Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q4. Things that are required for happiness
Source context
- Theme
- conditions necessary for the attainment of human happiness, including vision of God, rectitude of will, body, and external goods
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian eudaimoniaAquinas's enumeration of required conditions for happiness — including bodily integrity and external goods alongside the beatific vision — reflects Aristotle's composite account of eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics, where the full flourishing of the human being requires both virtue and a minimum of material and social conditions.
- Vedantic moksha doctrineCross-tradition congruence appears in Advaita Vedanta's insistence that liberation (moksha) requires preparatory conditions — viveka, vairagya, and the six virtues — structurally paralleling Aquinas's graduated account of what happiness requires at different levels of the human composite.
Q4. Things that are required for happiness
Article 1
[I-II.q.4.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus in I De Trin., cap. viii, § 17, col. 832, t. 8, quod « visio est tota merces fidei 4. » Sed id quod est prae-mium, vel merces virtutis, est beatido, ut patet per Philosophum in I Ethic., cap. 9, in princ. Ergo nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio. — 2 In « modo.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.arg.2] Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (Question 3, Article 8); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut Philosophus dicit I Ethic., cap. vii, circ. med. Quod autem eget aliquo modo alio, non est perfecte sufficiens. Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut ostensum est, vide-tur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur delectatio.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.arg.3] Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non impeditam; ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. vii. Sed delectatio impedit actionem intellectus: « Corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiæ, » ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth."
[I-II.q.4.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., c. xxiii, § 33, col. 793, t. 1, quod « beatitudo est gaudium de veritate. »
[I-II.q.4.a.1.co] One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo sicut præambulum vel præparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo sicut coadjuvans extrinsecus, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto modo sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus, quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto. Unde cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.ad.1] From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas merentis quiescit; quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione mercedis redditæ delectatio includitur.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.ad.2] The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille qui Deum videt delectatione indigere non potest.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.ad.3] Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
[I-II.q.4.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus non impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. iv. Ea enim quæ delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quando quidem ex in-tentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus, et dum uni vehementer intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur; quandoque autem etiam ex contrarietate; sicut delectatio sensus contraria rationi impedit aestimationem prudentiæ magis quam aestimationem speculativi intellectus.
Article 2
[I-II.q.4.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. iv, a med., est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili. Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quæ est visio.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.arg.2] Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum: unde et natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et speciei delectationem apposuit, ut hujusmodi operationes ab animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quæ est visio.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.arg.3] Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, visio respondet fidei; delectatio autem, sive fruitio, charitati. Sed charitas est major fide, ut dicit Apostolus I ad Corinth., xiii. Ergo delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.sc] The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.sc] Sed contra, causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo visio est potior quam delectatio.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.co] The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (1, 1, ad 2; 3, 4): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod istam quæstionem movet Philosophus in X Ethic., c. iv, in fin., et eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quæ est visio, sit potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis; quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, non est nisi propter bonitatem ejus in In Perperam edit. Rom.: « Sicut anima requiritur ad aliquid agendum. » Ita cod. Alcan., Camer. et Tarrac., cum edit. plurimis; intermediis omissis. Item: « Impedit aestimationem prudentiæ magis quam speculativi intellectus. » In — 5 In quo quietatur. Si ergo voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quærit bonum propter quietationem; sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est contra præmissa. Sed ideo quærit quod quietetur in operatione, quia operatio est bonum ejus. Unde manifestum est, quod principalius bonum est ipsa operatio, in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio voluntatis in ipso.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.ad.1] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus ibidem dicit: « delectatio perficit operationem, sicut decor juventutem, » qui est juventutem consequens; unde delectatio est quædam perfectio concomitans visionem, non sicut perfectio faciens visionem in sua specie perfectam esse.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.ad.2] The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in animalibus, operationes quæruntur propter delectationem. Sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cujus consecutionem sequitur delectatio; unde principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est institutor naturæ delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non est autem aliquid æstimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.ad.3] Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity.
[I-II.q.4.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod charitas non quærit bonum dilectum propter delectationem; sed hoc fit ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono adepto, quod amat; et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei præsens.
Article 3
[I-II.q.4.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [Cf. Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is without comprehension.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Pau- 1 — 2 Expressius: Serm. CXVII, c. III, § 5, col. 663, t. 5. —; in Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.arg.2] Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect and will, as stated in the I, 79 and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in qua non sunt aliæ potentiæ quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in I dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per visionem Dei; voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.arg.3] Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur secundum objecta; objecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum; sed verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi 3. Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.sc] The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 9:24): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (2 Timothy 4:7-8): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I ad Corinth., 1x, 24: Sic currite ut comprehendatis. Sed spiritualis cursus terminatur ad beatitudinem. Unde ipse dicit II ad Tim., ult., 7 et 8: Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est mihi corona justitiæ. Ergo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.co] Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already stated (02, ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum beatitudo consistat in consecutione ultimi finis, ea quæ requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex ipso ordine hominis ad finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per voluntatem; per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu præx existit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta; per voluntatem autem primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in aliquid; secundo autem per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum: quæ quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim amatum est præsens amanti, et tunc jam non quæritur; quandoque autem non est præsens, sed imposibile est ipsum adipisci, et tunc etiam non quæritur; quandoque autem possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non possit, et hæc est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quæ sola habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent aliqua in ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis Hic comprehensio dicit tentionem alicujus rei præsentialiter habitæ. respondet imperfectæ; præsentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini spei; sed delectatio in fine jam præsenti consequitur dilectio-nem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria concurrere, scilicet visionem, quæ est cognitio perfecta intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quæ importat præsentiam finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quæ importat quietationem rei amantis in amato.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.ad.1] Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo inclusio comprehensi in comprehendente, et sic omne quod comprehenditur a finito est finitum; unde hoc modo Deus comprehendi non potest ab aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo comprehensio nihil aliud nominat quam tentionem alicujus rei, jam presentiter habitæ; sicut aliquis consequens aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere, quando tenet eum; et hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.ad.2] Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut ad voluntatem pertinet spes et amor, quia ejusdem est amare aliquid, et tendere in illud non habitum; ita etiam ad voluntatem pertinet comprehensio et delectatio, quia ejusdem est habere aliquid, et quiescere in illo.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.ad.3] Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension.
[I-II.q.4.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod comprehensio non est aliqua operatio præter visionem, sed quædam habitudo ad finem jam habitum. Unde etiam ipsa visio vel res visa secundum quod præsentialiter adest, est objectum comprehensionis.
Article 5
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus. Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae præsupponit perfectionem naturæ. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae; anima autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturæ, cum sit pars naturaliter humanæ naturæ; omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo toto separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.2] Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (3, 2,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est operatio quædam perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum; quia nihil operatur, nisi secundum quod est ens in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse perfectum, quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec pars separata a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non possit esse beata.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.3] Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the body.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.4] Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, in X Ethic., cap. VII, et lect. 7, cap. XIII, operatio felicitatis, in qua consistit beatitudo,; in Parm. et in edit.: « ut motus, » sed minus recte. Nam oportet hæc duo conjungi, imperfectionem scilicet et motum; nec omne illud cessat quod se habet in ratione motus, siquidem charitas quæ nos ad Deum ducit manet in æternum. Sed operatio animæ separatæ est impedita; quia, ut dicit Augustinus, XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xxxv, § 68, col. 483, t. 3, « inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum cælum, » id est, in visionem essentiæ divinæ. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.5] Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.5] 5. Præterea, beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium. Sed hoc non convenit animæ separatæ; quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.6] Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.arg.6] 6. Præterea, homo in beatitudine est angelis æqualis. Sed anima sine corpore non æquatur angelis, ut Augustinus dicit ibid. Ergo non est beata.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.sc] It is written (Apocalypse 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord."
[I-II.q.4.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc., xiv, 43: Beati mortui qui in Domino moriuntur.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.co] Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the I, 84, 6,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 5:6): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness.
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the I, 84, 7. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the I, 12, 3. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.
We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body."
[I-II.q.4.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quæ habetur in hac vita; et alia perfecta, quæ in Dei visione consistit. Manifestum est autem, quod ad beatitudinem hujus vitæ de necessitate requiritur corpus; est enim beatitudo hujus vitæ operatio intellectus vel speculativi, vel practici. Operatio autem intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in I habitum est. Et sic beatitudo quæ in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quæ in Dei visione consistit, aliqui posuerunt, quod non potest animæ advenire sine corpore existenti, dicentes, quod animæ sanctorum a corporibus separatæ ad illam beatitudinem non pervenient usque ad diem judicii, quando corpora resument. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum et auctoritate, et ratione. Auctoritate quidem, quia Apostolus dicit II ad Corinth., v, 6: Quamdiu * sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; et quæ sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens: Per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Ex quo apparet, quod quamdiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, caress visione divinæ essentiæ, nondum est Causam impeccabilitatis beatorum Scotus, et sui, voluntatem et auxilium Dei beatos protegentis ac conservantis assignant; S. Thomas et sui, et allii communius, Dei visionem et amorem. Deo præsens. Animæ autem sanctorum a corporibus separatæ sunt Deo præsentes; unde subditur: Audemus autem, et voluntatem habemus bonam peregrinari a corpore, et præsentes esse ad Deum.* Unde manifestum est, quod animæ sanctorum separatæ a corporibus ambulant per speciem, Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. Hoc etiam per rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem intelligibilem contuetur, ut in I dictum est. Manifestum est autem, quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in I ostensum est. Unde cum in visione divinæ essentia perfecta hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. Sed sciendum, quod ad perfectionem alicujus rei dupliciter aliquid pertinet. Uno modo ad constituentam essentiam rei, sicut anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse ejus, sicut pulchritudo corporis, vel velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanæ non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quanto anima perfectior erit in sua natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua felicitas consistit. Unde Augustinus in XII Super Genes. ad litt., ubi supra, cum quæsivisset, « utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus possit summa illa beatitudo præberi, » respondet, quod « non sic possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti angeli vident, sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi. »
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.1] Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beatitudo est perfectio animæ ex parte intellectus, secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum quod est forma naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturalis perfectio manet, secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur; licet non maneat illa naturæ perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.2] The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the I, 75, 2. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliæ partes; nam esse totius non est alicujus suarum partium. Unde vel pars omnino desinit esse destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo animali; vel si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars lineæ habet aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animæ humanæ remanet esse compositi post corporis destructionem; et hoc ideo, quia idem est esse formæ, et materiae; et hoc idem est esse compositi. Anima autem subsistit in suo esse, ut in I ostensum est. Unde relinquitur, quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat; unde perfectam operationem habere potest, licet non habeat perfectam naturam speciei.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.3] Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum; et ideo remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo; sicut dentes Æthiopis possunt esse albi etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos Æthiopis dicitur albus.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.4] One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris; et tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo per modum cujusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad omnimodam ejus perfectionem requiritur; et tale impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodæ perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio animæ a corpore dicitur animam retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinæ essentiae. Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile; et ideo quamdiu ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus ejus sic quiescit in eo, quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem ejus vellet suum corpus pertingere.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.5] The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod desiderium animæ separatæ totaliter quiescit ex parte appetibili, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui sufficit; sed non totaliter quiescit ex parte appetentis, quia illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit, non intensive, sed extensive.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.6] The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
[I-II.q.4.a.5.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod « spiritus defunctorum non sic vident Deum sicut angeli, » non est intelligendum secundum inæqualitatem Nicolai: « Secundum corporis formam.» — «Specië » deest in edit. — «Quod habet » deest in edit. quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquæ animæ beatorum sunt assumptæ ad superiores ordines angelorum, clarius videntes Deum quam inferiores angeli; sed intelligitur secundum inæqualitatem proportionis, quia angeli etiam infimi habent omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt babituri, non autem animæ separatæ sanctorum.
Article 6
[I-II.q.4.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily good. But it has been shown above (Article 2) that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiritur ad beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam corporale bonum. Sed supra ostensum est, quod beati-tudo non consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.arg.2] Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Question 3, Article 8). But the body has not part in this operation, as shown above (Article 5). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinæ essentiæ, ut ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.arg.3] Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.sc] Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (John 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (Isaiah 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.sc] Sed contra, præmium virtutis est beatitudo. Unde dicitur Joan., xiii, 17: Beati eritis, si feceritis ea. Sed sanctis repromititur pro præmio non solum visio Dei, et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona dispositio; dicitur enim Is., ult., 14: Videbitis, et gaudebit cor vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt. Ergo bona dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.co] If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature."
[I-II.q.4.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si loquamur Papias et Cerinthus, hæresiarcha, Millenario-rum sectæ fuerunt auctores. Porro Papias iste vel Joannis cujusdam senioris, apostolici viri, ac ephesini episcopi, vel S. Joannis evangelistæ discipulus exstitit.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.ad.1] Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudio sicut in objecto beatitudinis; sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem beatitudinis decorem, vel perfectionem.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.ad.2] Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur; tamen posset ab hac impedire; et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis.
[I-II.q.4.a.6.ad.3] The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this work (II-II, 82, seqq.).
[I-II.q.4.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam; non autem a spirituali corpore quod erit totaliter spiritui subjectum. De quo in tertia parte hujus operis dicetur.
Article 7
[I-II.q.4.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Luke 22:30): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (Matthew 6:20): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Matthew 25:34): "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requirantur etiam exteriora bona. Quod enim in præmium sanctis promittitur, ad beatitudinem pertinet. Sed sanctis repromittuntur exteriora bona, sicut cibus et potus, divitiæ et regnum; dicitur enim Luc., XXII, 30: Ut edatis, et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo; et Matth., VI, 20: Thesaurize vobis thesaurum* in cælo; et Matth., XXV, 34: Venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete regnum. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.arg.2] Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Boetium in III De consol., prosa II, col. 724, t. 1, « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. » Sed exteriora sunt aliqua hominis bona, licet minima, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. II De lib. arb., cap. XIX, col. 1268, t. 1. Ergo ipsa etiam requiruntur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.arg.3] Further, Our Lord said (Matthew 5:12): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Dominus, Matth., v, 12, dicit: Merces vestra multa* est in cælis. Sed esse in cælis significat esse in loco. Ergo saltem locus exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.sc] It is written (Psalm 72:25): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"--"It is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psalm. LXXII, 24: Quid enim mihi est in cælo, et a te quid volui super terram? quasi dicat: Nihil volo nisi hoc quod sequitur: Mihi ad hærere Deo bonum est. Ergo nihil aliud extra Deum ad beatitudinem requiritur.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.co] For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its operations.
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad beatitudi- Plenius in textu D. Augustini. Vide etiam I Retract., c. IX, § 4, col. 597, t. 1. Origenistæ posuerunt resuscitata corpora itenem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia beatitudini, quæ consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur I Ethic., cap. VII, a med.; indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad operationem virtutis contemplativæ, quam etiam ad operationem virtutis activæ; ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus exerceat opera activæ virtutis. Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam, quæ in visione Dei consistit, nullo modo hujusmodi bona requiruntur. Cujus ratio est, quia omnia hujusmodi bona exteriora vel requiruntur ad sustentationem animalis corporis, vel requiruntur ad aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus exercemus, quæ humanæ vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta beatitudo quæ in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine corpore, vel erit in anima corpori unita, non jam animali, sed spirituali. Et ideo nullo modo hujusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem. Et quia in hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius perfectæ beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa, utpote etiam Deo similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo minus indiget hujusmodi bonis corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. VII.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.ad.1] All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnes illæ corporales promissiones quæ in sacra Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendæ, secundum quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari, « ut ex his quæ novimus ad desiderandum incognita consurgamus, » sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam Hom. in Evang., § 1, col. 4114, t. 2. Sicut per cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias sufficientia, qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum exaltatio hominis usque ad conjunctionem cum Deo.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.ad.2] These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bona ista deservientia animali vitae non competunt vitae spirituali, in qua beatitudino perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio; quia quid-quid bonum invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.ad.3] According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.
[I-II.q.4.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum in lib. I De serm. Dom. in In — Ut ex his quæ animus novit. » — Scil. hom. xi. — Plenius in monte, cap. v, § 15, col. 4237, t. 3, « merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis cælis, sed per cælos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. » Nihilominus tamen locus corporeus, scilicet cælum empyreum, aderit beatis, non propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundnm quamdam congruentiam et decorem.
Article 8
[I-II.q.4.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem. Futura enim beatudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriæ designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur societas amicorum.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.arg.2] Further, Boethius [Seneca, Ep. 6 says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Seneca dicit, Epist. vi, circa med., quod « nullius boni sine consortio jucunda est possessio. » Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo etiam requiritur societas amicorum.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.arg.3] Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, charitas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed charitas extendit se ad directionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur societas amicorum.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.sc] It is written (Wisdom 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap., VII, 14: Venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quæ consistit in contemplatione Dei; et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud requiritur.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.co] If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."
[I-II.q.4.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si loquamur de felicitate præsentis vitae, sicut Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. 1x et xi, felix indiget amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut ab eis in benefaciendo juvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum tam in operibus vitae activæ, quam in operibus vitae contemplativæ. textu D. Augustini. Sed si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine, quæ erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem; quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suæ perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum; unde Augustinus dicit, VIII Super Gen. ad litt., c. xxv, § 47, col. 391, t. 3, quod « creatura spiritualis ad hoc quod sit beata, nonnisi intrinsecus adjuvatur æternitate, veritate, charitate Creatoris; extrinsecus vero si adjuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo adjuvatur quod se invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent. »
[I-II.q.4.a.8.ad.1] That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod gloria quæ est essentialis beatitudini, est quam habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.ad.2] This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod habetur, non est plena sufficientia; quod in proposito dici non potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.
[I-II.q.4.a.8.ad.3] Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.4.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod perfectio charitatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed, supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio ejus ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter se habet amicitia ad perfectam beatitudinem.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-secundae/q004.json