Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q28. The divine relations
Source context
- Theme
- real relations within the divine unity as constitutive of Trinitarian distinction
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta (Advaita / Vishishtadvaita boundary)Cross-tradition congruence appears in the Vishishtadvaita debate over whether internal differentiations within Brahman are real or merely nominal — a structural parallel to Aquinas's claim that the four Trinitarian relations (paternity, filiation, spiration, procession) are real relations subsisting in the divine essence without compromising its simplicity.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads V)Plotinus's account of the procession of Nous from the One establishes a relational structure within the intelligible realm that anticipates, without equalling, Aquinas's position that relations in God are not accidental but identical with the divine substance itself.
Q28. The divine relations
Article 1
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Deo non sint aliquæ relationes reales. Dicit enim Boetius, in lib. De Trinit., cap. iv, col. 1252, t. 2, quod « cum quis prædicamenta in divinam vertit prædicationem, cuncta mutantur in substantiam, quæ prædicari possunt; ad aliquid vero omnino non potest prædicari. » Sed quidquid est realiter in Deo, de ipso prædicari potest. Ergo relatio non est realiter in Deo.
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.2] Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind.
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dicit Boetius, in eod. lib., cap. vi, col. 1255, t. 2, quod « similis est relatio in Trinitate Patris ad Filium, et utriusque ad Spiritum sanctum, ut ejus quod est idem ad id quod est idem. » Sed hujusmodi relatio est rationis tantum, quia omnis relatio realis exigit duo extrema realiter. Ergo relationes quæ ponuntur in divinis, non sunt reales relationes, sed rationis tantum.
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.3] Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God.
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, relatio paternitatis est relatio principii. Sed cum dicitur: Deus est principium creaturarum, non importatur aliqua relatio realis, sed rationis tantum. Ergo nec paternitas in divinis est relatio realis, et eadem ratione nec aliæ relationes quæ ponuntur ibi.
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.4] Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.
[I.q.28.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, generatio in divinis est secundum intelligibilis verbi processionem. Sed relationes quæ consequuntur operationem intellectus sunt relationes rationis. Ergo paternitas et filiatio, quæ dicuntur in divinis secundum generationem, sunt relationes rationis tantum.
[I.q.28.a.1.sc] The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.
[I.q.28.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod pater non dicitur nisi a paternitate, et filius a filiatione. Si igitur paternitas et filiatio non sunt in Deo realiter, sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter pater aut filius, sed secundum rationem intelligentiae tantum; quod est hæresis Sabellianæ 4.
[I.q.28.a.1.co] relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (27, 2, 4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
[I.q.28.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod relationes quædam sunt in divinis realiter. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod solum in his quæ dicuntur ad aliquid, inveniuntur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, et non secundum rem; non autem 2 in aliis generibus, quia alia genera, ut quantitas et qualitas, secundum propriam rationem significant aliquid alicui inhærens. Ea vero quæ dicuntnr ad aliquid, significant secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud. Qui quidem respectus aliquando est in ipsa natura rerum, utpote quando aliquæ res secundum suam naturam ad invicem ordinatæ sunt, et invicem inclinationem habent; et hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales; sicut in corpore gravi est inclination et ordo ad locum medium; unde respectus quidam est in ipso gravi respectu loci medii; et simpliciter est de aliis hujusmodi. Aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea quæ dicuntur ad aliquid, est tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri; et tunc est relatio rationis tantum; sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali ut speciem ad genus. Cum autem aliquid procedit a principio ejusdem naturæ, necesse est quod ambo, scilicet procedens et id a quo procedit, in eodem ordine conveniant: et sic oportet quod habeant reales respectus ad invicem. Cum igitur processiones in divinis sint in identitate naturæ, ut ostensum est, necesse est quod relationes quæ secundum processiones divinas accipiuntur, sint relationes reales.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.1] Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod « ad aliquid » dicitur omnino non prædicari in Deo secundum propriam rationem ejus quod dicitur ad aliquid, in quantum scilicet propria ratio ejus quod ad aliquid dicitur, non accipiutur per comparisonem ad illud cui inest relatio; sed per respectum ad alterum. Non ergo 1 Sic cod.; sed in Melius codices, nam alia puncta reprobata hæresis Sabelliana continet; est hoc ergo hæresis « Sabellianæ » 2 per hoc excludere voluit quod relatio non esset in Deo, sed quod non prædicaretur per modum inhærentis secundum propriam relationis rationem, sed magis per modum ad aliud se habentis.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.2] The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod relatio quæ importatur per hoc nomen « idem » est relatio rationis tantum, si accipiatur simpli-citer idem; quia hujusmodi relatio non potest consistere nisi in quodam ordine, quem ratio adinvenit alicujus ad seipsum, secundum aliquas ejus duas considerationes. Secus autem est, cum dicuntur aliqua eadem esse non in numero, sed in natura generis vel speciei. Boetius igitur relationes quæ sunt in divinis assimilat relationi identatis, non quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad hoc solum quod per hujusmodi relationes non diversificatur substantia, sicut nec per relationem identitatis.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.3] As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above explained (14, 3 and 4; 19, 8). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum creatura procedit a Deo in diversitate naturæ, Deus est extra ordinem totius creaturæ, nec ex ejus natura est ejus habitudo ad creaturas, non enim producit creaturas ex necessitate suæ naturæ, sed per intellectum et per voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in Deo non est realis relatio ad creaturas, sed in creaturis est realis relatio ad Deum; quia creaturæ continentur sub ordine divino, et in earum natura est ut dependeant a Deo. Sed processiones divinæ sunt in eadem natura. Unde non est similis ratio.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.4] Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God.
[I.q.28.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod relationes quæ consequuntur solam operationem intellectus, in ipsis rebus intellectis sunt relationes rationis tantum, quia scilicet eas ratio adinvenit inter duas res intellectas. Sed relationes quæ consequuntur operationes intellectus, quæ sunt inter verbum intellectualiter procedens, et illud a quo procedit, non sunt relationes rationis tantum, sed rei; quia et ipse intellectus et ratio, est quæ-dam res; et comparatur realiter ad id quod procedit intelligibiliter, sicut res corporalis ad id quod procedit corporaliter. Et sic paternitas et filiatio sunt relationes reales in divinis.
Article 2
[I.q.28.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.
[I.q.28.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod relatio in Deo non sit idem quod sua essentia. Dicit enim enim Augustinus, De Trin., lib. V, c. v, col. 914, t. 8, quod non omne quod dicitur in Deo dicitur secundum substantiam; dicitur enim ad aliquid, sicut pater ad filium. Sed hæc non secundum substantiam dicuntur. Ergo relatio non est divina essentia.
[I.q.28.a.2.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
[I.q.28.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., lib. VII, c. 11, col. 935, t. 8: « Omnis res quæ relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid excepto relativo; sicut homo dominus et homo servus. » Si igitur relationes aliquæ sunt in Deo, oportet esse in Deo aliquid aliud prætere relationes. Sed hoc aliud non potest esse nisi essentia. Ergo essentia est aliud a relationibus.
[I.q.28.a.2.arg.3] Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting (3, 4). Therefore relation is not the divine essence.
[I.q.28.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, esse relativi est ad aliud se habere, ut dicitur in Prædicamentis, in cap. Ad aliquid. Si igitur relatio sit ipsa divina essentia, sequitur quod esse divinæ essentiæ sit ad aliud se habere; quod repugnat perfectioni divini esse, quod est maxime absolutum et per se subsistens, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur relatio est ipsa essentia divina. Sed contra: omnis res quæ non est divina essentia est creatura. Sed relatio realiter competit Deo. Si ergo non est divina essentia, erit creatura; et ita ei non erit adoratio latriæ exhibenda, contra quod in præfatione cantatur: « Ut in personis proprietas, et in essentia unitas, et in majestate adoretur aequalitas. »
[I.q.28.a.2.sc] Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."
[I.q.28.a.2.co] It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
[I.q.28.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc dicitur Gilbertus Porretanus errasse, sed errorem suum postmodum in Rhemensi concilio revocasse. Dixit enim quod relationes in divinis sunt assistentes, sive extrinsecus affixæ. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. Quorum unum est esse, quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens; et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subjecto; accidentis enim esse est inesse. Aliud quod potest In — — « Omnis essentia quæ, » etc. considerari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscujusque illorum generum. Et in aliis quidem generibus a relatione, utpote quantitate et qualitate, etiam propria ratio generis accipitur secundum comparisonem ad subjectum; nam quantitas dicitur mensura substantiae, qualitas vero dispositio substantiae. Sed ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparisonem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparisonem ad aliquid extra. Si igitur consideremus etiam in rebus creatis relationes secundum id quod relationes sunt, sic inveniuntur esse assistentes, non intrinsecus affixæ: quasi significantes respectum quodammodo contingentem ipsam rem relatam, prout ab ea tendit in alterum. Si vero consideretur relatio secundum quod est accidens, sic est inhærens subjecto, et habens esse accidentale in ipso. Sed Gilbertus Porretanus consideravit relationem primo modo tantum. Quidquid autem in rebus creatis habet esse accidentale, secundum quod transferur in Deum, habet esse substantiale; nihil enim est in Deo ut accidens in subjecto, sed quidquid est in Deo est ejus essentia. Sic igitur ex ea parte qua relatio in rebus creatis habet esse accidentale in subjecto, relatio realiter existens in Deo habet esse essentiae divinæ, idem omnino ei existens. In hoc vero quod ad aliquid dicitur non significatur aliqua habitudo ad essentiam, sed magis ad suum oppositum. Et sic manifestum est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem, et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiæ rationem, prout in relatione importatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae. Patet ergo quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et essentiae, sed unum et idem.
[I.q.28.a.2.ad.1] These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity.
[I.q.28.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verba illa Augustini non pertinent ad hoc quod paternitas vel alia relatio, quæ est in Deo secundum esse suum, non sit idem quod divina essentia, sed quod non prædicatur secundum modum substantiae, ut existens in eo de quo dicitur, sed ut ad alterum se habens. Et propter hoc dicuntur duo tantum esse prædicamenta in divinis; quia alia prædicamenta important habitudinem ad id de quo dicuntur, tam secundum suum esse, quam secundum proprii generis rationem. Nihil autem quod est in Deo potest habere habitudinem ad id in quo est vel de quo dicitur, nisi habitudinem identatis, propter summam Dei simplicitatem.
[I.q.28.a.2.ad.2] As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained (13, 2), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us.
[I.q.28.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut in rebus creatis, in illo quod dicitur relative non solum est invenire respectum ad alterum, sed etiam aliquid absolutum, ita et in Deo; sed tamen aliter et aliter. Nam id quod inventur in creatura præter id quod continetur sub significatione nominis relativi, est alia res; in Deo autem non est alia res, sed una et eadem; quæ non perfecte exprimitur relationis nomine, quasi sub significatione talis nominis comprehensa. Dictum est enim supra, cum de divinis nominibus agebatur, quod plus continetur in perfectione divinæ essentiae quam aliquo nomine significari posset. Unde non sequitur quod in Deo præter relationem sit aliquid aliud secundum rem, sed solum considerata nominum ratione.
[I.q.28.a.2.ad.3] If the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus (4, 2).
[I.q.28.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod si in perfectione divina nihil plus continetur quam quod significat nomen relativum, sequere-tur quod esse ejus esset imperfectum, utpote ad aliquid aliud se habens; sicut si non continetur ibi plus quam quod nomine sapientiae significatur, non esset aliquid subsistens. Sed quia divinæ essentiae perfectio est major quam quod significatione alicujus nominis comprehendi possit; non sequitur si nomen relativum vel quodcumque aliud nomen dictum de Deo non significat aliquid perfectum, quod divina essentia habeat esse imperfectum; quia divina essentia comprehendit in se omnium generum perfectionem, ut supra dictum est.
Article 3
[I.q.28.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
[I.q.28.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod relationes quæ ponuntur in Deo, realiter ab invicem non distinguantur. Quæcumque enim uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. Sed omnis relatio in Deo existens est idem secundum rem cum divina essentia. Ergo relationes secundum rem ab invicem non distinguuntur.
[I.q.28.a.3.arg.2] Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation.
[I.q.28.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut paternitas et filiatio secundum nominis rationem distinguuntur ab essentia divina, ita et bonitas et potentia. Sed propter hujusmodi rationis distinctio nem non est aliqua realis distinctio bonitatis et potentiæ divinæ. Ergo neque paternitatis et filiationis.
[I.q.28.a.3.arg.3] Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
[I.q.28.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in divinis non est distinctio realis, nisi secundum originem. Sed una relatio non videtur oriri ex alia. Ergo relationes non distinguuntur realiter ab invicem.
[I.q.28.a.3.sc] Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.
[I.q.28.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, in lib. De Trinit., cap. vi, col. 1255, t. 2, quod « substantia in divinis continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat Trinitatem. » Si ergo relationes non distinguuntur ab invicem realiter, non erit in divinis trinitas realis, sed rationis tantum, quod est Sabelliani erroris.
[I.q.28.a.3.co] The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation (1), there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is relative.
[I.q.28.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ex eo quod aliquid alicui attribuitur, oportet quod attribuantur ei omnia quæ sunt de ratione illius. Sicut cuicumque attribuitur homo, oportet quod attribuatur ei rationale. De ratione autem relationis est respectus unius ad alterum, secundum quem aliquid alteri opponitur relative. Cum igitur in Deo realiter sit relatio, ut dictum est, oportet quod realiter sit ibi oppositio. Relativa autem oppositio in sui ratione includit distinctionem. Unde oportet quod in Deo sit realis distinctio; non quidem secundum rem absolutam, quæ est essentia, in qua est summa unitas et simpli-citas, sed secundum rem relativam.
[I.q.28.a.3.ad.1] According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.
[I.q.28.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, in III Physic., text. 21, argumentum illud tenet, quod quæcumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem, in his quæ sunt idem re et ratione, sicut tunica et indumentum; non autem in his quæ differunt ratione. Unde ibidem dicit quod, licet actio sit idem motui, similiter et passio, non tamen sequitur quod actio et passio sint idem; quia in actione importatur respectus, ut a quo est motus in mobili; in passione vero, ut qui est ab alio. Et similiter, licet paternitas sit idem secundum rem cum essentia divina, et similiter filiatio, tamen hæc duo in suis propriis rationibus important oppositos respectus. Unde distinguuntur ab invicem.
[I.q.28.a.3.ad.2] Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
[I.q.28.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia et bonitas non important in suis rationibus ali-quam oppositionem. Unde non est similis ratio.
[I.q.28.a.3.ad.3] Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another.
[I.q.28.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis relationes, proprie loquendo, non oriantur vel procedant ab invicem, tamen accipiuntur per oppositum secundum processionem ali-cujus ab alio.
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