Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q81. The power of sensuality
Source context
- Theme
- the sensitive appetite (vis sensitiva) as a distinct power of the soul, its structural relation to reason and will, and its proper ordering within human nature
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 188, 1919-01-24Steiner treats the interplay of rationality, sensuality, and aesthetic activity as three soul-powers that must be rightly ordered if the human being is to stand as a free agent within social life.
- GA 265a, 1913-11-19Steiner identifies ungoverned sensual passion — gluttony, drunkenness — as a denial of divine creative powers, structurally paralleling Aquinas's account of disordered concupiscence as a deviation from right reason.
- GA 90a, 1904-12-25Steiner describes a developmental stage in which the merely sensual part of the human being was hardened, and the higher forces of the soul could only emerge as that sensual productivity was progressively surrendered.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian psychology (De Anima II–III)Aristotle's division of the sensitive appetite into concupiscible and irascible parts, governed by the rational part when properly ordered, provides the direct philosophical substrate that Aquinas systematizes in Q81.
- Platonic tripartite soul (Republic IV)Plato's appetitive part of the soul (epithumia) corresponds structurally to the concupiscible appetite Aquinas treats here, with right order depending on reason's governance — a cross-tradition congruence Aquinas himself acknowledges.
- Vedantic antaḥkaraṇa doctrineThe kāma (desire-faculty) within the antaḥkaraṇa functions as the seat of sensual impulse that must be subordinated to buddhi (discriminative intelligence), offering a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's demand that sensuality be subject to reason.
Q81. The power of sensuality
Article 1
[I.q.81.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.
[I.q.81.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sensualitas non solum sit appetitiva, sed etiam cognitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. XII, cap. xii, col. 1007, t. 8, quod « sensualis animæ motus, qui in cor- Sensualitas accipitur tripliciter: 1. Pro dispositione corporis ad actum virtutis sensitivæ. 2. Pro dispositione ex parte carnis ad sentiendum cum virtute speciali movente, nondum anima corpus perficiente, sicut in embryone ubi anima sensitiva non est, si tamen ibi non sit; nam si ibi esset, virtus specialis inutilis foret. 3. Pro habilitate quæ ad sentiendum inest ex anima perficiente corpus, et sic ipsam animam sensitivam sensualitas dicit. Sensualitas definitur ultimo sensu vis quædam inferior animæ ex qua est motus qui in corporis exteriores sensus intenditur, et appetitus in homine rerum ad corpus pertinentium. Proprie loquendo poris sensu intenditur, nobis pecoribusque communis est. » Sed corporis sensus sub vi cognitiva continentur. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva.
[I.q.81.a.1.arg.2] Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.
[I.q.81.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quæ cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed Augustinus, lib. XII De Trinit., loc. cit., dividit sensualitatem contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, quæ ad cognitionem pertinet. Ergo sensualitas etiam est vis cognitiva.
[I.q.81.a.1.arg.3] Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.
[I.q.81.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sensualitas in tentatione homminis tenet locum serpentis. Sed serpens in tentatione primorum parentum se habuit ut nuntians et proponens peccatum; quod est viris cognitive. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva.
[I.q.81.a.1.sc] Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body."
[I.q.81.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod sensualitas definitur esse « appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium. »
[I.q.81.a.1.co] The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.
[I.q.81.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen sensulitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur, XII De Trinit., loco cit., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiæ, ut a visione visus. Motus autem sensulis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens; actus enim apprehensivæ virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus. Nam operatio virtutis apprehensivæ perficitur in hoc quod res apprehensæ sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivæ perficitur in hoc quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem. Et ideo operatio apprehensivæ virtutis assimilatur quieti, operatio autem virtutis appetitivæ magis assimilatur motui: unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivæ virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.
[I.q.81.a.1.ad.1] By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.
[I.q.81.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod « sensualis animæ motus intenditur in corporis sensu, » non datur intelligigi quod corporis sensus sub est in homine tantum, juxta Guillermum. A sensualitate quæ solum appetitum nominat, nec est ipsa inferior rationis portio, differt. — Anima sensitiva sensitivam, et motivam, et brutalem comprehendit. — Proprie autem sensualitas designat illam partem per quam animal, et homo præcipue in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum sub ratione convenientis vel disconvenientis movetur. Vis rationes convenientis vel disconvenientis apprehendens vocatur aestimativa, per quam lupum fugit, matrem sequitur agnus. Unde, proprie loquendo, in confinio aestimativæ et appetitivæ sequentis sensualitas incipit, et est rerum corporalium appettitus. Sensibilitas autem omnes vires animæ sensitive comprehendit. sensualitate comprehendantur, sed magis quod motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quædam ad sensus corporis, dum scilicet appetimus ea quæ per corporis sensus apprehenduntur. Et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi præambuli.
[I.q.81.a.1.ad.2] Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.
[I.q.81.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis. Vis enim cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva; sicut appetitiva ad quam pertinet sensualitas.
[I.q.81.a.1.ad.3] The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent.
[I.q.81.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod serpens non solum ostendit et proposuit peccatum; sed etiam inclinavit in affectum peccati $^4$; et quantum ad hoc sensualitas per serpentem significatur.
Article 2
[I.q.81.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.
[I.q.81.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus non distinguatur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem sicut in potentias diversas. Eadem enim potentia animæ est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et nigri, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 107. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt contraria. Cum ergo concupiscibilis respiciat conveniens, irascibilis vero nocivum, videur quod eadem potentia animæ sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis.
[I.q.81.a.2.arg.2] Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible.
[I.q.81.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, appetitus sensitivus non est nisi convenientium secundum sensum. Sed conveniens secundum sensum est objectum concupiscibilis. Ergo nullus appetitus sensitivus est a concupiscibilis differens.
[I.q.81.a.2.arg.3] Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on Matthew 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.
[I.q.81.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, odium est in irascibili. Dicit enim Hieronymus, in Matth. xiii, v. 33, Comm. lib. II, col. 91, t. 7: « Possideamus in irascibili odium vitiorum. » Sed odium, cum contrarietur amori, est in concupiscibili. Ergo eadem vis est concupiscibilis et irascibilis.
[I.q.81.a.2.sc] Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.
[I.q.81.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus, lib. De nat. hominis $^2$, cap. xvI, et Damasce- $^1$ Edit. Patav.: « in effectum. » $^2$ Liber De natura hominis Gregorio Nysseno olim adscribebatur; auctorem autem habet Nemesium, episcopum Emesæ, in Phænicia secunda, qui nus, De fid. orth., lib. II, cap. xn, col. 927, t. 1, ponunt duas vires, « irascibilem » et « concupiscibilem » partes appetitus sensitivi.
[I.q.81.a.2.co] The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite--the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible--namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [De Animal. Histor. viii.].
[I.q.81.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quæ sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quæ sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod in rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva, sed etiam ad resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quæ convenientibus impedimentum præbent, et ingerunt nocumenta; sicut ignis habet naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem, sed etiam quod resistat corrumpentibus et impedientibus. Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclination consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclination consequens formam naturalem, necesse est quod in parte sensitiva sint duæ appetitivæ potentiæ. Una per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quæ sunt convenientia secundum sensum et ad refugiendum nociva; et hæc dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero per quam animal resistit impugnantibus quæ convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt; et hæc vis vocatur irascibilis; unde dicitur quod ejus objectum est arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis. Hæ autem duæ inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium; quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit contra inclinationem concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet contraria; unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur passionibus concupiscibilis. Nam concupiscentia accensa minuit iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam ut in pluribus. Patet etiam ex hoc quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quæ impedient convenientia quæ concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva quæ concupiscibilis refugit. Et propter hoc omnes passiones irascibilis iv sæculo floruit et inter hujus aevi doctores numeratur. Vide inter hujus Opera librum praedictum, cap. xvI, col. 671. incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis et in eas terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam inferens in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnæ animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de de cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in IX De animalibus, cap. 1.
[I.q.81.a.2.ad.1] The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.
[I.q.81.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et inconvenientis; sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti quod impugnat.
[I.q.81.a.2.ad.2] As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Question 78, Article 2); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power.
[I.q.81.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quæ est perceptiva eorum quæ sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est, ita etiam in appetitu sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali ad suam defensionem; et hæc est vis irascibilis.
[I.q.81.a.2.ad.3] Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite.
[I.q.81.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod odium simpliciter pertinet ad concupiscibilem; sed ratione impugnationis, quæ ex odio causatur, potest ad irascibilem pertinere.
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