Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q29. The divine persons
Source context
- Theme
- Scholastic definition of divine persons within the Trinitarian structure: personhood, relation, and subsistence in God
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Cappadocian theology (hypostasis / ousia distinction)Cross-tradition congruence: the Cappadocian distinction between ousia (common divine essence) and hypostasis (individual subsistence) anticipates the Scholastic formula that Aquinas formalises in Q29, where 'person' in God denotes a distinct subsistent relation.
- Neoplatonic henology (Plotinus, Enneads)Cross-tradition congruence: Plotinus's three hypostases (the One, Intellect, Soul) furnish a structural analogue to Trinitarian threeness, though Aquinas explicitly distinguishes the Christian doctrine of co-equal persons from Neoplatonic emanationist hierarchy.
- Boethius: Contra Eutychen III (definition of person as 'rationalis naturae individua substantia')Cross-tradition congruence: Aquinas in Q29 explicitly receives and critiques the Boethian definition, adapting 'individual substance of rational nature' to the divine case by substituting subsistent relation for individual substance.
Q29. The divine persons
Article 1
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient--that is, "a person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular. Therefore person is improperly defined.
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod incompetens sit definitio personæ quam Boetius assignat in lib. De duabus naturis, cap. 111, col. 1343, t. 2, quæ talis est: « Persona est rationalis naturæ individua substantia. » Nullum enim singulare definitur. Sed persona significat quoddam singulare. Ergo persona inconvenienter definitur.
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.2] Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word "individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second substances are the "genera" or "species." Therefore this definition is incorrect.
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, substantia, prout ponitur in definitione personæ, aut sumitur pro substantia prima, aut pro substantia secunda. Si pro substantia prima, superflue additur, « individua, » quia substantia prima est substantia individua: si vero stat pro substantia secunda, falso additur, et est oppositio in adjecto: nam secundæ substantia dicuntur genera vel species. Ergo definitio est male assignata,
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.3] Further, an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal" would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition.
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nomen intentionis non debet poni in definitione rei. Non enim esset bona assignatio, si quis diceret: Homo est species animalis; homo enim est nomen rei, species est nomen intentionis. Cum igitur persona sit nomen rei, significat enim substantiam quamdam rationalis naturæ, inconvenienter individuum, quod est nomen intentionis, in ejus definitione ponitur.
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.4] Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence."
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea: « Natura est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est per se, et non per accidens, » ut dicitur in II Physic., text 3. Sed persona est in rebus immobilibus, sicut in Deo, et in angelis. Non ergo in definitione personæ debuit poni natura, sed magis essentia.
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.5] Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not properly defined as above.
[I.q.29.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, anima separata est rationalis naturæ individua substantia: non autem persona. Inconvenienter ergo persona sic definitur.
[I.q.29.a.1.co] Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is "person."
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.
[I.q.29.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, licet universale et particulare inveniantur in omnibus generibus, tamen speciali quodam modo individuum invenitur in genere substantiae. Substantia enim individuatur per seipsam; sed accidentia individuantur per subjectum, quod est substantia; dicitur enim hæc albedo, in quantum est in hoc subjecto. Unde etiam convenienter individuae substantiae habent aliquod speciale nomen præ aliis; dicuntur enim hypostases vel primæ substantiae. Sed adhuc quodam specialiori et perfectiori modo invenitur particulare et individuum in substantiis rationalibus quæ habent dominium sui actus; et non solum aguntur, sicut alia, sed per se agunt; actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Et ideo etiam inter cæteras substantias quoddam speciale nomen habent singularia rationalis naturæ, et hoc nomen est « persona. » Et ideo in prædicta definitione personæ ponitur « substantia individua, » in quantum significat singulare in genere substantiae; additur autem « rationalis naturæ, » in quantum significat singulare in rationalibus substantiis.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines person.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet hoc singulare vel illud definiri non possit, tamen id quod pertinet ad communem rationem singularitatis, definiri potest, et sic Philosophus in lib. Prædicament., cap. De substantia, definit substantiam primam; et hoc modo definit Boetius personam. omittunt argumentum « sed contra. » Habet Nicolaï sic: « Sed contra est auctoritas prædicta Boetii. »
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.2] In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part. But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater--that is, by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when "individual" is added, it is restricted to first substance.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, secundum quosdam, « substantia » in definitione personæ ponitur pro substantia prima, quæ est hypostasis; neque tamen superflue additur « individua, » quia ratione hypostasis vel substantiae primæ excluditur ratio universalis et partis. Non enim dicimus quod homo communis sit hypostasis, neque etiam quod manus, cum sit pars. Sed per hoc quod additur « individua, » excluditur a persona ratio assumptibilis; humana enim natura in Christo non est persona, quia est assumpta a digniori, scilicet a Verbo Dei. Sed melius dicendum est quod substantia accipitur communiter, prout dividitur per primam et secundam, et per hoc quod additur, « individua, » trahitur ad standum pro substantia prima.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.3] Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, quia substantiales differentia non sunt nobis notæ, vel etiam nominatæ non sunt, oportet interdum uti differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium; puta, si quis diceret, ignis est corpus simplex, calidum et siccum. Accidentia enim propria sunt effectus formarum substantialium et manifestant eas. Et similiter nomina intentionum possunt accipi ad definiendum res, secundum quod accipiuntur pro aliquibus nominibus rerum quæ sunt posita. Et sic hoc nomen, « individuum, » ponitur in definitione personæ ad designandum modum subsistendi qui competit substantiis particularibus.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.4] According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines "nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of "person," which means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from being, which is most common.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum, in V Metaph., text. 5, nomen naturæ primo impositum est ad significandam generationem viventium, quæ dicitur nativitas. Et quia hujusmodi generatio est a principio intrinseco, extensum est hoc nomen ad significandum principium intrinsecum cujuscumque motus. Et sic definitur natura in II Phys., text 3. Et quia hujusmodi principium est formale vel materiale, communiter tam materia quam forma dicitur natura. Et quia per formam completur essentia uniuscujusque rei, communiter essentia uniuscujusque rei, quam significat ejus definitio, vocatur natura. Et sic accipitur hic natura. Unde Boetius, in eodem lib. De duab. naturis., cap. I, col. 1342, t. 2, dicit, quod « natura est unumquodque in- 1 In 2 Sic cod. in edit.: « quæ non sunt. » Sed sensus est: secundum quod nomina quæ sunt posita accipiuntur pro aliquibus nominibus rerum. » Specifica enim differentia est quæ complet definitionem, et sumitur a propria forma rei. Et ideo convenientius fuit quod in definitione personæ, quæ est singulare alicujus generis determinati, uteretur nomine naturæ quam essentiæ, quæ sumitur ab esse, quod est communissimum.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.5] The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it.
[I.q.29.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod anima est pars humanæ speciei; et ideo, licet sit separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis, non potest dici substantia individua, quæ est hypostasis vel substantia prima; sicut nec manus, nec quæcumque alia partium hominis; et sic non competit ei neque definitio personæ, neque nomen.
Article 3
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore "person" is not to be applied to God.
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod nomen personæ non sit ponendum in divinis. Dicit enim Dionysius, De div. nom., cap. 1, § 1, col. 587, t. 4: « Universaliter non est audendum aliquid dicere nec cogitare de supersubstantiali et occulta divinitate præter ea quæ divinitus nobis ex sanctis eloquiis sunt expressa. » Sed nomen personæ non exprimitur nobis in sacra Scriptura Novi vel Veteris Testamenti. Ergo non est nomine personæ utendum in divinis.
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.2] Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called prosopa, as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes." This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Boetius dicit, lib. De duab. nat., c. 111, col. 1343, t. 2: « Nomen personæ videtur traductum ex his personis quæ in comœdiis tragœdiisque quosdam homines repræsentabant. Persona enim dicta est a personando, quia concavitate ipsa major necesse est ut volvatur sonus. Græci vero has personas πρόσωπα vocant ab eo quod ponantur in facie, atque ante oculos obtegant vultum. » Sed hoc non potest competere in divinis, nisi forte secundum metaphoram. Ergo nomen personæ non dicitur de Deo nisi metaphorice.
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.3] Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word "hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person" should not be said of God.
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis personæ est hypostasis. Sed nomen hypotasis non videtur Deo competere, cum secundum Boetium, ibidem, col. 1344, significet id quod subjicitur accidentibus, quæ in Deo non sunt. Hieronymus etiam dicit in Ep. xv ad Damasum, col. 356, § 3, t. 4, quod « in hoc nomine » hypostasis « venenum latet sub melle. » Ergo hoc nomen « persona » non est dicendum de Deo.
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.4] Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above (14, 1); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word "person" ought not to be attributed to God.
[I.q.29.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, a quocumque removetur definitio, removetur et definitum. Sed definitio personæ supra posita, non videtur Deo competere; tum quia ratio importat discursivam cognitionem, quæ non competit Deo, ut supra ostensum est, et sic Deus non potest dici rationalis naturæ; tum etiam quia Deus dici non potest individua substantia, cum principium individuationis sit materia, Deus autem immaterialis est; neque etiam accidentibus substat, ut substantia dici possit. Nomen ergo personæ Deo attribui non debet. Ex versione Joannis Sarraceni. Corderius « universe igitur audendum non est, neque dicere, neque cogitare quidquam de supersubstantiali et abdita deitate, prætere ea quæ nobis in sacris oraculis
[I.q.29.a.3.sc] In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."
[I.q.29.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in Symbolo Athanasii, t. iv, col. 1582: « Alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti. »
[I.q.29.a.3.co] "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature--that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when treating of the names of God (13, 2).
[I.q.29.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura. Unde cum omne illud quod est perfectionis Deo sit attribuendum, eo quod ejus essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem; conveniens est ut hoc nomen, persona, de Deo dicatur; non tamen eodem modo quod dicitur de creaturis, sed excellentiori modo, sicut et alia nomina, quæ creaturis a nobis imposita, Deo attribuuntur, sicut supra ostensum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur.
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.1] Although the word "person" is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Timothy 6:20).
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet nomen personæ in Scriptura veteris vel novi Testamenti non inveniatur dictum de Deo; tamen id quod nomen significat multipliciter in sacra Scriptura inventur assertum de Deo, scilicet quod est maxime per se ens, et perfectissime intelligens. Si autem oporteret de Deo diici solum illa secundum vocem quæ sacra Scriptura de Deo tradit, sequeretur quod nunquam in alia lingua posset aliquís loqui de Deo, nisi in illa in qua primo tradita est Scriptura Veteris vel Novi Testamenti. Ad inveniendum autem nova nomina antiquam fidem de Deo significantia coegit necessitas disputandi cum hæreticis. Nec hæc novitas vitanda est, cum non sit profana; utpote a Scripturarum sensu non discordans. Docet autem Apostolus profanas vocum novitates vitare I ad Timoth., ult.
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.2] Although this name "person" may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a "person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to God.
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, quamvis hoc nomen, persona, non conveniat Deo quantum ad id a quo primum impositum est nomen, tamen quantum ad id ad quod significandum imponitur, maxime Deo convenit. Quia enim in comœdiis et tragœdiis repræsentabantur aliqui homines famosi, impositum est hoc nomen, persona, ad significandum aliquos dignitatem habentes. Unde consueverunt dici personæ in Ecclesiis, quæ habent aliquam dignitatem. Propter quod quidam definiunt personam, dicentes quod « persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. » Et quia magnæ dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturæ dicitur persona, ut dictum est. Sed dignitas sunt indicata divinitus. » « Nescio quid veneni in syllabis latet. » Ita edit. Rom. et Patav.; Nicolaï: « rationalis natura. » divinæ naturæ excedit omnem dignitatem, et secundum hoc maxime competit Deo noomen personæ.
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.3] The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word," forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nomen hypostasis non competit Deo quantum ad id a quo est impositum nomen, cum non substet accidentibus; competit autem quantum ad id ad quod significandum est impositum; est enim impositum ad significandum rem subsistentem. Hieronymus autem, dicit « sub hoc nomine venenum latere, » quia antequam significatio hujus nominis esset plene nota apud Latinos, hæretici per hoc nomen simplices decipiebant, ut confiterentur plures essentias, sicut confiterentur plures hypostases, propter hoc quod nomen substantiæ, cui respondet in Græco nomen ðπόστασις, communiter accipitur apud nos pro essentia.
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.4] It may be said that God has a rational "nature," if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above (Article 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature."
[I.q.29.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deus potest dici rationalis naturæ, secundum quod ratio non importat discursum, sed communiter intellectualem naturam. Individuum autem Deo competere non potest quantum ad hoc quod individuationis principium est materia, sed solum secundum quod importat incommunicabilitatem. Substantia vero convenit Deo secundum quod significat existere per se. Quidam tamen dicunt quod definitio superius, art. 1 hujus quæst., arg. 1, a Boetio data, non est definitio personæ secundum quod personas in Deo dicimus. Propter quod Richardus de Sancto Victore, lib. IV De Trinit., c. xviii, col. 941, corrigere volens hanc definitionem, dixit quod « persona, » secundum quod de Deo dicitur, « est divinæ naturæ incommunicabilis existentia. »
Article 4
[I.q.29.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son."
[I.q.29.a.4.arg.2] Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies essence.
[I.q.29.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « quid » quærit de essentia. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in eodem loco, cap. iv, col. 940, t. 8, cum dicitur: Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in cælo, Pater, Verbum et Spiritus sanctus, et quæritur: « Quid tres? respondetur, tres personæ. » Ergo hoc nomen persona significat essentiam.
[I.q.29.a.4.arg.3] According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated. Therefore "person" signifies substance.
[I.q.29.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, IV Met., text. 28, id quod significatur per nomen, est ejus definitio. Sed definitio personæ est rationalis naturæ individua substantia, ut dictum est. Ergo hoc nomen, persona, significat substantiam.
[I.q.29.a.4.arg.4] Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.
[I.q.29.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, persona in hominibus et angelis non significat relationem, sed aliquid absolutum. Si igitur in Deo significaret relationem, diceretur æquivoce de Deo et de hominibus et de angelis.
[I.q.29.a.4.sc] Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word "person" signifies relation.
[I.q.29.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius in lib. II De Trinit., col. 4302, t. 2, quod « omne nomen ad personas pertinens relationem significat. » Sed nullnm nomen magis pertinet ad personam quam hoc nomen, persona. Ergo hoc nomen, persona, relationem significat.
[I.q.29.a.4.co] A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express relation.
Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word "Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth.
To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of "man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person.
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above (28, 2, 3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word "person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
[I.q.29.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa significationem hujus nominis, persona, in divinis difficultatem ingerit quod pluraliter de tribus prædicatur præter naturam essentialium nominum: neque etiam ad aliquid dicitur, sicut nomina quæ relationem significant. Unde quibusdam visum est quod hoc nomen, persona, simpliter ex virtute vocabuli essentiam significet in divinis, sicut hoc nomen, Deus, et hoc nomen, sapiens. Sed propter instantiam hæreticorum est accommodatum ex ordinatione concilii ut possit poni pro relativis, et præcipue in plurali, vel cum nomine partitivo; ut cum tus de divinitate substantialiter prædicentur. Sapiens...: ita Hugo a Sancto Victore et Magister Sententiarum, qui tamen de ordinatione concilii silent. Secundum Scotum, Scotorellum et alios, si teneatur opinio quod persona aliquid positivum dicit, tunc nec substantiam, nec relationem; sed ab utroque abstrahit. dicimus: Tres personas, vel: « Alia est persona Patris, alia Filii. » In singulari vero potest sumi pro absoluto et pro relativo. Sed haec non videtur sufficiens ratio: quia si hoc nomen persona ex vi suæ significationis non habet quod significet nisi etiam in divinis, ex hoc quod dictum est tres personas non fuisset hæreticorum quietata calumnia, sed majoris calumniae data esset eis occasio. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod hoc nomen persona in divinis significat simul essentiam et relationem. Quorum quidam dixerunt quod significat essentiam in recto et relationem in obliquo, quia persona dicitur quasi per se una; unitas autem pertinet ad essentiam; quod autem dicitur per se, implicat relationem oblique. Intelligitur enim Pater per se esse, quasi relatione distinctus a Filio. Quidam vero dixerunt e converso quod significat relationem in recto, et essentiam in obliquo, quia in definitione personæ natura ponitur in obliquo, et isti propinquius ad veritatem accesserunt. Ad evidentiam igitur hujus quæstionis considerandum est quod aliquid est de significatione minus communis, quod tamen non est de significatione magis communis; rationale enim includitur in significatione hominis, quod tamen non est de significatione animalis. Unde aliud est quærere de significatione animalis, et aliud est quærere de significatione animalis quod est homo. Similiter aliud est quærere de significatione hujus nominis, persona, in communi, et aliud de significatione personæ divinæ. Persona enim in communi significat substantiam individuam rationalis naturæ, ut dictum est. Individuum autem est quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum. Persona igitur in quacumque natura significat id quod est distinctum in natura illa; sicut in humana natura significat has carnes, hæc ossa, et hanc animam, quæ sunt principia individuantia hominem; quæ quidem, licet non sint de significatione personæ in communi, sunt tamen de significatione personæ humanæ. Distinctio autem in divinis non fit nisi per relationes originis, ut dictum est supra. Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhærens alicui subjecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia: unde est subsistens sicut et essentia divina subsistit. Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita paternitas divina est Deus Pater, qui est persona divina. Persona igitur 1 In — 2 In Parm. Et hoc est significare relationem per modum substantiae, quæ est hypostasis subsistens in natura divina, licet subsistens in natura divina non sit aliud quam natura divina. Et secundum hoc verum est quod nomen, persona, significat relationem in recto et essentiam in obliquo; non tamen relationem in quantum est relatio, sed in quantum significat per modum hypostasis. Similiter etiam significat essentiam in recto et relationem in obliquo, in quantum essentia idem est quod hypostasis. Hypostasis autem significatur in divinis ut relatione distincta. Et similiter relatio per modum relationis significata cadit in ratione personæ in obliquo. Et secundum hoc etiam dici potest quod hæc significatio hujus nominis, persona, non erat percepta ante hæreticorum calumniam. Unde non erat in usu hoc nomen, persona, nisi sicut unum aliorum absolutorum: sed postmodum accommodation est hoc nomen, persona, ad standum pro relativo ex congruentia suæ significationis, ut scilicet hoc quod stat pro relativo, non solum habeat ex usu, ut prima opinio dicebat, sed etiam ex significatione sua.
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.1] This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a substance--which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the same.
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc nomen, persona, dicitur ad se, non ad alterum: quia significat relationem non per modum relationis, sed per modum substantiae, quæ est hypostasis. Et secundum hoc Angustinus dicit quod significat essentiam, prout in Deo essentia est idem cum hypostasi, quia in Deo non differt quod est et quo est.
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.2] The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the "suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod « quid » quandoque quærit de natura, quam significat definitio, ut cum quæritur: Quid est homo? et respondetur, animal rationale mortale. Quandoque vero quærit suppositum, ut cum quæritur: Quid natat in mari? et respondetur, piscis. Et sic quærentibus, « quid tres, » responsum est, « tres personæ. »
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.3] In God the individual--i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance--includes the idea of relation, as above explained.
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in intellectu substantiae individuæ, id est distinctæ vel incommunicabilis, intelligitur in divinis relatio, ut dictum est.
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.4] The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures (13, 5).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.29.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod diversa ratio minus communium non facit æquivocationem in magis communi. Licet enim sit alia propria definitio equi et asini; tamen univocantur in nomine animalis, quia communis definitio animalis convenit utrique. Unde deest: « et » — non sequitur, licet in significatione personæ divinæ contineatur relatio, non autem in significatione angelicæ personæ, vel humanæ, quod nomen personæ aequivoce dicatur. Licet nec etiam dicatur univoce; cum nihil univoce de Deo dici possit, et de creaturis, ut supra ostensum est.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-pars/q029.json