Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q48. The distinction of things in particular
Source context
- Theme
- ontological differentiation of particular beings within the created order, including the nature and role of evil
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Proclus)The procession of multiplicity from the One entails a hierarchical privation of being, structurally parallel to Aquinas's treatment of evil as privation and the graduated distinction of particular things from their source.
- Kabbalah (Tzimtzum doctrine)The contraction and differentiation of the infinite into finite particulars offers a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's account of how distinct, limited beings proceed from an unlimited divine source.
Q48. The distinction of things in particular
Article 1
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod malum sit natura quædam. Quia omne genus est natura quædam. Sed malum est quoddam genus; dicitur enim in Prædicamentis, cap. x De opposit., in fine, quod bonum et malum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera aliorum. Ergo malum est natura quædam.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.2] Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis differentia constitutiva alicujus speciei est natura quædam. Malum autem est differentia constitutiva in moralibus; differt enim specie malus habitus a bono, ut liberalitas ab illiberalitate. Ergo malum significat naturam quamdam.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.3] Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, utrumque contrariorum est natura quædam. Sed malum et bonum non opponuntur ut privatio et habitus, sed ut contraria, ut probat Philosophus in Prædicamentis, cap. De oppositis, per hoc quod inter bonum et malum est aliquid medium, et a malo potest fieri reditus ad bonum. Ergo malum significat naturam quamdam.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.4] Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quod non est, non agit. Sed malum agit, quia corrumpit bonum. Ergo malum est quoddam ens, et natura quædam.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.5] Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil is a nature.
[I.q.48.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, ad perfectionem universitatis rerum non pertinet nisi quod est ens et natura quædam. Sed malum pertinet ad perfectionem universitatis rerum; dicit enim Augustinus in Enchir., c. x et xi, col. 236, tom. VI, quod « ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo. In qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et suo loco positum, eminentius commendat bona. » Ergo malum est natura quædam.
[I.q.48.a.1.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good."
[I.q.48.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius, dicit 1, De div. nom., c. iv, § 33, col. 734, t. 1: « Malum non est existens, neque bonum. »
[I.q.48.a.1.co] One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
[I.q.48.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod unum oppositorum cognoscitur per alterum, sicut per lucem tenebrae. Unde et quid sit malum, oportet ex ratione boni accipere. 1 Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Guillermus dicit quod infiniti mundi isto mundo perfectiores in mente Dei latitant. Democritus autem infinitos actu mundos posuit. Juxta D. Thomam, stante isto mundo, Deus alium mundum producere non posset, quod Scotorello et Guillermo displicet; nam in agendo Deus materiam non præsupponit, qui de nihilo ad alium mundum producendum novam aliam materiam crearet. Nec terra mundi alterius ad hujus mundi centrum moveretur, sed ad suum proprium centrum, quia duæ illæ terræ connexionem ad inviæm non haberent. Deus insuper non est motor ad aliquod mobile natura deputatus, sed quodcumque mobile natura sua movere potest. Dicendum est ergo quod plures mundos etiam sphericæ figuræ Deus producere posset.
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.1] Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Aristoteles ibi loquitur secundum opinionem Pythagoricorum, qui malum existimabant esse naturam quamdam; et ideo ponebant bonum et malum genera. Consuevit enim Aristoteles, et praecipue in libris logicalibus, ponere exempla quæ probabilia erant suo tempore secundum opinionem aliorum philosophorum. Vel dicendum, sicut dicit Philosophus in IV Metaph., text. 6, quod prima contrarietas est habitus et privatio, quia scilicet in omnibus contrariis salvatur; cum semper unum contrariorum sit imperfectum respectu alterius, ut nigrum respectu albi, et amarum respectu dulcis. Et pro tanto bonum et malum dicuntur genera non simpliciter, sed contrariorum; quia, sicut omnis forma habet rationem boni, ita omnis privatio, inquantum hujusmodi, habet rationem mali.
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.2] Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum et malum non sunt differentiae constitutivæ nisi in moralibus, quæ recipiunt species ex fine, qui est objectum voluntatis, a quo moralia dependent. Et quia bonum habet rationem finis, ideo bonum et malum sunt differentiae specificæ in moralibus. Nec tamen remotio debiti finis constituit speciem in moralibus, nisi secundum quod adjungitur fini indebito; sicut neque in materialibus inventur privatio formæ substantialis, nisi adjuncta alteri formæ. Sic igitur malum quod est differentia constitutiva in moralibus, est quoddam bonum adjunctum privationi alterius boni; sicut finis intemperati est non quidem carere bono rationis, sed delectabile sensus absque ordine rationis. Unde malum, inquantum malum, non est differentia constitutiva, sed ratione boni adjuncti. Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad tertium. Nam ibi Philosophus loquitur de bono et malo, secundum quod inveniuntur in moralibus. Sic enim inter bonum et malum inventur medium, prout bonum dicitur quod est ordinatum, malum autem quod non solum est deordinatum, sed etiam nocivum alteri. Unde dicit Philosophus in IV Ethic., cap. 1, circ. med., quod « prodigus vanus quidem est, sed non malus. » Ab hoc etiam malo quod est secundum morem, contingit fieri reditum ad bonum, non autem ex quocumque malo; non enim ex cæcitate fit reditus ad visionem, cum tamen cæcitas sit malum quoddam.
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.3] This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.4] A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white.
Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquid agere dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo formaliter, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur albedo facere album: et sic malum etiam ratione ipsius privationis dicitur corrumpere bonum, quia est ipsa corruptio, vel privatio boni. Alio modo dicitur aliquid agere effective, sicut pictor dicitur facere album parietem. Tertio modo per modum causæ finalis, sicut finis dicitur efficere movendo efficientem. His autem duobus modis malum non agit aliquid per se, id est secundum quod est privatio quædam, sed secundum quod ei bonum adjungitur. Nam omnis actio est ab aliqua forma, et omne quod desideratur ut finis, est perfectio aliqua. Et ideo, ut Dionysius dicit, De divin. nomin., cap. iv, § 32, col. 731, t. 1. « Malum non agit, neque desideratur, nisi virtute boni adjuncti; per se autem est infinitum, et præter voluntatem et intentionem. »
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.5] As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it.
[I.q.48.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, partes universi habent ordinem ad invicem, secundum quod una agit in alteram, et est finis alterius et exemplar. Hæc autem, ut dictum est, non possunt convenire malo nisi ratione boni adjuncti. Unde malum neque ad perfectionem universi pertinet, neque sub ordine universi concluditur, nisi per accidens, id est, ratione boni adjuncti.
Article 2
[I.q.48.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
[I.q.48.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod malum non inveniatur in rebus. Quidquid enim invenitur in rebus, vel est ens aliquod, vel privatio alicujus, quod est non ens. Sed Dionysius dicit $^1$, De div. nomin., cap. iv, § 49, col. 715, t. 4, quod « malum distat ab existente, et adhuc plus distat a non existente. » Ergo malum nullo modo invenitur in rebus.
[I.q.48.a.2.arg.2] Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been said (1).
[I.q.48.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ens et res convertuntur. Si ergo malum est ens in rebus, sequitur quod malum sit res quædam, quod est contra prædicta.
[I.q.48.a.2.arg.3] Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil.
[I.q.48.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « albius est quod est nigro impermixtius, » ut dicitur in III Topic. Aristotelis, cap. iv, non remote a princ. Ergo et melius est quod est malo impermixtius. Sed Deus facit semper quod melius est, multo magis quam natura. Ergo in rebus a Deo conditis nihil malum invenitur.
[I.q.48.a.2.sc] On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
[I.q.48.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod secundum hoc removerentur omnes prohibitiones et pœnæ, quæ non sunt nisi malorum.
[I.q.48.a.2.co] As was said above (47, 1,2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.
As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil.
[I.q.48.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, perfectio universi requirit inæqualitatem esse in rebus, ut omnes bonitatis gradus impleantur. Est autem unus gradus bonitatis ut aliquid ita bonum sit quod nun-quam deficere possit. Alius autem gradus bonitatis est ut sic aliquid bonum sit quod a bono deficere possit; qui etiam gradus in ipso esse inveniuntur; quædam enim sunt, quæ suum esse amittere non possunt, ut incorruptibilia; quædam vero sunt quæ amittere possunt, ut corruptibilia. Sicut igitur perfectio universitatis rerum requirit ut non solum sint entia incorruptibilia, sed etiam corruptibilia; ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quædam quæ a bonitate deficere possint, ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere. In hoc autem consistit ratio mali, ut scilicet aliquid deficiat a bono. quando negat esse de eo quod non est; hoc modo malum dicitur esse, sicut cæcitas in oculo. Proprie loquendo malum non est in genere, nisi reductive, ut alicujus boni privatio.
[I.q.48.a.2.ad.1] Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation.
[I.q.48.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod malum distat et ab ente simpliciter, et a non ente simpliciter; quia neque est sicut habitus, neque sicut pura negatio, sed sicut privatio.
[I.q.48.a.2.ad.2] As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.
[I.q.48.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 14, ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem prædicamenta; et sic convertitur cum re; et hoc modo nulla privatio est ens, unde nec malum. Alio modo dicitur ens quod significat veritatem propositionis, quæ in compositione consistit, cujus nota est hoc verbum « est; » et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quæstionem, an est; et sic cæcitatem dicimus esse in oculo, vel quamcumque aliam privationem. Et hoc modo etiam malum dicitur ens. Propter hujus autem distinctionis ignorantiam aliqui considerantes quod aliquæ res dicuntur malæ, vel quod malum dicitur esse in rebus, crediderunt quod malum esset res quædam.
[I.q.48.a.2.ad.3] God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above (Question 47, Article 2). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.
[I.q.48.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus et natura et quodcumque agens facit quod melius est in toto sed non quod melius est in unaquaque parte, nisi per ordinem ad totum, ut supra dictum est. Ipsum autem totum, quod est universitas creaturarum, melius et perfectius est, si in eo sint quædam quæ a bono deficere possunt, quæ interdum deficiunt, Deo hoc non impediente. Tum quia « providentiae non est naturam destruere, sed salvare, » ut Dionysius dicit $^2$, De div. nomin., cap. iv, § 33, col. 734, t. 4. Ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet, ut quæ deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant. Tum quia, ut dicit Augustinus $^3$, in Enchirid., cap. xi, col. 236, t. 6: « Deus est adeo potens, quod etiam bona potest facere de malis. » Unde multa bona tollerentur, si Deus nullum malum permitteret esse; non enim generaretur ignis, nisi corrumperetur aer; neque conservaretur vita leonis, nisi occideretur asinus. Neque etiam laudaretur justitia vinautem nec in iis est quæ sunt, nec in iis quæ non sunt, sed eo etiam quod non est, remotius est a bono, tanquam alienum ac minus ens. » $^2$ Corderius: « Non est Providentiae naturam violare. » $^3$ Sensum reddit D. Thomas; plenius in textu: « Neque Deus omnipotens... ullo modo sineret mali aliquid esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret et de malo.» dicantis et patientia sufferentis si non esset iniquitas persequentis.
Article 3
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod malum non sit in bono sicut in subjecto. Omnia enim bona sunt existentia. Sed Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., cap. iv, § 33, col. 734, t. 4, quod « malum non est existens, neque in existentibus. » Ergo malum non est in bono sicut in subjecto.
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.2] Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject.
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, malum non est ens; bonum vero est ens. Sed non requirit ens, in quo sit sicut in subjecto. Ergo nec malum requirit bonum, in quo sit sicut in subjecto.
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.3] Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject.
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unum contrariorum non est subjectum alterius. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria. Ergo malum non est in bono sicut in subjecto.
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.4] Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (Isaiah 5:20): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"
[I.q.48.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, id in quo est albedo sicut in subjecto dicitur esse album. Ergo et id in quo est malum sicut in subjecto, est malum. Si ergo malum sit in bono sicut in subjecto, sequitur quod bonum sit malum, contra id quod dicitur Isa., v, 20: Væ qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum malum!
[I.q.48.a.3.sc] Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good."
[I.q.48.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchir., cap. xiv, col. 238, t. 6, quod malum non est nisi in bono.
[I.q.48.a.3.co] As was said above (Article 1), evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.
Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same--viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.
[I.q.48.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, malum importat remotionem boni. Non autem quælibet remotio boni malum dicitur. Potest enim accipi remotio boni et privative et negative. Remotio igitur boni negative accepta mali rationem non habet, alioquin sequeretur quod ea quæ nullo modo sunt, mala essent; et iterum quod quælibet res esset mala ex hoc quod non habet bonum alterius rei; utpote quod homo esset malus, quia non habet velocitatem capræ, vel fortitudinem leonis. Sed remotio boni privative accepta malum dicitur, sicut privatio visus cæcitas dicitur. Subjectum autem privationis et formæ est unum et idem, scilicet ens in potentia; sive sit ens in potentia simpliter, sicut materia prima, quæ est subjectum formæ substantialis, et privatio-nis oppositæ; sive sit ens in potentia secundum quid, et in actu simplicitur, ut corpus diaphanum, quod est subjectum tenebrarum et lucis. Manifestum est autem quod forma per quam aliquid est actu, perfectio quædam est, et bonum quoddam; et sic omne ens in actu bonum quoddam est, et similiter omne ens in potentia, inquantum hujusmodi, bonum quoddam est, secundum quod habet ordinem ad bonum. Sicut enim est ens in potentia, ita et bonum in potentia. Relinquitur ergo quod subjectum mali sit bonum.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.1] Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dionysius intelligit malum non esse in existentibus sicut partem, aut sicut proprietatem naturalem alicujus existentis.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.2] "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non ens negative acceptum non requirit subjectum; sed «privatio est negatio in subjecto, » ut dicitur in IV Metaph., text. 4, et lib. V, text. 27, et lib. X, text. 15, et tale non ens est malum.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.3] Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight," but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod malum non est, sicut in subjecto, in bono quod ei opponitur, sed in quodam alio bono; subjectum enim cæcitatis non est visus, sed animal. Videtur tamen, ut Augustinus dicit in Ench., cap. xiv, col. 238, t. 6, hic fallere dialectico-rum regula, quæ dicit contraria simul esse non posse. Hoc tamen intelligendum est secundum communem acceptionem boni et mali, non autem secundum quod specialiter accipitur hoc bonum et hoc malum. Album autem et nigrum, dulce et amarum, et hujusmodi contraria, non accipiuntur nisi specialiter, quia sunt in quibusdam generibus determinatis; sed bonum circuit omnia genera. Unde unum bonum potest simul esse cum privatione alterius boni.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.4] The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given.
[I.q.48.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod propheta imprecatur væ illis qui dicunt id quod est bonum, secundum quod est bonum, esse malum. Hoc autem non sequitur ex præmissis, ut per prædicta patet.
Article 4
[I.q.48.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
[I.q.48.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod malum corrumpat totum bonum. Unum enim contrariorum totaliter corrumpitur per aliud. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria. Ergo malum potest corrumpere totum bonum.
[I.q.48.a.4.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
[I.q.48.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in Enchir., cap. xii, ante med., quod « malum nocet, inquantum adimit bonum. » Sed bonum est sibi simile et uniforme. Ergo totaliter tollitur per malum.
[I.q.48.a.4.arg.3] Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
[I.q.48.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, malum, quamdiu est, nocet et adimit bonum. Sed illud a quo semper aliquid aufertur, quandoque consumitur, nisi sit infinitum, quod non potest dici de aliquo bono creato. Ergo malum consumit totaliter bonum.
[I.q.48.a.4.sc] Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot wholly consume good."
[I.q.48.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchir., cap. xii, col. 236, t. 6, quod malum non potest totaliter consumere bonum.
[I.q.48.a.4.co] Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality.
The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.
Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to Isaiah 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature.
[I.q.48.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod malum non potest totaliter consumere bonum. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod est triplex bonum. Quoddam quod per malum totaliter tollitur, et hoc est bonum oppositum malo; sicut lumen totaliter per tenebras tollitur, et visus per cæcitatem. Quoddam vero bonum est quod nec totaliter tollitur per malum, nec diminuitur, scilicet bonum quod est subjectum mali; non enim per tenebras aliquid de substantia aeris diminuitur. Quoddam vero bonum est quod 'diminuitur quidem per malum, sed non totaliter tollitur; et hoc bonum est habilitas subjecti ad actum. Diminutio autem hujus boni non est accipienda per subtractionem, sicut est diminutio in quantitatibus, sed per remissionem, sicut est diminutio in qualitatibus et formis. Remissio autem hujus habilitatis est accipienda e contrario intensioni ipsius. Intenditur enim hujusmodi habilitas per dispositiones quibus materia præparatur ad actum, quæ quanto magis multiplicantur in subjecto, tanto habilius est ad recipiendum perfectionem et formam; et e contrario remittitur per dispositiones contrarias, quæ quanto magis multiplicatæ sunt in materia et magis intensæ, tanto magis remittitur potentia ad actum. Si igitur contrariæ dispositiones in infinitum multiplicari et intendi non possunt, sed usque ad certum terminum; neque habilitas prædicta in infinitum diminuitur vel remittitur, sicut patet in qualitatibus activis et passivis elementorum; frigiditas enim et humiditas, per quæ diminuitur sive remittitur habilitas materiae ad formam ignis, non possunt multiplicari in infinitum. Si vero dispositiones contrariæ in infinitum multiplicari possunt, et habilitas prædicta in infinitum diminuitur vel remittitur, non tamen totaliter tollitur; quia semper manet in sua radice, quæ est substantia subjecti; sicut si in infinitum interponantur corpora opaca inter solem et aerem, in infinitum diminuetur habilitas aeris ad lumen; nunquam tamen, manente aere, tolleretur, quod secundum naturam suam est diaphanum. Similiter in infinitum potest fieri additio in peccatis, per quæ semper magis ac magis minuitur habilitas animæ ad gratiam; quæ quidem peccata sunt quasi obstacula interposita inter nos et Deum, secundum illud Isa., LIX, 2: Peccata nostra diviserunt inter nos* et Deum. Neque tamen tollitur totaliter ab anima prædicta habilitas, quia consequitur naturam ipsius.
[I.q.48.a.4.ad.1] The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
[I.q.48.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonum quod opponitur malo, totaliter tollitur; sed alia bona non totaliter tolluntur, ut dictum est.
[I.q.48.a.4.ad.2] The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
[I.q.48.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod habilitas prædicta est media inter subjectum et actum. Unde ex ea parte qua attingit actum, diminuitur per malum; sed ex ea parte qua tenet se cum subjecto, remanet. Ergo licet bonum in se sit simile, tamen propter comparisonem ejus ad diversa non totaliter tollitur, sed in parte.
[I.q.48.a.4.ad.3] Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more.
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.
[I.q.48.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quidam imaginantes diminutionem boni prædicti ad similitudinem diminutionis quantitatis, dixerunt quod, sicut continuum dividitur in infinitum, facta divisione secundum eamdem proportionem, ut puta quod accipiatur medium medii, vel tertium tertii; sic in proposito accidit. Sed hæc ratio hic locum non habet, quia in divisione in qua servatur eadem proportio, semper subtrahitur minus et minus: minus enim est medium medii quam medium totius. Sed secundum peccatum non de necessitate minus diminuit de habilitate prædicta quam præcedens, sed forte aut æqualiter, aut magis. Dicendum est ergo quod, licet ista habilitas sit quoddam finitum, diminuitur tamen; in edit.: « tollitur totaliter, quia sein infinitum, non per se, sed per accidens, secundum quod contrariæ dispositiones etiam in infinitum augentur, ut dictum est.
Article 6
[I.q.48.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
[I.q.48.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod habeat plus de ratione mali pœna quam culpa. Culpa enim se habet ad pœnam ut meritum ad præmium. Sed præmium habet plus de ratione boni quam meritum, cum sit finis ejus. Ergo pœna plus habet de ratione mali quam culpa.
[I.q.48.a.6.arg.2] Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above (Article 5), is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault.
[I.q.48.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud est majus malum quod opponitur majori bono. Sed pœna, sicut dictum est, opponitur bono agentis; culpa autem bono actionis. Cum ergo melius sit agens quam actio, videtur quod pejus sit pœna quam culpa.
[I.q.48.a.6.arg.3] Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
[I.q.48.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ipsa privatio finis pœna quædam est, quæ dicitur carentia visionis divinæ; malum autem culpæ est per privationem ordinis ad finem. Ergo pœna est majus malum quam culpa.
[I.q.48.a.6.sc] A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain.
[I.q.48.a.6.sc] Sed contra, sapiens artifex inducit minus malum ad vitandum majus; sicut medicus præcidit membrum, ne corrumpatur corpus. Sed Dei sapientia infert pœnam ad vitandam culpam. Ergo culpa est majus malum quam pœna.
[I.q.48.a.6.co] Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to include privation of grace or glory.
There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than pain has.
The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has.
[I.q.48.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod culpa habet plus de ratione mali quam pœna: et non solum quam pœna sensibilis, quæ consistit in privatione corporalium bonorum, cujusmodi pœnas plures attendunt; sed etiam universaliter accipiendo pœnam, secundum quod privatio gratiae vel gloriæ pœna quædam sunt. Cujus est duplex ratio. Prima quidem est, quia ex malo culpæ fit aliquis malus, non autem ex malo pœna, secundum illud Dionysii, De divin. nom., c. iv, § 22, col. 723: « Puniri non est malum, sed fieri pœna dignum. » Et hoc ideo est, quia, cum bonum simpliciter consistat in actu, et non in potentia, ultimus autem actus est operatio, vel usus quarumcumque rerum habitarum; bonum hominis simpliciter consideratur in bona operatione, vel bono usu rerum habitarum. Utimur autem rebus omnibus per voluntatem. Unde ex bona voluntate, qua homo bene utitur rebus habitis, dicitur homo bonus et ex mala malus. Potest enim qui habet malam voluntatem, etiam bono quod habet male uti, sicut si grammaticus voluntarie incongrue loquatur. Quia ergo ipsa culpa consistit in deordinato actu voluntatis, pœna vero in privatione alicujus eorum quibus utitur voluntas, perfectius habet ratioem mali culpa quam pœna. Secunda ratio sumi potest ex hoc quod Deus est auctor mali pœna, non autem mali culpæ. Cujus ratio est, quia malum pœnae privat bonum creaturæ, sive accipiatur bonum creaturæ aliquid creatum, sicut cæciitas privat visum, sive sit bonum increatum, sicut per carentiam visionis divinæ tollitur creaturæ bonum increatum. Malum vero culpæ opponitur ipsi bono increato. Contrariatur enim impletioni divinæ voluntatis, et divino amori, quo bonum divinum in seipso amatur, et non solum secundum quod participatur a creatura. Sic igitur patet quod culpa habet plus de ratione mali quam pœna.
[I.q.48.a.6.ad.1] Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
[I.q.48.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet culpa terminetur ad pœnam, sicut meritum ad præmium, tamen culpa non intenditur propter pœnam, sicut meritum propter præmium, sed potius e converso pœna induciatur, ut vitetur culpa; et sic culpa est pejus quam pœna.
[I.q.48.a.6.ad.2] The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.
[I.q.48.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ordo actionnis, qui tollitur per culpam, est perfectius bonum agentis, cum sit perfectio secunda, quam bonum quod tollitur per pœnam, quod est perfectio prima.
[I.q.48.a.6.ad.3] Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.48.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est comparatio culpæ ad pœnam sicut finis et ordinis ad finem; quia utrumque potest privari aliquo modo, et per culpam, et per pœnam; sed per pœnam quidem, secundum quod ipse homo removetur a fine et ab ordine ad finem; per culpam vero, secundum quod ista privatio pertinet ad actionem quae non ordinatur ad finem debitum.
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