Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q80. The appetitive powers in general
Source context
- Theme
- the appetitive powers as a distinct faculty of the soul, ordered toward sensed or apprehended good
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 314, 1924-01-02Steiner describes appetite as a striving power distributed through the whole organism, arising where the etheric and astral bodies lose their proper connection, locating appetitive life in subconscious organismic processes rather than in an isolated faculty.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian psychology (De Anima III.9–10)Aristotle's treatment of orexis as the general genus of desire — subdivided into epithumia, thumos, and boulesis — provides the structural source Aquinas inherits and refines in Q80, establishing appetite as necessarily distinct from cognition.
- Vedantic psychology (Pranamaya / Manomaya kosha)Cross-tradition congruence exists between Aquinas's distinction of sense appetite and intellectual appetite and the Vedantic layering of desire-driven vital sheaths below the rational sheath, though the ontological frameworks and soteriological aims differ substantially.
Q80. The appetitive powers in general
Article 1
[I.q.80.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul.
[I.q.80.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod appetitus non sit aliqua specialis animæ potentia. Ad ea enim quæ sunt communia animatis et inanimatis, non est aliqua potentia animæ assignanda. Sed appetere est commune animatis et inanimatis; quia « bonum est quod omnia appetunt, » ut di- $^1$ Sic scilicet « habitu, » sed Parm. et edit. placuit addere: « principio, » sic: « primo principio. » $^2$ Multoties in eo capite. Secundum Scotorellum et Richardum, conscientia est tactus, habitus, objectum scitum, habitus innatus et habitus adquisitus, habitus unicus, et plures habitus. citur in I Ethic., cap. 1. Ergo appetitus non est specialis potentia animæ.
[I.q.80.a.1.arg.2] Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.
[I.q.80.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, potentiæ distinguuntur secundum objecta. Sed idem est quod cognoscimus et appetimus. Ergo vim appetitivam non oportet esse aliam præter vim apprehensivam.
[I.q.80.a.1.arg.3] Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing--namely its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.
[I.q.80.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, commune non distinguitur contra proprium. Sed quælibet potentia animæ appetit quoddam particulare appetibile, scilicet objectum sibi conveniens. Ergo respectu hujus objecti, quod est appetibile in communi, non oportet accipi aliquam potentiam ab aliis distinctam, quæ appetitiva dicatur.
[I.q.80.a.1.sc] The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.
[I.q.80.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in II De anima, text. 27, distinguit appetitivum ab aliis potentiis. Damascenus etiam in II lib. Orth. fid., cap. xxii, col. 942, t. 1, distinguit vires appetitivas a cognitivis.
[I.q.80.a.1.co] It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.
[I.q.80.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere quamdam potentiam animæ appetitivam. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio; sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur ad superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quæ cognitionem participant altiori modo inventur quam in his quæ cognitione carent. In his enim quæ cognitione carent inventur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscujusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio quæ appetitus naturalis vocatur. In habentibus autem cognitionem sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum, sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium. Et sic anima hominis fit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem quodammodo appropinquant, in quo omnia præx existunt, sicut Dionysius dicit $^2$, De div. Triplex appetitus in nobis est: 1. Naturalis quem non imaginatio gignit, sed ipsa est dispositio qualitatum naturalium, quibus vires naturales suas actiones exercent; 2. Sensitivus qui ex pracedenti imaginatione vel sensu consequitur; 3. Rationalis qui sequitur rationis apprehensio-nem. nom., c. v, col. 845, t. 4. Sicut igitur formæ altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis quæ dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et hæc superior inclination pertinet ad vim animæ appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quæ apprehendit, non solum ea ad quæ inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animæ appetitivam.
[I.q.80.a.1.ad.1] Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power.
[I.q.80.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod appetere inventur in habentibus cognitionem supra modum communem quo inventur in omnibus, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animæ.
[I.q.80.a.1.ad.2] What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.
[I.q.80.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod apprehenditur et appetitur est idem subjecto, sed differt ratione. Apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in objectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum, non autem materialis diversitas.
[I.q.80.a.1.ad.3] Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.
[I.q.80.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod unaquæque potentia animæ est quædam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquæque appetit objectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu, supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione quæ est conveniens ad actum hujus vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.
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