Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q3. What is happiness
Source context
- Theme
- constitution and proper object of human happiness (beatitudo) as perfect good
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 64, 1915-01-15Steiner distinguishes happiness as a strengthening of the whole human being — flowing into feeling, mind, and will through connection with the outer world — from the deeper spiritual orientation that anthroposophy seeks to cultivate beyond mere happiness.
- GA 4, chapter 9Steiner treats the pursuit of individual happiness (egoism) as one motivational principle of action, contrasting it with ethical individualism grounded in moral intuition rather than pleasure-maximization.
- GA 41bSteiner states that practical theosophy directs action toward the happiness of others and the fulfillment of right for its own sake, not toward personal happiness as the ultimate end.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian eudaimoniaAquinas's analysis of beatitudo as perfect good attained through activity in accordance with the highest faculty maps onto Aristotle's eudaimonia as the actualization of the rational soul's proper function — a structural correspondence Aquinas explicitly acknowledges while subordinating it to supernatural beatitude.
- Vedanta: anandaAdvaita Vedanta identifies the deepest nature of Brahman-Atman as sat-chit-ananda (being-consciousness-bliss), offering a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that perfect happiness consists in the vision of the highest Good, though the metaphysical frameworks differ substantially.
- Neoplatonism: return to the OnePlotinus's account of the soul's return to the One as the supreme good and source of all well-being presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's placement of ultimate beatitude in the contemplative union with God, though Aquinas insists this is a supernatural gift rather than a natural ascent.
Q3. What is happiness
Article 1
[I-II.q.3.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is happiness itself."
[I-II.q.3.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit enim Boetius in III De consol., prosa x, col. 766, t. 4: « Esse Deum ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri. »
[I-II.q.3.a.1.arg.2] Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem quod Deus.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.arg.3] Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet nisi in Deum, « quo solo fruendum est, » ut Augustinus dicit lib. I De doctr. christ., cap. xxii, § 20, col. 26, t. 3. Ergo beatitudo est idem quod Deus.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.sc] Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.sc] Sed contra, nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid factum; quia secundum Augustinum, I De doct. christ., cap. iii, § 3, col. 20, « illis rebus fruendum est quæ nos beatos faciunt. » Ergo beatitudo non est aliquid increatum.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.co] As stated above (1, 8; 2, 7), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis pecunia. Alio modo ipsa adeptio, vel possessio, seu usus, aut fruitio ejus rei quæ desideratur; sicut si dicatur, quod possessio pecuniæ est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis intemperati. Primo ergo modo ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo ultimus finis hominis est creatum aliquid in ipso existens; quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum ad causam vel objectum, sic est aliquid increatum; si autem consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est aliquid creatum.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.ad.1] God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam; non enim per adeptionem aut participationem alicujus alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit Boetius, per participationem, sicut et dii per participationem dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis, secundum quam homo dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.ad.2] Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est adeptio vel fruitio summi boni.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.ad.3] Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.
[I-II.q.3.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo adeptio finis dicitur finis.
Article 3
[I-II.q.3.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses also.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat etiam in operatione sensus. Nulla enim operatio invenitur in homine nobilior operatione sensitiva; nisi intellectiva. Sed operatio intellectiva dependet in nobis ab operatione sensitiva; quia « non possumus intelligere sine phantasmate, » ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 30. Ergo beatitudo consistat etiam in operatione sensitiva.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.arg.2] Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Boetius dicit in III De consol., prosa, col. 724, t. 1, quod « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. » Sed quædam bona sunt sensibilia, quæ attingimus per sensus operationem. Ergo videtur quod operatio sensus requira-tur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.arg.3] Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo est bonum perfectum, ut probatur in I Ethic., cap. vii; quod non esset, nisi homo perficeretur per ipsam secundum omnes partes suas. Sed per operationes sensitivas quædam partes animæ perficiuntur. Ergo operatio sensitiva requiritur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.sc] Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.sc] Sed contra, in operatione sensitiva communicant nobiscum bruta animalia, non autem in beatitudine. Ergo beatitudo non consistit in operatione sensitiva.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.co] A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above (Article 1): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Question 2, Article 5), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II, 82 -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad beatitudinem potest aliquid pertinere tripliciter: uno modu essentialiter, alio modo antecedenter, tertio modo consequenter. Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere Ita ex cod.; edit. Rom., Garcia, Nicolaï et edit. Patav. supplendum putarunt: « ratione somni. »; « bona » deest in edit. Edit. Patav. ann. 1712 huic loco talem notam operatio sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis consistit essentialiter in conjunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est ultimus finis, ut supra ostensum est, cui homo conjungi non potest per sensus operationem; similiter etiam quia, sicut ostensum est, in corporalibus bonis beatitudo hominis non consistit, quæ tamen sola bona per sensus operationem attingimus. Possunt autem operationes sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in præsenti vita haberi potest; nam operatio intellectus præexigit operationem sensus. Consequenter autem in illa perfecta beatitudine quæ expectatur in cælo; quia post resurrectionem « ex ipsa beatitudine animæ, » ut Augustinus dicit in Epist., cxviii, ad Dioscorum, cap., § 14, col. 439, t. 2, « fiet quædam refluentia in corpus, et in sensus corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur, » ut infra magis patebit, cum de corporum resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio qua mens humana Deo conjungitur a sensu dependebit.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.ad.1] This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa probat quod operatio sensus requiritur antecedenter ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita haberi potest.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.ad.2] Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod beatitudo perfecta qualem angeli habent, habet congregationem omnium bonorum per conjunctionem ad universalem fontem totius boni, non quod indigeat singulis particularibus bonis; sed in hac beatitudine imperfecta requiritur congregationem bonorum sufficientium ad perfectissimam operationem hujus vitæ.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.ad.3] In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
[I-II.q.3.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori; in beatitudine autem imperfecta præsentis vitæ e converso a perfectione inferioris partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.
Article 4
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Psalm 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in the will.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX De civ. Dei, cap. xi, col. 637, t. 7, quod « beatitudo hominis in pace consistit, » unde in ps. cxLVII, 3: Qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Sed pax ad voluntatem pertinet. Ergo beatitudo hominis in voluntate consistit.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.2] Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum est objectum voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo in voluntatis operatione consistit.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.3] Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on (9, 1,3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, primo moventi respondet ultimus finis; sicut ultimus finis totius exercitus est victoria: quæ est finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed primum movens ad operandum est voluntas, quia movet alias vires, ut infra dicetur. Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.4] Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Corinthians 13). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod sit nobilissima operatio hominis. Sed nobilior est Dei dilectio, quæ est actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quæ est operatio intellectus, ut patet per Apostolum, I ad Cor., xiii. Ergo videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu voluntatis.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.5] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some good--i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in XIII De Trin., cap. vi, § 9, col. 1020, t. 8, quod « beatus est qui habet omnia quæ vult, et nihil vult male; » et post pauca subdit: « Et appropinquat beato, qui bene vult quodcumque vult; bona enim beatum faciunt, quorum bonorum jam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam voluntatem. » Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.sc] Our Lord said (John 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (02, ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Joan., xvii, 3: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum. Vita autem æterna est ultimus finis, ut dictum est. Ergo beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei consistit, quæ est actus intellectus.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.co] As stated above (Question 2, Article 6) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (1,2; 2, 7) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra dictum est, duo requiruntur: unum, quod est esse beatitudinis; aliud quod est quasi per se accidens ejus, scilicet delectatio ei adjuncta. Dico ergo, quod quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est enim ex præmissis, quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi. Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis; voluntas autem fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat, et præsentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum est autem, quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est præsens; non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit præsens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliuid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit finis ipse præsens voluntati. Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere; sed a principio quidem est absens ei, consequitur autem ipsam per hoc quod manu ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo hujusmodi; et tunc jam delectatur in pecunia habita. Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequui finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit præsens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit in fine jam adepto. Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit. Sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens, secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., c. xxiii, § 33, col. 793, t. 4, quod « beatitudo est gaudium de veritate, » quia scilicet ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.1] Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo, sed quia antecedenter et consequenter habet se ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum jam sunt remota omnia perturbantia et impedientia ab ultimo fine; consequenter vero, inquantum jam homo, adepto ultimo fine, remanet pacatus desiderio quietato.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.2] The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod primum objectum voluntatis non est actus ejus, sicut nec primum objectum visus est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso quod beatitudo pertinet ad voluntatem, tanquam primum objectum ejus, sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.3] The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas; tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate et ideo voluntati debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet delectatio, vel fruitio.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.4] Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod dilectio præeminet cognitioni in movendo; sed cognitio prævia est dilectioni in attingendo. Non enim diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X De Trinit., c. 1, col. 971, t. 8. Et ideo intelligibilem finem primo attingimus per actionem intellectus, sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus.
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.5] He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."
[I-II.q.3.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod ille qui habet omnia quæ vult, ex hoc est beatus quod habet ea quæ vult; quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem sicut quædam debita dispositio ad ipsam. Voluntas autem bona ponitur in numero bonorum quæ beatum faciunt, prout est inclinatio quædam in ipsa; sicut motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad qualitatem.
Article 5
[I-II.q.3.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in operatione intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cujuslibet creaturæ consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis assimilatur Deo per intellectum practicum, qui est causa rerum intellectarum, quam per intellectum speculativum, cujus scientia accipitur a rebus. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus practici quam speculativi.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.arg.2] Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est perfectum bonum hominis. Sed intellectus practicus magis ordinatur ad bonum quam speculativus qui ordinatur ad verum; unde et secundum perfectionem practici intellectus dicimur boni, non autem secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus; sed secundum eam dicimur scientes, vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam speculativi.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.arg.3] Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis. Sed speculativus intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quæ sunt extra hominem; practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa ea quæ sunt ipsius hominis, scilicet circa operationes et passiones ejus. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus practici quam intellectus speculativi.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys."
[I-II.q.3.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Secundum Almaricum, mens beati suum esse perdit, ac in illud redit esse ideale quod in mente divina habuit. Bonaventuræ ista tribuitur opinio, quod formaliter non in operatione, sed in habitu essentiam animæ deificante, et ad operationem potentiam animæ perficiente, beatitudo consistat. Magister vero Bona Spes, postque ipsum nonnulli e Carmelitis calceatis, antiquatam Joannis de Ripa suscitantes iterum opinionem, in intellectione Dei increata, creaturæ per unitivam actionem ab ipsa creatura elicitam communicata, beatitudem reponunt. Scotus illam in solo actu voluntatis, scilicet in amore amicitiae, juxta alios in fruitione sola, forma liter constituunt. Hæ sunt Scoti rationes: 1° fruitio magis ultimo fini extrinseco appropinquat, quia immediate tendit in ipsum; 2° homo Deum ut ipse diligat videre vult, non autem diligere ut videat, et sic dilectio non visio finis est; 3° juxta rectæ rationis dictamen, magis suam quam sui intellectus perfectionem voluntas appetit. — Ad hæc Tho- I De Trinit., c. viii, §17, col. 831, t. 8, quod « contemplatio promittitur nobis actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum. »
[I-II.q.3.a.5.co] Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi intellectus quam practici, quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem ex hoc quod si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quæ est optimæ potentiæ respectu optimi objecti; optima autem potentia est intellectus, cujus objectum optimum est bonum divinum; quod quidem non est objectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime consistit beatitudo. Et quia « unusquisque videtur esse id quod est optimum in eo, » ut dicitur in IX Ethic., cap. iv et viii, et X, cap. vii, ad fin.; ideo talis operatio est maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis. Secundo apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime quæritur propter seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quæritur propter seipsum, sed propter actionem; ipsæ autem actiones ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde manifestum est, quod ultimus finis non potest consistere in vita activa, quæ pertinet ad intellectum practicum. Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur; sed in his quæ pertinent ad vitam activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant, licet imperfecte. Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quæ expectatur in futura vita, tota principaliter consistit in contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter consistit in contemplatione; secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. vii et viii.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.ad.1] The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod similitudo prædicta intellectus practici ad Deum est secundum proportionalitatem, quia scilicet habet se ad suum cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum; sed assimilatio intellectus specu-lativi ad Deum est secundum unionem, vel informationem, quæ est multo major assimilatio. Et tamen dici potest, quod respectu principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.ad.2] The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus practicus habet bonum quod est extra ipsum; sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, scilicet contemplationem veritatis; et si illud bonum sit perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur, et fit bonus; quod quidem intellectus practicus non habet, sed ad aliud ordinat.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.ad.3] This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.
[I-II.q.3.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsemet homo esset ultimus finis suus. Tunc enim consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum ejus esset ejus beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est aliud bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem intellectus speculativi attingimus, ideo magis beatitudo hominis in operatione intellectus speculativi consistit quam in operatione intellectus practici.
Article 6
[I-II.q.3.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative virtues--"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum. Philosophus enim dicit in lib. X Ethic., c. vii, in princ., quod « felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam virtutem; » et distinguens virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi tres, scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum; quæ omnes pertinent ad considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum consistit.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.arg.2] Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo, quod naturaliter desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum. Sed hujusmodi est consideratio speculativarum In quibusdam codicibus deest « et principaliter. » —; in edit. deest « suus. » —; in edit. deest « ejus. » scientiarum; quia, ut dicitur in I Metaph., in princ., « omnes homines natura scire desiderant; » et post pauca subditur, cap. 11, a princ., quod « speculativæ scientiæ propter seipsas quæruntur. » Ergo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum consistit beatitudo.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.arg.3] Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem perficitur, secundum quod reducitur de potentia in actum; intellectus autem humanus reducitur in actum per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo videtur quod in hujusmodi consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.sc] It is written (Jeremiah 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jerem., ix, 23: Non glorietur sapiens in sapientia sua, et loquitur de sapientia speculativarum scientiarum. Non ergo consistit in harum consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.co] As stated above (02, ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown (I, 88, 2), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quæ attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem; beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quæ non attingit, sed participat quamdam particularem beatitudinis similitudinem; sicut inventur perfecta prudentia in homine, apud quem est ratio rerum agibilium; imperfecta autem prudentia est in quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares instinctus ad quædam opera similia operibus prudentiae. Perfecta igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod consideratio speculativæ scientiæ non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiæ; quia in principiis scientiæ virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta, ut patet per Philosophum in princ. Metaph., lib. I, a princ., et in fine Poster., text. ult. Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo, quæ est ultima ejus perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem, quod forma lapidis, vel cujuslibet rei sensibilis est inferior homine; unde per formam lapidis non perficitur intellectus, inquantum est talis forma, sed inquantum in ea participatur aliquid simile quod est supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel aliqua similitudo alicujus. Omne autem quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per cognitionem alicujus rei quæ sit supra intellectum humanum. Ostensum est autem part. I, quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quæ sunt supra intellectum humanum. Unde relinquitur, quod hominis ultima beatitudo non possit esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo substantiarum superiorum; ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est quædam participatio veræ et perfectæ beatitudinis.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.ad.1] In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (02, ad 4).
[I-II.q.3.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur in lib. Ethic., de felicitate imperfecta, qualiter in hac vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum est.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.ad.2] Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo, sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo, vel participatio ejus.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.ad.3] Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act.
[I-II.q.3.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum reducitur intellectus noter aliquo modo in actum, non autem in ultimum et completum.
Article 7
[I-II.q.3.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in cognitione substantiarum separatarum, id est an- In — In — In gelorum. Dicit enim Gregorius in quadam Homilia xxvi in Evang., § 10, col. 1202, t. 2: « Quid prodest interesse festis hominum, si deesse contingat festis angelorum; » per quod finalem beatitudinem designat. Sed festis angelorum interesse possumus per eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in contemplatione angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.arg.2] Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ultima perfectio uniuscujusque rei est ut conjungatur suo principio; unde et circulus dicitur esse figura perfecta, quia habet idem principium et finem. Sed principium cognitionis humanæ est ab ipsis angelis, per quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit Dionysius, iv cap. De cælest. hierar., § 2, col. 179, t. 1. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus est in contemplatione angelorum.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.arg.3] Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unaquæque natura perfecta est quando conjungitur superiori naturæ, sicut ultima perfectio corporis est ut conjungatur naturæ spirituali. Sed supra intellectum humanum ordine naturæ sunt angeli. Ergo ultima perfectio humani intellectus est ut conjungatur per contemplationem ipsis angelis.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.sc] It is written (Jeremiah 9:24): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jerem., ix, 24: In hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, scire, et nosse me. Ergo ultima hominis gloria vel beatitudo non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.co] As stated above (Article 6), man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown in the I, 44, 1. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus, secundum alicujus participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum est autem, quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicujus potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii objecti illius potentiae; proprium autem objectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit dispositio rerum in esse, sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in II Metaph., text. 4, quæcumque sunt entia per participationem sunt vera per participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in I ostensum est. Unde relinquitur, quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod ejus contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Corderius. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione angelorum, et etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.ad.1] We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod festis angelorum intererimus non solum contempl-plantes angelos, sed simul cum ipsis Deum.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.ad.2] According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in I, 90, 3. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the I, 111, 2, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum illos qui ponunt animas humanas esse ab angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur quod beatitudo hominis sit in contemplatione angelorum, quasi in conjunctione ad suum principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut in I dictum est. Unde ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per conjunctionem ad Deum, qui est principium et creationis animæ, et illuminationis ejus. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in I habitum est. Unde suo ministerio adjuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem perveniat; non autem est humanæ beatitudinis objectum.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.ad.3] The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.
[I-II.q.3.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum gradum potentiæ participantis; et sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad contemplandnm, sicut angeli contemplan-tur. Alio modo sicut objectum attingitur a potentia: et hoc modo ultima perfectio cujus-libet potentiæ est ut attingat ad id in quo plene inventur ratio sui objecti.
Article 8
[I-II.q.3.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence.
[I-II.q.3.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione ipsius divinæ essentiæ. Dicit enim Dionysius in 1 cap. Mysticæ theologiæ, col. 1002, § 3, t. 1, quod « per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo conjungitur, sicut omnino ignoto 1. » Sed id quod videtur per essentiam, non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu beatitudo non con- In cognitione ultimi angeli totam Algazel beatitudinem nostram consistere dicebat. sistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam videtur.
[I-II.q.3.a.8.arg.2] Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less.
[I-II.q.3.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, altioris naturæ perfectio altior est. Sed hæc est perfectio divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra subsistit
[I-II.q.3.a.8.sc] It is written (1 John 3:2): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulgate: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
[I-II.q.3.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Joan., III, 2: Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et* videbimus eum sicuti est.
[I-II.q.3.a.8.co] Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (1,7; 2, 8).
[I-II.q.3.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinæ essentiae. Ad cujus evidentiam duo consideranda sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus quamdiu restat ei aliquid desiderandum et quærendum. Secundum est, quod uniuscujusque potentiæ perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui objecti. Objectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, id est essentia rei, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 26, unde intantum procedit perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicujus rei. Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicujus effectus, per quam non possit cognosci essentia causæ, ut scilicet sciatur de causa quid est, non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid est; et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaph., c. 2, circ. med., puta, si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit; nec ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causæ. Si igitur intellectus humanus cognoscens essentiam alicujus effectus creati non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est, nondum perfectio ejus attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam; unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primæ causæ. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad objectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.
[I-II.q.3.a.8.ad.1] Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.
[I-II.q.3.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.3.a.8.ad.2] As stated above (Question 1, Article 8), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (Question 1, Article 8). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.3.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad rem ipsam quæ desideratur; et hoc modo idem est finis et superioris, et inferioris naturæ, imo omnium rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo quantum ad consecutionem hujus rei, et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris naturæ secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis, quam hominis vel angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.
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