Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q114. The assaults of the demons
Source context
- Theme
- demonic assault upon rational and spiritual life — angelic guardianship as counter-force
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Zoroastrian demonology (Angra Mainyu / daēvas)Zoroastrian teaching distinguishes a hierarchy of destructive spirit-beings (daēvas) whose assaults on human faculties require angelic counter-forces — a structural parallel to Aquinas's treatment of demonic temptation opposed by guardian-angel protection.
- Jewish Kabbalistic tradition (sitra achra)Kabbalistic sources frame the sitra achra (the 'other side') as an organised realm of adversarial spiritual beings whose influence on human beings is countered by angelic mediation — a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's formal taxonomy of demonic attack and its limits.
Q114. The assaults of the demons
Article 1
[I.q.114.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.
[I.q.114.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homines non impugnentur a dæmonibus. Angeli enim deputantur ad hominum custodiam missi a Deo. Sed dæmones non mittuntur a Deo, cum dæmonum intentio sit perdere animas, Dei autem salvare. Ergo dæmones non deputantur ad hominum impugnationem.
[I.q.114.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.
[I.q.114.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, non est æqua conditio pugnæ, ut infirmus contra fortem, ignarus contra astutum exponatur ad bellum. Sed homines sunt infirmi et ignari; dæmones autem potentes et astuti. Non est ergo permittendum a Deo, qui est omnis justitiæ auctor, ut homines a dæmonibus impugnentur.
[I.q.114.a.1.arg.3] Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.
[I.q.114.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad exercitium hominum sufficit impugnatio carnis et mundi. Sed Deus permittit electos suos impugnari propter eorum exercitium. Ergo non videtur necessarium quod a dæmonibus impugnentur.
[I.q.114.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (Ephesians 6:12): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places."
[I.q.114.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Eph., vi, 12, quod non est nobis colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra spiritualia nequitiæ in cælestibus.
[I.q.114.a.1.co] Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.
[I.q.114.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa impugnationem dæmonum duo est considerare: scilicet ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem ipsa ex dæmonum malitia procedit; qui propter invidiam profectum hominum impedire nituntur, et propter superbiam divinæ potestatis similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad hominum impugnationem, sicut et angeli Deo ministrant in determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem. Sed ordo impugnationis ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bonum ea ordinando. Sed ex parte angelorum tam ipsa custodia quam ordo custodiæ reducitur ad Deum sicut ad primum auctorem.
[I.q.114.a.1.ad.1] The wicked angels assail men in two ways.
Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 1 Kings 22:20. For punishment is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.
[I.q.114.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod mali angeli impugnant homines dupliciter. Uno modo, instigando ad peccatum : et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum, sed ali-quando permittuntur secundum Dei justa Al. : « per. » Ita plures codd. cum Alcan. et editi fere omnes; judicia. Aliquando autem impugnant homines puniendo: et sic mittuntur a Deo, sicut missus est spiritus mendax ad puniendum Achab regem Israel, ut dicitur III Reg., ult. Pœna enim refertur in Deum sicut in primum auctorem; et tamen dæmones ad puniendum missi alia intentione puniunt quam mittuntur; nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia; mittuntur autem a Deo propter ejus justi-tiam.
[I.q.114.a.1.ad.2] In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (2 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."
[I.q.114.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad hoc quod non sit inæqualis pugnæ conditio, fit ex parte hominis recompensatio principaliter quidem per auxilium divinæ gratiae, secundario autem per custodiam augelorum. Unde IV Reg., vi, 46, Elisaeus dixit ad ministrum suum: Noli timere; plures enim nobiscum sunt quam cum illis.
[I.q.114.a.1.ad.3] The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
[I.q.114.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod infirmitati humanæ sufficeret ad exercitium impugna-tio quæ est a carne et mundo; sed malitiæ dæmonum non sufficit, quæ utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem; sed tamen ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.
Article 2
[I.q.114.a.2.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Genesis 22:1, "God tempted Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.
[I.q.114.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod tentare non sit proprium diaboli. Dici-tur enim Deus tentare, secundum illud Genes., xxii, 4: Tentavit Deus Abraham; tentat etiam caro et mundus, et etiam homo dicitur tentare Deum et hominem. Ergo non est proprium dæmonis tentare.
[I.q.114.a.2.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.
[I.q.114.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, tentare est 1 ignorantis. Sed dæmones sciunt quid circa homines agatur. Ergo dæmones non tentant.
[I.q.114.a.2.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above (Question 111, Article 2), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt.
[I.q.114.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, tentatio est via in peccatum. Peccatum autem in voluntate consistit. Cum ergo dæmones non possint voluntatem hominis immutare, ut per supra dicta patet, videtur quod ad eos non pertineat tentare.
[I.q.114.a.2.sc] On the contrary, It is written (1 Thessalonians 3:5): "Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt."
[I.q.114.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Thess., iii, 5: Ne forte tentaverit vos is qui tentat; Glossa interlinear. : « Id est diabolus, cujus officium est tentare. »
[I.q.114.a.2.co] I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.
From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (Deuteronomy 13:3): "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him."
The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.
Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.
[I.q.114.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tentare est proprie experimentum sumere de aliquo. Experimentum autem sumitur de aliquo ut sciatur aliquid circa ipsum; et ideo proximus finis cujuslibet tentantis est scientia. Sed quandoque ulterius ex scientia quæritur aliquis alius finis vel bonus vel malus; bonus quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult scire qualis aliquis sit vel quantum ad scientiam vel quantum ad virtutem, ut eum promoveat; malus autem, quando hoc scire vult ut eum decipiat vel subvertat. Et per hunc modum potest accipi, quomodo tentare diversis diversimode attribuatur. Homo enim tentare dicitur quandoque quidem, ut sciat tantum; et propter hoc tentare Deum dicitur esse peccatum, quia homo quasi incertus experiri præsumit Dei virtutem; quandoque vero tentat ut juvet; quandoque vero ut noceat. Diabolus autem semper tentat ut noceat, in peccatum præcipitando, et secundum hoc dicitur proprium officium ejus tentare. Nam, etsi homo aliquando sic tentet, hoc agit, in-quantum est minister diaboli. Deus autem tentare dicitur ut sciat, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur scire quia facit alios scire. Unde dicitur Deut., xiii, 3: Tentat vos Dominus Deus vester, ut palam fiat, utrum diligatis eum. Caro etiam et mundus dicuntur tentare instrumentaliter seu materialiter, inquantum scilicet potest cognosci qualis sit homo ex hoc quod sequitur vel repugnat concupis-centiis carnis, et ex hoc quod contemnit prospera mundi et adversa; quibus etiam diabolus utitur ad tentandum. Et sic patet solutio ad primum.
[I.q.114.a.2.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher of spirits" (Proverbs 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.
[I.q.114.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dæmones sciunt ea quæ exterius aguntur circa homines; sed interiorem hominis conditionem solus Deus novit, qui est spirituum ponderator; ex qua aliqui sunt magis proni ad unum vitium quam ad aliud. Et ideo diabolus tentat explorando interiorem conditionem hominis, ut de illo vitio tentet ad quod homo magis pronus est.
[I.q.114.a.2.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (Question 111, Article 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.
[I.q.114.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dæmon, etsi non possit immutare voluntatem, potest tamen, ut supra dictum est, aliqualiter immutare inferiores hominis vires; ex quibus, etsi non cogitur voluntas, tamen inclinatur.
Article 3
[I.q.114.a.3.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil."
[I.q.114.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod omnia peccata procedant ex tentatione diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, De div. nom. cap. iv, § 18, col. 715, t. 1, quod « multitudo dæmonum est causa omnium malorum sibi et aliis; » et Damascenus dicit, lib. II Orth. fid., cap. iv, col. 878, t. 1, quod « omnis malitia et omnis immunditia a diabolo excogitatæ sunt. »
[I.q.114.a.3.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (John 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.
[I.q.114.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, de quolibet peccatore dici posset quod Dominus de Judæis dicit, Joan., viii, 44: Vos ex patre diabolo estis. Hoc autem est, inquantum ipsi ex diaboli suggestione peccabant. Omne ergo peccatum est ex suggestione diaboli.
[I.q.114.a.3.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil.
[I.q.114.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut angeli deputantur ad custodiam hominum, ita dæmones ad impugnationem. Sed omnia bona quæ facimus, ex suggestione bonorum angelorum procedunt, quia divina ad eos mediantibus angelis perferuntur. Ergo et omnia mala quæ facimus proveniunt ex suggestione diaboli.
[I.q.114.a.3.sc] On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will."
[I.q.114.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in lib. De eccl. dogm., cap. xlix, col. 1221, t. 8 Op. Aug. : « Non omnes cogitationes nostræ malæ semper diaboli instinctu excitantur, sed aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt. »
[I.q.114.a.3.co] I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.
But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).
Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.
[I.q.114.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod causa alicujus potest dici aliquid dupliciter; uno modo directe, alio modo indirecte. Indirecte quidem, sicut cum aliquod agens causat aliquam dispositionem ad aliquem effectum dicitur esse occasionaliter et indirecte causa illius effectus; sicut si dicatur, quod ille qui siccat ligna, est occasio combustionis ipsorum : et hoc modo dicendum est, quod diabolus est causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, quia instigavit primum hominem ad peccandum; ex cujus peccato consecuta est in toto genere humano quædam pronitas ad omnia peccata. Et per hunc modum intelligenda sunt verba Damasceni et Dionysii inducta in arg. 1. Directe autem dicitur esse aliquis causa alicujus, quod operatur directe ad illud; et hoc modo diabolus non est causa omnis peccati. Non enim omnia peccata committuntur diabolo instigante, sed quædam ex libertate arbitrii et carnis corruptione; quia, ut Origenes dicit, Periar., lib. III, cap. ii, § 2, col. 305, t. 1, « etiamsi diabolus non esset, homines haberent appetitum ciborum et venereorum et hujusmodi; » circa quæ multa iordinatio contingit, nisi per rationem talis appetitus refrenetur, et maxime supposita corruptione naturæ. Refrenare autem et ordinare hujusmodi appetitum, subjacet libero arbitrio. Sic ergo non est necessarium omnia peccata ex instinctu diaboli provenire. Si qua tamen ex instinctu ejus proveniunt, ad ea complenda « eo blandimento decipiuntur homines nunc, quo primi parentes, » ut Isidorus dicit, lib. III Sententiarum, cap. v, col. 22, t. 6. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
[I.q.114.a.3.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.
[I.q.114.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si qua peccata absque instinctu diaboli perpetrantur, per ea tamen fiunt homines filii diaboli, inquantum ipsum primo peccantem imitantur.
[I.q.114.a.3.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.
[I.q.114.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod homo potest per seipsum ruere in peccatum, sed ad meritum proficere non potest nisi auxilio divino, quod homini exhibetur mediante ministerio angelorum; et ideo ad omnia bona nostra cooperantur angeli. Non tamen omnia nostra peccata procedunt ex dæmonum suggestione; quamvis nullum genus peccati sit quod non interdum ex dæmonum suggestione proveniat.
Article 4
[I.q.114.a.4.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thessalonians 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders.
[I.q.114.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod dæmones non possint homines seducere per aliqua miracula vera. Operatio enim dæmonum maxime vigebit in operibus antichristi. Sed, sicut Apostolus dicit, II ad Thessal., II, 9: Ejus adventus est* secundum operationem Satanæ in omni virtute et signis et prodigiis mendacibus. Ergo multo magis alio tempore per dæmones non fiunt nisi signa mendacia.
[I.q.114.a.4.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.
[I.q.114.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, vera miracula per aliquam corporum immutationem fiunt. Sed dæmones non possunt immutare corpus in aliam naturam: dicit enim Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XVIII, cap. xviii, col. 575, t. 7: « Nec corpus quidem humanum ulla ratione crediderim dæmonum arte vel potestate in membra bestialia veraciter posse converti. » Ergo dæmones vera miracula facere non possunt.
[I.q.114.a.4.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mark 16:20): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."
[I.q.114.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, argumentum efficaciam non habet quod se habet ad opposita. Si ergo miracula vera possunt fieri a dæmonibus ad falsitatem persuadendam, non erunt efficacia ad veritatem fidei confirmandam; quod est inconveniens; cum dicatur Marc., ult., 20: Domino cooperante, et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis.
[I.q.114.a.4.sc] On the contrary, Augustine says (83; [Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God."
[I.q.114.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, libro LXXXIII Quæstion., q. Lxxix, col. 92, t. 6, quod « magicis artibus fiunt miracula plerumque similia illis miraculis quæ fiunt per servos Dei. »
[I.q.114.a.4.co] I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above (Question 110, Article 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.
It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19).
[I.q.114.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, si miraculum proprie accipiatur, dæmones miracula facere non possunt, nec aliqua creatura, sed solus Deus, quia miraculum proprie dicitur quod fit præter ordinem totius naturæ, sub quo ordine continetur omnis virtus creata. Dicitur tamen quando miraculum large, quod excedit humanam facultatem et considerationem; et sic dæmones possunt facere miracula, quæ scilicet homines mirantur, inquantum eorum facultatem et cognitionem excedunt. Nam et unus homo, inquantum facit aliquid quod est supra facultatem et cognitionem alterius, ducit alium in admirationem sui operis, ut quodammodo miraculum videatur operari. Sciendum est tamen quod, quamvis hujusmodi opera dæmonum, quæ nobis miracula videntur, ad veram rationem miraculi non pertingant, sunt tamen quandoque veræ res; sicut magi Pharaonis per virtutem dæmonum veros serpentes et ranas fecerunt; et « quando de cælo, ignis cecidit, et familiam Job cum gregibus pecorum uno impetu absumsit, et turbo domum dejiciens filios ejus occidit, quæ fuerunt opera Satanæ, phantasmata non fuerunt, » ut Augustinus dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XX, c. xix, col. 687, t. 7.
[I.q.114.a.4.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."
[I.q.114.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit ibidem, antichristi opera possunt dici esse signa mendacii; vel quia mortales sensus per phantasmata decepturus est, ut quæ non facit videatur facere; vel quia si sint vera prodigia, ad mendacium tamen pertrahent credituros.
[I.q.114.a.4.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. As we have said above (Question 110, Article 2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction.
[I.q.114.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non obedit angelis bonis seu malis ad nutum, ut dæmones sua virtute possint transmutare materiam de forma in formam; sed possunt adhibere quædam semina quæ in elementis mundi inveniuntur, ad hujusmodi effectus complendos, ut Augustinus dicit, De Trin., lib. III, cap. viii, col. 876, t. 8. Et ideo dicendum est, quod omnes transmutationes corporalium rerum quæ possunt fieri per aliquas virtutes naturales ad quas pertinent prædicta semina, possunt fieri per operationem dæmonum, hujusmodi seminibus adhibitis, sicut cum aliquæ res transmutantur in serpentes vel ranas, quæ per putrefactionem generari possunt. Illæ vero transmutationes corporalium rerum quæ non possunt virtute naturæ fieri, nullo modo operatione dæmonum secundum rei veritatem perfici possunt; sicut quod corpus humanum mutetur in corpus bestiale, aut quod corpus hominis mortuum reviviscat. Et si aliquando aliquid tale operatione dæmonum fieri videatur, hoc non est secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum apparentiam tantum. Quod quidem potest dupliciter contingere: uno modo ab interiori, secundum quod dæmon potest mutare phantasiam hominis, et etiam sensus corporeos, ut aliquid videatur aliter quam sit, sicut supra dictum est; et hoc etiam interdum fieri dicitur virtute aliquarum rerum corporalium. Alio modo ab exteriori. Cum enim ipse possit formare corpus ex aere cujus-cumque formæ et figuræ, ut illud assumens in eo visibiliter appareat, potest eadem ra-tione circumponere cuicumque rei quam-cumque formam corpoream, ut in ejus specie videatur. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XVIII De civ. Dei, c. xviii, col. 575, t. 7, quod « phantasticum hominis, quod etiam in cogitando sive somniandio, per rerum innumerabilia genera variatur, veluti corporatum in alicujus animalis effigie sensibus apparet alienis. » Quod non est sic intelligendum, quod ipsa vis phantastica hominis aut species ejus eadem numero corporata alterius sensibus ostendatur, sed quia dæmon, qui in phantasia unius hominis format aliquem speciem, ipse etiam potest similem speciem alterius sensibus offerre.
[I.q.114.a.4.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject."
[I.q.114.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., q. Lxxix, col. 92, t. 6, « cum talia faciunt magi, qualia sancti, diverso fine et diverso jure fiunt. Illi enim faciunt quærentes gloriam suam, isti quærentes gloriam Dei; et illi faciunt per quædam privata commercia, isti autem publica administratione et jussu Dei, cui cuncta creatura subjecta est . »
Article 5
[I.q.114.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
[I.q.114.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dæmon qui superatur ab aliquo, non propter hoc ab impugnatione arceatur. Christus enim efficacissime suum tentatorem vicit : sed tamen postea eum impugnavit, ad ocisionem ejus Judæos incitando. Ergo non est verum quod diabolus victus ab impugnatione cesset. Plenius et mutatis aliquot verbis in textu D. Augustini. Opus imperfectum in Matth. falso D. Chrysostomo tribuitur. Omnes doctores communiter concedunt dæmonem semel victum aliquo modo cessare, sed 2. Præterea, infligere pœnam ei qui in pugna succumbit, est incitare ad acrius impugnandum. Hoc autem non pertinet ad Dei misericordiam. Ergo dæmones superati non arcentur.
[I.q.114.a.5.arg.2] Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.
[I.q.114.a.5.sc] It is written (Matthew 4:11): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.
[I.q.114.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., iv, 14 : Tunc reliquit eum diabolus, scilicet Christum superantem.
[I.q.114.a.5.co] Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (Luke 4:13) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke 4:13: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from Matthew 12:44: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."
From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.114.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod dæmon superatus nullum hominem potest de cætero tentare nec de eodem nec de alio peccato. Quidam autem dicunt quod potest alios tentare, sed non eumdem. Et hoc probabilius dicitur, si tamen intelligatur usque ad aliquod tempus. Unde et Luc. iv dicitur quod, consummata omni tentatione, diabolus recessit a Christo usque ad tempus. Et hujus ratio est duplex. Una est ex parte divinæ clementiæ; quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit super Matth., in Op. imperf., hom. v, in illud : Vade retro, Satana : « Non tamdiu homines diabolus tentat quamdiu vult, sed quamdiu Deus permittit; quia etsi permittat paulisper tentare, tamen repellit propter infirmam naturam . » Alia ratio sumitur ex astutia diaboli. Unde Ambrosius dicit super Lucam, lib. IV, § 36, col. 1707, t. 2, super illud : Diabolus recessit ab illo, quod « diabolus instare formidat : quia frequentius refugit triumphari. » Quod tamen aliquando diabolus redeat ad eum quem dimisit, patet per illud quod dicitur Matth., xii, 44 : Revertar in domum meam unde exivi. Et per hoc patet solutio ad objecta.
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