Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q91. The production of the first man's body
Source context
- Theme
- divine formation of the first human body from material elements
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Genesis / Hebraic traditionThe Yahwist account (Gen 2:7) presents the first man's body as formed from the dust of the ground and animated by divine breath, providing the scriptural basis Aquinas systematically interprets in this question.
- Platonic-Neoplatonic cosmologyCross-tradition congruence exists between Aquinas's claim that God worked through secondary material causes in forming Adam's body and the Neoplatonic scheme in which the Demiurge employs lower craftsman-principles to fashion sensible matter.
- Vedantic anthropogenesis (Taittiriya Upanishad)Cross-tradition congruence appears between Aquinas's layered account of body-formation (elemental matter shaped by a higher formative principle) and the Taittiriya Upanishad's doctrine of sheaths (koshas) in which gross material form is the outermost expression of a spiritual origination.
Q91. The production of the first man's body
Article 1
[I.q.91.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing.
[I.q.91.a.1.arg.2] Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.
[I.q.91.a.1.arg.3] Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth.
[I.q.91.a.1.arg.4] Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements.
[I.q.91.a.1.sc] It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God made man of the slime of the earth."
[I.q.91.a.1.co] As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" (Deuteronomy 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him.
[I.q.91.a.1.ad.1] The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances.
[I.q.91.a.1.ad.2] Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false--that light is a body.
Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power.
[I.q.91.a.1.ad.3] If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such contraries--thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense--or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes.
[I.q.91.a.1.ad.4] In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed.
Article 2
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God.
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod corpus humanum non sit immediate a Deo productum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in III De Trinit., cap. iv, col. 873, t. 8, quod Rom., aliæque « terræ et aquæ. » Juxta Origenistas Adæ formatio de limo terræ allegorica et figurativa, non historica est. « corporalia disponuntur a Deo per angeli-cam creaturam. » Sed corpus humanum formatum fuit ex materia corporali, ut dictum est. Ergo debuit produci mediantibus angelis, et non immediate a Deo.
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.2] Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod fieri potest virtute creata, non est necessarium quod immediate produci potest per virtutem creatam cælestis corporis; nam et quædam animalia ex putrefactione generantur per virtutem activam corporis cælestis; et Albumazar dicit quod in locis in quibus nimis abundat calor aut frigus, homines non generantur, sed in locis temperatis tantum. Ergo non oportuit quod immediate corpus humanum formaretur a Deo.
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.3] Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production.
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil fit ex materia corporali nisi per aliquam materiæ transmutationem. Sed omnis transmutatio corporalis causatur ex motu cælestis corporis, qui est primus motuum. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit productum ex materia corporali, videtur quod ad ejus formationem aliquid operatum fuerit corpus cæleste.
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.4] Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God.
[I.q.91.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, VII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xxiv, col. 368, t. 3, quod homo factus est secundum corpus in operibus sex dierum, secundum causales rationes, quas Deus inseruit creaturæ corporali; post-modum vero fuit formatum in actu. Sed quod præxistit in corporali creatura secundum causales rationes, per aliquam virtutem corpoream produci potest. Ergo corpus humanum productum est aliqua virtute creata.
[I.q.91.a.2.sc] It is written (Sirach 17:1): "God created man out of the earth."
[I.q.91.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., xvii, 1: Deus creavit de terra hominem.
[I.q.91.a.2.co] The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (65, 4); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God.
[I.q.91.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prima formatio humani corporis non potuit esse per aliquam virtutem creatam, sed immediate a Deo. Posuerunt siquidem aliqui formas quæ sunt in materia corporali a quibusdam formis immaterialibus derivari. Sed hanc opinionem refellit Philosophus in VII Metaph., text. 26, 27 et 32, per hoc quod formis non competit secundum se fieri, sed composito, ut supra expositum est. Et quia oportet agens esse simile facto, non convenit quod forma pura, quæ est sine materia, producat formam quæ est in materia, quæ non fit nisi per hoc quod compositum fit. Et ideo oportet quod forma quæ est in materia, sit causa formæ quæ est in materia, secundum quod compositum a composito generatur. Deus autem quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque adminiculo pracedentis formæ materialis. Et propter hoc angeli non possunt transmutare corpora ad formam ali-quam, nisi adhibitis seminibus quibusdam, ut Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., lib. III, cap. Ⅺ, col. 875, t. 8. Quia igitur corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cujus virtute per viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur, necesse fuit quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.1] Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod etsi angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his quæ circa corpora operantur, aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea facit quæ nullo modo angeli facere possunt, sicut quod suscitat mortuos et illuminat cæcos; secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus primi hominis de limo terræ formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis angeli exhibent, sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres colligendo.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.2] Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), "man and the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod animalia perfecta, quæ generantur ex semine, non possunt generari per solam virtutem cælestis corporis, ut Avicenna fingit; licet ad eorum generationem naturalem cooperetur virtus cælestis corporis, prout Philosophus dicit in II Phys., text. 26, quod « homo generat hominem ex materia et sol. » Et exinde est quod exigitur locus temperatus ad generationem hominum et aliorum animalium perfectorum. Sufficit autem virtus cælestium corporum ad generandum quædam animalia imperfectiora ex materia disposita. Manifestum est enim quod plura requiruntur ad productionem rei perfectæ quam ad productionem rei imperfectæ.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.3] The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod motus cæli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non tamen transmutationum quæ fiunt praeter naturæ ordinem et sola virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod cæci illuminantur; quibus est simile, quod homo ex limo terræ formatur.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.4] An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways.
First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it.
Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their causal virtues.
[I.q.91.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum In rationes causales in creaturis dicitur aliquid præexistere dupliciter: uno modo secundum potentiam activam et passivam; ut non solum ex materia præexistenti fieri possit, sed etiam ut aliqua præexistens creatura hoc facere possit. Alio modo secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet de materia præexistente fieri possit a Deo; et hoc modo secundum Augustinum corpus hominis præexistit in operibus productis, secundum causales rationes.
Article 3
[I.q.91.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.
[I.q.91.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod corpus hominis non habuerit convenientem dispositionem. Cum enim homo sit nobilis-simum animalium, corpus hominis debuit esse dispositum optime ad ea quæ sunt propria animalis, scilicet ad sensum et motum. Sed quædam animalia inveniuntur acutioris sensus quam homo, et velocioris motus, sicut canes melius odorant, et aves velocius moventur. Ergo corpus hominis non est convenienter dispositionum.
[I.q.91.a.3.arg.2] Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.
[I.q.91.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, perfectum est cui nihil deest. Sed plura desunt humano corpori quam corporibus aliorum animalium, quæ habent tegumenta et arma naturalia ad sui protectionem, quæ homini desunt. Ergo corpus humanum est imperfectissime dispositionum.
[I.q.91.a.3.arg.3] Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.
[I.q.91.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo plus distat a plantis quam ab animalibus brutis. Sed plantæ habent staturam rectam, animalia autem bruta pronam. Ergo homo non debuit habere staturam rectam. Secundum Richardum, nulla causa creata ad hominis productionem attingere potest, nisi per unum modum, scilicet per generationem. Secus est de productione murium et vermium propter imperfectionem corporis eorum, propter quod secundum aliquos conceditur quod mures per putrefactionem geniti et per propagationem sint speciei ejusdem, licet alii id negent. Quoad Adæ et Ævæ corpora, dicendum est quod Deus ea per seipsum, nulla influentia cælesti mediante, nec agente particulari univoco cooperante, immediate plasmavit. Articulus iste quod homo sufficienter ex putrefactione generari posset per magistros et episcopum sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle., vii, 30: Deus fecit hominem rectum.
[I.q.91.a.3.sc] It is written (Ecclesiastes 7:30): "God made man right."
[I.q.91.a.3.co] All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance."
Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.
[I.q.91.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnes res naturales productæ sunt ab arte divina; unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparisonem ad finem. Et si talis dispositio habet secum adjunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat; sicut artifex qui facit serram ad secandum, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad secandum; nec curat eam facere ex vitro, quæ est pulchrior materia, quia talis pulchritudo esset impedimentum finis. Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem; et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in II Physic., text. 74: « Et quia dignius est sic » vel « melius, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscujusque substantiam. » Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius. Materia enim est propter formam et instrumenta propter actiones agentis. Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes. Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiæ ad ea quæ requiruntur in corpore, ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animæ operationes.
[I.q.91.a.3.ad.1] The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Question 78, Article 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Question 84, Article 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.
[I.q.91.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod tactus, qui est fundamentum aliorum sensuum, est perfection in homine quam in aliquo alio animali. Et propter hoc oportuit quod homo haberet temperatissimam complexionem inter omnia animalia. Præcedit etiam homo omnia alia animalia quantum ad vires sensitivas interiores, sicut ex supradictis apparisiensem excommunicatus est. Avicenna dixerat corpus humanum posse generari de terra per influentiam cælorum, sicut mus et vermis. — Quidam autem ex Judæis et Arianis Deum ad angelos contendebant hæc verba, Faciamus hominem, direxisse. Homo meliorem et certiorem habet tactum cæteris animalibus ut communiter. Nota « ut communiter, » quia aranea præcellit hominum tactu, cum statim sentiat etiam solum motum suæ velæ; sed hic tactus araneæ mere materialis est; unde præcellit adhuc tactu araneam homo. paret. Ex quadam autem necessitate contingit, quod quantum ad aliquos exteriores sensus homo ab aliis animalibus deficiat, sicut homo inter omnia animalia habet pessimum olfactum. Necessarium enim fuit quod homo inter omnia animalia respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum: tum ut liberius in eo perficerentur operationes interiorum virium sensitivarum, quae sunt necessariæ ad intellectus operationem, ut supra dictum est, tum etiam ut frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, quem necesse est in homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit rectæ staturæ. Magnitudo autem cerebri propter ejus humiditatem est impedimentum olfactus, qui requirit siccitatem. Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare quædam animalia sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam homo, propter impedimentum horum sensuum, quod necesse est consequi in homine ex perfecta complexionis aqualitate. Et eadem etiam ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quædam animalia sunt homine velociora: cui excellentiæ velocitatis repugnat aqualitas humanæ complexionis.
[I.q.91.a.3.ad.2] Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ of organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.
[I.q.91.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cornua et ungulæ, quae sunt quorumdam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii et multitudo pilorum ac plumarum, quae sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiæ terrestris elementi, quae repugnat aqualitati et teneritudini complexionis humanæ; et ideo hæc homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitæ necessaria, infinitis modis; unde et manus, in III De anima, text. 38, dicitur « organum organorum. » Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturæ, quæ est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi.
[I.q.91.a.3.ad.3] An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons.
First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things.
Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body.
Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease.
Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation.
Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.
[I.q.91.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitæ necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus, sed etiam ad cognoscendum. Unde, cum cætera animalia non delectentur in sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et ideo, quia sensus præcipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram, quasi ad cibum quærendum et providendum sibi de motu; homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et præcipue per visum qui est subtiliar et plures differentias rerum ostendit, libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere et cælestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat veritatem. Secundo, ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes habeant; dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis elevatum. Tertio, quia oporteret, si homo haberet pronam staturam, quod uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum; et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret. Quarto, quia si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum caperet ore; et ita haberet os oblongum et labia dura et grossa et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus; et talis dispositio omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis. Et tamen homo staturam rectam habens maxime distat a plantis. Nam homo habet superius sui, id est caput, versus superius mundi et inferius sui versus inferius mundi; et ideo est optime dispositus secundum dispositionem totius. Plantæ vero habent superius sui versus inferius mundi, nam radices sunt ori proportionales, inferius autem sui versus superius mundi. Animalia vero bruta medio modo; nam superius animalis est pars qua accipit alimentum, inferius autem est pars qua emittit superfluum.
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