Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q46. The beginning of the duration of creatures
Source context
- Theme
- Temporal origination of creatures: whether the world began in time or is eternal
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian cosmologyAristotle's argument for the eternity of motion and the unmoved mover stands as the primary philosophical pressure Aquinas must answer in Q46, which distinguishes revealed temporal creation from philosophical necessitarianism.
- Vedanta (Advaita)Advaita Vedanta posits cyclical cosmic emanation and dissolution (srishti/pralaya) rather than a singular temporal beginning, representing a cross-tradition congruence with Q46's concern for the relation between the Absolute and creaturely duration — though the structural logic differs sharply from Aquinas's creatio ex nihilo.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus)Plotinus locates time as a product of the World-Soul's activity, arising with creation rather than preceding it — a structural parallel to Aquinas's position that time and creatures are co-originate, though Plotinus's emanationism contrasts with Aquinas's free divine will.
Q46. The beginning of the duration of creatures
Article 1
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod universitas creaturarum, quæ nunc 1 In Parm. et in edit. minus recte quam in mundi nomine nuncupatur, non inceperit, sed fuerit ab æterno. Omne enim quod incepit esse, antequam fuerit, possibile fuit ipsum esse; alioquin impossibile fuisset ipsum fieri. Sed quod est possibile esse, est materia, quæ est in potentia ad esse, quod est per formam; et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus incepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia. Sed non potest esse materia sine forma; materia autem mundi cum forma est mundus. Fuit ergo mundus antequam esse inciperet; quod est impossibile.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.2] Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, quando est et quando non est; quia ad quantum se extendit virtus alicujus rei, tamdiu est. Sed omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper; non enim virtutem habet ad determinatum durationis tempus. Nullum ergo incorruptibile quando est et quando non est, sed omne quod incipit esse, quando est et quando non est. Nullum ergo incorruptibile incipit esse. Sed multa sunt in mundo incorruptibilia, ut corpora cælestia, et omnes substantiæ intellectuales. Ergo mundus non incepit esse.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.3] Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullum ingenitum incepit esse. Sed Philosophus, in I Physic., text. 82, dicit quod materia est ingenita; et in I De cæl. et mund., text. 20, quod cælum est ingenitum. Non ergo universitas rerum incepit esse.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.4] Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, vacuum est ubi non est corpus, sed possibile est esse. Sed si mundus incepit esse, ubi nunc est corpus mundi, prius non fuit aliquod corpus; et tamen poterat ibi esse; alioquin nunc ibi non esset. Ergo ante mundum fuit vacuum quod est impossibile.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.5] Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, nihil de novo incipit moveri, nisi per hoc quod movens vel mobile aliter se habet nunc quam prius. Sed quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius, movetur. Ergo ante omnem motum de novo incipientem fuit aliquis motus. Motus ergo semper fuit; ergo et mobile, quia motus non est nisi in mobili.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.6] Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.6] 6. Præterea, omne movens aut est naturale, aut est voluntarium. Sed neutrum incipit movere nisi aliquo motu præxistente: natura enim semper eodem modo operatur. Unde nisi præcedat aliqua immutatio vel in natura moventis vel in mobili, non incipit a movente naturali esse motus, qui non fuit prius. Voluntas autem absque sui immutatione retardat facere quod proponit. Sed hoc non est nisi per aliquam immutationem, quam imaginatur ad minus ex parte ipsius temporis; sicut qui vult facere domum cras et non hodie, expectat aliquid futurum cras quod hodie non est, et ad minus expectat quod dies hodiernus transeat et crastinus adveniat; quod sine mutatione non est, quia tempus est numerus motus. Relinquitur ergo quod ante omnem motum de novo incipientem fuit alius motus, et sic idem quod prius.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.7] Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the measure of what is time.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.7] 7. Præterea, quidquid est semper in principio et semper in fine, nec incipere nec desinere potest, quia quod incipit, non est in suo fine; quod autem desinit, non est in suo principio. Sed tempus semper est in suo principio et fine, quia nihil est temporis nisi nunc, quod est finis præteriti et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nec incipere nec desinere potest, et per consequens nec motus, cujus numerus tempus est.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.8] Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.8] 8. Præterea, Deus aut est prior mundo natura tantum, aut et duratione. Si natura tantum, ergo cum Deus sit ab æterno, et mundus est ab æterno. Si autem est prior duratione, prius autem et posterius in duratione constituunt tempus; ergo ante mundum fuit tempus, quod est impossibile.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.9] Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (44, 2,3,4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also eternal.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.9] 9. Præterea, posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus; causa enim ad quam non sequitur effectus est causa imperfecta, indigens alio ad hoc quod effectus sequatur. Sed Deus est sufficiens causa mundi: et finalis, ratione suæ bonitatis, et exemplaris ratione suæ sapientiae, et effectiva ratione suæ potentiae, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum ergo Deus sit ab æterno, et mundus fuit ab æterno.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.10] Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal.
[I.q.46.a.1.arg.10] 10. Præterea, cujus actio est æternus, et effectus est æternus. Sed actio Dei est ejus substantia quae est æterna. Ergo et mundus est æternus.
[I.q.46.a.1.sc] It is said (John 17:5), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (Proverbs 8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning."
[I.q.46.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., xvii, 5: Clarifica me, Pater, apud temetipsum claritate quam habui, priusquam mundus fieret*; et Prov., viii, 22: Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio.
[I.q.46.a.1.co] Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Question 19, Article 4) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (Question 19, Article 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration.
Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative--viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways.
Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them.
Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable.
Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
[I.q.46.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nihil potest præter Deum ab æterno fuisse. Et hoc qui dem ponere non est impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra, quod voluntas Dei est causa rerum. Sic ergo aliqua necesse est esse, sicut necesse est Deum velle illa, cum necessitas effectus ex necessitate causæ dependeat, ut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 6. Ostensum est autem supra, quod, absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum. Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper; sed eatenus mundus est, quatenns Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi ex voluntate Dei dependeat sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur necessarium mundum semper esse. Unde nec demonstrative probari potest. Nec rationes quas ad hoc Aristoteles inducit lib. VIII Physic., sunt demonstrativæ simpliciter sed secundum quid, scilicet ad contradicendum positionibus 4 antiquorum ponentium mundum incipere secundum quosdam modos in veritate impossibles. Et hoc apparet ex tribus. Primo quidam quia tam in VIII Phys., loc. nunc cit., quam in I De cæl., text. 101 et seqq., præmittit quasdam opiniones, ut Anaxagoræ et Empedoclis et Platonis, contra quos rationes contradictorias inducit. Secundo, quia ubicumque de hac materia loquitur inducit testimonia antiquorum, quod non est demonstratoris, sed probabiliter persuadentis. Tertio, quia expresse dicit in lib. I Topic., cap. 1x, parum a princ., quod quædam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habemus, ut, « utrum mundus sit æternus. » Ad primum ergo dicendnm, quod antequam mundus esset, erat possibile mundum esse, non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quæ est materia, sed secundum potentiam activam Dei: et etiam secundum quod dicitur aliquid absolute possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam, sed ex sola habitudine terminorum qui sibi non repugnant, secundum quod possibile opponitur impossibili, ut patet per Philosophum in V Metaph., text. 17.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.1] Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.2] Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before it received that power, it did not exist.
Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper ex quo habet illam virtutem, non quando est et quando non est; sed antequam haberet illam virtutem non fuit. Unde hæc ratio quæ ponitur ab Aristotele in I De cæl., text. 120, non concludit simpliciter quod incorruptibilia non incæperunt esse; sed quod non inceperunt esse per modum naturalem quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt esse.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.3] Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (44, 1, ad 2).
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Aristoteles in I Physic., loc. cit. in arg., probat materiam esse ingenitam per hoc quod non habet subjectum de quo sit; in I autem De cæl. et mund., loc cit. in arg., probat cælum ingenitum, quia non habet contrarium ex quod generetur. Unde patet quod per utrumque non excluditur 2 nisi quod materia et cælum non inceperunt per generationem, ut quidam ponebant præcipue de cælo. Nos autem dicimus quod materia et cælum producta sunt in esse per creationem, ut ex dictis patet.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.4] The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world was.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ad rationem vacui non sufficit « in quo nihil est, » sed requiritur quod sit spatium capax corporis in quo non sit corpus, ut patet per Aristotelem in IV Physic., text. 60. Nos autem dicimus non fuisse locum aut spatium ante mundum.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.5] The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (45, 2, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod primus motor semper eodem modo se habuit; primum autem mobile non semper eodem modo se habuit, quia incepit esse, cum prius non fuisset. Sed hoc non fuit per mutationem, sed per creationem, quæ non est mutatio, ut supra dictum est. Unde patet quod hæc ratio quam ponit Aristoteles in VIII Physic., procedit contra eos qui ponebant mobilia æterna, sed motum non æternum, ut patet ex opinionibus Anaxagoræ et Empedoclis. Nos autem ponimus, ex quo mobilia inceperunt, semper fuisse motum.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.6] The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod primum agens est agens voluntarium. Et quamvis habuerit voluntatem æternam producendi aliquem effectum, non tamen produxit æternum effectum. Nec est necesse quod præsupponatur aliqua mutatio, nec etiam propter imaginationem temporis. Aliter enim est intelligendum de agente particulari quod præsupponit aliquid et causat alterum, et aliter de agente universali quod producit totum; sicut agens particulare producit formam, et præsupponit materiam; unde oportet quod formam inducat secundum proportionem ad debitam materiam. Unde rationabiliter in ipso consideratur quod inducit formam in talem materiam et non in aliam, ex differentia materiae ad materiam. Sed hoc non rationabiliter consideratur in eo qui simul producit formam et materiam, sed consideratur rationabiliter in eo quod ipse producit materiam congruam formæ et fini. Agens autem particulare præ-supponit tempus, sicut et materiam. Unde rationabiliter consideratur in eo quod agit in tempore posteriori et non priori, secundum imaginationem successionis temporis post tempus. Sed in agente universali, quod producit rem et tempus, non est considerare quod agat nunc et non prius secundum imaginationem temporis post tempus, quasi tempus præ-supponatur ejus actioni; sed considerandum est quod dedit effectui suo tempus, quantum et quando voluit, et secundum quod conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim mundum ducit in cognitionem divinæ potentiæ creantis, si mundus non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset; omne enim quod non semper fuit manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de eo quod semper fuit.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.7] As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.7] Ad septimum dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., text. 100, prius et posterius est in tempore, secundum quod prius et posterius est in motu. Unde principium et finis accipienda sunt in tempore sicut et in motu. Supposita autem æternitate motus, necesse est quod quodlibet momentum in motu acceptum sit principium et terminus motus: quod non oportet si motus incipiat. Et eadem ratio est de nunc temporis. Et sic patet quod ratio illa instantis nunc, quod semper sit principium et finis temporis, supponit æternitatem temporis. Unde Aristoteles hanc rationem inducit in VIII Physic., text. 40, contra eos qui ponebant æternitatem temporis, sed negabant æternitatem motus.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.8] God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.8] Ad octavum dicendum, quod Deus est prior mundo duratione. Sed ly prius non designat prioritatem temporis, sed æternitatis. Vel dicendum quod designat æternitatem temporis imaginati et non realiter existentis, sicut cum dicitur: Supra cælum nihil est, ly supra designat locum imaginarium tantum, secundum quod possibile est imaginari, dimensionibus cælestis corporis dimensions alias superaddi.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.9] As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (19, 4; 41, 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as preordained by His will--that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.9] Ad nonum dicendum, quod, sicut effectus sequitur a causa agente naturaliter secundum modum suæ formæ, ita sequitur ab 1. — 2. — 3. Juxta Billuart, possibile est quoad res permaagente per voluntatem secundum formam ab eo præconceptam et definitam, ut ex superioribus patet. Licet igitur Deus ab æterno fuerit sufficiens causa mundi, non tamen oportet quod ponatur mundus ab eo productus, nisi secundum quod est in præ-definitione suæ voluntatis, ut scilicet habeat esse post non esse, ut manifestius declaret suum auctorem.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.10] Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not being.
[I.q.46.a.1.ad.10] Ad decimum dicendum, quod posita actione, sequitur effectus secundum exigen-tiam formæ, quæ est principium actionis. In agentibus autem per voluntatem, quod conceptum est et præ-definitum, accipitur ut forma quæ est principium actionis. Ex actione igitur Dei æterna non sequitur effectus æternus, sed qualem Deus voluit, ut scilicet haberet esse post non esse.
Article 2
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod mundum incepisse non sit articulus fidei, sed conclusio demonstrabilis. Omne enim factum habet principium suæ durationis. Sed demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit causa effectiva mundi; et hoc etiam probabiliores philosophi posuerunt. Ergo demonstrative probari potest quod mundus inceperit.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.2] Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si necesse est dicere quod mundus factus est a Deo, aut ergo ex nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo; quia sic materia mundi præcessisset mundum; contra quod procedunt rationes Aristotelis ponentes, lib. I De cælo, text. 20, cælum ignitum. Ergo oportet dicere quod mundus sit factus ex nihilo, et sic habet esse post non esse. Ergo oportet quod esse inceperit.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.3] Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne quod operatur per intellectum a quodam principio operatur, ut patet in omnibus artificialibus. Sed Deus est agens per intellectum. Ergo a quodam principio operatur. Mundus igitur, qui est ejus effectus, non fuit semper.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.4] Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, manifeste apparet artes ali-nentes non quoad res successivas mundum ab æterno fuisse; hanc prorsus inutilem et vanam distinctionem S. Thomas omittit. quas et habitationem regionum ex determinatis temporibus incepisse. Sed hoc non esset, si mundus semper fuisset. Mundum igitur non semper fuisse manifestum est.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.5] Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.5] 5. Præterea, certum est nihil Deo æquari posse. Sed si mundus semper fuisset, æquipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo certum est non semper mundum fuisse.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.6] Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.6] 6. Præterea, si mundus semper fuit, infiniti dies præcesserunt diem istum. Sed infinita non est pertransire. Ergo nunquam fuisset perventum ad hunc diem: quod est manifeste falsum.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.7] Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.7] 7. Præterea, si mundus fuit æternus, et generatio fuit ab æterno. Ergo unus homo genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens filii, ut dicitur in II Phys., text. 29. Ergo in causis efficientibus est procedere in infinitum; quod improbatur in II Metaph., text. 5.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.8] Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
[I.q.46.a.2.arg.8] 8. Præterea, si mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti hominis præcesserunt. Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitæ animæ humanæ nunc essent actu; quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri potest quod mundus inceperit, et non sola fide tenetur.
[I.q.46.a.2.sc] The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Hebrews 11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
[I.q.46.a.2.sc] Sed contra, fidei articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, quia fides de non apparentibus est, ut dicitur ad Hebr., xi. Sed Deum esse creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus inceperit esse, est articulus fidei; dicimus enim, « Credo in unum Deum, etc. » et iterum Gregorius dicit in Hom. i in Ezech., § 1, col. 786, t. 2, quod « Moyses prophetavit de præterito, dicens: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram; » in quo novitas mundi traditur. Ergo novitas mundi habetur tantum per revelationem: et ideo non potest probari demonstrative.
[I.q.46.a.2.co] By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity (32, 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Question 19, Article 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.
[I.q.46.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod mundum non semper fuisse sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative probari non potest, sicut ut supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est. Et ejus ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem secundum rationem suæ speciei abstrahit ab hic et nunc; propter quod dicitur quod universalia sunt ubique et semper. Unde demonstrari non potest quod homo, aut cælum, aut lapis non semper fuit. Similiter etiam neque ex parte causæ agentis, quæ agit per voluntatem. Voluntas enim Dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi circa ea quæ absolute necesse est Deum velle. Talia autem non sunt quæ circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est. Potest autem voluntas divina homini manifestari per revelationem, cui fides innititur. Unde mundum incepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile, vel scibile. Et hoc utile est ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod fidei est demonstrare præsumens, rationes non necessarias inducat, quæ præbeant materiam irridendi infidelibus existimantibus nos propter hujusmodi rationes credere quæ fidei sunt.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.1] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (Question 45, Article 2).
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, De civ. Dei, lib. XI, c. iv, col. 319, t. 7, philosophorum ponentium æternitatem mundi duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim posuerunt quod substantia mundi non sit a Deo, et horum est intolerabilis error; et ideo ex necessitate refellitur. Quidam autem sic posuerunt mundum æternum, quod tamen mundum a Deo factum dicerent. Non enim mundum temporis volunt habere, sed suæ creationis initium, ut quodam modo vix intelligibili semper sit factus. « Id autem quomodo intelligant, invenereunt, » ut idem dicit De civ. Dei, lib. X, c. xxxi, col. 314, t. 7. « Sicut enim, » inquit, « si pes ex æternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium, quod a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; sic et mundus semper fuit, semper existente qui fecit. » Et ad hoc intelligendum considerandum est quod causa efficiens quæ agit per motum, de necessitate præcedit tempore suum effectum; quia effectus non est nisi in termino actionis, agens autem omne oportet esse principium actionis. Sed si actio sit instantanea et non successiva, non est necessarium faciens esse prius facto duratione, sicut patet in illuminatione. Unde dicunt quod non sequitur ex necessitate, si Deus est causa activa mundi, quod sit prior mundo duratione; quia creatio, qua mundum produxit, non est mutatio successiva, ut supra dictum est.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.2] Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illi qui ponerent mundum æternum, dicerent mundum factum a Deo ex nihilo, non quod factus sit post nihilum, secundum quod nos intelligimus per nomen creationis, sed quia non est factus de aliquo; et sic etiam non recusant aliqui eorum creationis nomen, ut patet ex Avicenna in sua Metaph., lib. IX, cap. iv.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.3] This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human intellect, but not the divine intellect (14, 7,12).
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa est ratio Anaxagoræ, quæ ponitur in VIII Physic., text. 45. Sed non de necessitate conclusit nisi de intellectu qui deliberando investigat quid agendum sit, quod est simile motui. Talis autem est intellectus humanus, sed non divinus, ut supra patet.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.4] Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ponentes æternitatem mundi ponunt aliquam regionem infinities esse mutatam de inhabitabili in habitabilem, et e converso, et similiter ponunt quod artes propter diversas corruptiones et accidentia infinities fuerunt inventæ, et iterum corruptæ. Unde Aristoteles dicit in lib. I Meteor., cap. ult. post med., quod ridiculum est ex hujusmodi particularibus mutationibus opinionem accipere de novitate mundi totius.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.5] Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod, etsi mundus semper fuisset, non tamen parificaretur Deo in æternitate, ut dicit Boetius in fine De consol., lib. V, prosa vi, col. 859, t. 4, quia esse divinum est esse totum simul absque successione; non autem sic est de mundo.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.6] Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod transitus semper intelligitur a termino in terminum. Quæcumque autem præterita dies signetur, ab illa usque ad istam sunt finiti dies, qui pertransiri poterunt. Objectio autem procedit, ac si, positis extremis, sint media infinita.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.7] In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.7] Ad septimum dicendum, quod in causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in infinitum per se; ut puta, si causæ quæ per se requiruntur ad aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum; sicut si lapis movetur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur impossibile; ut puta, si omnes causæ, quæ in infinitum multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi unius causæ, sed earum multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis martellis per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic martello quod agat post actionem alterius martelli; et similiter accidit huic homini, inquantum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio; generat enim inquantum homo, et non inquantum est filius alterius hominis. Omnes enim homines generantes habent gradum unum in causis efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Unde non est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum; esset autem impossibile, si generatio hujus hominis dependeret ad hoc homine et a corpore elementari et a sole, et sic in infinitum.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.8] Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was disproved above (Question 7, Article 4). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine says [Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13, asserted on this account a circuit of souls--viz. that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later (75, 2; 118, 6). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or least some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
[I.q.46.a.2.ad.8] Ad octavum dicendum, quod hanc rationem, ponentes æternitatem mundi, multipliciter effugiunt. Quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse infinitas animas actu, ut patet in Metaph. Algazelis, dicentis hoc esse infinitum per accidens. Sed hoc improbatum est superius. Quidam vero dicunt animam corrumpi cum corpore. Quidam vero, quod ex omnibus animabus remanet una tantum. Alii vero, ut Augustinus dicit, posuerunt propter hoc circuitum animarum, ut scilicet animæ separatæ a corporibus post determinata temporum curricula iterum redirent ad corpora; de quibus omnibus in sequentibus est agendum. Considerandum tamen quod hæc ratio particularis est. Unde posset dicere aliquis quod mundus fuit æternus, vel saltem aliqua creatura, ut angelus, non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus universaliter an aliqua creatura fuerit ab æterno.
Article 3
[I.q.46.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.
[I.q.46.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod creatio rerum non fuerit in principio temporis. Quod enim non est in tempore, non est in aliquo temporis. Sed creatio rerum non fuit in tempore; per creationem enim rerum substantia in esse producta est. Tempus autem non mensurat substantiam rerum, et præcipue incorporalium. Ergo creatio non fuit in principio temporis.
[I.q.46.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.
[I.q.46.a.3.arg.3] Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.
[I.q.46.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ipsum etiam tempus creatum est. Sed tempus non potest creari in principio temporis; cum tempus sit divisibile, principium autem temporis indivisibile. Non ergo creatio rerum fuit in principio temporis.
[I.q.46.a.3.sc] It is said (Genesis 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
[I.q.46.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Genes, 1, 4, dicitur: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram.
[I.q.46.a.3.co] The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the beginning" are expounded--viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded--"in the Son." For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Psalm 103:24), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Colossians 1:16), "In Him"--viz. the Son--"were created all things." But others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"--i.e. before all things--"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
[I.q.46.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illud verbum Genes, 1: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram, tripliciter exponitur ad excludendum tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, et tempus non habere principium; et ad hoc excludendum exponitur: In principio, scilicet temporis. Quidam vero posuerunt duo esse creationis principia unum bonorum, aliud malorum; et ad hoc excludendum exponitur: In principio; id est, in Filio. Sicut enim principium effectivum appropriatur Patri propter potentiam, ita principium exemplare appropriatur Filio propter sapientiam; ut, sicut dicitur psal. ciii, 24: Omnia in sapientia fecisti; ita intelligatur, Deum omnia fecisse in principio, id est, in Filio, secundum illud Apostoli ad Colossens., 1, 45: In ipso, scilicet Filio, condita sunt universa. Alii vero dixerunt corporalia esse creata a Deo mediantibus creaturis spiritualibus; et ad hoc excludendum exponitur: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram, id est, ante omnia. Quatuor enim ponuntur simul creata, scilicet cælum empyreum, materia corporalis, quæ nomine terræ intelligitur, tempus, et natura angelica.
[I.q.46.a.3.ad.1] Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time heaven and earth were created.
[I.q.46.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non dicuntur in principio temporis res esse creatæ, quasi principium temporis creatio-nis sit mensura; sed quia simul cum tempore cælum et terra creata sunt.
[I.q.46.a.3.ad.2] This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said above (45, 2,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.
[I.q.46.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum illud Philosophi intelligitur de fieri quod est per motum vel quod est terminus motus. Quia, cum in quolibet motu sit accipere prius et posterius, ante quodcumque signum in motu signato, dum scilicet aliquid est in moveri et fieri, est accipere prius, et etiam aliquid post ipsum, quia quod est in principio motus vel in termino, non est in moveri. Creatio autem neque est motus, neque terminus motus, ut supra dictum est. Unde sic aliquid creatur quod non prius creabatur.
[I.q.46.a.3.ad.3] Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.46.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil fit nisi secundum quod est. Nihil autem est temporis nisi « nunc; » unde non potest fieri nisi secundum aliquod « nunc; » non quia in ipso primo nunc sit tempus, sed quia ab eo incipit tempus.
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