Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q89. The knowledge of the separated soul
Source context
- Theme
- cognitive capacities and retained knowledge of the soul after separation from the body at death
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 80b, 1922-02-12Steiner distinguishes between the corpse as externally observable and the soul-spiritual reality accessible to higher knowledge after death, affirming that cognition of the separated soul-being is possible through initiate perception.
- GA 218, 1922-12-07Steiner describes how the full content of the soul's powers, when brought into the spiritual cosmos, yields not merely abstract knowledge but lived experience of that knowledge — a faculty that persists beyond physical incarnation.
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonic tradition (Plotinus, Porphyry)Neoplatonic accounts of the disembodied soul's noetic activity — its turn toward Nous after separation from hyle — show cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that the separated soul retains intellectual knowledge previously acquired and can receive new intelligible species.
- Islamic scholasticism (Avicenna, Ibn Sīnā)Avicenna's doctrine of the 'floating man' and the soul's self-knowledge independent of sensory input provides cross-tradition congruence with Q89's thesis that intellectual cognition does not cease at bodily separation.
Q89. The knowledge of the separated soul
Article 1
[I.q.89.a.1.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle." But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.
[I.q.89.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima separata nihil omnino intelligere possit. Dicit enim Philosophus in I De anima, text. 69, quod « intelligere corrum-pitur quodam interius corrupto. » Sed omnia interiora hominis corrumpuntur per mortem. Ergo et ipsum intelligere corrumpitur.
[I.q.89.a.1.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained above (84, 7,8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have shown above (Question 77, Article 8). Therefore after death the soul understands nothing.
[I.q.89.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, anima humana impeditur ab intelligendo per ligamentum sensuum, et perturbata imaginatione, sicut supra dictum est. Sed morte totaliter sensus et imaginatio corrumpuntur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo anima post mortem nihil intelligit.
[I.q.89.a.1.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of innate species, because it has none such; being at first "like a tablet on which nothing is written": nor does it understand by species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing.
[I.q.89.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si anima separata intelligit, oportet quod per aliquas species intelligat. Sed non intelligit per species innatas, quia a principio est « sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum ; » neque per species quas tunc abstrahit a rebus, quia non habet organa sensus et imaginationis quibus mediantibus species intelligibiles abstrahantur a rebus ; neque etiam per species prius abstractas et in anima conservatas, quia sic anima pueri nihil intelliget post mortem; neque etiam per species intelligibiles divinitus influxas; hæc enim cognitio non esset naturalis, de qua nunc agitur, sed gratiae. Ergo anima separata a corpore nihil intelligit.
[I.q.89.a.1.sc] On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body." But the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation and above all, that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.
[I.q.89.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in 1 In Parm. et in edit. deest : « nobis. » Hunc articulum hodiernis commendamus. I De anima, text. 43, quod « si non est aliqua operationum animæ propria, non contingit ipsam separari. » Contingit autem ipsam separari. Ergo habet aliquam operationem propriam, et maxime eam quæ est intelligere. Intelligit ergo sine corpore existens.
[I.q.89.a.1.co] I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.
To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose.
In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples.
It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.
[I.q.89.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ista quæstio difficultatem habet ex hoc quod anima, quamdiu est corpori conjuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere non convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per experimentum patet. Si autem hoc non est ex natura animæ, sed per accidens hoc convenit ei ex eo quod corpori alligatur, sicut Platonici posuerunt; de facili quæstio solvi posset. Nam, remoto impedimento corporis, rediret anima ad suam naturam ut intelligeret intelligibilia simpliciter, non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut est de aliis substantiis separatis. Sed secundum hoc non esset anima corpori unita propter melius animæ; quia secundum hoc pejus intelligeret corpori unita quam separata; sed hoc esset solum propter melius corporis; quod est irrationabile, cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso. Si autem ponamus quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut intelligat convertendo se ad phantasmata; cum natura animæ post mortem corporis non mutetur, videtur quod anima tunc naturaliter nihil possit intelligere, cum non sint ei præsto phantasmata ad quæ convertatur. Et ideo ad hanc difficultatem tollendam considerandum est quod, cum nihil operetur nisi inquantum est actu, modus operandi uniuscujusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet autem anima alium modum essendi cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente tamen eadem animæ natura; non ita quod uniri corpori sit ei accidentale, sed per rationem suæ naturæ corpori unitur; sicut nec levis natura mutatur cum est in loco proprio, quod est ei naturale, et cum est extra proprium locum, quod est ei præter naturam. Animæ igitur secundum istum modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata corporum quæ in corporeis organis sunt; cum autem fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad ea quæ sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis a corpore separatis. Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animæ naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est præter rationem suæ naturæ, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei præter naturam. Et ideo ad hoc unitur corpori ut sic operetur secundum naturam suam. Sed hoc rursus habet dubitationem. Cum enim res semper ordinetur ad id quod melius est, est autem melior modus intelligendi per conversionem ad intelligibilia simpliciter quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, debuit sic a Deo institui animæ natura, ut modus intelligendi nobilior ei esset naturalis, et non indigeret corpori propter hoc uniri. Considerandum est igitur quod, etsi intelligere per conversionem ad superiora sit simpliciiter nobilius quam intelligere per conversionem ad phantasmata; tamen ille modus intelligendi, prout erat possibilis animæ, erat imperfectior. Quod sic patet. In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus inventur virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis; quod quidem in primo principio est unum et simplex; et quanto magis creaturæ intellectuales distant a primo principio, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro egredientibus. Et inde est quod Deus per unam suam essentiam omnia intelligit. Superiores autem intellectualium substantia-rum etsi per plures formas intelligant, tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis universales et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum, propter efficaciam virtutis intellectiva quæ est in eis. In inferioribus autem sunt formæ plures et minus universales et minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum, inquantum deficiunt a virtute intellectualum. Si ergo inferiores substantiae haberent formas in illa universitate in qua habent superiores, quia non sunt tantæ efficaciae in intelligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem de rebus, sed in quadam communitate et confusione. Quod aliqualiter apparet in hominibus. Nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus, per universales conceptiones magis intelligentium non acci-piunt perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur. Manifestum est autem inter substantias intellectuales secundum naturæ ordinem infimas esse animas humanas. Hæc autem perfectio universi exigebat ut diversi gradus in rebus essent. Si igitur animæ humanæ sic essent institutæ a Deo ut intelligerent per modum qui competit substantiis separatis, non haberent cognitionem perfectam, sed confusam in communi. Ad hoc ergo quod perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus habere possent, sic naturaliter sunt institutæ ut corporibus uniantur, et sic ab ipsis rebus sensibilibus propriam de eis cognitionem accipiant, sicut homines rudes ad scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla. Sic ergo patet quod propter melius animæ est ut corpori uniatur, et intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata; et tamen esse potest separata, et alium modum intelligendi habere.
[I.q.89.a.1.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second objection.
[I.q.89.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si diligenter verba Philosophi discutiantur, Philosophus hoc dixit ex quadam suppositione prius facta, lib. eod., text. 12, scilicet quod intelligere sit quidam motus conjuncti, sicut et sentire. Nondum enim differentiam ostenderat inter intellectum et sensum. Vel potest dici quod loquitur de illo modo intelligendi qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. De quo etiam procedit secunda ratio.
[I.q.89.a.1.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.
[I.q.89.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima separata non intelligit per species innatas, nec per species quas tunc abstrahit, nec solum per species conservatas, ut objectio probat, sed per species ex influentia divini luminis participatas, quarum anima fit particeps, sicut et aliæ substantiae separatæ, quamvis inferiori modo. Unde tam cito cessante conversione ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. Nec tamen propter hoc cognitio vel potentia non est naturalis : quia Deus est auctor non solum influentiae gratuiti luminis, sed etiam naturalis.
Article 2
[I.q.89.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above (Question 88, Article 1). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.
[I.q.89.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima separata non intelligat substantias separatas. Perfectior enim est anima corpori conjuncta quam a corpore separata; cum anima sit naturaliter pars humanæ naturæ. Quælibet autem pars perfectior est in suo toto. Sed anima conjuncta corpori non intelligit substantias separatas, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo minus cum fuerit a corpore separata.
[I.q.89.a.2.arg.2] Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances.
[I.q.89.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne quod cognoscitur, vel cognoscitur per sui præsentiam, vel per suam speciem. Sed substantiæ separatæ non possunt cognosci ab anima per suam præsentiam, quia nihil illabitur animæ nisi solus Deus; neque etiam per aliquas species quas anima ab angelo abstrahere possit, quia angelus simplicior est quam anima. Ergo nullo modo anima separata potest cognoscere substantias separatas.
[I.q.89.a.2.arg.3] Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reasonably be said.
[I.q.89.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quidam philosophi posuerunt in cognitione separatarum substantiarum consistere ultimam hominis felicitatem. Si ergo anima separata potest intelligere substantias separatas, ex sola sua separatione consequitur felicitatem, quod est inconveniens.
[I.q.89.a.2.sc] Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Luke 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels.
[I.q.89.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod animæ separatæ cognoscunt alias animas separatas, sicut dives in inferno positus vidit Lazarum et Abraham, Luc., xvi. Vident ergo et dæmones et angelos animæ separatæ.
[I.q.89.a.2.co] Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"--i.e. by knowing itself (88, 1, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above (Article 1), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Question 87, Article 1). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.
[I.q.89.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., lib. IX, c. 111, col. 963, t. 8, « mens nostra cognitionem rerum 1 Ita Rom. cum edit. Patavinis; Nicolaï: « Unde quam cito cessat conversio ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. » Certum est animam separatam intelligere posse; sed quomodo? Ambigitur. 1. Quidam dicunt eam intelligere partim per species in corpore acceptas, partim per species quas a Deo recipit; quia statim post separationem, inquiunt, anima a Deo species totius universi ordinis, per modum naturæ recipit; etiam animæ reprobæ talem influentiam recipiunt, eo quod illis etiam beneficia naturæ non substrahuntur. 2. D. Thomas quasi necessario separatas animas ponit non cognoscere, nisi per species a Deo vel ab angelis influxas, maxime ignota prius eisdem. 3. Scotus cum suis dicit: in anima separata quae speciem adquisitam habuit, non necesse est ut ad cognitionem ponatur species secundum naturam a Deo influxa. Secus est de anima parvuli cum speciem concreatam non habeat. Juxta Scotorellum, Guillermum, Richardum et Scotum, anima separata etiam objectum prius ignotum sibi præsens per speciem adquisitam hic impressam bene cognoscere potest. incorporearum per seipsam accipit, » id est, cognoscendo seipsam, sicut supra dictum est. Per hoc ergo quod anima separata cognoscit seipsam, accipere possumus qualiter cognoscit alias res separatas. Dictum est autem, quod quandiu anima corpori est unita, intelligit convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et ideo nec seipsam potest intelligere, nisi inquantum fit actu intelligens per speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam; sic enim per actum suum intelligit seipsam, ut supra dictum est. Sed cum fuerit a corpore separata, intelliget non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sed ad ea quæ sunt secundum se intelligibilia; unde seipsam per seipsam intelliget. Est autem commune omni substantiæ separatæ quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est infra se, per modum suæ substantiæ. Sic enim intelligitur aliquid secundum quod est in intelligente; est autem aliquid in altero per modum ejus in quo est. Modus autem substantiæ animæ separatæ est infra modum substantiæ angelicæ, sed est conformis modo aliarum animarum separatarum; et ideo de aliis animabus separatis perfectam cognitionem habet; de angelis autem imperfectam et deficientem, loquendo de cognitione naturali animæ separatæ. De cognitione autem gloriæ est alia ratio.
[I.q.89.a.2.ad.1] The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.
[I.q.89.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima separata est quidem imperfectior, si consideretur natura corporis; sed tamen quodammodo est liberior ad intelligendum, inquantum per gravedinem et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiæ impeditur.
[I.q.89.a.2.ad.2] The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.
[I.q.89.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod anima separata intelligit angelos per similitudines divinitus impressas; quæ tamen deficiunt a perfecta repræsentatione eorum, propter hoc quod animæ natura est inferior quam angeli.
[I.q.89.a.2.ad.3] Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness--not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article.
[I.q.89.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in cognitione substantiarum separatarum non quarum-cumque consistit ultima hominis felicitas, sed solius Dei, qui non potest videri nisi per gratiam. In cognitione vero aliarum substantiarum separatarum est magna feli- Ita cod. Alcan.; edit. Rom. et Patav., 1698. Cod. Camer., et ex eo theologi Lovan. et Duaceni. Nicolaï, et edit. Patav. 1612: « separatarum substantiarum. » Sic cod.; in Parm.: « quarumcumque non. » Ita cod. Alcan. et edit. Rom. Al.: « in solius Dei. » I. citas, etsi non ultima, si tamen perfecte intelligantur. Sed anima separata naturali cognitione non perfecte eas intelligit, ut dictum est.
Article 3
[I.q.89.a.3.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things.
[I.q.89.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscat. In substantiis enim separatis sunt rationes omnium rerum naturalium. Sed animæ separata cognoscunt substantias separatas. Ergo cognoscunt omnia naturalia.
[I.q.89.a.3.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility.
[I.q.89.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, qui intelligit magis intelligibile, multo magis potest intelligere minus intelligibile. Sed anima separata intelligit substantias separatas, quæ sunt maxima intelligibilium. Ergo multo magis potest intelligere omnia naturalia, quæ sunt intelligibilia minus. 3. Sed contra, in dæmonibus magis viget naturalis cognitio quam in anima separata. Sed dæmones non omnia naturalia cognoscunt, sed multa addiscunt per longi temporis experientiam, ut Isidorus dicit, lib I Sententiarum, cap. x, § 17, col. 556, t. 6. Ergo neque anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscunt.
[I.q.89.a.3.co] I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.
[I.q.89.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, anima separata intelligit per species quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et angeli. Sed tamen quia natura anima est infra naturam angeli, cui Ita cod. et edit. cit.; Al. et Nicolaï: « maxime intelligibiles. » « Prævaricatores angeli triplici modo præscientia acumine vigent, id est, subtilitate naturæ, experientia temporum, revelatione superiorum potestatum. » iste modus cognoscendi est connaturalis; anima separata per hujusmodi species non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem, sed quasi in communi et confusam. Sicut igitur se habent angeli ad perfectam cognitionem rerum naturalium per hujusmodi species, ita animæ separatæ ad imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per hujusmodi species cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia; quia omnia quæ Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut dicit Augustinus, Super Genes. ad litt., lib. II, cap. viii, col. 269, t. 3. Unde et animæ separatæ de omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed communem et confusam.
[I.q.89.a.3.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above (Question 87, Article 1). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.
[I.q.89.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quia nec ipse angelus per suam substantiam cognoscit quoquomodo omnia naturalia, sed per species quasdam, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non propter hoc sequitur quod anima cognoscat omnia naturalia, quia cognoscit substantiam separatam.
[I.q.89.a.3.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article.
[I.q.89.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut anima separata non perfecte intelligit substantias separatas, ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte, sed sub quadam confusione, ut dictum est.
[I.q.89.a.3.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things.
[I.q.89.a.3.ad.4] Reply to Objection 4. Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is useless.
[I.q.89.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod cognitio quæ acquiritur hic per studium, est propriia et perfecta; alia autem est confusa. Unde non sequitur quod studium addiscendi sit frustra.
Article 4
[I.q.89.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Question 77, Article 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (86, 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.
[I.q.89.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima separata non cognoscat singularia. Nulla enim potentia cognoscitiva remanet in anima separata, nisi intellectus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed intellectus non est cognoscitivus singularium, ut supra habi-tum est. Ergo anima separata singularia non cognoscit.
[I.q.89.a.4.arg.2] Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars.
[I.q.89.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, magis est determinata cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquid in singulari, quam illa qua cognoscitur aliquid in universali. Sed anima separata non habet aliquam determinatam cognitionem de specibus rerum naturalium. Multo igitur minus cognoscit singularia.
[I.q.89.a.4.arg.3] Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none.
[I.q.89.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si cognoscit singularia, et non per sensum, pari ratione omnia singularia cognosceret. Sed non cognoscit omnia singularia. Ergo nulla cognoscit.
[I.q.89.a.4.sc] The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" (Luke 16:28).
[I.q.89.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dives in inferno positus dixit: Habeo quinque fratres, ut habetur Luc., xvi, 28.
[I.q.89.a.4.co] Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Question 86, Article 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (14, 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.
[I.q.89.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod animæ separatæ aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, etiam quæ sunt præsentia. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod duplex est modus intelligendi: unus per abstractionem a phantasmatibus; et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum est. Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specie-rum a Deo: et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia, et universalia, et singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatæ per species, quæ sunt quædam participatæ similitudines illius divinæ essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere. In hoc tamen est differentia inter angelos et animas separatas, quia angeli per hujusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus; animæ vero separatæ, confusam. Unde angeli, propter efficaciam sui intellectus, per hujusmodi species non solum naturas rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub specibus contenta; animæ vero separatæ non possunt cognoscere per hujusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quæ quodammodo determinantur, vel per pracedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam ordinationem; quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. 1 In edit. deest « quoquomodo. » — 2 Parm. : « cognoscit. » — 3 In Parm. : « per. »
[I.q.89.a.4.ad.1] The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained above.
[I.q.89.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectus per viam abstractionis non est cognoscitivus singularium. Sic autem anima separata non intelligit ea, sed sicut dictum est.
[I.q.89.a.4.ad.2] The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said.
[I.q.89.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio animæ separatæ determinatur, ad quæ anima separata habet aliquam determinatam habitudinem, sicut dictum est.
[I.q.89.a.4.ad.3] The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.
[I.q.89.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima separata non se habet æqualiter ad omnia singularia, sed ad quædam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet ad alia. Et ideo est non æqualis ratio ut omnia singularia cognoscat.
Article 5
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Corinthians 13:8).
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod habitus scientiæ hic acquisitæ non remaneat in anima separata. Dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Cor., xiii, 8: Scientia destruetur.
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.2] Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; which seems unreasonable.
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quidam minus boni in hoc mundo scientia pollent, aliis magis bonis carentibus scientia. Si ergo habitus scientiæ permaneret etiam post mortem in anima, sequeretur quod aliqui minus boni etiam in futuro statu essent potiores aliquibus magis bonis; quod videtur inconveniens.
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.3] Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot be.
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, animæ separatæ habebunt rerum 1 scientiam per influentiam divini luminis. Si igitur scientia hic acquisita in anima separata remaneat, sequetur quod duæ erunt formæ unius speciei in eodem subjecto, quod est impossibile.
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.4] Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death.
[I.q.89.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in lib. Prædicam., in prædicam qualitatis, quod « habitus est qualitas difficile mobilis. » Sed ab ægritudine vel ab aliquo hujusmodi quandoque corrumpitur scientia. Sed nulla est ita fortis immutatio in hac vita, sicut immutatio quæ est per mortem. Ergo vide-tur quod habitus scientiæ per mortem corrumpatur.
[I.q.89.a.5.sc] Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven."
[I.q.89.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit in Epist. LIII ad Paulinum, col. 549, § 9, t. 4: « Discamus in terris, quorum nobis scientia perseveret in cælo. »
[I.q.89.a.5.co] Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed.
But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated (79, 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.
[I.q.89.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt habitum scientiæ non esse in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus sensitivis, scilicet imaginativa, cogitativa et memorativa; et quod species intelligibiles non conservantur in intellectu possibili. Et si hæc opinio vera esset, sequeretur quod destructo corpore, totaliter habitus scientiæ hic acquisitæ destrueretur. Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui est « locus specierum, » ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 6, oportet quod habitus scientiæ hic acquisitæ partim sit in prædictis viribus sensitivis et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiæ acquiritur. Nam « habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiritur, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. 1. Actus autem intellectus, ex quibus in præsenti vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quæ sunt in prædictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas quædam ad considerandum per species susceptas, et in prædictis inferioribus viribus acquiritur quædam habilitas, ut facilius per conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari. Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus viribus; ita etiam dicendum est de habitu. Quantum ergo ad id quod aliquis præsentis scientiæ habet in inferioribus viribus, non remanebit in anima separata; sed quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat: quia, ut dicitur in lib. De longitudine et brevitate vitæ, cap. II, dupliciter corrumpitur aliqua forma: uno modo per se, quando corrumpitur a suo contrario, ut calidum a frigido; alio modo per accidens, scilicet per corruptionem subjecti. Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem subjecti scientia quæ est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non potest; cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec per contra- 1 « Rerum » deest in edit. Guillermus et Scotus, in hoc concordantes rium corrumpi possunt species intelligibiles quæ sunt in intellectu possibili; quia intentioni intelligibilium nihil est contrarium, et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed quantum ad operationem quia intellectus componit et dividit vel etiam ratiocinatur, sic inventur contrarietas in intellectu, secundum quod falsum in propositione vel argumentatione est contrarium vero. Et hoc modo interdum scientia corrumpitur per contrarium, dum scilicet aliquis per falsam argumentationem abducitur a scientia veritatis. Et ideo Philosophus in libro prædicto, loco cit., ponit duos modos quibus scientia per se corrumpitur, scilicet per oblivionem ex parte memorativæ et per deceptionem ex parte argumentationis falsæ. Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata. Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientia secundum quod est in intellectu, manet in anima separata.
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.1] The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, "Now, I know in part."
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus non loquitur ibi de scientia quantum ad habitum, sed quantum ad cognitionis actum. Unde ad hujus probationem inducit, xiii, 12: Nunc cognosco ex parte.
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.2] As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man.
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut secundum staturam corporis aliquis minus bonus erit major aliquo magis bono, ita nihil prohibet aliquem minus bonum habere aliquem scientia habitum in futuro, quem non habet aliquis magis bonus. Sed tamen hoc qnasi nullius momenti est in comparatione ad alias prærogativas quas meliores habebunt.
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.3] These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility.
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod utraque scientia non est unius rationis. Unde nullum inconveniens sequitur.
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.4] This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.
[I.q.89.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de corruptione scientia quantum ad id quod est ex parte sensitivarum virium.
Article 6
[I.q.89.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired.
[I.q.89.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod actus scientiæ hic acquisitæ non maneat in anima separata. Dicit enim Philosophus in I De anima, text. 66, quod « corrupto corpore, anima neque reminiscitur, neque amat. » Sed considerare ea quæ prius novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima separata non potest habere actum scientiæ quam hic acquisit.
[I.q.89.a.6.arg.2] Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above (Question 84, Article 7). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life.
[I.q.89.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, species intelligibiles non erunt potentiores in anima separata, quam sint in anima corpori unita. Sed per species intelligibiles non possumus modo intelligere, nisi convertendo nos super phantasmata, sicut supra habitum est. Ergo nec anima separata hoc poterit; et ita nullo modo per species intelligibiles hic acquisitas anima separata intelligere poterit.
[I.q.89.a.6.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life.
[I.q.89.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., c. 1, quod « habitus similes actus reddunt actibus per quos acquiruntur. » Sed habitus scientiæ hic acquiritur per actus intellectus convertentis se supra phantasmata. Ergo non potest habitus alias actus reddere. Sed tales actus non competunt animæ separatæ. Ergo anima separata non habebit aliquem actum scientiæ hic acquisitæ.
[I.q.89.a.6.sc] It was said to Dives in hell (Luke 16:25): "Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime."
[I.q.89.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Lucæ, xvi, 25, dicitur ad divitem in inferno positum: Recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua.
[I.q.89.a.6.co] Action offers two things for our consideration--its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (Article 5), and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way.
[I.q.89.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in actu est duo considerare; scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex objecto in quod actus cognoscitæ virtutis dirigitur per speciem quæ est objecti similitudo; sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis; sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem contingit ex specie lapidis quæ est in oculo; sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in anima separata, sicut dictum est, status autem animæ separatæ non sit idem sicut modo est; sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas anima separata intelligere possit quæ prius intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad « Habitus » deest in edit. phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animæ separatæ. Et ita manet quidem in anima separata actus scientiæ hic acquisitæ, sed non secundum eumdem modum.
[I.q.89.a.6.ad.1] The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above (Question 79, Article 6).
[I.q.89.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de reminiscentia secundum quod memoria pertinet ad partem sensitivam, non autem secundum quod memoria est quodammodo in intellectu, ut dictum est.
[I.q.89.a.6.ad.2] The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.
[I.q.89.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversitate specierum, sed ex diverso statu animæ intelligentis.
[I.q.89.a.6.ad.3] The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).
[I.q.89.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod actus per quòs acquiritur habitus, sunt similes actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari justa sed non juste, id est delectabiliter, causat habitum justitiae politicæ, per quem delectabiliter operamur.
Article 7
[I.q.89.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that "the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.
[I.q.89.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod distantia localis impediat cognitionem animæ separatæ. Dicit enim Augustinus in libro De cura pro mort. agenda, cap. xiii, col. 605, t. 6, quod « animæ mortuorum ibi sunt ubi ea quæ hic fiunt scire non possunt. » Sciunt autem ea quæ apud eos aguntur. Ergo distantia localis impedit cognitionem animæ separatæ.
[I.q.89.a.7.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon's.
[I.q.89.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in libro De divinatione dæmonum, cap. 111, col. 584, t. 6, quod « dæmones propter celeritatem motus aliqua nobis ignota denuntiant. » Sed agilitas motus ad hoc nihil faceret, si distantia localis cognitionem dæmonum non impediret. Multo igitur magis distantia localis impedit cognitionem animæ separatæ, quæ est inferior secundum naturam quam dæmon.
[I.q.89.a.7.arg.3] Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge.
[I.q.89.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut distat aliquid secundum locum ita secundum tempus. Sed distantia temporis impedit cognitionem animæ separatæ; non enim cognoscit futura. Ergo videtur quod etiam distantia secundum locum animæ separatæ cognitionem impediat.
[I.q.89.a.7.sc] It is written (Luke 16:23), that Dives, "lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.
[I.q.89.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur, Luc., xvi, 23, quod dives, cum esset in tormentis, elevans oculos suos*, vidit Abraham a longe. Ergo distantia localis non impedit animæ separatæ cognitionem.
[I.q.89.a.7.co] Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance.
[I.q.89.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt quod anima separata cognosceret singularia abstrahendo a sensibilibus. Quod si esset verum, posset dici quod distantia localis impediret animæ separatæ cognitionem. Requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam separatam, vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum ad utrumque requireretur distantia determinata. Sed prædicta positio est impossibilis; quia abstractio specierum a sensibilibus fit mediantibus sensibus et aliis potentiis sensitivis, quæ in anima separata actu non manent. Intelligit autem anima separata singularia per influxum specierum ex divino lumine, quod quidem lumen æqualiter se habet ad propinquum et distans. Unde distantia localis nullo modo impedit animæ separatæ cognitionem.
[I.q.89.a.7.ad.1] Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if impeded by local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (8).
[I.q.89.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus non dicit quod propter hoc quod ibi sunt animæ mortuorum, ea quæ hic fiunt videre non possunt, ut localis distantia hu-jus ignorantiæ causa esse credatur; sed hoc potest propter aliquid aliud contingere, ut infra dicetur.
[I.q.89.a.7.ad.2] Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10.
[I.q.89.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum opinionem illam qua aliqui posuerunt quod dæmones habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita; secundum quam positionem etiam potentias sensitivas habere possunt, ad quarum cognitionem requiritur determinata distantia. Et hanc opinionem etiam in eodem lib., c. 111 et 11v, Augustinus expresse tangit : licet hanc opinionem magis recitando quam asserendo tangere videatur, ut patet per ea quæ dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XXI, c. x, col. 724, t. 7.
[I.q.89.a.7.ad.3] The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place.
[I.q.89.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod futura, quæ distant secundum tempus, non sunt entia in actu; unde in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia; quia sicut deficit aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognoscibilite. Sed ea quæ « Ibi sunt spiritus defunctorum ubi non vident quæcumque aguntur aut eveniunt in ista vita ho-minibus. » Plenius in textu D. Augustini. sunt distantia secundum locum, sunt entia in actu, et secundum se cognoscibilia. Unde non est eadem ratio de distantia loci et de distantia temporis.
Article 8
[I.q.89.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said (Luke 16:27-28), "I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments." Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.
[I.q.89.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod animæ separatæ cognoscant ea quæ hic aguntur. Nisi enim ea cognoscerent, de eis curam non haberent. Sed habent curam de his quæ hic aguntur, secundum illud Luc., xvi, 28: Habeo quinque fratres, ut testificetur* illis, ne et ipsi veniant in hunc locum tormentorum. Ergo animæ separatæ cognoscunt ea quæ hic aguntur.
[I.q.89.a.8.arg.2] Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Samuel 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.
[I.q.89.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, frequenter mortui vivis apparent vel dormientibus vel vigilantibus, et eos admonent de his quæ hic aguntur; sicut Samuel apparuit Sauli, ut habetur I Reg., xxviii. Sed hoc non esset, si ea quæ hic sunt non cognoscerent. Ergo ea quæ hic aguntur cognoscunt.
[I.q.89.a.8.arg.3] Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (7).
[I.q.89.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, animæ separatæ cognoscunt ea quæ apud eas aguntur. Si ergo quæ apud nos aguntur non cognoscerent, impediretur earum cognitio per localem distantiam; quod supra negatum est.
[I.q.89.a.8.sc] It is written (Job 14:21): "He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor."
[I.q.89.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Job, xiv, 24: Sive fuerint filii ejus nobiles*, sive ignobiles, non intelliget.
[I.q.89.a.8.co] By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid down (4), since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living."
Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss quotes on the text, "Abraham hath not known us" (Isaiah 63:16). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions (2 Kings 22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one--that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.
[I.q.89.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum naturalem cognitionem, de qua nunc hic agitur, animæ mortuorum nesciunt quæ hic aguntur. Et hujus ratio ex dictis accipi potest, quia anima separata cognoscit singularia per hoc quod quodammodo determinata est ad illa vel per vestigium alicujus praecedentis cognitionis seu affectionis, vel per ordinationem divinam. Animæ autem mortuorum secundum ordinationem divinam et secundum modum essendi segregatæ sunt a conversatione viventium, et conjunctæ conversationi spiritualium substantiarum quæ sunt a corpore separatæ; unde ea quæ apud nos aguntur, ignorant. Et hanc rationem assignat Gregorius in XII Moralium, cap. xxi, § 26, col. 999, t. 1, dicens: « Mortui, vita in carne viventium post eos qualiter disponatur, nesciunt; quia vita spiritus longe est a vita carnis; » et sicut corporea atque incorporea diversa sunt genere, ita sunt distincta cognitione. Et hoc etiam Augustinus videtur tangere, in lib. De cura pro mortuis agenda, c. xiii, col. 604, t. 6, dicens quod « animæ mortuorum rebus viventium non intersunt. » Sed quantum ad animas beatorum, videur esse differentia inter Gregorium et Augustinum. Nam Gregorius ibidem subdit: « Quod tamen de animabus sanctis sentien-dum non est; quia quæ intus omnipotentis Dei claritatem vident, nullo modo credendum est, quia foris sit aliquod quod ignorent. » Augustinus vero in lib. De cura pro mortuis agenda, cap. xiii, expresse dicit quod « nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant vivi et eorum filii: » ut habetur in Glossa interl., super illud: Abraham nescivit nos, Isa., Lxiii. Quod quidem confirmat per hoc quod a matre sua non visitabatur, nec in tristitiis consolabatur, sicut quando vivebat; nec est ita probabile ut sit facta vita feliciore crudelior; et per hoc quod Dominus promisit Josiæ regi quod prius moreretur, ne videret mala quæ erant populo superven-tura, ut habetur IV Reg., xxii. Sed Augustinus hoc dubitando dicit, unde præmittit: « Ut volet, accipiat quisque quod dicam; » Gregorius autem assertive; quod patet per hoc quod dicit: « Nullo modo credendum est. » Magis tamen videtur, secundum sententiam Gregorii, quod animæ sanctorum Deum videntes, omnia præsentia, quæ hic aguntur, cognoscant. Sunt enim angelis aequales; de quibus etiam Augustinus, eod. lib., c. xv, col. 605, asserit quod ea quæ apud vivos aguntur, non ignorant. Sed quia sanctorum animæ sunt perfectissime justitiæ divinæ conjunctæ, nec tristanur, nec rebus viventium se ingerunt, nisi secundum quod justitiæ divinæ dispositio exigit. « Expresse » quoad sensum, non autem quoad verba.
[I.q.89.a.8.ad.1] The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by "the revelation of the Holy Ghost," as Augustine says in the same book.
[I.q.89.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod animæ mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus viventium, etiamsi ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos habemus de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quamvis eorum statum igno-remus. Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere, sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt, vel per angelos seu dæmones, vel etiam Spiritu Dei revelante, sicut Augustinus in eodem lib. dicit, cap. xv, col. 605.
[I.q.89.a.8.ad.2] That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to Sirach 46:23, "he slept, and told the king the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.
[I.q.89.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc quod mortui viventibus apparent qualitercumque, vel contingit per specialem Dei dispensationem, ut animæ mortuorum rebus viventium intersint; et est inter divina miracula computandum; vel hujusmodi apparitiones fiunt per operationes angelorum bonorum vel malorum, etiam ignorantibus mortuis, sicut etiam vivi ignorantes aliis viventibus apparent in somnis, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. prædicto, c. x, etc., col. 600. Unde et de Samuele dici potest, quod ipse apparuit per revelationem divinam, secundum hoc quod dicitur Eccli., xlvi, 23, quod dormivit, et notum fecit regi finem vitæ suæ; vel illa apparitio fuit procurata per dæmones, si tamen Ecclesiastici auctoritas non recipiatur, propter hoc quod inter canonicas Scripturas apud Hebraeos non habetur.
[I.q.89.a.8.ad.3] This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.89.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ignorantia hujusmodi non contingit ex locali distantia, sed propter causam prædictam.
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