Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q57. The angel's knowledge of material things
Source context
- Theme
- angelic cognition of material and sensory reality through non-discursive, species-based intellection
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Proclus / Pseudo-Dionysius)Cross-tradition congruence: the hierarchical intelligences in Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius know lower orders of being through higher, unified intuitions rather than discursive abstraction — a structural parallel to Aquinas's account of angelic knowledge of material things via innate intelligible species.
- Vedanta (Brahman's sakshi cognition)Cross-tradition congruence: in Advaita Vedanta, the witness-consciousness (sakshi) illuminates objects without being conditioned by them, structurally analogous to Aquinas's claim that angelic intellect grasps material particulars without being materially affected.
Q57. The angel's knowledge of material things
Article 1
[I.q.57.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.
[I.q.57.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angeli non cognoscant res materiales. Intellectum enim est perfectio intelligentis. Sed res materiales non possunt esse perfectiones angelorum, cum sint infra ipsos. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt res materiales.
[I.q.57.a.1.arg.2] Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [On 2 Corinthians 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know material things.
[I.q.57.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, visio intellectualis est eorum quæ sunt in anima per sui essentiam, ut dicitur 1 in Glossa II ad Cor., xii. Sed res materiales non possunt esse in anima hominis vel in mente angeli per suas essentias. Ergo non possunt intellectuali visione cognosci sed solum imaginaria, qua apprehenduntur similitudines corporum, et sensibili, quæ est de ipsis corporibus. In angelis autem non est visio imaginaria et sensibilis, sed solum intellectualis. Ergo angeli cognoscere materialia non possunt.
[I.q.57.a.1.arg.3] Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.
[I.q.57.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, res materiales non sunt intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt cognoscibiles apprehensione sensus et imaginationis; quæ non sunt in angelis. Ergo angeli materialia non cognoscunt.
[I.q.57.a.1.sc] Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel.
[I.q.57.a.1.sc] Sed contra, quidquid potest inferior virtus, potest virtus superior. Sed intellectus hominis, qui est ordine naturæ infra intellectum angeli, potest cognoscere res materiales. Ergo multo fortius intellectus angeli.
[I.q.57.a.1.co] The established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God.
Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelligible species.
[I.q.57.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod talis est ordo in rebus quod superiora in entibus sunt perfectiora inferioribus; et quod in inferioribus continetur deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter, in superioribus continetur eminenter, et per quamdam totalitatem et simplicitatem. Et ideo in Deo, sicut in summo rerum vertice, omnia supersubstantialiter præexistunt secundum ipsum suum simplex esse, ut Dionysius dicit in lib. De div. nom., cap. 1, § 1, col. 587, et cap. 11, § 11, col. 650, tom. I. Angeli autem inter cæteras creaturas sunt Deo propinquiores et similiiores. Unde et plura participant ex bonitate divina, et perfectius, ut Dionysius dicit, Cæl. hier., c. iv, § 2, col. 179, t. 4. Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis angelis præexistunt, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus, multiplicius autem et imperfectius quam in Deo. Omne autem quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum ejus in quo est. Angeli autem secundum suam naturam sunt intellectuales; et ideo, sicut Deus per suam essentiam materialia cognoscit, ita angeli ea cognoscunt per hoc quod sunt in eis per suas intelligibiles species.
[I.q.57.a.1.ad.1] The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect.
[I.q.57.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis secundum speciem intelligibilem, quam habet in intellectu; et sic species intelligibiles quæ sunt in intellectu angeli, sunt perfectiones et actus intellectus angelici.
[I.q.57.a.1.ad.2] Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision.
[I.q.57.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum; similiter neque imaginatio, sed apprehendit solas similitudines corporum; intellectus autem solus apprehendit essentias rerum. Unde in III De anima dicitur, text. 26, quod objectum intellectus est « quod quid est, » circa quod non errat, sicut neque sensus circa proprium sensibile. Sic ergo essentiæ rerum materialium sunt in intellectu hominis, vel angeli, ut intellectum est in intelligente, et non secundum esse suum reale. Quædam vero sunt quæ sunt in intellectu vel in anima secundum 1 Ex Augustino, XII De Gønesi ad litter., c. xxiv, xxv et xxx, col. 474, etc., t. 3. Non legitur in Glossa ordin. Strabi apud Migne. Bonaventura triplicem Dei visionem distinuit: 1. Facialis sine medio tam ex parte videntis quam ex parte visi; 2. Specularis cum medio non obscuro ex parte videntis propter visi altitudinem. 3. Enigmatica cum medio obscuro propter videntis obcuritatem. Prima est beatorum; secunda angelorum in puris naturalibus et Adami in paradiso; tertia nostra est. utrumque esse; et utrorumque est visio intellectualis.
[I.q.57.a.1.ad.3] If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves; he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.
[I.q.57.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, si angelus acciperet cognitionem rerum materialium ab ipsis rebus materialibus, oporteret quod faceret eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas; non autem accipiendo cognitionem earum a rebus materialibus, sed per species actu intelligibiles rerum sibi connaturales, rerum materialium notitiam habet, sicut intellectus noster secundum species quas intelligibiles facit abstrahendo.
Article 2
[I.q.57.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from what was said above (Question 54, Article 5). Consequently they do not know singulars.
[I.q.57.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angelus singularia non cognoscat. Dicit enim Philosophus, in I Post., cap. xxii, quod « sensus est singularium, ratio vero vel intellectus universalium. » In angelis autem non est vis cognoscitiva, nisi intellectus, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo singularia non cognoscunt.
[I.q.57.a.2.arg.2] Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Question 50, Article 2), an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.
[I.q.57.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem aliquam cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sed non videtur quod possit esse aliqua assimilatio angeli ad singulare in quantum est singulare; cum angelus sit immaterialis, ut supra dictum est, singularatis vero principium sit materia. Ergo angelus non potest cognoscere singularia.
[I.q.57.a.2.arg.3] Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars.
[I.q.57.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si angelus scit singularia, aut per species singulares, aut per species universales. Non per singulares, quia sic oporteret, quod haberet species infinitas; neque per universales, quia universale non est sufficiens principium cognoscendi singulare, inquantum est singulare, cum in universali singularia non cognoscantur nisi in potentia. Ergo angelus non cognoscit singularia.
[I.q.57.a.2.sc] No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to Psalm 90:11: "He hath given His angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars.
[I.q.57.a.2.sc] Sed contra, nullus potest custodire quod non cognoscit. Sed angeli custodiunt homines singulares, secundum illud psalm. xc, 11: Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis. Ergo angeli cognoscunt singularia. Nota sedulo hoc principium fundamentale in doctrina D. Thomæ: omne quod est in aliquo, est Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam totaliter subtraxerunt angelis singularium cognitionem. Sed hoc primo quidem derogat catholicæ fidei, quæ ponit hæc inferiora administrari per angelos, secundum illud Hebr., i, 14: Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus. Si autem singulorum notitiam non haberent, nullam providentiam habere possent de his quæ in hoc mundo aguntur, cum actus singularium sint. Et hoc est contra illud quod dicitur Eccle., v, 5: Ne dicas coram angelo: Non est providentia. Secundo etiam derogat philosophiæ documentis, secundum quæ ponuntur angeli motores cælestium orbium; et quod eos moveant secundum intellectum et voluntatem. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod angelus habet quidem cognitionem singularium, sed in causis universalibus, ad quas reducuntur particulares omnes effectus; sicut si astrologus judicet de aliqua eclipsi futura per dispositiones cælestium motuum. Sed hæc positio prædicta inconvenientia non evadit; quia sic cognoscere singulare in causis universalibus non est cognoscere ipsum ut est singulare, hoc est, ut est hic et nunc; astrologus enim cognoscens eclipsim futuram per computationem cælestium motuum, scit eam in universali, et non prout est hic et nunc, nisi per sensum accipiat. Administratio autem, et providentia, et motus sunt singularium, prout sunt hic et nunc. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognitivis omnium rerum genera; intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia, sensu autem singularia et corporalia; ita angelus per unam intellectivam virtutem utraque cognoscit. Hoc enim rerum ordo habet, quod quanto aliquid est superius, tanto habet virtutem magis unitam, et ad plura se extendentem; sicut in ipso homine patet quod sensus communis, qui est superior quam sensus proprius, licet sit unica potentia, omnia cognoscit quæ quinque sensibus exterioribus cognoscuntur, et quædam alia quæ nullus sensus exterior cognoscit, scilicet differentiam albi et dulcis; et simile etiam est in aliis considerare. Unde cum angelus naturæ ordine sit supra hominem, inconveniens est dicere quod homo quacum-in eo per modum ejus in quo est. que sua potentia cognoscat aliquid quod angelus per unam vim suam cognoscitivam, scilicet intellectum, non cognoscat. Unde Aristoteles pro inconvenienti habet, ut litem quam nos scimus, Deus ignoret, ut patet in I De anima, text. 80, et in III Metaph., text. 45. Modus autem quo intellectus angeli singularia cognoscit, ex hoc considerari potest, quod sicut a Deo effluunt res, ut subsistant in propriis naturis, ita etiam ut sint in cognitione angelica. Manifestum est autem quod a Deo effluunt in rebus non solum illud quod ad naturam universalem pertinet, sed etiam ea quæ sunt individuationis principia; est enim causa totius substantiæ rei, et quantum ad materiam, et quantum ad formam; et secundum quod causat, sic et cognoscit, quia scientia ejus est causa rei, ut supra ostensum est. Sicut igitur Deus per essentiam suam, per quam omnia causat, est similitudo omnium, et per eam omnia cognoscit non solum quantum ad naturas universales, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem; ita angeli per species a Deo inditas cognoscunt res non solum quantum ad naturam universalem, sed etiam secundum earum singularitatem, inquantum sunt quædam repræsentationes multiplicatæ illius unicæ et simplicis essentiae.
[I.q.57.a.2.co] Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to Hebrews 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text of Ecclesiastes 5:5: "Say not before the angel: There is no providence."
Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and will.
Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.
Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15).
The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above (Question 14, Article 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence.
[I.q.57.a.2.ad.1] The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels, as was said above (55, 2, 3 ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison.
[I.q.57.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de intellectu nostro, qui non intelligit res nisi abstrahendo; et per ipsam abstractionem a materialibus conditionibus id quod abstrahitur fit universale. Hic autem modus intelligendi non convenit angelis, ut supra dictum est; et ideo non est eadem ratio.
[I.q.57.a.2.ad.2] It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their matter.
[I.q.57.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum suam naturam angeli non assimilantur rebus materialibus, sicut assimilatur aliquid alicui secundum convenientiam in genere vel in specie, aut in accidente, sed sicut superius habet similitudinem cum inferiori, ut sol cum igne. Et per hunc etiam modum in Deo est similitudo omnium, et quantum ad formam, et quantum ad materiam; inquantum in ipso præexistit ut in causa, quidquid in rebus inventur. Et eadem ratione species intellectus angeli, quæ sunt quædam derivatæ similitudines a divina essentia, sunt similitudines rerum, non solum quantum ad formam, sed etiam quantum ad materiam.
[I.q.57.a.2.ad.3] Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above (55, 3, ad 3).
[I.q.57.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod angeli cognoscunt singularia per formas universales. quæ tamen sunt similitudines rerum et quantum ad principia universalia, et quantum ad individuationis principia. Quomodo autem per eamdem speciem possint multa cognosci, jam supra dictum est.
Article 3
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. Therefore much more do the angels.
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angeli cognoscant futura. Angeli enim potentiores sunt in cognoscendo quam homines. Sed homines aliqui cognoscunt futura multa. Ergo multo fortius angeli.
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.2] Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in De Causis, "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is, aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not different, but he knows each indifferently.
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, præsens et futurum sunt differentiæ temporis. Sed intellectus angeli est supra tempus; parificatur enim intelligentia æternitati, id est, ævo, ut dicitur in I De causis, propos. 2, circ. fin. Ergo quantum ad intellectum angeli non differunt præteritum et futurum; sed indifferenter cognoscit utrumque.
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.3] Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, angelus non cognoscit per species acceptas a rebus, sed per species in naturas universales. Sed species universales æqualiter se habent ad præteritum, præsens et futurum. Ergo videtur quod angeli indifferenter cognoscant præterita, præsentia et futura.
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.4] Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time.
[I.q.57.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut aliquid dicitur distans secundum tempus, ita secundum locum. Sed angeli cognoscunt distantia secundum locum. Ergo etiam cognoscunt distantia secundum tempus futurum.
[I.q.57.a.3.sc] Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, according to Isaiah 41:23: "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore the angels do not know future events.
[I.q.57.a.3.sc] Sed contra, id quod est proprium signum divinitatis, non convenit angelis. Sed cognoscere futura est proprium signum divinitatis, secundum illud Isai., xli, 23: Annuntiate quæ ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quod* dii estis vos. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt futura.
[I.q.57.a.3.co] The future can be known in two ways.
First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events.
In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore God's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge (14, 13). But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.
[I.q.57.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod futurum du-solummodo quod ea non cognoscit directe. Avicenna non aliter ab angelis cognosci vult singularia, nisi prout in ratione universali entis conveniunt. pliciter potest cognosci: uno modo in causa sua; et sic futura quæ ex necessitate ex causis suis proveniunt, per certam scientiam cognoscuntur, ut solem oriri cras. Quæ vero ex suis causis proveniunt ut in pluribus, cognoscuntur non per certitudinem, sed per conjecturam; sicut medicus præcognoscit sanitatem infirmi. Quæ vero proveniunt ex causis suis ut in paucioribus, penitus sunt ignota, sicut causalia et fortuita. Et iste modus cognoscendi futura adest angelis, et tanto magis quam nobis, quanto rerum causas et universalius et perfectius cognoscunt; sicut medici qui acutius vident causas, melius de futuro statu aegritudinis prognosticantur. Alio modo cognoscuntur futura in seipsis; et sic solius Dei est futura cognoscere, non solum quæ ex necessitate proveniunt, vel ut in pluribus, sed etiam casualia et fortuita; quia Deus videt omnia in sua aeternitate, quæ cum sit simplex, toti tempori adest, et ipsum concludit; et ideo unius Dei intuitus fertur in omnia quæ aguntur per totum tempus, sicut in præsentia; et videt omnia ut in seipsis sunt, sicut supra dictum est, cum de Dei scientia ageretur. Angelicus autem intellectus et quilibet intellectus creatus deficit ab aeternitate divina; unde non potest ab aliquo intellectu creato cognosci futurum ut est in suo esse.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.1] Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way, but much more distinctly.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homines non cognoscunt futura nisi in causis suis, vel Deo revelante; et sic angeli multo subtilius futura cognoscunt.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.2] Although the angel's intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves the spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet intellectus angeli sit supra tempus quo mensurantur corporales motus, est tamen in intellectu angeli tempus secundum successionem intelligibilium conceptionum, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, VIII Super Genes. ad litt., c. xx et xx1, col. 388, t. 3, quod Ita Nicolaï; edit. Rom et Patav.: « ad rationes. » « Jam » in edit deest. « Quoniam ipsa eorum claritas vicissim sibi in alternis cordibus patet, et cum uniuscujusque vultus attenditur, simul et conscientia penetratur. » Et inferius: « Sicque unusquisque tunc erit conspicabilis alteri, sicut nunc esse non potest conspicabilis sibi. » Hic summa difficultas inventur; nam ex D. Thoma angeli species rerum habent simul ac creantur; ergo species etiam futurorum; ergo futura cognoscere debent. Thomistæ respondent quod illæ species non sunt quomodocumque representantes, sed prout derivantur ipsæ naturæ « Deus movet spiritualem creaturam per tempus; » et ita, cum sit successio in intellectu angeli, non omnia quæ aguntur per totum tempus sunt ei præsentia.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.3] Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the species. Present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot be known by those species.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet species quæ sunt in intellectu angeli, quantum est de se, aequaliter se habeant ad præsentia, præterita et futura, tamen præsentia, præterita et futura non aequaliter se habent ad species; quia ea quæ præsentia sunt, habent naturam per quam assimilantur speciebus quæ sunt in mente angeli; et sic per eas cognosci possunt. Sed quæ futura sunt, nondum habent naturam per quam illis assimilentur. Unde per eas cognosci non possunt.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.4] Things distant according to place are already existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel; whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently there is no comparison.
[I.q.57.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod distantia secundum locum jam sunt in rerum natura, et participant aliquam speciem, cujus similitudo est in angelo; quod non est verum de futuris, ut dictum est, et ideo non est simile.
Article 4
[I.q.57.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, "one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be penetrated." But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated (Matthew 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience.
[I.q.57.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angeli cognoscant cogitationes cordium. Dicit enim Gregorius in Moralibus, super illud Job xxviii: Non aequabitur ei aurum, vel vitrum, lib. XVIII, c. xLVIII, § 78, col. 84, t. 2, quod « tunc, » scilicet in beatitudine resurgentium, « unus erit conspicabilis alteri, sicut ipse sibi; et cum uniuscujusque intellectus attenditur, simul ab ideis divinis a quibus ipsæ species exemplatur; unde species habent in repræsentando quod in causando ideæ divinæ; ideæ autem divinæ res in individuis successive causant; sic species res successive quando sunt in universo, non quando non sunt, repræsentare petunt. Instabis forsitan et dices quod inde sequitur speciem angelicam intrinsece mutari. Illationem negant rigidiores Thomistæ juxta quos tota mutatio se tenet ex parte objecti quod de futuro fit præsens, idque sufficit ut quod in specie continebatur implicite, explicite repræsentetur. Alii Thomistæ libenter admittunt aliquam mutationem intrinsecam, aliquam mutationem modalem profluentem ab ipsis ideis divinis, individua successive producentibus. conscientia penetratur. » Sed resurgentes erunt similes angelis, sicut habetur Matth., xxii. Ergo unus angelus potest videre id quod est in conscientia alterius.
[I.q.57.a.4.arg.2] Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both.
[I.q.57.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut se habent figuræ ad corpora, ita se habent species intelligibiles ad intellectum. Sed, viso corpore, videtur ejus figura. Ergo, visa substantia intellectuali, videtur species intelligibilis quæ est in ipsa. Ergo, cum angelus videat alium angelum, et etiam animam, videtur quod possit videre cognitionem utriusque.
[I.q.57.a.4.arg.3] Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect.
[I.q.57.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ea quæ sunt in intellectu nostro, sunt similiora angelo, quam ea quæ sunt in phantasia; cum illa sint intellecta in actu, hæc vero in potentia tantum. Sed ea quæ sunt in phantasia possunt cognosci ab angelo, sicut corporalia, cum phantasia sit virtus corporis. Ergo videtur quod angelus possit cognoscere cogitationes intellectus.
[I.q.57.a.4.sc] What is proper to God does not belong to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to Jeremiah 17:9: "The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart." Therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts.
[I.q.57.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod proprium Dei non convenit angelis. Sed cognoscere cogitationes cordium est proprium Dei, secundum illud Jerem., xvii, 9: Pravum est cor hominis* et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? Ego Dominus scrutans corda. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt secreta cordium.
[I.q.57.a.4.co] A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also by man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons "sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although (Retract. ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done."
In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone can work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be developed later (63, 1; 105, 5). Consequently all that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will. Hence the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:11): "For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?"
[I.q.57.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cogitatio cordis dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo in suo effectu; et sic non solum ab angelo, sed etiam ab homine cognosci potest, et tanto subtilius, quanto effectus hujusmodi fuerit magis occultus. Cognoscitur enim cogitatio interdum non solum per actum exteriorem, sed etiam per immutationem vultus: et etiam medici aliquas affectiones animi per pulsum cognoscere possunt, et multo magis angeli, vel etiam dæmones, quanto subtilius hujusmodi immutationes occultas corporales perpendunt. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De divinatione dæmonum, cap. v, col. 586, t. 6, quod «aliquando hominum dispositiones non solum voce prolatas, verum etiam cogitatione conceptas, cum signa quædam in corpore exprimuntur ex animo, tota facilitate perdiscunt, » quamvis in lib. II Retractationum, c. xxx, col. 643, t. 4, hoc dicat non esse asserendum quomodo fiat. Alio modo possunt cognosci cogitationes, prout sunt in intellectu, et affectiones, prout sunt in voluntate; et sic solus Deus cognitationes cordium et affectiones voluntatum cognoscere potest. Cujus ratio est, quia voluntas rationalis creaturæ soli Deo subjacet, et ipse solus in eam operari potest, qui est principale ejus objectum, et ultimus finis; et hoc magis infra patebit. Et ideo ea quæ in voluntate sunt vel quæ ex voluntate sola dependent, soli Deo sunt nota. Manifestum est autem quod ex sola voluntate dependet quod aliquis actu aliqua consideret; quia cum aliquis habet habitum scientiæ, vel species intelligibiles in eo existentes, utitur eis cum vult. Et ideo dicit Apostolus, I Cor., ii, 41, quod quæ sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est.
[I.q.57.a.4.ad.1] In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.
[I.q.57.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod modo cogitatio unius hominis non cognoscitur ab alio propter duplex impedimentum: scilicet propter grossitiem corporis, et propter voluntatem claudentem sua secreta. Primum autem obstaculum toletur in resurrectione, nec est in angelis; sed secundum impedimentum manebit post resurrectionem, et est modo in angelis. Et tamen qualitatem mentis, quantum ad quantitatem gratiae et gloriæ, repræsentabit claritas corporis, et sic unus mentem alterius videre poterit.
[I.q.57.a.4.ad.2] Although one angel sees the intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration.
[I.q.57.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si unus angelus species intelligibiles alterius videat per hoc quod modus intelligibilium specieum secundum majorem et minorem universalitatem proportionatur nobilitati substantiarum, non tamen sequitur quod unus cognoscat quomodo alius illis intelligibilibus specibus utitur actualiter considerando.
[I.q.57.a.4.ad.3] The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them.
[I.q.57.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod appetitus brutalis non est dominus sui actus, sed sequitur impressionem alterius causæ corporalis vel spiritualis. Quia igitur angeli cognoscunt res corporales et dispositiones earum, possunt per hæc cognoscere quod est in appetitu et in apprehensione phantastica brutorum animalium, et etiam hominum, secundum quod in eis quandoque appetitus sensitivus procedit in actum sequens aliquam impressionem corporalem, sicut in brutis semper est. Non tamen oportet quod angeli cognoscant motum appetitus sensitivi et apprehensionem phantasticam hominis, secundum quod moventur a voluntate et ratione; quia etiam inferior pars animæ participat aliqualiter rationem sicut obediens imperanti, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. ult. Nec tamen sequitur quod, si angelus cognoscit quod est in appetitu sensitivo vel phantasia hominis, cognoscat id quod est in cogitatione vel voluntate; quia intellectus et voluntas non subjacent appetitui sensitivo et phantasiæ, sed potest eis diversimode uti.
Article 5
[I.q.57.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places." And the Apostle says (1 Timothy 3:16): "That great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels." Vulgate: 'Great is the mystery of godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.' Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.
[I.q.57.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscant. Quia inter omnia mysteria excellentius est mysterium Incarnationis Christi. Sed hoc angeli cognoverunt a principio; dicit enim Augustinus, Super Genes. ad litt., lib. V, cap. xix, col. 335, t. 3, quod « sic fuit hoc mysterium absconditum a sæculis in Deo, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in cælestibus; » et dicit Apostolus, I ad Timoth., 11, 16, quod apparuit angelis illud magnum sacramentum pietatis*. Ergo angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt.
[I.q.57.a.5.arg.2] Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.
[I.q.57.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, rationes omnium mysteriorum gratiae in divina sapientia continentur. Sed angeli vident ipsam Dei sapientiam, quæ est ejus essentia. Ergo angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt.
[I.q.57.a.5.arg.3] Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace.
[I.q.57.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prophetæ per angelos instruuntur, ut patet per Dionysium, Cæl. hier., cap. iv, § 2, col. 179, t. 1. Sed prophetæ mysteria gratiae cognoverunt; dicitur enim Amos, 11, 7: Non facit Dominus verbum, nisi revelaverit secretum suum ad servos suos prophetas. Ergo angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt.
[I.q.57.a.5.sc] No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated (Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is evident in Isaiah 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice." Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.
[I.q.57.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod nullus discit illud quod cognoscit. Sed angeli etiam supremi quærunt de divinis mysteriis gratiae, et discunt; dicitur enim, Cælest. hierar., c. VII, § 3, col. 210, t. 1, quod « sacra Scriptura 1 Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius: « Quasdam enim eorum introducunt (theologi) a superioribus sacrosancte eruditas illum esse Dominum..., nonnullas item circa ipsummet Jesum hæsitantes, divinique ejus pro nobis suscepti operis scientiam discentes, ipsumque Jesum eas per se docentem, ac primum ejus summam in homines benignitatem explicantem: « Ego enim, inquit, loquor justitiam et judicium salutaris. » Durandus angelos dicit cogitationes cordium praesentes cognoscere, quod Thomistæ et alii ne-gant. Sed quomodo non cognosceret angelus cognitationes illas quæ sunt quid creatum, et ordinis naturalis, et alicui intellectui creato et naturali inducit quasdam cælestes essentias ad ipsum Jesum quæstionem facientes, et addiscentes scientiam divinæ ejus operationis pro nobis, et Jesum eas sine medio docentem; » ut patet Isa., c. Lxiii, 4, ubi quærentibus angelis: Quis est iste qui venit de Edom? respondet Jesus: Ego, qui loquor justitiam. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt mysteria gratiae.
[I.q.57.a.5.co] There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Corinthians 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of a man [Vulgate: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . .?'], but the spirit of a man that is in him." So, "the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God."
There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:10): "But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministrations.
[I.q.57.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in angelis est cognitio duplex. Una quidem naturalis, secundum quam cognoscunt res tum per essentiam suam tum etiam per species innatas; et hac cognitione mysteria gratiae angeli cognoscere non possunt; hæc enim mysteria ex pura Dei voluntate dependent. Si enim unus angelus non potest cognoscere cognitationes alterius ex voluntate ejus dependentes, multo minus potest cognoscere ea quæ ex sola Dei voluntate dependent; et sic argumentatur Apostolus, I Cor., 11, 14: Quæ sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est; ita et quæ sunt Dei* nemo novit nisi Spiritus Dei. Est autem et alia angelorum cognitio, quæ eos beatos facit, qua vident Verbum, et res in Verbo; et hac quidem visione cognoscunt mysteria gratiae, non quidem omnia, nec aequaliter omnes, sed secundum quod Deus voluerit eis revelare, secundum illud Apostoli, I Cor., 11, 10: Nobis autem revelavit Deus per Spiritum suum; ita tamen quod superiores angeli perspicacius divinam sapientiam contemplantes plura mysteria et altiora in ipsa Dei visione cognoscunt, quæ inferioribus manifestant, eos illuminando, et horum etiam mysteriorum quædam a principio suæ creationis cognoverunt, quædam vero postmodum, secundum quod eorum officiis congruit, edocentur.
[I.q.57.a.5.ad.1] One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered. For "all are [Vulgate: 'Are they not all.'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (Hebrews 1:14)"; and this is brought by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning.
We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.
[I.q.57.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod de mysterio Incarnationis Christi dupliciter contingit loqui. Uno modo in generali: et sic omnibus revelatum est a principio suæ bea-proportionatum? Quidam respondent: per concursus divini substractionem. Sed ista substraction estne debita, vel indebita? Si prius, ergo violenta angelis; si posterius, ratio postulatur. Respondemus: quæ a Deo et sola voluntate libera, non a Deo solo dependent, seclusa quavis a causis naturalibus dependentia, aut cum illis connexione, hæc ab angelis cognoscibilia non sunt. Si dicas angelos cognoscere habitus in voluntate acquisitos; ergo et liberos actus: antecedens quidam Thomistæ negant, alii concedentes illud, actus liberos in habitibus posse cognosci concedunt; sed omnes pene cogitationes cordis illis innotescere non inde sequitur. titudinis. Cujus ratio est, quia hoc est quod-dam generale principium, ad quod omnia eorum officia ordinantur. Omnes enim sunt administratorii spiritus, ut dicitur Heb., 1, 14, in ministerium missi propter eos qui hæreditatem capiunt* salutis; quod quidem fit per Incarnationis mysterium. Unde oportuit de hoc mysterio omnes a principio communiter edoceri. Alio modo possumus loqui de mysterio Incarnationis quantum ad speciales conditiones; et sic non omnes angeli a principio de omnibus sunt edocti, imo quædam etiam superiores angeli postmodum didicerunt, ut patet per auctoritatem Dionysii inductam.
[I.q.57.a.5.ad.2] Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it.
[I.q.57.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, licet angeli beati divinam sapientiam contemplentur, non tamen eam comprehendunt; et ideo non oportet quod cognoscant quidquid in ea latet.
[I.q.57.a.5.ad.3] Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read (Ephesians 3:4-5): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." Among the prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to Psalm 118:100: "I have had understanding above ancients," and Gregory says: "The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on" (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.57.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quidquid prophetæ cognoverunt de mysterio gratiae per revelationem divinam, multo excellentius est angelis revelatum; et licet prophetis ea quæ Deus facturus erat circa salutem humani generis, in generali revelaverit, quædam tamen specialia apostoli circa hoc cognoverunt quæ prophetæ non cognoverant, secundum illud Ephes., Ⅲ, 4: Potestis legentes intelligere prudentiam meam in mysterio Christi, quod aliis generationibus non est agnitum, sicut revelatum est sanctis apostolis ejus. Inter ipsos etiam prophetas posteriores cognoverunt quod priores non cognoverunt, secundum illud ps. cxviii, 400: Super senes intellexi; et Gregorius dicit, In Ezech., lib. II, homil. iv, § 12, col. 980, t. 2, quod « per successiones temporum crevit divinæ cognitionis augmentum.»
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