Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q58. The mode of angelic knowledge
Source context
- Theme
- angelic intellection as species-knowledge without discursive movement
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Proclus)Cross-tradition congruence exists between Aquinas's account of angels knowing by innate species in a single, non-discursive act and the Neoplatonic Nous, which apprehends the whole of intelligible reality simultaneously rather than sequentially.
- Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial HierarchyAquinas draws directly on Dionysian angelology, which locates the higher hierarchies in immediate, unmediated participation in divine illumination — a structural parallel to the non-discursive mode Aquinas attributes to angelic intellect.
- Islamic philosophy (Ibn Sina / Avicenna)Avicenna's doctrine of the Agent Intellect as an immaterial emanated being that illuminates human minds from without exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's analysis of how angels receive and communicate knowledge through impressed intelligible forms.
Q58. The mode of angelic knowledge
Article 1
[I.q.58.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels' minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.
[I.q.58.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intellectus angeli quandoque sit in potentia. « Motus » enim « est actus existentis in potentia, » ut dicitur III Physic., text. 6. Sed mentes angelicæ intelligendo moventur, ut dicit Dionysius, De div. nom., c. iv, § 8, col. 703, t. 1. Ergo mentes angelicæ quandoque sunt in potentia.
[I.q.58.a.1.arg.2] Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. But it is said (1 Peter 1:12): "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.
[I.q.58.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cum desiderium sit rei non habitæ, possibilis tamen haberi; quicumque desiderat aliquid intelligere, est in potentia ad illud. Sed I Petr., Ⅰ, 12, dicitur: In quem desiderant angeli prospicere. Ergo intellectus angeli quandoque est in potentia.
[I.q.58.a.1.arg.3] Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that "an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance." But the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes understands potentially.
[I.q.58.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in lib. De causis, prop. 8, circa princ., dicitur quod « intelligentia intelligit secundum modum sua substantiæ. » Sed substantia angeli habet aliquid de potentia permixtum; ergo quando inteligit in potentia.
[I.q.58.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.
[I.q.58.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, II Super Genes. ad litt., cap. viii, col. 270, tom. III, quod « angeli ex quo creati sunt, ipsa Verbi æternitate, sancta et pia contemplatione perfruuntur. » Sed intellectus contemplans non est in potentia, sed in actu. Ergo intellectus angeli non est in potentia.
[I.q.58.a.1.co] As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, "as before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not actually consider." In the first way an angel's intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun.
In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).
[I.q.58.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 8, et in VIII Phys., text. 32, intellectus dupliciter est in potentia: uno modo sicut ante addiscere vel invenire, scilicet antequam habeat habitum scientiæ. Alio modo dicitur esse in potentia, sicut cum habet jam habitum scientiæ sed non considerat. Primo igitur modo intellectus angeli nun-quam est in potentia respectu eorum ad quæ spiritalium patrum. » ejus cognitio naturalis se extendere potest. Sicut enim corpora superiora, scilicet cælestia, non habent potentiam ad esse quæ non sit completa per actum; ita cælestes intellectus, scilicet angeli, non habent aliquam intelligibilem potentiam quæ non sit totaliter completa per species intelligibles conna-turales. Sed quantum ad ea quæ eis divinitus revelantur, nihil prohibet intellectum eorum esse in potentia; quia sic etiam corpora cælestia sunt in potentia quando ut illuminentur a sole. Secundo vero modo intellectus angeli potest esse in potentia ad ea quæ cognoscit naturali cognitione. Non enim omnia quæ naturali cognitione cognoscit, semper actu considerat. Sed quantum ad cognitionem Verbi et eorum quæ in Verbo videt, nunquam hoc modo est in potentia; quia semper actu intuetur Verbum, et ea quæ in Verbo videt: in hac enim visione eorum beatitudo consistit. Beatitudo autem non consistit in habitu, sed in actu, ut dicit Philosophus, in I Ethic., cap. viii.
[I.q.58.a.1.ad.1] Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.
[I.q.58.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motus ibi non snmitur secundum quod est actus imperfecti, id est existentis in potentia, sed secundum quod est actus perfecti, id est, existentis in actu. Sic enim intelligere et sentire dicuntur motus, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 28.
[I.q.58.a.1.ad.2] Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.
[I.q.58.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod desiderium illud angelorum non excludit rem desideratam, sed ejus fastidium. Vel dicuntur desiderare Dei visionem quantum ad novas revelationes, quas pro opportunitate negotiorum a Deo recipiunt.
[I.q.58.a.1.ad.3] In the angel's substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act.
[I.q.58.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in substantia angeli non est aliqua potentia denudata ab actu: et similiter nec intellectus angeli sic est in potentia quod sit absque actu.
Article 2
[I.q.58.a.2.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one."
[I.q.58.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angelus non possit simul multa intelligere. Dicit enim Philosophus, II Topic., cap. iv, loc. 33, quod contingit multa scire, sed unum tantum intelligere.
[I.q.58.a.2.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things.
[I.q.58.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod intellectus formatur per speciem intelligibilem sicut corpus formatur per figuram. Sed unum corpus non potest formari diversis figuris. Ergo unus intellectus non potest simul intelligere diversa intelligibilia.
[I.q.58.a.2.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether.
[I.q.58.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, intelligere est motus quidam. Nullus autem motus terminatur ad diversos terminos. Ergo non contingit simul multa intelligere.
[I.q.58.a.2.sc] On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it wills."
[I.q.58.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, IV Super Genes. ad litt., c. xxxii, col. 316, tom. III: « Potentia spiritualis mentis angelicæ cuncta quæ voluerit, facillime simul comprehendit 4. »
[I.q.58.a.2.co] I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects.
Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once: just as in heaven "our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species.
[I.q.58.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut ad unitatem motus requiritur unitas termini, ita ad unitatem operationis requiritur unitas objecti. Contingit autem aliqua accipi ut plura et unum; sicut partes alicujus continui; si enim unaquæque per se accipiatur plures sunt; unde non una operatione nec simul accipiuntur per sensum et intellectum. Alio modo accipiuntur, secundum quod sunt unum in toto, et sic simul et una operatione cognoscuntur tam per sensum quam per intellectum, dum totum continuum consideratur, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 23. Et sic etiam intellectus noster simul intelligit subjectum et prædicatum, prout sunt partes unius propositionis, et duo comparata, secundum quod conveniunt in una comparatione. Ex quo patet quod multa secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi: sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur; unumquodque autem est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod ejus similitudo est in intellectu. Quæcumque igitur per unam speciem intelligibilem cognosci possunt, cognoscuntur ut unum intelligibile, et ideo telligit; item cognitione naturali Deum; item cælos angeli cælorum motores; item suos clientes, non tamen necessitate eadem qua se et Deum cognoscunt. simul cognoscuntur : quæ vero per diversas species intelligibiles cognoscuntur, ut diversa intelligibilia capiuntur. Angeli igitur ea cognitione qua cognoscunt res per Verbum, omnia cognoscunt una intelligibilia specie, quæ est essentia divina; et ideo quantum ad talem cognitionem omnia simul cognoscunt : sicut et in patria « non erunt volubiles nostræ cogitationes ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes; sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus, » ut Augustinus dicit in XV De Trin., cap. xvi, col. 1079, t. 8. Ea vero cogitatione qua cognoscunt res per species innatas, omnia illa simul possunt intelligere, quæ una specie cognoscuntur, non autem illa quæ diversis.
[I.q.58.a.2.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing.
[I.q.58.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intelligere multa ut unum, est quodammodo unum intelligere.
[I.q.58.a.2.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies.
To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.
[I.q.58.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus formatur per intelligibilem speciem, quam apud se habet; et ideo sic potest una specie intelligibili multa simul intelligibilia intueri, sicut unum corpus per unam figuram potest simul multis corporibus assimilari.
Article 3
[I.q.58.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.
[I.q.58.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angelus cognoscat discurrendo. Discursus enim intellectus attenditur secundum hoc quod per unum aliud cognoscitur. Sed angeli cognoscunt unum per aliud, cognoscunt enim creaturas per Verbum; ergo intellectus angeli cognoscit discurrendo.
[I.q.58.a.3.arg.2] Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason do this.
[I.q.58.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior potest et virtus superior. Sed intellectus humanus potest syllogizare, et in effectibus causas cognoscere; secundum quæ discursus attenditur. Ergo intellectus angeli, qui superior est ordine naturæ, multo magis hoc potest. 1 « Triplici enim modo præscientia acumine vigent, id est, subtilitate naturæ, experientia temporum, revelatione superiorum potestatum. » 2 Corderius: « non dividuis aut e dividuis, vel sensibus vel diffusis rationibus, ratiocinando divi-
[I.q.58.a.3.arg.3] Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons learn more things by experience." But experimental knowledge is discursive: for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.
[I.q.58.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Isidorus dicit, lib. I Sententiarum, cap. x, § 47, col. 556, t. 6, quod dæmones per experientiam multa cognoscunt. 4. Sed experimentalis cognitio est discursiva; ex multis enim memoris fit unum experimentum, et ex multis experimentis fit unum universale, ut dicitur in fin. Posteriorum, lib. II, text. ult., et in principio Metaphysicæ, cap. 1. Ergo cognitio angelo-ram est discursiva.
[I.q.58.a.3.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led to something particular from something common."
[I.q.58.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., cap. vii, § 2, col. 867, t. 4, quod angeli non congregant divinam cognitionem a sermonibus diffusis, neque ab aliquo communi ad ista specialia simul aguntur. 2.
[I.q.58.a.3.co] As has often been stated (1; 55, 1), the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them "heavenly minds" (1; 55, 1). Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them.
Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.
[I.q.58.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut sæpius dictum est. Angeli illum gradum tenent in substantiis spiritualibus quem corpora cælestia in substantiis corporeis; nam « et cælestes mentes » a Dionysio dicuntur. 3. Est autem hæc differentia inter cælestia et terrena corpora, quod corpora terrena per mutationem et motum adipiscuntur suam ultimam perfectionem, corpora vero cælestia statim ex ipsa sua natura suam ultimam perfectionem habent; sic igitur et inferiores intellectus, scilicet hominum, per quemdam motum et discursum intellectualis operationnis perfectionem et cognitionem veritatis 4. adipiscuntur, dum scilicet ex uno cognito in aliud cognitum procedunt. Si autem statim in ipsa cognitione principii noti inspicerent quasi notas omnes conclusiones consequentes, in eis discursus locum non haberet. Et hoc est in angelis, quia statim in illis quæ primo naturaliter cognoscunt, inspiciunt omnia quæcumque in eis cognosci possunt. Et ideo dicuntur intellectuales; quia etiam apud nos ea quæ statim naturaliter apprehenduntur, intelligi dicuntur; unde intellectus dicitur habitus primorum principiorum. Animæ vero humanæ, quæ veritatis notitiam per quemdam discursum acquirunt, rationales vocantur. Quod quidem contingit ex debilitate intellectualis luminis in eis. Si enim haberent plenitudinem intellectualis luminis, sicut angeli, statim in primo aspectu principiorum totam virtutem eorum apprehenderent, intuendo quidquid ex eis syllogizari posset. nam colligunt scientiam. » 3 Multis in locis, ut videre est, scilicet VII Cæl. hier., col. 206, X Cæl. hier., col. 294, § 3, etc. 4 In editis: « Perfectionem in cognitione veritatis. »
[I.q.58.a.3.ad.1] Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all movement is from something before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this way the angels know things in the Word.
[I.q.58.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod discursus quemdam motum nominat. Omnis autem motus est de uno priori in aliud posterius. Unde discursiva cognitio attenditur, secundum quod ex aliquo prius noto devenitur in cognitionem alterius posterius noti, quod prius erat ignotum. Si autem uno inspecto, simul aliud inspiciatur, sicut in speculo inspicitur simul imago rei, non est propter hoc cognitio discursiva: et hoc modo cognoscunt angeli res in Verbo.
[I.q.58.a.3.ad.2] The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.
[I.q.58.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod angeli syllogizare possunt, tanquam syllogismum cognoscentes; et in causis effectus vident, et in effectibus causas, non tamen ita quod cognitionem veritatis ignotæ acquirant syllogizando ex causis in causata, et ex causatis in causas.
[I.q.58.a.3.ad.3] Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are present, yet without any discursion withal.
[I.q.58.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod experientia in angelis et dæmonibus dicitur secundum quamdam similitudinem, prout scilicet cognoscunt sensibilia præsentia, tamen absque omni discursu.
Article 4
[I.q.58.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's mind.
[I.q.58.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angeli intelligent componendo et dividendo. Ubi enim est multitudo intellectorum, ibi est compositio intellectuum, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 24. Sed in intellectu angeli est multitudo intellectorum, cum per diversas species diversa intelligat, et non omnia simul. Ergo in intellectu angeli est compositio et divisio.
[I.q.58.a.4.arg.2] Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what was said (2). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and dividing.
[I.q.58.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, plus distat negatio ab affirmatione quam quæcumque duæ naturæ oppositæ, quia prima distinctio est per affirmationem et negationem. Sed aliquas naturas distantes angelus non cognoscit per unum, sed per diversas species, ut ex dictis patet, Ergo oportet quod affirmationem et negationem cognoscat per diversa; et ita videtur quod angelus intelligat componendo et dividendo.
[I.q.58.a.4.arg.3] Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing.
[I.q.58.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, locutio est signum intellectus. Sed angeli hominibus loquentes proferunt affirmativas et negativas enuntiationes, quæ sunt signa compositionis et divisionis in intellectu, ut ex multis locis sacræ Scripturæ apparet. Ergo videtur quod angelus intelligat componendo et dividendo.
[I.q.58.a.4.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine concepts." But a simple intelligence is without composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without composition or division.
[I.q.58.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., cap. vii, § 2, col. 867, t. 1, quod « virtus intellectualis angelorum resplendet perspicaci divinorum intellectorum simplicitate. » Sed simplex intelligentia est sine compositione et divisione, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 21. Ergo angelus intelligit sine compositione et divisione.
[I.q.58.a.4.co] As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said (3). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.
Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable immovably, and material things immaterially.
[I.q.58.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut in intellectu ratiocinante comparatur conclusio ad principium, ita in intellectu componente et dividente comparatur prædicatum ad subjectum. Si enim intellectus noster statim in ipso principio videret conclusionis veritatem, nunquam intelligentet discurrendo vel ratiocinando. Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subjecti haberet notitiam de omnibus quæ possunt attribui subjecto vel removeri ab eo, nunquam intelligentet componendo et dividendo, sed solum intelligendo quod quid est. Sic igitur patet quod ex eodem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et componendo et dividendo, ex hoc scilicet quod non statim in prima apprehensione alicujus primi apprehensi potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtute continetur; quod contingit ex debilitate luminis intellectualis in nobis, sicut dictum est. Unde cum in angelo sit lumen intellectuale perfectum, cum sit « speculum purum et clarissimum, » ut dicit Dionysius, De div. nom., cap. iv, § 22, col. 723, t. 1, relinquitur quod angelus sicut non intelligit ratiocinando, ita non intelligit componendo et dividendo. Nihilominus tamen compositionem et divisionem enuntiationum intelligit, sicut et ratiocinationem syllogismorum; intelligit enim composita simpliciter, et mobilia immobiliter, et materialia immaterialiter.
[I.q.58.a.4.ad.1] Not every multitude of things understood causes composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by composing and dividing.
[I.q.58.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non qualiscumque multitudo intellectorum compositionem causat, sed multitudo illorum intellectorum quorum unum attribuitur alteri, vel removetur ab altero. Angelus au-rum. » Sensum reddit D. Thomas ex Joannis Sarrasini versione. Corderius: « Estque illis vis spiritualis atque operatio impermixta, et immaculata puritate resplendens, et conspicax divinarum intelligentia- tem intelligendo quidditatem alicujus rei, simul intelligit quidquid ei attribui potest, vel removeri ab ea. Unde intelligendo quod quid est, intelligit quidquid nos intelligere possumus componendo et dividendo, per unum suum simplex intellectum.
[I.q.58.a.4.ad.2] The various natures of things differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.
[I.q.58.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod diversæ quidditates rerum minus differunt quantum ad rationem existendi, quam affirmatio et negatio; tamen quantum ad rationem cognoscendi affirmatio et negatio magis conveniunt; quia statim per hoc quod cognoscitur veritas affirmationis, cognoscitur falsitas negationis oppositæ.
[I.q.58.a.4.ad.3] The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply the nature of a thing.
[I.q.58.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc quod angeli loquuntur enuntiationes affirmativas et negativas, manifestat quod angeli cognoscunt compositionem et divisionem; non autem quod cognoscant componendo et dividendo, sed simpliciter cognoscendo quod quid est.
Article 5
[I.q.58.a.5.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels.
[I.q.58.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in intellectu angeli possit esse falsitas. Protervitas enim ad falsitatem pertinet. Sed in dæmonibus est « phantasia proterva, » ut dicit Dionysius , De div. nom., cap. iv, § 23, col. 726, t. 1. Ergo videtur quod in angelo-rum intellectu possit esse falsitas.
[I.q.58.a.5.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.
[I.q.58.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nescientia est causa falsæ aestimationis. Sed in angelis potest esse nescientia, ut Dionysius dicit , Eccles. hier., cap. vi, § 6, col. 538, t. 1. Ergo videtur quod in eis possit esse falsitas.
[I.q.58.a.5.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.
[I.q.58.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne quod cadit a veritate sapientiæ, et habet rationem depravatam, habet falsitatem vel errorem in suo intellectu. Sed hoc Dionysius dicit de dæmonibus, De div. nom., cap. vii, § 2, col. 867, tom. I. Ergo videtur quod in intellectu angelo-rum possit esse falsitas. Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius: « imaginatio præceps. » « A rerum, quarum hactenus scientia caruerunt, ignoratione quodammodo purgantur. » Corderius: « Dæmonum mens, inquantum mens est, ex ipsa (sapientia) est; inquantum vero amens est, et id quod appetit nec scit, nec vult I.
[I.q.58.a.5.sc] On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that "the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83, qu. 32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel's knowledge.
[I.q.58.a.5.sc] Sed contra, Philosophus dicit, III De anima, text. 26 et 41, quod « intellectus semper verus est. » Augustinus etiam dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., quæst. liv, col. 38, t. 6, quod « nihil intelligitur nisi verum . » Sed angeli non cognoscunt aliquid nisi intelligendo. Ergo in angeli cognitione non potest esse deceptio et falsitas.
[I.q.58.a.5.co] I answer that, The truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said (4) that an angel understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature, "a four-footed flying beast," for there is no such animal. And this comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known precisely as they exist.
So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with regard to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ, they may judge Him not to be God.
From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an undue manner, referred to some composition or division.
[I.q.58.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hujus quæstionis veritas aliquatenus ex præmissa dependet. Dictum est enim, quod angelus non intelligit componendo et dividendo, sed intelligendo quod quid est. Intellectus autem circa quod quid est semper verus est, sicut et sensus circa proprium objectum, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 26. Sed per accidens in nobis accidit deceptio et falsitas intelligendo quod quid est, scilicet secundum rationem alicujus compositionis, vel cum definitionem unius rei accipimus ut definitionem alterius; vel cum partes definitionis sibi non cohærent, sicut si accipia-tur pro definitione alicujus rei: Animal quadrupes volatile, nullum enim animal tale est. Et hoc quidem accidit in compositis, quorum definitio ex diversis sumitur, quorum unum est materiale ad aliud; sed intelligendo quidditates simplices, ut dicitur in IX Metaph., non est falsitas; quia vel totaliter non attinguntur, et nihil intelligimus de eis, vel cognoscuntur ut sunt. Sic igitur per se non potest esse falsitas aut error aut deceptio in intellectu alicujus angeli; sed per accidens contingit, alio tamen modo quam in nobis. Nam nos componendo et dividendo quando ad intellectum quidditatis pervenimus; sicut cum dividendo vel demonstrando definitionem investigamus. Quod quidem in angelis non contingit; sed per quod quid est rei cognoscunt omnes enuntiationes ad illam rem pertinentes. Manifestum est autem quod quidditas rei potest esse principium cognoscendi respectu eorum quae naturaliter conveniunt rei vel ab ea removentur; non autem eorum quae a supernaturali Dei ordinatione dependent. Angeli igitur boni habentes rectam voluntatem per cognitionem quidditatis rei, non judi- assequi, verius a sapientia defectio dici debet. » « Quod enim intelligitur verum est. » Al.: « vel demonstrando. » Constat discursum, id est compositionem et divisionem, non formaliter, virtualiter tamen angelis convenire. cant de his quæ supernaturaliter ad rem pertinent, nisi salva ordinatione divina. Unde in eis non potest esse falsitas aut error. Dæmones vero per voluntatem perversam subducentes intellectum a divina sapientia absolute interdum de rebus judicant secundum naturalem conditionem. Et in his quæ naturaliter ad rem pertinent, non decipiuntur; sed decipi possunt quantum ad ea quæ supernaturalia sunt; sicut si considerans hominem mortuum, judicet eum non resurrecturum; et si, videns hominem Christum, judicet eum non esse Deum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ea quæ utrinque objiciuntur. Nam protervitas dæmonum est secundum quod non subduntur divinæ sapientiae. Nescientia autem est in angelis non respectu naturalium cognoscibilium, sed supernaturalium. Patet etiam quod intellectus ejus quod quid est semper est verus, nisi per accidens, secundum quod indebite ordinatur ad aliquam compositio-nem vel divisionem.
Article 6
[I.q.58.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge.
[I.q.58.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in angelis non sit vespertina neque matutina cognitio. Vespere enim et mane admixtionem tenebrarum habent. Sed in cognitione angeli non est aliqua tenebrositas, cum non sit ibi error vel falsitas. Ergo cognitio angeli non debet dici matutina vel vespertina.
[I.q.58.a.6.arg.2] Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes; while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night knowledge.
[I.q.58.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, inter vespere et mane cadit nox; et inter mane et vespere cadit meridies. Si igitur in angelis cadit cognitio matutina et vespertina, pari ratione videtur quod in eis debeat esse meridiana et nocturna cognitio.
[I.q.58.a.6.arg.3] Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 38), "The sciences are divided just as things are." But there is a threefold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in the angelic mind.
[I.q.58.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cognitio distinguitur secundum differentiam cognitorum. Unde in III De anima, text. 38, dicit Philosophus quod scientiæ secantur quemadmodum et res. Triplex autem est esse rerum; scilicet in Verbo, in propria natura, et in intelligentia angelica, ut Augustinus dicit II Super Gen. ad litt., c. vIII, col. 269, § 16, t. 3. Ergo si ponatur cognitio matutina in angelis, et vespertina, propter esse rerum in Verbo et in propria natura, debet etiam in eis poni tertia cognitio propter esse rerum in intelligentia angelica.
[I.q.58.a.6.sc] Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31; De Civ. Dei xii, 7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening knowledge.
[I.q.58.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus, IV Super Gen. ad litt., c. xxII, col. 312, t. 3, et XI De civ. Dei, c. vII, col. 322, t. 7, distinguit cognitionem angelorum per matutinam et vespertinam.
[I.q.58.a.6.co] The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the being of things flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves.
[I.q.58.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc quod dicitur de cognitione matutina et vespertina in angelis, introductum est ab Augustino, qui sex dies, in quibus Deus legitur fecisse cuncta, Gen., I, intelligi vult non hos usitatos dies qui solis circuitu peraguntur cum sol quarto die factus legatur, sed unum diem, scilicet cognitionem angelicam sex rerum generibus præsentatam. Sicut autem in die consueto mane est principium diei, vespere autem terminus; ita cognitio ipsius primordialis esse rerum dicitur cognitio matutina; et hæc est secundum quod res sunt in Verbo; cognitio autem ipsius esse rei creatæ secundum quod in propria natura consistit, dicitur cognitio vespertina. Nam esse rerum fuit a Verbo sicut a quodam primordiali principio; et hic effluxus terminatur ad esse rerum quod in propria natura habent.
[I.q.58.a.6.ad.1] Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as compared to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked, according to Ephesians 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord": yet this very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to 2 Peter 1:19: "You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place." So the angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in comparison with the vision of the Word.
[I.q.58.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vespere et mane non accipiuntur in cognitione angelica secundum similitudinem ad admixtionem tenebrarum, sed secundum similitudinem principii et termini. Vel dicendum quod nihil prohibet, ut dicit Augustinus, Super Gen. ad litt., lib. IV, c. xxII, col. 312, t. 3, aliquid in comparisone ad unum dici lux, et in comparisone ad aliud dici tenebra; sicut vita fidelium et justorum, in comparisone ad impios, dicitur lux, secundum illud Eph., v, 8: Eratis aliquando tenebræ, nunc autem lux in Domino. Quæ tamen vita fidelium in comparisone ad vitam gloriæ tenebrosa dicitur, secundum illud II Petr., I, 19: Habetis * propheticum sermonem, cui bene facitis attendentes quasi lucernæ lucenti in caliginoso loco. Sic igitur cognitio angeli, qua cognoscit res in propria natura, dies est per comparisonem ad ignorantiam vel errorem, sed obscura est per comparisonem ad visionem Verbi.
[I.q.58.a.6.ad.2] The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things. Consequently after "evening" there is no night, but "morning"; so that morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to God's praise their knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end.
[I.q.58.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod matutina et vespertina cognitio ad idem pertinet, id est, ad angelos illuminatos, qui sunt distincti a tenebris, id est, a malis angelis. Angeli autem boni cognoscentes creaturam, non in ea figuntur, quod esset tenebrescere et noctem fieri; sed hoc ipsum referunt ad laudem Dei, in quo sicut in principio omnia cognoscunt. Et ideo post vesperam non po-nitur nox, sed mane ita quod mane sit finis præcedentis diei, et principium sequentis, in-quantum angeli cognitionem præcedentis operis ad laudem Dei referunt. Meridies autem sub nomine diei comprehenditur, quasi medium inter duo extrema. Vel potest meridies referri ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, quæ non habet principium nec finem.
[I.q.58.a.6.ad.3] The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature.
[I.q.58.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam ipsi angeli creaturæ sunt. Unde esse rerum in intelligentia angelica comprehenditur sub vespertina cognitione sicut et esse rerum in propria natura.
Article 7
[I.q.58.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one. For it is said (Genesis 1:5): "There was evening and morning, one day." But by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be understood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.
[I.q.58.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod una sit cognitio vespertina et matutina. Dicitur enim Gen., 1, 5: Factum est vespere et mane dies unus. Sed per diem intelligitur cognitio angelica, ut Augustinus dicit, loco cit. art. præc. in arg. sed contra. Ergo una et eadem est cognitio in angelis matutina et vespertina.
[I.q.58.a.7.arg.2] Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in God, according to Matthew 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge.
[I.q.58.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, impossibile est unam potentiam simul duas operationes habere. Sed angeli semper sunt in actu cognitionis matutinæ; quia semper vident Deum, et res in Deo, secundum illud Matth., xviii, 10: Angeli eorum semper vident faciem Patris mei, etc. Ergo si cognitio vespertina esset alia a matutina, nullo modo angelus posset esse in actu cognitionis vespertinæ.
[I.q.58.a.7.arg.3] Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But, if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.
[I.q.58.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Apostolus dicit, I Cor., xiii, 10: Cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Sed si cognitio vespertina sit aliud a matutina, comparatur ad ipsam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Ergo non poterit simul vespertina cognitio esse cum matutina. In contrarium est quod dicit Augustinus, IV Super Gen. ad litt., c. xxiii, col. 312, t. 3, quod « multum interest inter cognitionem rei cujusque in Verbo Dei, et cognitionem ejus in natura ejus; ut illud merito ad diem pertineat, hoc ad vesperam. »
[I.q.58.a.7.sc] Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening."
[I.q.58.a.7.co] As was observed (6), the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a principle; because, as has been already stated (55, 2), the angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that when we say "in their proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature.
Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own nature. If, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have in their own natures, then the morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.
[I.q.58.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, cognitio vespertina dicitur qua angeli cognoscunt res in propria natura. Quod non est ita intelligi, quasi ex propria re-rum natura cognitionem accipiant, ut hæc præpositio, « in, » indicet habitudinem principii; quia non accipiunt angeli cognitionem a rebus, ut supra habitum est. Relin-quitur igitur quod hoc quod dicitur, « in propria natura, » accipiatur secundum rationem cogniti, secundum quod subest cognitioni; ut scilicet cognitio vespertina in angelis dicatur secundum quod cognoscunt esse rerum, quod habent res in propria natura. Quod quidem per duplex medium cognoscunt, scilicet per species innatas, et per rationes rerum in Verbo existentes. Non enim videndo Verbum, cognoscunt solum illud esse rerum quod habent in Verbo, sed illud esse quod habent in propria natura; sicut Deus per hoc quod videt se, cognoscit esse rerum quod habent in propria natura. Si ergo dicatur cognitio vespertina, secundum quod cognoscunt esse rerum quod habent in propria natura, videndo Verbum, sic una et eadem secundum essentiam est cognitio vespertina et matutina, differens solum secundum cognita. Si vero cognitio vespertina dicatur secundum quod angeli cognoscunt esse rerum quod habent in propria natura per formas innatas, sic alia est cognitio vespertina et matutina. Et ita videtur intelligere Augustinus, cum unam ponat imperfectam respectu alterius.
[I.q.58.a.7.ad.1] The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day's unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.
[I.q.58.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut numerus sex dierum, secundum intellectum Augustini, loco cit. art. præc., in arg. sed contra, accipitur secundum sex genera re- Notitia matutina tripliciter intelligitur: 1. Quæ a creatione est infusa; 2. Quæ ante gloria visorum in essentia divina est; 3. Quæ in statu gloriæ rerum in verbo est. Notitia vespertina est rerum in proprio genere; sed rerum cognitio per species innatas non dicitur juxta Scotistas vespertina, nisi secundum quid. Notitia meridiana additur. Matutina angeli Deum et in Deo creaturas vident; vespertina per species concreatas in proprio genere quascumque res; meridiana seu diuturna ex quo clarius in Deo quam in seipsis creaturas vident, voluntate deliberata, toto amore, semper in creatoris laudem ac dilectionem omnes suas cognitiones referunt. rum quæ cognoscuntur ab angelis; ita unitas diei accipitur secundum unitatem rei cognitæ, quæ tamen diversis cognitionibus cognosci potest.
[I.q.58.a.7.ad.2] There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels.
[I.q.58.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod duæ operationes possunt simul esse unius potentiæ, quarum una ad aliam refertur; ut patet, cum voluntas simul vult et finem, et ea quæ sunt ad finem; et intellectus simul intelligit principia et conclusiones per principia quando jam scientiam acquisivit. Cognitio autem vespertina in angelis refertur ad matutinam, ut Augustinus dicit, Super Gen., lib. IV, c. xxiv, col. 313, t. 3. Unde nihil prohibet utramque simul esse in angelis.
[I.q.58.a.7.ad.3] On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion. In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.58.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod veniente perfecto, evacuatur imperfectum, quod scilicet ei opponitur; sicut fides, quæ est eorum quæ non videntur, evacuatur, visione veniente. Sed imperfectio vespertinæ cognitionis non opponitur perfectioni matutinæ. Quod enim cognoscatur aliquid in seipso, non est oppositum ei quod cognoscatur in sua causa; et iterum quod aliquid cognoscatur per duo media quorum unum est perfectius, et aliud imperfectius, nihil repugnans habet; sicut ad eamdem conclusionem habere possumus et medium demonstrativum et dialecticum; et similiter eadem res potest sciri ab angelo per Verbum increatum, et per speciem innatam.
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