Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q101. The condition of the offspring as regards knowledge
Source context
- Theme
- epistemic condition of offspring in the state of original justice — native knowledge versus acquired knowledge in the unfallen human
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedantic doctrine of samskarasThe Vedantic concept of innate samskaras — latent impressions carried into embodied life — presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's analysis of whether offspring in original justice possessed infused or only acquired knowledge.
- Neoplatonic anamnesis (Plato, Meno / Phaedo)Plato's doctrine that the soul carries knowledge from a pre-embodied state into birth offers a structural parallel to Aquinas's question of whether pre-lapsarian offspring would have possessed knowledge prior to sensory experience, though Aquinas locates the source in divine gift rather than recollection.
Q101. The condition of the offspring as regards knowledge
Article 1
[I.q.101.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (94, 3). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge.
[I.q.101.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in statu innocentiæ pueri nati fuissent in scientia perfecti. Qualis enim fuit Adam, tales filios generasset. Sed Adam fuit in scientia perfectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo filii nascerentur ab eo in scientia perfecti.
[I.q.101.a.1.arg.2] Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. I-II, 85, 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born.
[I.q.101.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ignorantia ex peccato causatur, ut Beda dicit. Sed ignorantia est privatio scientiæ. Ergo ante peccatum pueri mox nati omnem scientiam habuissent.
[I.q.101.a.1.arg.3] Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge.
[I.q.101.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, pueri mox nati justitiam habuissent. Sed ad justitiam requiritur scientia, quæ dirigit in agendis. Ergo scientiam habuissent.
[I.q.101.a.1.sc] The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth.
[I.q.101.a.1.sc] Sed contra est, quod anima nostra per naturam est « sicut tabula, in qua nihil est scriptum, » ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 14. Sed eadem animæ natura est modo quæ tunc fuisset. Ergo animæ puerorum in principio scientia caruissent.
[I.q.101.a.1.co] As above stated (99, 1), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (55, 2; 84, 6); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning.
[I.q.101.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, de iis quæ sunt supra naturam soli auctoritati creditur. Unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturæ conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est; et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est, quod pueri in statu innocentiæ non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent inveniendo vel addiscendo.
[I.q.101.a.1.ad.1] The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
[I.q.101.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis: et ideo quantum ad hoc non generasset filios similes sibi, sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturæ.
[I.q.101.a.1.ad.2] Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).
[I.q.101.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ignorantia est privatio scientiæ, quæ debet haberi pro Nil simile in Bedæ operibus occurrit. tempore illo; quod in pueris mox natis non fuisset. Habuissent enim scientiam quæ eis competebat secundum tempus illud. Unde ignorantia in eis non fuisset, sed nescientia respectu aliquorum; quam etiam Dionysius ponit in angelis sanctis, VII Cælest. hier., § 3, col. 210, t. 1.
[I.q.101.a.1.ad.3] Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.
[I.q.101.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus justitiae, in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia juris $^1$; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus; et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum.
Article 2
[I.q.101.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wisdom 9:15). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.
[I.q.101.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiæ mox nati habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Nunc enim pueri perfectum usum rationis non habent propter hoc quod anima per corpus aggravatur. Hoc autem tunc non erat: quia ut dicitur Sapient., ix, 15: Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam. Ergo ante peccatum et corruptionem a peccato sub-secutam, pueri mox nati perfectum usum rationis habuissent. 2. Praeterea, quædam alia animalia mox nata habent naturalis industriæ usum, sicut agnus statim fugit lupum. Multo ergo magis homines in statu innocentiæ mox nati habuissent usum perfectum rationis.
[I.q.101.a.2.arg.2] Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth.
[I.q.101.a.2.sc] In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.
[I.q.101.a.2.sc] Sed contra est, quod natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis. Ergo pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis.
[I.q.101.a.2.co] As above stated (84, 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (99, 1).
[I.q.101.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, usus rationis dependet quod-dammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum; unde, ligato sensu, et impeditis inferioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Vires autem sensitivæ sunt virtutes quædam corporalium organorum: $^1$ Ita cod. Alcan. cum edit. Rom. Theologi addi-dere « naturali, » quos secutæ sunt posteriores editions. Iidem theologi sustulerunt verba, « in quiet ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri; et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiæ non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta ætate. Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quæ ad eos pertine-bant quantum ad statum illum, sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum.
[I.q.101.a.2.ad.1] The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.
[I.q.101.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aggravatio additur $^2$ ex corruptione corporis in hoc quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quæ pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque ætatem.
[I.q.101.a.2.ad.2] Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Question 99, Article 1).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.101.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriæ naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea; quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur. Et tamen in homine est speciale impedimentum propter abundantiam humiditatis cerebri, ut supra dictum est.
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