Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q100. The condition of the offspring as regards righteousness
Source context
- Theme
- transmission of original righteousness (or its absence) to offspring through generation
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedantic doctrine of inherited dharmic tendency (samskara)Cross-tradition congruence: Vedantic thought holds that moral and spiritual tendencies (samskaras) are transmitted across generations through subtle-body inheritance, structurally paralleling Aquinas's question of whether original justice could pass to offspring through the generative act.
- Kabbalistic concept of zelem (divine image) and generational transmissionCross-tradition congruence: Kabbalistic anthropology treats the divine image (zelem) as a heritable spiritual quality whose integrity or corruption passes through lineage, offering a structural parallel to Aquinas's analysis of righteousness as a condition of the soul transmissible — or withheld — through human generation.
Q100. The condition of the offspring as regards righteousness
Article 1
[I.q.100.a.1.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness."
[I.q.100.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homines fuissent cum justitia nati. Dicit enim Hugo de Sancto Victore, lib. I De sacr., part. vi, c. xxiv, col. 277, t. 2, quod « primus homo ante peccatum generaret quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paternæ justitia hæredes. » 2. Praëterea, justitia est per gratiam, ut Apostolus dicit, ad Rom., v. Sed gratia non transfunditur, quia sic esset naturalis, sed a solo Deo infunditur. Ergo pueri cum justitia nati non fuissent. 3. Praëterea, justitia in anima est. Sed anima non est ex traduce. Ergo nec justitia traducta fuisset a parentibus in filios.
[I.q.100.a.1.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (Romans 5:16-21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous.
[I.q.100.a.1.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents, to the children.
[I.q.100.a.1.sc] On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul."
[I.q.100.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Anselmus dicit in lib. De conceptu Virgin., c. x, col. 444, t. 1, quod « simul cum rationalem haberent animam; justi essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret. »
[I.q.100.a.1.co] I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.
[I.q.100.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Plenius in textu Hugonis de S. Victore.
[I.q.100.a.1.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof.
[I.q.100.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Hugonis est intelligendum non quantum ad habitum justitia, sed quantum ad executionem actus.
[I.q.100.a.1.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (95, 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (95, 1). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.
From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
[I.q.100.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum justitia gratuita, quæ est merendi principium, sed cum justitia originali. Sed, cum radix originalis justitia, in cujus rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subjectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quæ est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est, necesse est dicere, quod si pueri nati fuissent in originali justitia, etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus, quod fuit cum gratia conditus. Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis; quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem; sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum, infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quæ tamem non est ex traduce. Unde patet solutio ad tertium.
Article 2
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten "children of hell"; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiæ nati fuissent in justitia confirmati. Dicit enim Gregorius, Mor., lib. IV, c. xxxi, § 62, col. 671, t. 4, super illud Job, III : Somno meo requiescerem, etc. « Si parentem primum nulla pecati putredo corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios gehennæ generaret; sed hi qui nunc per redemptionem salvandi sunt, soli ab illo electi nascerentur. » Ergo nascerentur omnes in justitia confirmati.
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.2] Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Anselmus dicit in libro II Cur Deus homo, c. xviii, col. 387, t. 4, quod « si primi parentes sic vixissent ut non pecarent tentati, ita confirmarentur cum omni propagine sua, ut ultra peccare non possent. » Ergo pueri nascerentur in justitia confirmati.
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.3] Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness.
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, bonum est potentius quam malum. Sed propter peccatum primi hominis consecuta est necessitas peccandi in his qui nascuntur ex eo. Ergo si primus homo in justitia perstitisset, derivaretur ad posteros necessitas observandi justitiam.
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.4] Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
[I.q.100.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, angelus adhærens Deo, aliis peccantibus, statim est in justitia confirmatus, ut ulterius peccare non potest. Ergo similiter et homo, si tentationi restitisset, confirmatus fuisset. Sed qualis ipse fuit, tales alios generasset. Ergo et ejus filii confirmati in justitia nascerentur.
[I.q.100.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
[I.q.100.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XIV De civit. Dei, c. x, col. 417, t. 7: « Tam felix universa societas esset humana, si nec illi, » scilicet primi parentes, « malum quod etiam in posteros trajecerunt, nec quisquam ex eorum stirpe iniquitatem committeret, quæ damnationem reciperet. » Ex quo datur intelligi, quod, etiamsi primi homines non peccassent, aliqui ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere. Non ergo nascerentur in justitia confirmati.
[I.q.100.a.2.co] It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
[I.q.100.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non videntur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiæ nascerentur in justitia confirmati. Manifestum est enim, quod pueri in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quamdiu generassent, non fuissent confirmati in justitia. Ex hoc enim creatura rationalis in justitia confirmatur, quod efficitur beata per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhærere, cum ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti; cum nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni. Et hoc dico secundum legem communem; quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus accidere potest, sicut creditur de Virgine matre Dei. Quam cito autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore; et animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in justitia confirmati.
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.1] If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin.
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si Adam non peccasset, non generaret ex se filios gehennæ, ita scilicet quod ab ipso peccatum contraherent, quod est causa gehennæ; possent tamen fieri filii gehennæ per liberum arbitrium peccando. Vel si filii gehennæ non fierent per peccatum, hoc non esset per hoc quia essent in justitia confirmati; sed propter divinam providentiam, per quam a peccato conservarentur immunes.
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.2] Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "It seems that if they had lived, etc."
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Anselmus hoc non dicit asserendo, sed opinando; quod patet ex ipso modo loquendi, cum dicit: « Videtur quod si vixissent, etc. »
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.3] This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed.
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio ista non est efficax; quamvis per eam Anselmus motus fuisse videatur, ut ex ejus verbis apparet, loc. in arg. 2 cit. Non enim sic per peccatum primi parentis ejus posteri necessitatem peccandi incurrunt, ut ad justitiam redire non possint: quod est tantum in damnatis. Unde nec ita necessitatem non peccandi transmisisset ad posteros, quod omnino peccare non possent; quod est tantum in beatis.
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.4] There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels (64, 2).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.100.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod non est simile de homine et angelo. Nam homo habet liberum arbitrium vertibile et ante electionem, et post; non autem angelus, sicut supra dictum est, cum de angelis ageretur.
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