Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q90. The first production of man's soul
Source context
- Theme
- Divine creation of the rational soul as an immediate act of God, distinct from corporeal generation
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Anthroposophy — human ego as spirit-bestowed principleSteiner's account in GA 34 of the higher members of human nature — including the I as a spiritually originating principle distinct from the products of bodily development — displays cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence in Q90 that the soul is not generated from matter but directly produced by God.
- Neoplatonism — soul as emanation from the OnePlotinus's position that the soul descends from Nous rather than arising from matter presents a structural parallel to Aquinas's claim that the soul's origin is irreducible to any corporeal productive process, though Aquinas replaces emanation with direct creation ex nihilo.
- Vedanta — atman as uncreated, non-material selfAdvaita Vedanta's identification of the individual self (jiva) with a principle that transcends material causation shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's thesis that the rational soul cannot be educed from the potency of matter.
Q90. The first production of man's soul
Article 1
[I.q.90.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's substance. For it is written (Genesis 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance.
[I.q.90.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia Dei. Dicitur enim Genes., ii, 7: Formavit Deus hominem de limo terræ, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ, et factus est homo in animam viventem. Sed ille qui spirat, aliquid a se emittit. Ergo anima qua homo vivit, est aliquid de substantia Dei.
[I.q.90.a.1.arg.2] Further, as above explained (75, 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.
[I.q.90.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut supra habitum est, anima est forma simplex. Sed forma est actus. Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius Dei. Ergo anima est de substantia Dei.
[I.q.90.a.1.arg.3] Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.
[I.q.90.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quæcumque sunt, et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et mens sunt, et nullo modo differunt; quia oporteret quod aliquibus differentiis differrent; et sic essent composita. Ergo Deus et mens humana idem sunt.
[I.q.90.a.1.sc] Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."
[I.q.90.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus in lib. III De anima et ejus origine, cap. xv, col. 522, t. 10, enumerat quædam quæ dicit esse « multum operteque perversa, et fidei catholicæ adversa; » inter quæ primum est quod quidam dixerunt, « Deum animam non ex nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse. »
[I.q.90.a.1.co] To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (77, 2; 79, 2; 84, 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence -- acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (3, 1,7; 9, 1).
This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body.
Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.) So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.
But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (3, 1,8 and 75, 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.
[I.q.90.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana est quando intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quæ omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut supra probatum est. hoc mundo aguntur pro purgatorii animabus experimentalem alleviationem vel liberationem. Sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus antiquorum. Primi enim qui naturas rerum considerare incepunt, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil praeter corpora esse posuerunt; et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum corporum judicabant esse principium. Et quia animam ponebant esse de natura illius corporis quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur in I De anima, text. 20 et seqq., per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de substantia Dei. Juxta quam positionem etiam Manichæi Deum esse quamdam lucem corpoream existimantes quamdam partem illius lucis animam esse posuerunt corpori alligatam. Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a corpore separatum, sed corporis formam. Unde et Varro dixit quod Deus est « anima, mundum intuitu vel motu et ratione gubernans, » ut Augustinus narrat, IV De civ. Dei, cap. xxxi, § 2, col. 138, t. 7. Sic igitur illius totalis animæ partem aliqui posuerunt animam hominis, sicut homo est pars totius mundi, non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium substantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones corporum. Hæc autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probatum est. Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei.
[I.q.90.a.1.ad.1] The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing.
[I.q.90.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod inspirare non est accipiendum corporaliter. Sed idem est Deum inspirare, quod spiritum facere; quamvis et homo corporaliter spirans non emittat aliquid de sua substantia, sed de natura extranea.
[I.q.90.a.1.ad.2] Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained (75, 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.
[I.q.90.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod anima, etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per participationem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo non est actus purus, sicut Deus.
[I.q.90.a.1.ad.3] That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.
[I.q.90.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod differens proprie acceptum aliquo differt, unde ibi quæri-tur differentia ubi est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet differentia esse composita quodammodo, cum in aliquo differant, et in aliquo conveniant. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens, ut dicitur in X Metaph., text. 25 et 25. Nam simplicia diversa sunt seipsis, non autem differunt aliquibus differentiis ex quibus componantur; sicut homo et asinus differunt rationali et irrati-nali differentiis, de quibus non est dicere quod ulterius aliis differentiis different.
Article 2
[I.q.90.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created.
[I.q.90.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale, fit ex materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus purus. Ergo anima est facta ex materia; non ergo est creata.
[I.q.90.a.2.arg.2] Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.
[I.q.90.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis actus materiæ alicujus videtur educi de potentia materiæ; cum enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet præexistit in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiæ corporalis, ut ex ejus definitione apparet. Ergo anima educi-tur de potentia materiæ.
[I.q.90.a.2.arg.3] Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true.
[I.q.90.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, anima est forma quædam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione omnes aliæ formæ; et sic nulla forma exibit in esse per generationem; quod est inconveniens.
[I.q.90.a.2.sc] It is written (Genesis 1:27): "God created man to His own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created.
[I.q.90.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Genes., 1, 27: Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit in esse per creationem.
[I.q.90.a.2.co] The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (75, 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.
[I.q.90.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem; quod non est verum de aliis formis. Cujus ratio est, quia cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod habet ipsum esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens. Unde solæ substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia; accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaph., text. 2 et 3, quod « accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. » Parmenides Deum dixit esse de substantia animæ; Manichæi et Gnostici animam nostram ra-tionalem esse de substantia Dei; Libertini eam nihil esse: sic impii hodierni. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus; et ideo nulli formæ non subsistenti proprie convenit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est: unde ipsi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia præjacente neque corporali, quia sic esset naturæ corporeæ, neque spirituali, quia sic substantiæ spirituales invicem transmutarentur; necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.
[I.q.90.a.2.ad.1] The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.
[I.q.90.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in anima est, sicut materiale, ipsa simplex essentia; formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum, quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animæ, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt; quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia cælestis corporis: alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia præjacente.
[I.q.90.a.2.ad.2] The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (75, 2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.
[I.q.90.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod actum extrahi de potentia materiæ nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri in actu quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiæ corporalis, ut supra dictum est propterea non educitur de potentia materiæ.
[I.q.90.a.2.ad.3] As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms.
[I.q.90.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est simile de anima rationali et de aliis formis, ut dictum est.
Article 4
[I.q.90.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (66, 1; 70, 1). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.
[I.q.90.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. Opus enim creationis præcessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem, ut supra habitum est; corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis producta est ante corpus.
[I.q.90.a.4.arg.2] Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.
[I.q.90.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, anima rationalis magis convenit cum angelis, quam cum animalibus brutis. Sed angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, quando et bruta animantia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit creata ante corpus.
[I.q.90.a.4.arg.3] Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body.
[I.q.90.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus.
[I.q.90.a.4.sc] The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body.
[I.q.90.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod « actus proprius fit in potentia propria. » Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore.
[I.q.90.a.4.co] Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them--namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies--are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (47, 2); and so we need say nothing about it here.
Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created."
Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.
Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days (74, 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days.
[I.q.90.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Origenes, lib. I Periar., cap. VII, col. 170, et cap. VIII, col. 176, t. 1, posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum angelis creatas, propter hoc quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam angelos, æquales esse secundum suæ naturæ conditionem, sed solum merito distare; sic quod quædam earum corporibus alligantur, quæ sunt animæ hominum, vel cælestium corporum; quædam vero in sui puritate secundum diversos ordines remanent. De qua opinione supra jam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad præsens. Augustinus vero, Super Gen. ad litt., lib. VII, cap. xxiv, col. 368, t. 3, dicit quod anima primi hominis ante corpus cum angelis est creata, ob aliam rationem: quia scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes; quod non potest de anima dici, quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut spirituali præexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata produci potuit. Et ideo videur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum angelis fuerit creata, et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus administrandum. Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut ejus verba demonstrant; dicit enim, loco cit.: « Credatur, si nulla Scripturarum auctoritas, seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi esset, anima vero jam ipsa crearetur. » Posset autem hoc utcumque tolerari secundum eos qui ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et naturam completam; et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed solum ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur corpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanæ naturæ, hoc omnino esse non potest. Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto statu suæ naturæ, secundum quod uniuscujusque rei species exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanæ naturæ, non habet naturalem perfectionem, nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Sustinendo ergo opinionem Augustini de operibus sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima humana præcessit in operibus sex dierum secundum quamdam similitudinem generis, prout convenit cum angelis in intellectuali natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secundum alios vero sanctos tam anima quam corpus primi ho- Cod. Alcan. et Nicolaï: « habitum est. » minis in operibus sex dierum sunt producta.
[I.q.90.a.4.ad.1] If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body.
[I.q.90.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si natura animae haberet integram speciem, ita quod secundum se crearetur, ratio illa procederet ut per se in principio crearetur. Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore. Et similiter est dicendum ad secundum. Nam anima, si per se speciem haberet, magis conveniret cum angelis; sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet ad genus animalium ut formale principium.
[I.q.90.a.4.ad.2] The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.
[I.q.90.a.4.ad.3] That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.90.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod animam remanere post corpus accidit per defectum corporis, qui est mors: qui quidem defectus in principio creationis animæ esse non debuit.
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