitione prædestinationis, quasi aliquid existens de essentia ejus, sed in quantum prædestinatio importat respectum ad gratiam, ut causæ ad effectum, et actus ad objectum. Unde non sequitur quod prædestinatio sit aliquid temporale.
Article 3
[I.q.23.a.3.arg.1] It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wisdom 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
[I.q.23.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. Nullus enim reprobat quem diligit. Sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum illud Sapientia, xi, 25: Diligis omnia quæ sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quæ fecisti. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat.
[I.q.23.a.3.arg.2] Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (Hosea 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate any man.
[I.q.23.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat reprobatio ad reprobatos, sicut prædestinatio ad prædestinatos. Sed prædestinatio est causa salutis prædestinatorum. Ergo reprobatio erit causa perditionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum; dicitur enim Oseæ, xiii, 9: Perditio tua Israel*, ex te est; tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.
[I.q.23.a.3.arg.3] Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Ecclesiastes 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.
[I.q.23.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulli debet imputari quod vitare non potest. Sed si Deus aliquem reprobat, non potest vitare quin ipse pereat; dicitur enim Eccles., vii, 14: Considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ipse* despexerit. Ergo non esset hominibus imputandum, quod pereunt. Hoc autem est falsum; non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.
[I.q.23.a.3.sc] It is said (Malachi 1:2-3): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."
[I.q.23.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Rom., ix, 13: Jacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui.
[I.q.23.a.3.co] God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Question 22, Article 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
[I.q.23.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra, quod prædestinatio est pars providentiæ. Ad providentiam autem pertinet permittere aliquem defectum in rebus quæ providentiæ subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum per divinam providentiam homines in vitam æternam ordinentur, pertinet etiam ad divinam providentiam quod permittat aliquos ab isto fine deficere; et hos dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut prædestinatio est pars providentiæ respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in æternam salutem, ita reprobatio est pars providentiæ respectu illorum qui ab hoc fine excidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat præscientiam tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, ut supra dictum est. Sicut enim prædestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis pœnam pro culpa.
[I.q.23.a.3.ad.1] God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them.
[I.q.23.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus omnes homines diligit, et etiam omnes creaturas, in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum; non tamen quodcumque bonum vult omnibus. In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita æterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare.
[I.q.23.a.3.ad.2] Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."
[I.q.23.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliter se habet reprobatio in causando quam prædestinatio. Nam prædestinatio est causa et ejus quod expectatur in futura vita a prædestinatis, scilicet gloriæ, et ejus quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae. Reprobatio vero non est causa ejus quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpæ; sed est causa derelicitionis a Deo. Est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in futuro, scilicet pœnæ æternæ. Sed culpa provenit ex libero arbitrio ejus qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et secundum hoc verificatur dictum Prophetæ, scilicet: Perditio tua, Israel.
[I.q.23.a.3.ad.3] Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Question 19, Article 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
[I.q.23.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati. Unde cum dicitur quod reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci, non est hoc intelli-gendum secundum impossibilitatem absolutam, sed secundum impossibilitatem conditionatam, sicut supra dictum est, quod prædestinatum necesse est salvari necessitate conditionata, quæ non tollit libertatem arbitrii.
Article 4
[I.q.23.a.4.arg.1] It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.
[I.q.23.a.4.arg.2] Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.
[I.q.23.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, electio est eorum quæ sunt. Sed prædestinatio ab aeterno est etiam eorum quæ non sunt. Ergo prædestinantur aliqui absque electione.
[I.q.23.a.4.arg.3] Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
[I.q.23.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, electio quamdam discretionem importat. Sed Deus vult omnes homines* salvos fieri, ut dicitur I Timoth., ii, 4. Ergo prædestinatio, quæ præordinat homines in salutem, est absque electione.
[I.q.23.a.4.sc] It is said (Ephesians 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."
[I.q.23.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes., i, 4: Elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem.
[I.q.23.a.4.co] Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (Article 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Question 22, Article 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:--love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (20, 2, 3):--election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (Article 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.
[I.q.23.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prædestinatio secundum rationem præsupponit electionem, et electio dilectionem. Cujus ratio est, quia prædestinatio, ut dictum est, est pars providentia. Providentia autem, sicut et prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens præceptiva ordinationis aliquorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem præcipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem nisi præexistente voluntate finis. Unde prædestinatio aliquorum in salutem præsupponit secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem; ad quod pertinet electio, et dilectio. Dilectio quidem, in quantum vult eis hoc bonum salutis aeternæ; nam diligere est velle alicui bonum, ut supra dictum est. Electio autem in quantum hoc bonum aliquibus præ aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobat, ut supra dictum est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in Deo, eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum, sed ex bono præexistente incitamur ad diligendum; et ideo elegimus aliquem, quem diligamus; et sic electio dilectionem præcedit in nobis: in Deo autem est e converso; nam voluntas ejus, qua vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illud bonum ab eo præ aliis habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio præsupponitur electioni secundum rationem, et electio prædestinationi. Unde omnes prædestinati sunt electi et dilecti.
[I.q.23.a.4.ad.1] If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Question 6, Article 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
[I.q.23.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinæ in communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat, in quantum scilicet nihil est quod non participet aliquid de bonitate ejus, ut supra dictum est. Sed si consideretur communicatio istius vel illius boni non absque electione tribuit, quia quædam bona dat aliquibus quæ non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et gloriæ attenditur electio.
[I.q.23.a.4.ad.2] When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Question 20, Article 2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."
[I.q.23.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a bono in re præexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quæ sunt, sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut dictum est. Et ideo, sicut dicit Augustinus, Serm. xi de verb. apost., aliquant. a princ., «eliguntur a Deo qui non sunt; neque tamen errat qui eligit. »
[I.q.23.a.4.ad.3] God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.
[I.q.23.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri antecedenter, quod non est simpliciter velle, sed secundum quid; non autem consequenter, quod est simpliciter velle.
Article 5
[I.q.23.a.5.arg.1] It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Romans 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Romans 9:15: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
[I.q.23.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod præscientia meritorum sit causa prædestinationis. Dicit enim Apostolus, Rom., vIII, 29: Quos præscivit et prædestinavit; et Glossa super illud Rom., 1x: Miserebor cui miserebor, etc., dicit: « Misericordiam illi dabo quem præscio toto corde reversurum ad me. » Ergo videtur quod præscientia meritorum sit causa prædestinationis.
[I.q.23.a.5.arg.2] Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.
[I.q.23.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prædestinatio divina includit divinam voluntatem, quæ irrationabilis esse non potest, cum prædestinatio sit propositum miserendi, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed nulla alia ratio potest esse prædestinationis, nisi præscientia meritorum. Ergo præscientia meritorum est causa vel ratio prædestinationis.
[I.q.23.a.5.arg.3] Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Romans 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.
[I.q.23.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, non est iniquitas apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom., xI, 14. Iniquum autem esse videtur ut aqualibus inæqualia dentur; omnes autem homines sunt aquales et secundum naturam, et secundum peccatum originale; attenditur autem in eis inæqualitas secundum merita vel demerita propriorum actuum. Non igitur inæqualia præparat Deus hominibus prædestinando et reprobando, nisi propter differentium meritorum præscientiam.
[I.q.23.a.5.sc] The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
[I.q.23.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus ad Titum, III, 5: Non ex operibus justitiæ, quæ fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita prædestinavit nos salvos fieri. Non ergo præscientia meritorum est causa vel ratio prædestinationis.
[I.q.23.a.5.co] Since predestination includes will, as was said above (Article 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (Question 19, Article 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Romans 9:11-12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."
Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummaion from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.
And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (22, 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light--in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lamentations 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
[I.q.23.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum prædestinatio includat voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, sic inquirenda est ratio prædestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinæ voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra, quod non est assignare causam divinæ voluntatis ex parte actus volendi; sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, in quantum sciicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. Nullus ergo fuit ita insanæ mentis qui dice- Non habetur apud Migne in Glossa ordinaria Strabi; sed D. Hieronymus: « ejus miserebor, cui præscius eram quod misericordiam daturus essem, sciens conversurum illum, et permansurum apud ret merita esse causam divinæ prædestinationis ex parte actus prædestinantis; sed hoc sub quæstione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus prædestinatio habeat aliquam causam. Et hoc est quærere, utrum Deus præordinavit se daturum effectum prædestinationis alicui propter merita aliqua. Fuerunt igitur qui dixerunt quod effectus prædestinationis præordinatur alicui propter merita præexistentia in alia vita; et hæc fuit positio Origenis, qui posuit animas humanas ab initio creatas, et secundum diversitatem suorum operum diversos status eas sortiri in hoc mundo corporibus unitas. Sed hanc opinionem excludit Apostolus, Rom., 1x, 41, dicens: Cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni, vel* mali, non ex operibus sed ex vocante dictum est, quia major serviet minori. Fuerunt ergo alii qui dixerunt quod merita præexistentia in hac vita sunt ratio et causa effectus prædestinationis. Posuerunt enim Pelagiani quod initium bene faciendi sit ex nobis, consummatio autem ex Deo. Et sic ex hoc contingit quod alicui datur prædestinationis effectus, et non alteri; quia unus initium dedit se præparando, et non alius. Sed contra hoc est quod dicit Apostolus, II Cor., III, 5, quod non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis. Nullum autem anterius principium inveniri potest quam cogitatio. Unde non potest dici quod aliquod in nobis initium existat quod sit ratio effectus prædestinationis. Unde fuerunt alii qui dixerunt quod merita sequentia prædestinationis effectum sunt ratio prædestinationis, ut intelligatur quod ideo Deus dat gratiam alicui, et præordinavit ei se daturum, quia præscivit eum bene usurum gratia: sicut si rex det alicui militi equum, quem scit eo bene usurum. Sed isti videntur distinxisse inter id quod est ex gratia, et id quod est ex libero arbitrio, quasi non possit esse idem ex utroque. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est gratia, est prædestinationis effectus; et hoc non potest poni ut ratio prædestinationis, cum hoc sub prædestinatione concludatur. Si igitur aliquid aliud ex parte nostra sit ratio prædestinationis, hoc erit præter effectum prædestinationis. Non est autem distinctum quod est me: et misericordiam præstabo illi, cui misericordiam præstitero, id est ei misericordiam dabo quem præscivi post errorem recto corde reversurum ad me.» Comm. in ep. ad Romanos, c. Ix, v. 15, col. 142, t. 4. ex libero arbitrio et ex prædestinatione, sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda et causa prima. Divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes causarum secundarum, ut supra dictum est. Unde et id quod est per liberum arbitrium est ex prædestinatione. Dicendum est ergo quod effectum prædestinationis considerare possumus dupliciter. Uno modo in particulari: et sic nihil prohibet aliquem effectum prædestinationis esse causam et rationem alterius: posteriorem quidem prioris secundum rationem causae finalis: priorem vero posterioris secundum rationem causae meritoriae, quae reducitur ad dispositionem materiae: sicut si dicamus quod Deus præordinavit se daturum alicui gratiam ut mereretur gloriam. Alio modo potest considerari prædestinationis effectus in communi, et sic impossibile est quod totus prædestinationis effectus in communi habeat aliquam causam ex parte nostra, quia quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu prædestinationis, etiam ipsa præparatio ad gratiam. Neque enim hoc fit nisi per auxilium divinum, secundum illud Thren., ult., 21: Converte nos, Domine, ad te et convertemur. Habet tamen hoc modo prædestinatio ex parte effectus pro ratione divinam bonitatem, ad quam totus effectus prædestinationis ordinatur ut in finem, et ex qua procedit sicut ex principio primo movente.
[I.q.23.a.5.ad.1] The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.
[I.q.23.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod usus gratiae præscitus non est ratio collationis gratiae nisi secundum rationem causae finalis, ut dictum est.
[I.q.23.a.5.ad.2] Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.
[I.q.23.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prædestinatio habet rationem ex parte effectus in communi ipsam divinam bonitatem: in particulari autem unus effectus est ratio alterius, ut dictum est.
[I.q.23.a.5.ad.3] The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14-15).
[I.q.23.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest prædestinationis aliquorum et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim Deus dicitur omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus divina bonitas repræsentetur. Necesse est autem quod divina bonitas, quae in se est una et simplex, multiformiter repræsentetur in rebus, propter hoc quod res creatæ ad simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Et inde est quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum quædam altum et quædam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua mala fieri, ne multa bona impediantur, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur consideremus totum genus humanum, sicut totam rerum universitatem. Voluit igitur Deus in hominibus quantum ad aliquos quos prædestinat, suam repræsentare bonitatem per modum misericordiae parcendo, et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per modum justitiæ puniendo. Et hæc est ratio quare Deus quosdam eligit et quosdam reprobat. Et hanc causam assignat Apostolus ad Rom., 1x, 22, dicens: Volens Deus* ostendere iram, id est, vindictam justitiæ, et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit, id est permisit, in multa patientia vasa iræ apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriæ suæ in vasa misericordiae, quæ præparavit in gloriam; et II Timoth., 11, 20, dicit: In magna domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed et lignea et fictilia: et quædam quidem in honorem, quædam in contumeliam. Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam et illos reprobavit, non habet rationem nisi divinam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, In Joan., tract. xxvi, col. 1607, t. 3: « Quare hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli velle dijudicare, si non vis errare. » Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus potest assignari ratio, cum prima materia tota sit in se uniformis, quare una pars ejus est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma terræ a Deo in principio condita, ut scilicet sit diversitas specierum in rebus naturalibus: quare autem hæc pars materiae est sub ista forma, et illa sub alia, dependet ex simplici divina voluntate; sicut ex simplici voluntate artificis dependet quod ille lapis est in ista parte parietis, et ille in illa, quamvis ratio artis habeat quod aliqui sint in hac, et aliqui sint in illa. Neque tamen propter hoc est iniquitas apud Deum, si inæqualia non inæqualibus præparat. Hoc enim esset contra justitiae rationem, si prædestinationis effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia. In his enim quæ Sic cod.; in edit.: « gloriam ex meritis; et quod præordinavit se daturum alicui. » Ita codd. Alcan. Camer. et Rom.; edit.: « volun-tatem. » In edit.: « ut sic sit. » — In edit.: « sed quare. » — In edit.: « ille in alia. » ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui vult, plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, absque præjudicio justitiæ. Et hoc est quod dicit paterfamilias, Matth., xx, 14 et 15: Tolle quod tuum est, et vade; an* non licet mihi quod volo facere?
Article 6
[I.q.23.a.6.arg.1] It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (Apocalypse 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
[I.q.23.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prædestinatio non sit certa. Quia super illud Apocal., 11: Tene quod habes, ne alius* accipiat coronam tuam, dicit Augustinus, lib. De corrept. et grat., cap. xiii, col. 940, t. 10, quod « alius non est accepturus, nisi iste perdiderit. » Potest ergo et acquiri et perdi corona quæ est prædestinationis effectus. Non est igitur prædestinatio certa.
[I.q.23.a.6.arg.2] Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
[I.q.23.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, posito possibili, nullum sequitur impossibile. Possibile est autem aliquem prædestinatum, ut Petrum, peccare, et tunc occidi: hoc autem posito, sequitur prædestinationis effectum frustrari. Hoc igitur non est impossibile: non ergo est prædestinatio certa.
[I.q.23.a.6.arg.3] Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.
[I.q.23.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quidquid Deus potuit, potest. Sed potuit non prædestinare quem prædestinavit. Ergo nunc potest non prædestinare; ergo prædestinatio non est certa.
[I.q.23.a.6.sc] A gloss on Romans 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."
[I.q.23.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud Rom., viii, 29: Quos præscivit et prædestinavit, etc., dicit Glossa ex Augustino, lib. De dono persev., c. xiv, col. 1014, § 35, t. 10: « Prædestinatio est præscientia et præparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur. »
[I.q.23.a.6.co] Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (Article 1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (Question 22, Article 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (14, 13; 19, 4) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible.
[I.q.23.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prædestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum effectuum, nec tamen imponit necessitatem, ut scilicet effectus ejus ex necessitate proveniat. Dictum est enim supra, quod prædestinatio est pars providentiae. Sed non omnia quæ providentiae subduntur, necessaria sunt: sed quædam contingenter eveniunt secundum conditionem causarum proximarum, quas ad tales effectus divina providentia ordinavit. Et tamen providentiae ordo est infallibilis, ut supra ostensum est. Sic igitur et ordo prædestinationis est certus, et tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur, ex qua contingenter provenit prædestinationis effectus. Ad hoc etiam consideranda sunt quæ supra dicta sunt de divina scientia et de divina voluntate, quomodo contingentia a rebus non tollunt, licet certissima et infallibilia sint.
[I.q.23.a.6.ad.1] The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.
[I.q.23.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod corona dicitur esse alicujus dupliciter. Uno modo ex prædestinatione divina, et sic nullus coronam suam amittit. Alio modo ex merito gratiæ. Quod enim meremur, quodam modo nostrum est; et sic suam coronam aliquis amittere potest per peccatum mortale sequens. Alius autem illam coronam amissam accipit, in quantum in locum ejus subrogatur; non enim permittit Deus aliquos cadere, quin alios erigat, secundum illud Job, xxxiv, 24: Conteret multos et innumerabiles, et stare faciet alios pro eis. Sic enim in locum angelorum cadentium substituti sunt homines, et in locum Judæorum Gentiles. Substitutus autem in statum gratiæ etiam quantum ad hoc coronam cadentis accipit, quod de bonis quæ alius fecit in æterna vita gaudebit, in qua unusquisque gaudebit de bonis tam a se quam ab aliis factis.
[I.q.23.a.6.ad.2] Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.
[I.q.23.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet sit possibile eum qui est prædestinatus mori in peccato mortali secundum se consideratum, tamen hoc est impossibile, posito, prout scilicet ponitur eum esse prædestina-tum. Unde non sequitur quod prædestinatio falli posset.
[I.q.23.a.6.ad.3] Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above (Article 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.
[I.q.23.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum prædestinatio includat divinam voluntatem, sicut supra dictum est, quod Deum velle aliquid creatum est necessarium ex suppositione, propter immobilitatem divinæ voluntatis, non tamen absolute; ita dicendum est hic de prædestinatione. Unde non oportet dicere quod Deus possit non prædestinare quem prædestinavit, in sensu composito accipien-do; licet absolute considerando, Deus possit prædestinare vel non prædestinare. Sed ex hoc non tollitur prædestinationis certitudo. Non habetur apud Migne in Glossa ordinaria Strabi. — Augustinus: « quibus. » — In edit.: « quæ contingentiam. » — — — In edit.: « immutabilitatem. »
Article 7
[I.q.23.a.7.arg.1] It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (Deuteronomy 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
[I.q.23.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod numerus prædestinatorum non sit certus. Numerus enim cui potest fieri additio, non est certus. Sed numero prædestinatorum potest fieri additio, ut videtur; dicitur enim Deuteron., 1, 41: Dominus Deus addat ad hunc numerum multa millia; Glossa ordinaria, col. 450, t. 1: « Definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui sunt ejus. » Ergo numerus prædestinatorum non est certus.
[I.q.23.a.7.arg.2] Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.
[I.q.23.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, non potest assignari ratio quare magis in hoc numero quam in alio Deus homines præordinat ad salutem. Sed nihil a Deo sine ratione disponitur. Ergo non est certus numerus salvandorum præordinatus a Deo.
[I.q.23.a.7.arg.3] Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Matthew 7:13-14: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.
[I.q.23.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea operatio Dei est perfectior quam operatio naturæ. Sed in operibus naturæ bonum invenitur ut in pluribus, defectus autem et malum ut in paucioribus. Si igitur a Deo institueretur numerus salvandorum, plures essent salvandi quam damnandi; cujus contrarium ostenditur Matth., vii, 13, ubi dicitur: Lata et spatiosa est via quæ ducit ad perditionem, et multi sunt, qui intrant per eam. Angusta est porta et arcta via* quæ ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt qui inveniunt eam. Non ergo est præordinatus a Deo numerus salvandorum.
[I.q.23.a.7.sc] Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."
[I.q.23.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De correctione et gratia, c. xiii, col. 940, t. 10: « Certus est prædestinatorum numerus, qui neque augeri potest, neque minui. »
[I.q.23.a.7.co] The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (Article 6). Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite (7, 2, 3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that universe--that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Romans 8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"
[I.q.23.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod numerus prædestinatorum est certus. Sed quidam dixerunt eum esse certum formaliter, sed non materialiter; ut puta, si diceremus certum esse quod centum vel mille salventur, non autem quod hi, vel illi. Sed hoc tollit certitudinem prædestinationis de qua jam diximus. Et ideo oportet dicere quod numerus prædestinatorum sit certus Deo non solum formaliter, sed etiam materialiter. Sed advertendum est quod numerus prædestinatorum certus Deo dicitur, non solum ratione cognitionis, quia scilicet scit quot sunt salvandi, sic enim Deo certus est etiam numerus guttarum pluviæ et arenæ maris; sed ratione distinctionis et electionis cujusdam. Ad cujus evidentiam est sciendum quod omne agens intendit aliquid finitum, ut ex supra dictis de infinito apparet. Quicumque autem intendit aliquam determinatam mensuram in suo effectu, excogitat aliquem numerum in partibus essentialibus ejus quæ per se requiruntur ad perfectionem totius. Non enim per se eligit aliquem numerum in his quæ non principaliter requiruntur, sed solum propter aliud; sed in tanto numero accipit hujusmodi, in quantum sunt necessaria propter aliud; sicut edificator excogitat determinatam mensuram domus, et etiam determinatum numerum mansionum quas vult facere in domo, et determinatum numerum mensurarum parietis, vel tecti; non autem eligit determinatum numerum lapidum, sed accipit tot quot sufficiunt ad explendam tantam mensuram parietis. Sic igitur considerandum est in Deo respectu totius universitatis, quæ est ejus effectus. Præordinavit enim in qua mensura deberet esse totum universum, et quis numerus esset conveniens essentialibus partibus universi, quæ scilicet habent aliquo modo ordinem ad perpetuitatem; quot scilicet sphæræ, quot stellæ, quot elementa, quot species rerum. Individua vero corruptibilia non ordinantur ad bonum universi principaliter, sed quasi secundario, in quantum in eis salvatur bonum speciei. Unde licet Deus sciat numerum omnium individuorum, non tamen numerus vel bonum vel culicum vel aliquorum hujusmodi est per se præordinatus a Deo. Sed tot hujusmodi divina providentia producit, quot sufficiunt ad specierum conservationem. Inter omnes autem creaturas principalius ordinantur ad bonum universi creaturæ rationales, quæ in quantum hujusmodi, incorruptibles sunt, et potissime illæ quæ beatitudinem consequuntur quæ immediatius attingunt ultimum finem. Unde certus est Deo numerus prædestinatorum, non solum per modum cognitionis, sed etiam per modum cujusdam principalis præfinitionis. Non sic autem omnino est de numero re-proborum, qui videntur esse præordinati a Deo in bonum electorum, quibus omnia cooperantur in bonum, ad Rom., viii, 28. De numero autem omnium prædestinatorum hominum quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot angeli ceciderunt. Quidam vero, quod tot salvabuntur, quot angeli remanserunt. Quidam vero, quot tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot angeli ceciderunt, et insuper tot quot fuerunt angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod « soli Deo est cognitus numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus, » ut habet Collecta pro vivis et defunctis.
[I.q.23.a.7.ad.1] These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.
[I.q.23.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum illud Deuteron. est intelligendum de illis qui sunt prænotati a Deo respectu præsentis justitiæ. Horum enim numerus et augetur et minuitur, et non numerus prædestinatorum.
[I.q.23.a.7.ad.2] The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.
[I.q.23.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio quantitatis alicujus partis accipienda est ex proportione illius partis ad totum. Sic enim est apud Deum ratio quare tot stellas fecerit, vel tot rerum species, et quare tot prædestinavit ex proportione partium principalium ad bonum universi.
[I.q.23.a.7.ad.3] The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.
[I.q.23.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum proportionatum communi statui naturæ accidit ut in pluribus, et deficit ab hoc bono ut in paucioribus; sed bonum quod excedit communem statum naturæ, inventur ut in paucioribus et deficit ad hoc bono ut in pluribus: sicut patet quod plures homines sunt qui habent sufficientem scientiam ad regimen vitæ suæ; pauciores autem qui hac scientia carent, qui moriones vel stulti dicuntur: sed paucissimi sunt respectu aliorum, qui attingunt ad habendam profundam scientiam intelligibilium rerum. Cum igitur beatitudo æterna in visione Dei consistens excedat communem statum naturæ, et præcipue secundum quod est gratia destituta per corruptionem originalis peccati, pauciores sunt qui salvantur. Et in hoc etiam maxime misericordia Dei apparet, quod aliquos in illam salutem erigit, a qua plurimi deficiunt secundum communem cursum et inclinationem naturæ.
Article 8
[I.q.23.a.8.arg.1] It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.
[I.q.23.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prædestinatio non possit juvari precibus sanctorum. Nullum enim æternum præceditur ab aliquo temporali; et per consequens non potest temporale juvare ad hoc quod aliquod æternum sit. Sed prædestinatio est æterna. Cum igitur preces sanctorum sint temporales, non possunt juvare ad hoc quod aliquis prædestinetur. Non ergo prædestinatio juvatur precibus sanctorum.
[I.q.23.a.8.arg.2] Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? [Vulgate: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (Romans 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
[I.q.23.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut nihil indiget consilio nisi propter defectum cognitionis, ita nihil indiget auxilio nisi propter defectum virtutis. Sed neutrum horum competit Deo prædestinanti: unde dicitur Is., xl, 13: Quis adjuvit Spiritum Domini? aut quis consiliarius ejus fuit? Ergo prædestinatio non juvatur precibus sanctorum.
[I.q.23.a.8.arg.3] Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.
[I.q.23.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ejusdem est adjuvari et impediri. Sed prædestinatio non potest aliquo impediri. Ergo non potest aliquo juvari.
[I.q.23.a.8.sc] It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" (Genesis 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
[I.q.23.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen., xxv, 21, quod Isaac rogavit Deum pro Rebecca uxore sua, et dedit conceptum Rebeccæ⁺. Ex illo autem conceptu natus est Jacob, qui prædestinatus fuit. Non autem fuisset impleta predestinatio, si natus non fuisset. Ergo prædestinatio juvatur precibus sanctorum.
[I.q.23.a.8.co] Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Samuel 15:29); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance" (Romans 11:29).
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered--namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Peter 1:10).
[I.q.23.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hanc quæstionem diversi errores fuerunt. Quidam enim, attendentes certitudinem divinæ prædestinationis, dixerunt superfluas esse orationes, vel quidquid aliud fiat ad salutem æternam consequendam; quia his factis vel non factis prædestinati consequuntur, reprobati non consequuntur. Sed contra hoc sunt omnes admonitiones sacræ Scripturæ exhortantes ad orationem, et ad alia bona opera. Alii vero dixerunt quod per orationes mutatur divina prædestinatio; et hæc dicitur fuisse opinio Ægyptiorum, qui ponebant ordinationem divinam, quam fatum appellabant, aliquibus sacrificiis et oratio- Aug., ep. xxvii: « Quidam tantæ sunt fatuitatis, ut non multum a pecoribus different quos moriones vulgo vocant. » * Deprecatus est Isaac Dominum pro uxore. nibus impediri posse. Sed contra hoc etiam est auctoritas sacrae Scripturæ; dicitur enim I Reg., xv, 29: Porro triumphator Israel non parcet neque pænitudine flectetur*; et Rom., xi, 29, dicitur quod sine pænitudine sunt dona Dei et vocatio*. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod in prædestinatione duo sunt consideranda; scilicet ipsa præordinatio divina, et effectus ejus. Quantum igitur ad primum, nullo modo prædestinatio juvatur precibus sanctorum. Non enim precibus sanctorum fit quod aliquis prædestinetur a Deo. Quantum vero ad secundum dicitur prædestinatio juvari precibus sanctorum et aliis bonis operibus, quia Providentia, cujus prædestinatio est pars, non subtrahit causas secundas, sed sic providet effectus, ut etiam ordo causarum secundarum subjaceat Providentiæ. Sicut igitur sic providentur naturales effectus, ut etiam causæ naturales ad illos naturales effectus ordinentur, sine quibus illi effectus non provenirent; ita prædestinatur a Deo salus alicujus, ut etiam sub ordine prædestinationis cadat quidquid hominem promovet in salutem, vel orationes propriæ vel aliorum vel alia bona vel quidquid hujusmodi, sine quibus aliquid salutem non consequitur. Unde prædestinatis conandum est ad bene operandum et orandum; quia per hujusmodi prædestinationis effectus certitudinaliter impletur. Propter quod dicitur II Petr., 1, 40: Satagite ut per bona opera certam vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis.
[I.q.23.a.8.ad.1] This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
[I.q.23.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa ostendit, quod prædestinatio non juvatur precibus sanctorum quantum ad ipsam præordinationem.
[I.q.23.a.8.ad.2] One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Corinthians 3:9: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.
[I.q.23.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquis dicitur adjuvari per alium dupliciter; uno modo in quantum ab eo accipit virtutem, et sic adjuvari infirmi est; unde Deo non competit; et sic intelligitur illud: Quis adjuvit Spiritum Domini? Alio modo dicitur quis adjuvari per aliquem, per quem exequitur suam operationem, sicut dominus per ministrum; et hoc modo Deus adjuvatur per nos, in quantum exequimur suam ordinationem secundum illud I ad Cor., 9: Dei enim adjutores sumus*. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinæ virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis ut ordinis pulchritudo servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis communicet.
[I.q.23.a.8.ad.3] Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (Question 19, Article 6), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.23.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundæ causæ non possunt egredi ordinem causæ primæ universalis, ut supra dictum est, sed ipsum exequuntur; et ideo prædestinatio per creaturas potest adjuvari sed non impediri.
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