Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q79. The intellectual powers
Source context
- Theme
- The intellective powers of the soul: possible intellect, agent intellect, memory, and reason as distinct faculties
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 26, chapter 9Steiner treats intellectuality as a cosmic force formerly administered by Michael as servant of the divine-spiritual powers, which then detached itself and passed into human souls — a process structurally related to Aquinas's distinction between possible and agent intellect as differently oriented capacities within the soul.
- GA 346, 1924-09-22Steiner describes humanity's appropriation of intellectuality from the cosmos as a pivotal world-historical event, providing a spiritual-evolutionary context for the question of where the intellect's power originates — a question Aquinas addresses through the doctrine of abstraction and the agent intellect.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian nous (De Anima III)Aristotle's distinction between the active intellect (nous poietikos) and the passive/potential intellect (nous pathetikos) is the direct philosophical source Aquinas reworks in Q79, attributing both functions to the individual human soul rather than to a separate cosmic intellect.
- Avicerroism / Averroes on the Separate IntellectAverroes held the agent intellect to be a single transcendent entity shared by all humans; Aquinas's Q79 explicitly argues against this, insisting each soul possesses its own agent and possible intellect — a position with cross-tradition congruence to debates in Islamic Kalam about divine versus human cognitive powers.
- Neoplatonic illuminationism (Augustine)The Augustinian tradition located intellectual illumination in divine light acting on the soul; Aquinas in Q79 absorbs and limits this by grounding abstraction in the soul's own agent intellect, marking a structural departure from pure illuminationist epistemology.
Q79. The intellectual powers
Article 1
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intellectus non sit aliqua potentia animæ, sed sit ipsa ejus essentia. Intellectus enim idem videtur esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animæ, sed essentia: dicit enim Augustinus, IX De Trinit., cap. iv, col. 964, t. 8: «Mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. » Ergo intellectus est ipsa essentia animæ.
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.2] Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, diversa genera potentiarum animæ non uniuntur in aliqua potentia una, sed in sola essentia animæ. Appetitivum autem et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animæ, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 27; conveniunt autem in mente; quia Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. X, c. xi, col. 983, t. 8, ponit intelligentiam et voluntatem in mente. Ergo mens et intellectus est ipsa essentia animæ, et non aliqua ejus potentia.
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.3] Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Gregorium in Homil. Ascensionis, xxix in Evang., § 2, col. 4214, t. 2: «Homo intelligit cum angelis.» Sed angeli dicuntur mentes et intellectus. Ergo mens et intellectus hominis non est aliqua potentia animæ, sed ipsa anima.
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.4] Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.
[I.q.79.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, ex hoc convenit alicui substantiae quod sit intellectiva, quia est immaterialis. Sed anima est immaterialis per suam essentiam. Ergo videtur quod anima per suam essentiam sit intellectiva.
[I.q.79.a.1.sc] The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
[I.q.79.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus ponit «intellectivum» potentiam animæ, ut patet in II De anima, text. 27.
[I.q.79.a.1.co] In accordance with what has been already shown (54, 3; 77, 1) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.
[I.q.79.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere secundum præmissa, quod intellectus sit aliqua potentia animæ, et non ipsa animæ essentia. Tunc enim solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei operantis, quando ipsa operatio est ejus esse. Sicut enim potentia se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad esse. In solo autem Deo idem est intelligere quod suum esse; unde in solo Deo intellectus est ejus essentia; in omnibus autem creaturis intellectualibus intellectus est quædam potentia intelligentis.
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.1] Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando vero pro ipsa anima sensitiva. Denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomine principalioris suæ potentiæ, quæ est sensus; et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nomine intellectus, quasi a principaliori sua virtute, sicut dicitur in I De anima, text. 65, quod «intellectus est substantia quædam.» Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus dicit quod mens est species, vel essentia.
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.2] The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animæ secundum diversas rationes objectorum. Sed appetitivum partim convenit cum intellectivo et partim cum sensitivo, quantum ad modum operandi per organum corporale vel sine hujusmodi organo; nam appetitus sequitur apprehension. Et secundum hoc Augustinus ponit voluntatem in mente, et Philosophus in ratione, lib. III De anima, text. 42.
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.3] In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in angelis non est alia vis quam intellectiva, et voluntas quæ ad intellectum consequitur; et propter hoc angelus dicitur mens vel intellectus, quia tota virtus ipsius in hoc consistit. Anima autem habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas et nutritivas. Et ideo non est simile.
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.4] The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
[I.q.79.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatæ non est ejus intellectus; sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum. Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia animæ, sed ejus virtus et potentia.
Article 2
[I.q.79.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.
[I.q.79.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. Patitur enim unumquodque secundum materiam, sed agit ratione formæ. Sed virtus intellectiva consequitur immaterialitatem substantiæ intelligentis. Ergo videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva.
[I.q.79.a.2.arg.2] Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above (Question 79, Article 6). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.
[I.q.79.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, potentia intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus, si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 20. Ergo potentia intellectiva non est passiva.
[I.q.79.a.2.arg.3] Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.
[I.q.79.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, agens est nobilius patiente, ut dicit Augustinus, Sup. Gen. ad litt., lib. XII, c. xvi, col. 467, t. 3, et Aristoteles, III De anima, text. 19. Potentiæ autem vegetativæ partis omnes sunt activæ, quæ tamen sunt infimæ inter potentias animæ. Ergo multo magis potentiæ intellectivæ, quæ sunt supremæ, omnes sunt activæ.
[I.q.79.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive."
[I.q.79.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 12, quod « intelligere est pati quoddam. »
[I.q.79.a.2.co] To be passive may be taken in three ways.
Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad.
Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved.
Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above (Question 78, Article 1), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.
Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly bodies (58, 1). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.
[I.q.79.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo propriissime, scilicet quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam aut secundum propriam inclinationem, sicut cum aqua frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo ægrotat aut tristatur. Secundo modo minus proprio dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abjicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens; et secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui ægrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; et non solum pati tristatur, sed etiam qui lætatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur. Tertio dicitur aliquis pati communiter ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abjiciatur: secundum quem modum omne quod exit de potentia in actum potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione apparet. Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se habeat ad ens uni-versale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis, et talis est intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et virtualiter totum ens præexistit sicut in prima causa: et ideo intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu totius entis universalis, quia sic oporteret quod esset ens infinitum; unde omnis intellectus creatus per hoc ipsum quod est, non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum. Potentia autem dupliciter se habet ad actum. Est enim quædam potentia quæ semper est perfecta per actum, sicut dicimus de materia corporum cælestium; quædam autem potentia est quæ non semper est in actu, sed de potentia procedit in actum, sicut invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium; et in principio est « sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, » ut Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 14. Quod mani-nifeste apparet ex hoc quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, post-modum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu. Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis; et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva.
[I.q.79.a.2.ad.1] This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.
[I.q.79.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de primo et secundo modo passionis, qui sunt proprii materiæ primæ. Tertius autem modus passionis est cujuscumque in potentia existentis quod in actum reducitur.
[I.q.79.a.2.ad.2] "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.
[I.q.79.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus passivus secundum quosdam dicitur appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animæ passiones, qui etiam in I Ethic., cap. ult., dicitur « rationalis per participationem, » quia obedit rationi. Secundum alias autem intellectus passivus dicitur virtus cogitativa, quæ nominatur ratio particularis. Et utroque modo passivum accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, in quantum talis intellectus sic dictus, est actus alicujus organi corporalis. Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, quem Aristoteles, III De anima, text. 5, ob hoc nominat « intellectum possibile, » non est passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis; et ideo est incorruptibilis.
[I.q.79.a.2.ad.3] The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one.
[I.q.79.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur; non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cujusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis conjuncti. Unde nihil prohibet hujusmodi passivum esse nobilius tali activo.
Article 3
[I.q.79.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive.
[I.q.79.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit ponere intellectum agentem. Sicut enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia. Sed quia sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia, non ponitur sensus agens, sed sensus patiens tantum. Ergo, cum intellectus noster sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, videtur quod non debeat poni intellectus agens, sed possibilis tantum.
[I.q.79.a.3.arg.2] Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.
[I.q.79.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si dicatur quod in sensu etiam est aliquod agens, sicut lumen, contra: lumen requiritur ad visum inquantum facit medium lucidum in actu; nam color ipse secundum se est motivus lucidi. Sed in operatione intellectus non ponitur aliquod medium quod necesse sit fieri in actu. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem.
[I.q.79.a.3.arg.3] Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible.
[I.q.79.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, similitudo agentis recipitur in patiente secundum modum patientis. Sed intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis. Ergo immaterialitas ejus sufficit ad hoc quod recipiantur in eo formæ immaterialiter. Sed ex hoc ipso aliqua forma est intelligibilis in actu quod est immaterialis. Ergo nulla neccessitas est ponere intellectum agentem ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in actu.
[I.q.79.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect.
[I.q.79.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 17, quod « sicut in omni natura, ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere. » Est ergo ponere intellectum agentem.
[I.q.79.a.3.co] According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on (4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.
[I.q.79.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum opinionem Platonis nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu, sed forte ad præbendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu quod est immateriale; et hujusmodi vocabat species sive ideas; ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et specibus, et intellectus nostros ad hoc quod de generibus et specibus rerum scientiam haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles, lib. III Metaphysic., a text. 10 ad fin. lib., non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formæ autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu; sequebatur quod naturæ seu formæ rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportet igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quæ faciat intelligibilia in actu per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus; et hæc est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.
[I.q.79.a.3.ad.1] Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.
[I.q.79.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam; et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiæ sunt activæ; in parte autem sensitiva omnes passivæ; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum.
[I.q.79.a.3.ad.2] There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason.
[I.q.79.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut idem sit in omnibus hominibus, diversitas in pluribus hominibus, vel defectus aliquando in eodem homine ex diversitate specierum in imaginatione causatur, sicut videndi diversitas ex diversitate vel defectu coloris. faciat colores actu visibles; et secundum hoc similiter requiritur, et propter idem 1, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. Secundum alios vero lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter colores, ut fiant actu visibles, sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum, ut Commentator dicit, in HI De anima, comm. 48. Et secundum hoc similitudo, qua Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc quod, sicut hoc est necessarium ad videndum, ita illud ad intelligendum: sed non propter idem.
[I.q.79.a.3.ad.3] If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.
[I.q.79.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, supposito agente, bene contingit diversimode recipi ejus similitudinem in diversis, propter eorum dispositionem diversam. Sed si agens non præexistit, nihil ad hoc faciet dispositio recipientis. Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt præter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis.
Article 5
[I.q.79.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men.
[I.q.79.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod intellectus agens sit unus in omnibus. Nihil enim quod est separatum a corpore, multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem corporum. Sed intellectus agens est separatus, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 19 et 20. Ergo non multiplicatur in multis corporibus hominum, sed est unus in omnibus.
[I.q.79.a.5.arg.2] Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.
[I.q.79.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, intellectus agens facit universale, quod est unum in multis: sed illud quod est causa unitatis, magis est unum. Ergo intellectus agens est unus in omnibus.
[I.q.79.a.5.arg.3] Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect.
[I.q.79.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnes homines conveniunt in primis conceptionibus intellectus. His autem assentiunt per intellectum agentem. Ergo conveniunt omnes in uno intellectu agente.
[I.q.79.a.5.sc] The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men.
[I.q.79.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in III De anima, text. 18, quod « intellectus agens est sicut lumen. » Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis. Ergo non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus.
[I.q.79.a.5.co] The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above (Question 76, Article 2). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances.
[I.q.79.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod veritas hujus quaestionis dependet ex præmissis. Si enim intellectus agens non esset aliquid animæ, sed esset quædam substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum; et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis. Si autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animæ, ut quædam virtus ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, secundum pluralitatem animarum, quæ multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Non enim potest esse quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversorum subjectorum.
[I.q.79.a.5.ad.1] The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate substance.
[I.q.79.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse separatum per hoc quod possibilis est separatus, quia, ut ipse dicit, lib. III De anima, text. 19, « agens est honorabilius patiente. » Intellectus autem possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicujus organi corporalis; et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.
[I.q.79.a.5.ad.2] The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.
[I.q.79.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus agens causat universale abstrahendo a materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus habentibus intellectum; sed quod sit unus secundum habitudinem ad omnia a quibus abstrahit universale, respectu quorum universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti, inquantum est immaterialis.
[I.q.79.a.5.ad.3] All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.
[I.q.79.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia quæ sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione consequente naturam speciei; et per consequens in virtute quæ est actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute quæ est principium hujus actionis; et hæc est virtus intellectus agentis. Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus; oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli, non autem unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.
Article 6
[I.q.79.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.
[I.q.79.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod memoria non sit in parte intellectiva animæ. Dicit enim Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. XII, cap. III, col. 999, t. 8, quod « ad partem superiore animæ pertinent quæ non sunt hominibus pecoribusque communia. » Sed 1 2 3 « Illud vero nostrum quod in actione corporalium atque temporalium tractandorum ita versatur, ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore, rationale quidem est, sed ex illa rationali nostræ mentis substantia, qua subhæremus intelligibilii atque incommutabili veritati. » Et c. II: « Possunt autem et pecora et sentire per corporis extrinsecus corporalia, et ea memoriae fixa reminisci. » Ne credas doctissimo D. Maret, canonico san-dionysiano ex ordine episcoporum, facultatisque memoria est hominibus pecoribusque communis; dicit enim ibidem, cap. 11, quod « possunt pecora sentire per corporis sensus corporalia, et ea mandare memoriae. » Ergo memoria non pertinet ad partem animæ intellectivam.
[I.q.79.a.6.arg.2] Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.
[I.q.79.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, memoria præteritorum est. Sed præteritum dicitur secundum aliquod determinatum tempus. Memoria igitur est cognoscitiva alicujus sub determinato tempore, quod est cognoscere aliquid sub hic et nunc. Hoc autem non est intellectus, sed sensus. Memoria igitur non est in parte intellectiva, sed solum in parte sensitiva.
[I.q.79.a.6.arg.3] Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.
[I.q.79.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in memoria conservantur species rerum quæ actu non cogitantur. Sed hoc non est possibile accidere in intellectu; quia intellectus fit in actu per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili; intellectum autem esse in actu est ipsum intelligere in actu; et sic intellectus omnia intelligit in actu quorum species apud se habet. Non ergo memoria est in parte intellectiva.
[I.q.79.a.6.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind."
[I.q.79.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X De Trinit., cap. xi, col. 983, t. 8, quod « memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens. »
[I.q.79.a.6.co] Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part.
But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding--namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.
The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.
[I.q.79.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum de ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quæ actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet, utrum species intelligibilies sic in intellectu conservari possint. Posuit enim Avicenna hoc esse impossibile. In parte enim sensitiva dicebat hoc accidere quantum ad aliquas potentias, inquantum sunt actus organorum corporalium, in quibus conservari possunt aliquæ species absque actuali apprehensione. In intellectu autem, qui caret organo corporali, nihil existit nisi intelligibiliter. Unde oportet intelligi in actu illud cujus similitudo in intellectu existit. Sic ergo, secundum ipsum, quam cito aliquis actu desinit intelligere aliquam rem, desinit esse illius rei species in intellectu; sed oportet, si denuo vult illam rem intelligere, quod convertat se ad intellectum agentem, quem ponit substantiam separatam, ut ab illo effluant species intelligibles in intellectum possibile. Et ex exercitio et usu convertendi se ad intellectum agentem relinquitur, secundum ipsum, quædam habi-sorbonicæ decano, dicenti quod in D. Thomæ doctrina intellectus agens est Deus. Salva eruditissimi viri reverentia, intellectus agens humanus ab intellectu divino participatus in D. Thomæ doctrina litas in intellectu possibili convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, quem dicebat esse habitum scientiæ. Secundum igitur hanc positionem nihil conservatur in parte intellectiva quod non actu intelligatur. Unde non poterit poni memoria in parte intellectiva secundum hunc modum. Sed hæc opinio manifeste repugnat dictis Aristotelis, qui dicit enim in III De anima, text. 8, quod « cum intellectus possibilis sic fiat singula, ut sciens dicitur quis secundum actum; hoc autem accidit, cum possit operari per seipsum; est quidem et tunc potentia quodammodo, non tamen simpliciter, ut ante addiscere aut invenire. » Dicitur autem intellectus possibilis fieri singula, secundum quod recipit species singulorum. Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur; quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet modo quo sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu. Repugnat etiam prædicta positio rationi. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis stabilis naturæ et immobilis quam materia corporalis. Si ergo materia corporalis formas quas recipit non solum tenet dum per eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam per eas agere cessaverit, multo fortius intellectus immobiliter, et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo superiori intellectu effusas. Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod ejus objectum sit præteritum ut præteritum, memoria in parte intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quæ est apprehensiva particularium. Præteritum enim ut præteritum, cum significet esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis pertinet.
[I.q.79.a.6.ad.1] Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect."
[I.q.79.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, non est nobis pecoribusque communis; species enim conservantur non in parte animæ sensitiva tantum, sed magis in conjuncto, cum vis memorativa sit actus organi est aliquid animæ. Scotistæ consentiunt. — — Nicolaï: « secundum actum, et quod hoc accidit. » — In — cujusdam. Sed intellectus secundum seip-sum est conservativus specierum praeter concomitantiam organi corporalis; unde Philosophus dicit, III De anima, text. 6, quod « anima est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus. »
[I.q.79.a.6.ad.2] The condition of past may be referred to two things--namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (76, 1); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here" and "now."
[I.q.79.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad objectum quod cognoscitur, et ad cognitionis actum; quae quidem duo simul conjunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva alicu-jus per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili. Unde simul animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse quoddam praeteritum sensibile. Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam pertinet, praeteritio accidit et non per se convenit ex parte objecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum est homo. Homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut in sensu; quia intelligere animæ nostræ est quidam particularis actus in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur homo intelligere nunc vel heri, vel cras. Et hoc non repugnat intellectualiati; quia hujusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu dictum est. Et ideo, sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus; ita intelligit suum intelligere, quod est singularis actus, vel in praeterito, vel in praesenti, vel in futuro existens. Sic igitur salvatur ratio memoriae quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum in intellectu, secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum quod intelligit praeteritum prout est hic et nunc.
[I.q.79.a.6.ad.3] The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.
[I.q.79.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod species intelligibles aliquando sunt in intellectu in potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia; aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc intelligit actu; aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum; et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu; et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species etiam quando actu non intelligit.
Article 7
[I.q.79.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect.
[I.q.79.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod alia potentia sit memoria intellectiva, et alia intellectus. Augustinus enim in X De Trin., c. xi, col 982, t. 8, ponit in mente memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Manifestum est autem quod memoria est alia potentia a voluntate. Ergo similiter est alia ab intellectu. 2. Praeterea, eadem ratio distinctionis est potentiarum sensitivæ partis, et intellectivæ. Sed memoria in parte sensitiva est alia potentia a sensu, ut supra dictum est. Ergo memoria partis intellectivæ est alia potentia ab intellectu. 3. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, loc. cit., memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt sibi invicem æqualia, et unum eorum ab alio oritur. Hoc autem esse non posset, si memoria esset eadem potentia cum intellectu. Non est ergo eadem potentia.
[I.q.79.a.7.arg.2] Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (78, 4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.
[I.q.79.a.7.arg.3] Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.
[I.q.79.a.7.sc] From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (6, ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect.
[I.q.79.a.7.sc] Sed contra, de ratione memoriae est quod sit thesaurus, vel locus conservativus specierum. Hoc autem Philosophus, in III De anima, text. 6, attribuit intellectui, ut dictum est. Non ergo in parte intellectiva est alia potentia memoria ab intellectu.
[I.q.79.a.7.co] As has been said above (Question 77, Article 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above (Question 59, Article 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.
[I.q.79.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, potentiæ animæ distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes objectorum, eo quod ratio cujuslibet potentiæ consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est ejus objectum. Dictum est etiam supra quod si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod objectum secundum communem rationem objecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversates particularium differentiarum; sicut potentia visiva quæ respicit suum objectum secundum rationem colorati, non diversificatur secundum rationem albi et nigri. Intellectus autem respicit suum objectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quia speciem quæ in phantasmate est sufficere contendunt. quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri. Unde secundum nullam differentiam entium diversificatur differentia intellectus possibilis. Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis et intellectus possibilis; quia respectu ejusdem objecti aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam quæ facit objectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam quæ movetur ab objecto in actu existente; et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum objectum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia; potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum objectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu. Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in intellectu esse potest nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu. Ad rationem enim potentiæ passivæ pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.
[I.q.79.a.7.ad.1] Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.
[I.q.79.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis in tertia distinctione I Sententiarum dicatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires, tamen hoc non est secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit, De Trinit., lib. XIV, c. VII, col. 1043, t. 8, quod « si accipiantur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum quod semper præsto sunt animæ, sive cogitentur, sive non cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem, vel dilectionem, quæ istam prolem parentemque conjungit. » Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus pro illis tribus potentiis; sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animæ retentione; intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus, voluntatem autem pro actu voluntatis.
[I.q.79.a.7.ad.2] Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.
[I.q.79.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod præteritum et præsens possunt esse propriæ differentia potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativæ, non autem potentiarum intellectivarum, ratione supra dicta.
[I.q.79.a.7.ad.3] Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.
[I.q.79.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex habitu, et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei; non autem sicut potentia potentiæ.
Article 8
[I.q.79.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.
[I.q.79.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. In lib. enim De spiritu et anima, c. xi, col. 786, t. 6 Oper. Augustini, dicitur: « Cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, postea ratio, deinde intellectus. » Est ergo alia potentia ratio ab intellectu, sicut imaginatio a ratione.
[I.q.79.a.8.arg.2] Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.
[I.q.79.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Boetius dicit in lib IV De consol., prosa vi, col. 847, t. 4, quod « intellectus comparatur ad rationem sicut aternitas ad tempus. » Sed non est ejusdem virtutis esse in aternitate et esse in tempore. Ergo non est eadem potentia ratio et intellectus.
[I.q.79.a.8.arg.3] Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.
[I.q.79.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo communicat cum angelis in intellectu, cum brutis vero in sensu. Sed ratio, quæ est propria hominis, qua animal rationale dicitur, est alia potentia a sensu. Ergo pari ratione est alia potentia ab intellectu, qui proprie coqvenit angelis, unde et intellectuales dicuntur.
[I.q.79.a.8.sc] Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.
[I.q.79.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III Super Genes. ad litt., cap. xx, col. 292, t. 3, quod « illud quo homo irrationabilibus animalibus antecellit, vel est ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur. » Ratio ergo et intellectus et mens sunt una potentia.
[I.q.79.a.8.co] Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood--namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.
[I.q.79.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversæ potentiæ. Quod manifeste cognoscitur, si utriusque actus consideretur. Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere; ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem; in pluribus edit.: « potentia; » nos autem propter codices « differentia » in obliquo eligimus. Plenius in textu D. Augustini. Ita cod. Alcan. cum editis omnibus quos vidimus; cod. Tarrac.: « non sicut potentiae puræ. » Opusculum De spiritu et anima, quod olim ab aliquibus ut genuinus D. Augustini fœtus aestimabatur et in appendice ad ejus opera nunc rejicitur, videtur ab Alchero, clarevallensi monacho, scriptum. « Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aternitatem tempus, etc. » « Intelligamus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem Dei, in quo irrationalibus animantibus antecellit. Id autem est ipsa ratio, etc. » intelligibilem cognoscendam. Et ideo angeli qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suæ naturæ, cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., c. VII, § 2, col. 867, t. 1. Homines autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur; et ideo rationales dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratio-cinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere; quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur, inde est quod ratiocinatio humana secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quæ sunt prima principia; et rursus in via judicii resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quæ inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eamdem etiam in naturalibus rebus; quia per eamdem naturam aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. Multo ergo magis per eamdem potentiam intelligimus et ratiocinamur. Et sic patet quod in homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus.
[I.q.79.a.8.ad.1] That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority.
[I.q.79.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa enumeratio fit secundum ordinem actuum, non secundum distinctionem potentiae; quamvis liber ille non sit magnæ auctoritatis, ut jam dictum est. Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. Æternitas enim comparatur ad tempus, sicut immobile ad mobile; et ideo Boetius comparavit intellectum æternitati, rationem vero tempori.
[I.q.79.a.8.ad.2] The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
[I.q.79.a.8.ad.3] Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
[I.q.79.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod alia animalia sunt ita infra hominem, quod non possunt attingere ad cognoscendam veritatem, quam angeli cognoscunt, sed imperfecte; et ideo vis cognoscitiva angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum.
Article 9
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ratio superior et inferior sint diversæ potentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. XII, c. iv, col. 1000, t. 8, quod « imago Trinitatis est in superiori parte rationis, non autem in inferiori. » Sed partes animæ sunt ipsæ ejus potentiae. Ergo duæ potentiae sunt ratio superior et inferior.
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.2] Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower.
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil oritur a seipso. Sed ratio inferior oritur a superiori, et ab ea regulatur et dirigitur. Ergo ratio superior est alia potentia ab inferiori.
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are "generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower.
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. 1, a med., quod « scientificum animæ, quo cognoscit anima necessaria, est aliud principium et alia pars animæ ab opinativo et ratiocinativo quo cognoscit contingentia, » et probat per hoc, quia ad « ea quæ sunt genere altera, altera genere particula animæ ordinatur. » Contingens autem et necessarium sunt altera genere, sicut corruptibile et incorruptibile. Cum autem idem sit necessarium quod æternum, et temporale idem quod contingens; videtur quod idem sit quod Philosophus vocat scientificum, et superior pars rationis, quæ secundum Augustinum, De Trinit., lib. XII, c. VII, col. 1005, t. 8, « intendit æternis conspiciendis et consulendis » et quod idem sit quod Philosophus vocat ratiocinativum vel opinativum, et inferior ratio, quæ secundum Augustinum, ibid., « intendit temporalibus disponendis. » Est ergo alia potentia animæ ratio superior et ratio inferior.
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.4] Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision." Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason.
[I.q.79.a.9.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Damascenus dicit, lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xxii, col. 942, t. 4, quod « ex imaginatione fit opinio; deinde mens dijudicans opinionem, sive vera sit, sive falsa, dijudicat veritatem; » unde et mens dicitur a metiendo. De quibus igitur judicatum est jam et determinatum, vere dicitur intellectus. Sic igitur opinativum, quod 1 Ita cod. Alcan. cum aliis et Nicolaï; edit. Rom. et Patav.: « acquisitionis. » 2 « Ex imaginatione oritur opinio; tum cogitatio, est ratio inferior, est aliud a mente et intellectu, per quod potest intelligi ratio superior.
[I.q.79.a.9.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they are not two powers.
[I.q.79.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XII De Trinit., cap. iv, col. 1000, t. 8, quod « ratio superior et inferior non nisi per officia distinguuntur. » Non ergo sunt duæ potentiæ.
[I.q.79.a.9.co] The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two--namely, eternal and temporal --are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (Romans 1:20), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.
But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science--for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.
[I.q.79.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ratio superior et inferior, secundum quod ab Augustino accipiuntur, nullo modo duæ potentiæ animæ esse possunt. Dicit enim, De Trinit., lib. XII, cap. vii, col. 1005, t. 8, quod « ratio superior est quæ intendit æternis conspi-ciendis, aut consulendis; » conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod ea in seipsis speculatur; consulendis vero, secundum quod ex eis accipit regulas agendorum. Ratio vero inferior ab ipso dicitur « quæ intendit temporalibus rebus. » Hæc autem duo, scilicet temporalia et æterna, comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem devenimus æternorum, secundum illud apostoli ad Rom., 1, 20: Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. In via vero judicii, per æterna jam cognita de temporalibus judicamus, et secundum rationes æternorum temporalia disponimus. Potest autem contingere quod medium et id ad quod per medium pervenitur ad diversos habitus pertineant: sicut principia inde-monstrabilia pertinent ad habitum intellectus, conclusiones vero ex his deductæ, ad habitum scientiæ. Et iterum ex principiis geometriæ contingit aliquid conclusere in alia scientia, puta in perspectiva. Sed eadem potentia rationis est, ad quam pertinet et medium et ultimum. Est enim actus rationis quasi quidam motus de uno in aliud perveniens. Idem autem est mobile, quod per-transiens medium pertingit ad terminum. Unde una et eadem potentia rationis est ratio superior et inferior; sed distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum, loco citato arg. sed contra, per officia actuum, et secundum diversos habitus. Nam superiori rationi attribuitur sapientia, inferiori vero scientia.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.1] We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secun-dum quamcumque rationem partitionis potest pars dici; inquantum vero ratio dividitur secundum diversa officia, ratio superior et inferior partes dicuntur, et non quia sunt diversæ potentiæ.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.2] The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea regulari, inquantum principia quibus utitur inferior ratio deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.3] The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect--namely, under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul--namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientificum de quo Philosophus loquitur, non est idem quod ratio superior. Nam necessaria scibilia inveniuntur etiam in rebus temporalibus, de quibus est scientia naturalis et mathematica. Opinativum autem et ratiocinativum in minus est quam ratio inferior, quia est contingentium tantum. Nec tamen est simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus cognoscit necessaria, et alia qua cognoscit contingentia; quia utraque cognoscit secundum eamdem rationem objecti, scilicet secundum rationem entis et veri. Unde et necessaria, quae habent perfectum esse in veritate, perfecte cognoscit, utpote ad eorum quidditatem pertingens, per quam propria accidentia de his demonstrat. Contingentia vero imperfecte cognoscit sicut et habent imperfectum esse et veritatem. Perfectum autem et imperfectum in actu non diversificant potentiam, sed diversificant actus quantum ad modum agendi, et per consequens principia actuum, et ipsos habitus. Et ideo Philosophus posuit duas particulas animæ scientificum et ratio-cinativum, non quia sunt duæ potentiæ, sed quia distinguuntur secundum diversam aptitudinem ad recipiendum diversos habitus, quorum diversitatem ibi inquirere intendit. Contingentia enim et necessaria, etsi different secundum propria genera, conveniunt tamen in communi ratione entis, quam respicit intellectus: ad quam diversimode se habent secundum perfectum et imperfectum.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.4] That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.
[I.q.79.a.9.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod illa distinctio Damasceni est secundum diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Opinio enim significat actum intellectus qui fertur in unam partem contradictionis cum formidine alterius. Dijudicare « Eam mentem in hæc duo quæ commemoravi, nisi per officia geminamus. » « Mens hominis æternis rationibus conspiciendis vel consulendis adhærescit. » Ita cod. Alcan. cum aliis et edit. Patav.; edit. Rom. et Nicolaï: « participationis. » Cod. cit. cum edit. Rom.: « partitionis. » vero, vel mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad examinationem propositorum. Et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis. Intelligere autem est cum quadam approbatione dijudicatis inhærere.
Article 10
[I.q.79.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.
[I.q.79.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Dicitur enim in lib. De spiritu et anima, cap. xi, col. 786, t. 6 Oper. Augustini, quod, « cum ab inferioribus ad superiora volumus ascendere, prius occurrit sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, postea intellectus, et postea intelligentia. » Sed imaginatio et sensus sunt diversæ potentiæ. Ergo intellectus et intelligentia.
[I.q.79.a.10.arg.2] Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.
[I.q.79.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Boetius dicit in V De consol., prosa iv, col. 849, t. 1, quod « ipsum hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia intuetur. » Sed intellectus est eadem potentia cum ratione. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia quam intellectus, sicut ratio est alia potentia quam imaginatio et sensus.
[I.q.79.a.10.arg.3] Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.
[I.q.79.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, actus sunt prævii potentiis, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 33. Sed intelligentia est quidam actus, ab aliis actibus qui attribuuntur intellectui diversus. Dicit enim Damascenus, lib. II De orthod. fid., cap. xxii, col. 243, t. 1, quod « primus motus intelligentia dicitur; quæ vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, intentio vocatur; quæ permanens et figurans animam ad id quod intelligitur, excogitatio dicitur: excogitatio vero in eodem manens et seipsam examinans, et dijudicans, phronesis dicitur, » id est, sapientia; « phronesis autem dilatata « Liber De spiritu et anima Augustino abjudicatur, et videtur ab Alchero, Clarevallensi monacho, scriptus. » « Sciendum est quod prima mentis agitatio, cogitatio simplex dicitur. Quæ autem rei alicui affixa est, ἐννοια seu mentis ratio appellatur. Hæc porro, si diutius persiterit, atque in animo id quod cogitatum est impresserit, consideratio nunfacit cognitionem, id est interius dispositum sermonem; » ex quo ait « provenire sermonem per linguam enarratum. » Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit quædam specialis potentia.
[I.q.79.a.10.sc] The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that "intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.
[I.q.79.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 21, quod « intelligentia indivisibilium est in quibus non est falsum. » Sed hujusmodi cognoscere pertinet ad intellectum. Ergo intelligentia non est alia potentia præter intellectivum.
[I.q.79.a.10.co] This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds." Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects--namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect.
[I.q.79.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum intellectus, qui est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de arabico translatis, substantiæ separatæ, quas nos angelos dicimus, intelligentiae vocantur, forte propter hoc quod hujusmodi substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de græco translatis dicuntur intellectus seu mentes. Sic ergo intelligentia ab intellectu non distinguitur sicut potentia a potentia, sed sicut actus a potentia; innuitur enim talis divisio etiam a philosophis. Quandoque enim ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum agentem, intellectum possibilem, intellectum habitu et intellectum adeptum; quorum quatuor intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversæ potentiae, sicut et in omnibus est alia potentia activa et alia passiva; alia vero tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis; qui quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo qui est considerare, et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus adeptus.
[I.q.79.a.10.ad.1] If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power.
[I.q.79.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si recipi debet illa auctoritas, intelligentia ponitur pro actu intellectus; et sic dividitur contra intellectum sicut actus contra potentiam.
[I.q.79.a.10.ad.2] Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.
[I.q.79.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Boetius accipit intelligentiam pro actu intellectus, qui transcendit actum rationis; unde ibidem, prosa v, col. 854, t. 1, dicit quod « ratio tantum humani generis est, sicut intellicupatur. Consideratio in eadem re rursus hærens, ac sese probans et explorans, prudentia nominatur. Hæc denique si latius progreditur, ratiocinationem facit, quæ internus sermo est, etc. Ex quo prolatitium aiunt prodire sermonem, qui lingua pronuntiatur. » gentia sola Dei; proprium enim Dei est quod absque omni investigatione omnia intelligit. 》 Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnes illi actus quos Damascenus enumerat, sunt unius potentiæ, scilicet intellectivæ; quæ primo quidem simpliciter aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia; secundo vero id quod apprehendit ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum vel operandum, et hic vocatur intentio; dum vero persistit in inquisitione illius quod intendit, vocatur cogitatio; dum vero id quod est cogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel sapere, quod est phronesis vel sapientia: nam sapientiae est judicare, ut dicitur in I Metaph., cap. II, a princ. Ex quo autem habet aliquid pro certo quasi examinatum, cogitat quomodo possit illud aliis manifestare; et hæc est « dispositio interioris sermonis, » ex qua procedit exterior locutio. Non enim omnis differentia actuum potentias diversificat, sed sola illa quæ non potest reduci in idem principium, ut supra dictum est.
[I.q.79.a.10.ad.3] All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power--namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence."
Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above (Question 78, Article 4).
Article 11
[I.q.79.a.11.arg.1] It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers.
[I.q.79.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod intellectus speculativus et practicus sint diversæ potentiæ. Apprehensivum enim et motivum sunt diversa genera potentia-rum, ut patet in II De anima, text. 27. Sed intellectus speculativus est apprehensivus tantum: intellectus autem practicus est motivus. Ergo sunt diversæ potentiæ.
[I.q.79.a.11.arg.2] Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.
[I.q.79.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, diversa ratio objecti diversificat potentiam. Sed objectum speculativi intellectus est verum, practici autem bonum, quæ differunt ratione. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus sunt diversæ potentiæ.
[I.q.79.a.11.arg.3] Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above (Question 78, Article 4). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.
[I.q.79.a.11.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in parte intellectiva intellectus practicus comparatur ad speculativum, sicut aestimativa ad imaginativam in parte sensitiva. Sed aestimativa differt ab imaginativa sicut potentia a potentia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et intellectus practicus a speculativo.
[I.q.79.a.11.sc] The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers.
[I.q.79.a.11.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in III De anima, text. 49, quod « intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. » Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversæ potentiæ.
[I.q.79.a.11.co] The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above (Question 77, Article 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical--i.e. operative.
[I.q.79.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversæ potentiæ. Cujus ratio est, quia, ut supra dictum est, id quod accidentaliter se habet ad objecti rationem quam respicit aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam. Accidit enim colorato quod sit homo, aut magnum, aut parvum. Unde omnia hujusmodi eadem visiva potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus; nam intellectus speculativus est qui quod apprehendit non ordinet ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem; practicus vero intellectus dicitur qui hoc quod apprehendit ordinet ad opus. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 49, quod « speculativus differt a practico fine; » unde et a fine denominatur uterque: hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, id est, operativus.
[I.q.79.a.11.ad.1] The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.
[I.q.79.a.11.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectus practicus est motivus non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum; quod convenit ei secundum modum suæ apprehensionis.
[I.q.79.a.11.ad.2] Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.
[I.q.79.a.11.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verum et bonum se invicem circumcedunt 1. Nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur objectum appetitus potest esse verum, in-quantum habet rationem boni, sicut cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere, ita objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit sicut speculativus, sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus.
[I.q.79.a.11.ad.3] Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (7, ad 2; 77, 3, ad 4).
[I.q.79.a.11.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod multæ differentiæ diversificant sensitivas potentias quæ non diversificant potentias intellectivas, ut supra dictum est.
Article 12
[I.q.79.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezekiel 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore "synderesis" is a power.
[I.q.79.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod synderesis sit quædam specialis potentia ab aliis distincta. Ea enim quæ cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed in Glossa Hieronymi Ezech., 1, super illud: Quatuor facies uni, col. 22, t. 5, dividitur synderesis contra irascibilem, et concupiscibilem et rationalem, quæ sunt quædam potentia. Ergo synderesis est quædam potentia.
[I.q.79.a.12.arg.2] Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But "synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because "synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that "synderesis" is a power just as sensuality is.
[I.q.79.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, opposita sunt unius generis. Sed synderesis et sensualitas opponi videntur, quia synderesis semper inclinat ad bonum, sensualitas autem semper ad malum; unde per serpentem significatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII De Trinit., c. xii et xiii, col. 1007, t. 8. Videtur ergo quod synderesis sit potentia, sicut et sensualitas.
[I.q.79.a.12.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason: and thus it is a power.
[I.q.79.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. II De libero arbitrio, cap. x, col. 1256, t. 1, quod « in naturali judicatorio adsunt quædam regulæ, et semina virtutum, et vera et incommutabilia 1. » Hæc autem dicimus synderesim. Cum ergo regulæ incommutabiles quibus judicamus pertineant ad rationem secundum sui superiorem partem, ut Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., lib. XII, cap. 11, col. 999, t. 8, videtur quod synderesis sit idem quod ratio, et ita est quædam potentia.
[I.q.79.a.12.sc] According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), "rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.
[I.q.79.a.12.sc] Sed contra, « potentiæ rationales se habent ad opposita, » secundum Philosophum, XII Metaph., text. 3. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis non est potentia; si enim esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia; non enim inventur in brutis.
[I.q.79.a.12.co] "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, 73] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above (Article 8), man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things--namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle--and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call "synderesis". Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural habit.
[I.q.79.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus; licet quidam posuerint synderesim esse quamdam potentiam ratione altiorem, quidam vero dixerint eam esse ipsam rationem, non ut est ratio, sed ut est natura. 1 « Istas tanquam regulas et quædam lumina virtutum, et vera et incommutabilia, et sive singula, sive omnia communiter ad contemplandum eis qui hæc valent sua quisque ratione ac Ad hujus autem evidentiam considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, progreditur ab intellectu aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili; et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum judicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota de his quæ ratiocinando inveniuntur. Constat autem quod sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita sicut principia speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium. Prima autem principia speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita non pertinent ad aliquam specialem potentiam, sed ad quem-dam specialem habitum, qui dicitur « intellectus principiorum, » ut patet in VI Ethic., cap. vi. Unde et principia operabilium nobis naturaliter indita non pertinent ad specialem potentiam, sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus synderesim. Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et judicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus naturalis.
[I.q.79.a.12.ad.1] The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power.
[I.q.79.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa divisio Hieronymi attenditur secundum diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Diversi autem actus possunt esse unius potentiae.
[I.q.79.a.12.ad.2] In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to "syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus.
[I.q.79.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod oppositio sensualitatis et synderesis attenditur secundum oppositionem actuum, non sicut diversarum specierum unius generis.
[I.q.79.a.12.ad.3] Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis".
[I.q.79.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hujusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima principia operabilium, circa quæ non contingit errare; et attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui: unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter judicamus.
Article 13
[I.q.79.a.13.arg.1] It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says [Commentary on Romans 2:15] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a power--either the mind itself, according to the text (Ephesians 4:13), "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"--or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.
[I.q.79.a.13.arg.2] Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that "their mind and conscience are defiled" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power.
[I.q.79.a.13.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil est peccati subjectum nisi potentia animæ. Sed conscientia est subjectum peccati; dicitur enim ad Tit., i, 15, de quibusdam quod inquinatæ sunt eorum et mens et conscientia. Ergo videtur quod conscientia sit potentia.
[I.q.79.a.13.arg.3] Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.
[I.q.79.a.13.arg.3] 3. Præterea, necesse est quod conscientia sit actus, vel habitus, vel potentia. Sed non est actus, quia non semper maneret in homine, nec etiam habitus, non enim esset unum quid conscientia, sed multa; per multos enim habitus cognoscitivos dirigimur in agendis. Ergo conscientia est potentia.
[I.q.79.a.13.sc] Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.
[I.q.79.a.13.sc] Sed contra, conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia. Ergo conscientia non est potentia.
[I.q.79.a.13.co] Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.
The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" (Ecclesiastes 7:23), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit--namely, "synderesis": thus Jerome calls "synderesis" conscience (Gloss. Ezekiel 1:6); Basil [Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [De Fide Orth. iv. 22 says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another.
[I.q.79.a.13.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod conscientia, propriie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus. Et hoc patet tum ex ratione nominis, tum etiam ex his quæ secundum communem usum loquendi conscientia attribuuntur. Conscientia enim secundum proprietatem vocabuli importat ordinem scientiæ ad aliquid: nam conscientia dicitur « cum alio scientia. » Applicatio autem scientiæ ad alihabitum conclusionum ex hujusmodi principiis habitarum; lex naturæ hujusmodi principiorum objectum designat. Juxta Bonaventuram, synderesis superior portio rationis non est. Juxta D. Thomam, synderesis non est liberum arbitrium. Hanc, sicut et conscientiam, in voluntate collocat doctor Solemnis, Henricus scilicet a Gandavo; sed in voluntate synderesim, et in intellectu conscientiam doctor Devotus et Alexander de Hales. Cum quid fit per aliquem actum. Unde ex ista ratione nominis patet quod conscientia sit actus. Idem autem apparet ex his quæ conscientia attribuuntur. Dicitur enim conscientia testificari, ligare vel instigare, vel etiam accusare, vel etiam remordere sive reprehendere. Et hæc omnia consequuntur applicationem alicujus nostræ cognitionis vel scientiæ ad ea quæ agimus. Quæ quidem applicatio fit tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod recognoscimus aliquid nos fecisse vel non fecisse, secundum illud Eccle., vii, 23; Scit conscientia tua, quia et tu crebro maledixisti aliis; et secundum hoc conscientia dicitur testificari. Alio modo applicatur secundum quod per nostram conscientiam judicamus aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum; et secundum hoc dicitur conscientia instigare vel ligare. Tertio modo applicatur secundum quod per conscientiam judicamus quod aliquid quod est factum, sit bene factum vel non bene factum; et secundum hoc conscientia dicitur excusare, vel accusare, seu remordere. Patet autem quod omnia hæc consequuntur actualem applicationem scientiæ ad ea quæ agimus; unde, proprio loquendo, conscientia nominat actum. Quia tamen habitus est principium actus, quandoque nomen conscientia attribuitur primo habitui naturali, scilicet synderesi, sicut Hieronymus in Glossa Ezech., i, super illud: Quatuor facies uni, lib. I, col. 22, t. 5, synderesim « conscientiam » nominat; et Basilius, Hom. in princ. Proverb., « naturale judicatorium; » et Damascenus dicit, De fid. orth., lib. IV, cap. xxii, col. 1499, t. 4, quod est « lex intellectus nostri. » Consuetum enim est quod causæ et effectus per invicem nominentur.
[I.q.79.a.13.ad.1] Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind.
[I.q.79.a.13.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod conscientia dicitur spiritus, secundum quod spiritus pro mente ponitur, quia est quoddam mentis dictamen.
[I.q.79.a.13.ad.2] The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is defiled.
[I.q.79.a.13.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod inquinatio dicitur esse in conscientia, non sicut in sub- D. Thoma doctor Subtilis et Scotistæ concordant. « Arbitror quod (conscientia) ipse sit spiritus, qui ab apostolo esse cum anima dicitur,... velut pædagogus ei quidam sociatus, et rector, ut eam de melioribus moneat, vel de culpis castiget et arguat. » « Conscientiam, quæ et ipsa mentis nostræ lex dicitur. » jecto, sed sicut cognitum in cognitione, in-quantum scilicet aliquis scit se esse inqui-natum.
[I.q.79.a.13.ad.3] Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called "synderesis". And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.79.a.13.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod actus, etsi non semper maneat in se, semper tamen manet in sua causa, quæ est potentia et habitus. Habitus autem ex quibus conscientia informatur, etsi multi sunt, omnes tamen effica-ciam habent ab uno primo $^1$, scilicet ab habitu primorum principiorum, qui dicitur synderesis. Unde specialiter hic habitus interdum conscientia nominatur, ut supra dictum est.
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