Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q5. The attainment of happiness
Source context
- Theme
- conditions and possibility of humanity's attainment of perfect happiness (beatitudo)
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 4, chapter 9Steiner distinguishes egoistic pursuit of individual happiness from moral action grounded in free spiritual activity, arguing that happiness-seeking as a motivating principle is subordinate to ethically self-determined willing.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian eudaimonismAristotle's account of eudaimonia as the complete actualization of the rational soul's highest capacities provides the structural framework Aquinas inherits and transforms through the doctrine of supernatural beatitude.
- Vedantic moksha doctrineThe Advaita Vedantic identification of final liberation (moksha) with the soul's return to its source shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's thesis that complete beatitude consists in the direct vision of the divine essence, both positing a supernatural terminus beyond natural capacity.
Q5. The attainment of happiness
Article 1
[I-II.q.5.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit. Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem, ita natura intellectualis est supra rationalem, ut patet per Dionysium in lib. De div. nom., in multis locis, cap. iv, v, etc. Sed bruta animalia, quæ habent naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem rationalis naturæ. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturæ, potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturæ, qui est beati-tudo.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.arg.2] Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, quæ est veritas pura. Sed homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus materialibus; unde species intelligibles in phantasmatibus intelligit, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 39. Ergo non potest ad beatitudinem pervenire.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.arg.3] Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain Happiness.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo transcendere non potest, videtur quod non possit beatitudinem adipisci.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.sc] It is written (Psalm 93:12): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."
[I-II.q.5.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. xciii, 12: Beatus homo quem tu erudieris, Domine.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.co] Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in I, 12, 1: in which vision, as we stated above (Question 3, Article 8) man's perfect Happiness consists.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. Quod autem homo boni perfecti sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quod ejus intellectus potest comprehendere universale et perfectum bonum, et ejus voluntas appe-tere illud; et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis divinæ essentiæ, sicut in primo habitum est. In qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.ad.1] The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the I, 58, 3; I, 79, 8. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natură enim rationalis excedit sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis objectum, quia sensus nullo modo potest cognoscere universale, cujus ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum cognoscendi intelligibilem veritatem. Nam intellectualis natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in I dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per quemdam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturæ: tamen alio modo quam angeli; nam angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post principium suæ conditionis; homines autem per tempus ad ipsam perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo pertingere potest.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.ad.2] To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the I, 84, 7; I, 89, 1.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod homini secundum statum præsentis vitæ est connauralis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per phantasmata; sed post hujus vitæ statum habet alium modum connaturalem, ut in I dictum est.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.ad.3] Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he will be perfectly happy.
[I-II.q.5.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod homo non potest transcendere angelos gradu naturæ, ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior; potest tamen eos transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid super angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte consequetur, perfecte beatus erit.
Article 2
[I-II.q.5.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (Matthew 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse beatior. Beatitudo enim est præmium virtutis, ut Philosophus dicit in I Ethic., cap. ix. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus æqualis merces redditur; dicitur enim Matth., xx, 40, quod omnes qui operati sunt in vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius, Homil. xix in Evangel., § 3, col. 4156, t. 2: « Æqualem æternæ vitæ retributionem sortiti sunt. » Ergo unus non erit beatior alio.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.arg.2] Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed by another's.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid majus. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia major beatitudo.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.arg.3] Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum deest quod suppleri possit; si autem nihil deest quod suppleri possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud majus bonum. Ergo vel homo non est beatus, vel si est beatus, non potest alia major beatitudo esse.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.sc] It is written (John 14:2): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., xiv, 2: In domo Patris mei mansiones multæ sunt; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, Tract. lxvii in Joan., § 2, col. 1812, t. 3: « Diversæ meritorum dignitates intelliguntur in vita æterna 1. » Dignitas autem vitæ æternæ, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est æqualis beatitudo.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.co] As stated above (1, 8; 2, 7), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum, et adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod est beatitudinis objectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo alia major, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, cujus frutione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem hujusmodi boni, vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior; quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius dispositus vel ordinatus ad ejus fruitionem; et secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beatior esse.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.ad.1] The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the divers degrees of enjoyment.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex parte objecti; sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.ad.2] Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est summi boni perfecta possessio, sive fruitio.
[I-II.q.5.a.2.ad.3] None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing Thee alone."
[I-II.q.5.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est « bonum omnis boni, » ut Augustinus dicit, VIII De Trinit., c. iii, col. 949, t. 8. Sed dici- Iste error est Joviniani, qui somniavit omnes beatos pares esse in gloria. tur aliquis alio beatior ex diversa ejusdem boni participatione. Additio autem aliorum bonorum non auget beatitudinem. Unde Augustinus dicit in V Confess., c. iv, § 7, col. 708, t. 4: « Qui et te, et illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum beatus est. »
Article 3
[I-II.q.5.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (Psalm 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi. Dicitur enim psal. cxviii, 1: Beati immaculati in via, qui ambulant in lege Domini. Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.arg.2] Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man can be happy in this life.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem beatitudinis; alio-quin unus non esset beatior alio. Sed in hac vita homines possunt participate summum bonum cognoscendo et amando Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse beatus.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.arg.3] Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from Psalm 143:15: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quod a pluribus 1 dicitur non potest totaliter falsum esse; videtur enim naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per illud psal. cxliii, 15: Beatum dixerunt populum, cui hæc sunt, scilicet præsentis vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.sc] It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Job., xiv, 1: Homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens tempore, repletur multis miseriis. Sed beatitudo excludit miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita non potest esse beatus.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.co] A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold consideration.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the I, 12, 11. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita haberi potest; perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari potest dupliciter. Primo quidem ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione; nam beatitudo, cum sit per- 1 In et inepte; nam falsum est quod omnes beatitudinem in hac vita ponant. Iste error est Begardorum et Beguinarum, qui fectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi; multis enim malis præsens vita subjacet, quæ vitari non possunt, et ignorantiæ ex parte intellectus, et inordinatæ affectioni ex parte appetitus, et multiplicibus pœnalitibus ex parte corporis, ut Augustinus diligenter prosequitur, XIX De civit. Dei, cap. iv, col. 627, t. 7. Similiter etiam boni desiderium in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter enim homo desiderat permanentiam ejus boni quod habet. Bona autem præsentis vitæ transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est, quod in hac vita vera beatitudo habeatur. Secundo, si consideretur id in quo specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinæ essentiæ, non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in I ostensum est. Ex quibus manifeste apparet, quod non potest aliquis in hac vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.ad.1] Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Romans 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita vel propter spem beatitudinis adipiscendæ in futura vita, secundum illud Rom., viii, 24: Spe salvi facti sumus; vel propter aliqualem participationem beatitudinis secundum aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.ad.2] The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above (Question 3, Article 2), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsius objecti beatitudinis; quod quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur; et talis imperfectio tollit rationem veræ beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse imperfecta ex parte ipsius participantis; qui quidem ad ipsum objectum beatitudinis, secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed imperfecte per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso fruitur; et talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem beatitudinis: quia cum beatitudo sit operatio quædam, ut supra dictum est, vera ratio beatitudinis consideratur ex objecto, quod dat speciem actui, non autem ex subjecto.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.ad.3] Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
[I-II.q.5.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod homines reputant in hac vita esse aliquam beatitudiprædicarunt homines in hac vita beatitudinem finalem, secundum omnem perfectionis patriæ gradum, consequi posse. nem, propter aliquam similitudinem veræ beatitudinis: et sic non ex toto in sua æstimatione deficiunt.
Article 4
[I-II.q.5.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo possit amitti. Beatitudo enim est perfectio quædam. Sed omnis perfectio inest perfectibili secundum modum ipsius. Cum igitur homo secundum naturam suam sit mutabilis, videtur quod beatitudo ab homine mutabiliter participetur; et ita videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit amittere.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.arg.2] Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui subjacet voluntati. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo videtur quod possit desistere ab operatione qua homo beatificatur; et ita homo desinet esse beatus.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.arg.3] Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it seems that it has an end.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo hominis habet principium, quia homo non semper fuit beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat finem.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.sc] It is written (Matthew 25:46) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated (2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., xxv, 46, de justis, quod ibunt hi* in vitam æternam, quæ, ut dictum est, est beatitudo sanctorum. Quod autem est æternum, non deficit. Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.co] If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (Question 3, Article 8) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written (Psalm 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wisdom 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wisdom 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above (Question 4, Article 4). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time and movement.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, qualis in hac vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate contemplativa, quæ amittitur vel per oblivionem, puta cum corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua ægritudine, vel per aliquas occupationes, quibus totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a contemplatione. Patet etiam idem in felicitate activa. Voluntas enim hominis transmutari potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute, in cujus actu principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus remanet integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem beatitudinem talem perturbare, in quantum impediunt multas operationes virtutum, non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia adhuc remanet operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo laudabiliiter sustinet. Et quia beatitudo hujus vitæ amitti potest, quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis, ideo Philosophus dicit in I Ethic., cap. x, in fin.: « Aliquos esse in hac vita beatos non simpliciter, sed sicut homines, » quorum natura mutationi subjecta est. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta quæ expectatur post hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit, lib. I Periarch., cap. v, quorumdam Platonicorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam beatitudinem homo potest fieri miser. Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum dupliciter. Primo quidem ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat. Naturaliter autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod habet, et quod ejus retinendi securitatem obtineat; alioquin necesse est quod timore amittendi vel dolore de certitudine amissionis affligatur. Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat opinionem, bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum; quæ quidem opinio si vera sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam amittet. Si autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam opinionem habere; nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut verum est bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. 11. Non igitur jam vere erit beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest. Secundo idem apparet si consideretur ratio beatitudinis in speciali. Ostensum est enim supra, quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinæ essentiae consistit. Est autem imposibile quod aliquis videns divinam essentiam velit eam non videre, quia omne bonum habitum, quo aliquis carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quæritur aliquid sufficientius loco ejus, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum, propter quod in In Parm. et in edit. ex mala lectione codicum: « videlicet. » Juxta Origenistas, corpora mortalia in quibus patientur animæ beatæ resument, et hinc rursus ad beatitudinem evocabuntur; sicque fieret quidam beatitudinis ac miseriæ circulus. Thofastidium venit. Visio autem divinæ essentiae replet animam omnibus bonis, cum conjungat fonti totius bonitatis. Unde dicitur in psal. xvi, 15: Satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua; et Sap., vii, 41, dicitur: Venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, scilicet cum contemplatione sapientiae. Similiter etiam non habet aliquod incommodum adjunctum; quia de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur Sap., vii, 16: Non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec tædium convictus ejus*. Sic ergo patet, quod propria voluntate beatus non potest beatitudinem deserere. Similiter etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo subtrahente: quia cum subtractio beatitudinis sit quædam pœna, non potest talis subtractio a Deo justo judice provenire nisi pro aliqua culpa; in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam videt, cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec aliquod aliud agens potest eam subtrahere; quia mens Deo conjuncta super omnia alia elevatur, et sic ab hujusmodi conjunctione nullum aliud agens potest ipsam excludere. Unde inconveniens videtur, quod per quasdam alternationes temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad miseriam, et e converso; quia hujusmodi temporales alternationes esse non possunt nisi circa ea quæ subjacent tempori et motui.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.ad.1] Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quæ omnem defectum excludit a beato; et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quæ hominem sublevat in participationem æternitatis transcenden-tis omnem mutationem.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.ad.2] The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas ad opposita se habet in his quæ ad finem ordinantur; sed ad ultimum finem naturali necessitate ordinatur: quod patet ex hoc quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.ad.3] Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.
[I-II.q.5.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod beatitudo habet principium ex conditione participantis; sed caret fine propter conditionem boni cujus participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio est initium beatitudinis, et ab alio est quod caret fine.
Article 5
[I-II.q.5.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo per sua naturalia possit beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Sed nihil est homini tam necessarium quam id per quod finem ultimum consequitur. Ergo hoc naturæ humanæ non deest. Potest igitur homo per sua naturalia beatitudinem consequi.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.arg.2] Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homo cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis, videtur esse sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturæ per sua naturalia possunt consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis homo per sua naturalia potest beatitudinem consequi.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.arg.3] Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo est operatio perfecta secundum Philosophum, II Ethic., cap. vii. Ejusdem autem est incipere rem, et perficere ipsam. Cum igitur operatio imperfecta, quæ est quasi principium in operationibus humanis, subdatur naturali hominis potestati, qua suorum actuum est dominus, videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit pertingere ad operationem perfectam, quæ est beatitudo.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.sc] Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.sc] Sed contra, homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo sanctis præparata excedit intellectum hominis et voluntatem; dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Corinth., ii, 9: Oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quæ præparavit Deus diligentibus se*. Ergo homo per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.co] Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (63). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Question 3, Article 8), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the I, 12, 4. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod beatitudo imperfecta, quæ in hac vita haberi potest, potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, in cujus operatione consistit; de quo infra dicetur. Sed beatitudo hominis perfecta, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in visione divinæ essentiae. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturæ, ut in I ostensum est. Naturalis enim cognitio cujuslibet creaturæ * Nec auris... nec in cor... iis qui diligunt illum. 1 Ita Garcia, theologi, Nicolaï et editi plurimi. Codices quidam et edit. Rom.: « quam id quod II. est secundum modum substantiæ ejus, sicut de intelligentia dicitur in lib. De causis, propos. 8, quod « cognoscit ea quæ sunt super se et ea quæ sunt infra se secundum modum substantiæ suæ. » Omnis autem cognitio quæ est secundum modum substantiæ creatæ, deficit a visione divinæ essentiæ, quæ in infinitum excedit omnem substantiæ creatam. Unde nec homo nec aliqua creatura potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.ad.1] Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
[I-II.q.5.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non dederit ipsi arma et tegumenta, sicut aliis animalibus, quia dedit ei rationem et manus quibus possit hæc sibi acquirere: ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret ipsi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc enim erat imposibile; sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deum qui eum faceret beatum. « Quæ enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus, » ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. 111, post med.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.ad.2] The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nobilioris conditionis est natura quæ potest consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc consequendum, quam natura quæ non potest consequi perfectum bonum, sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem ejus non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut Philosophus dicit in II De cælo, a text. 60 ad 66; sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinæ, quam qui solum potest consequi quamdam imperfectam sanitatem sine medicinæ auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quæ potest consequi perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quæ hujusmodi boni non est capax, sed quoddam bonum imperfectum consequi tur virtute suæ naturæ.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.ad.3] When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its object. Consequently the argument does not prove.
[I-II.q.5.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quando imperfectum et perfectum sunt ejusdem speciei, ab eadem virtute causari possunt; non autem hoc est necesse, si sint alterius speciei. Non enim quidquid potest causare dispositionem materiæ, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. Imperfecta autem operatio, quæ subjacet naturali hominis potestati, non est ejusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta quæ est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex objecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.
Article 6
[I-II.q.5.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a twofold order in things--one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the lower, as stated in the I, 109, 02: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod homo possit fieri beatus per actionem alicujus superioris creaturæ, scilicet angeli. Cum enim duplex ordo inveniatur in rebus, unus partium universi ad invicem, alius totius universi ad bonum, quod est extra universum; primus ordo ordinatur ad secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur in XII Metaph., text. 52 et 53; sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi ad invicem attenditur secundum quod superiores creaturæ agunt in inferiores, ut in I dictum est. Beatitudo autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum, quod est extra universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem superioris creaturæ, scilicet angeli in hominem, homo beatus efficitur.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.arg.2] Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who is actually happy.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod est in potentia tale, potest reduci in actum per id quod est actu tale; sicut quod est potentia calidum, fit actu calidum per id quod est actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest fieri actu beatus per angelum, qui est actu beatus.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.arg.3] Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Question 3, Article 4). But an angel can enlighten man's intellect as shown in the I, 111, 1. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Sed angelus potest illuminare intellectum hominis, ut in I habitum est. Ergo angelus potest facere hominem beatum.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.sc] It is written (Psalm 83:12): "The Lord will give grace and glory."
[I-II.q.5.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in ps. Lxxxiii, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.co] Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above (Article 5) that Happiness is a good surpassing created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum omnis creatura naturæ legibus sit subjecta, utpote habens limitatam virtutem et actionem, illud quod excedit naturam creatum, non potest Algazel: beatitudo hominis potest naturaliter haberi; Begardi et Beguinæ: beata in seipsa naturaliter est operatio intellectualis naturæ; Pelagius et Cælestinus: absque Christi gratia, homo suis potest meritis consequi vitam æternam. fieri virtute alicujus creaturæ. Et ideo, si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit immediate a Deo, sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio cæci, et cætera hujus-modi. Ostensum est autem, quod beatitudo est quoddam bonum exceedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per actionem alicujus creaturæ conferatur; sed homo beatus fit solo Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem ratio est de ipsa et de virtute in cujus actu consistit.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.ad.1] It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which is God.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis, quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam; inferiores vero potentiæ coadjuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi finis disponendo; sicut ad artem gubernativam, quæ præest navifactivæ, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic igitur in ordine universi homo quidem adjuvatur ab angelis ad consequendum ultimum finem secundum aliqua præcedentia, quibus disponitur ad ejus consecutionem; sed ipsum ultimum finem consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.ad.2] When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in alterum, sicut calidum per calorem calefacit; sed si forma existit in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum, sicut intentio coloris quæ est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque etiam omnia quæ sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia calefacere et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio et calefactio essent usque ad infinitum. Lumen autem gloriæ, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo quidem est perfecte et secundum esse naturale; in qualibet autem creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam beatitudinem alteri.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.ad.3] A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the I, 106, 1: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.
[I-II.q.5.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis vel etiam inferioris angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum operum, non autem quantum ad visionem divinæ essentiae, ut in primo dictum est; ad eam enim videndam omnes immediate illuminantur a Deo.
Article 7
[I-II.q.5.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above (Article 6), can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non requirantur aliqua opera hominis ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Deus enim cum sit agens infinitæ virtutis, non præexigit in agendo materiam, aut dispositionem materiae, sed statim potest totum producere. Sed opera hominis, cum non requirantur ad beatitudinem ejus sicut causa efficiens, ut dictum est, non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non præexigit in agendo, beatitudinem sine præcedentibus operibus confert.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.arg.2] Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate, ita et naturam immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione naturæ produxit creaturas nulla dispositione præcedente, vel actione creaturæ, sed statim fecit unumquodque perfectum in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod beatitudinem conferat homini sine aliquibus operationibus præcedentibus.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.arg.3] Further, the Apostle says (Romans 4:6) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Apostolus dicit, Rom., iv, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus confert justitiam sine operibus. Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera hominis ad beatitudinem consequendam.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.sc] It is written (John 13:17): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., xiii, 17: Si hæc scitis, beati eritis si feceritis ea. Ergo per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenimus.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.co] Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Question 4, Article 4), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in the I, 62, 5; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, requiritur ad beatitudinem; cum nihil aliud sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis ad ultimum finem; quæ ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis, sicut debita dispositio materiae ad consecutionem formæ. Sed ex hoc non ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat præcedere ejus beatitudinem. Posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem, sicut quandoque simul materiam disponit et inducit formam. Sed ordo divinæ sapientiæ exigit ne hoc fiat. Ut enim dicitur in II De cælo, text. 62 et seq.: « Eorum quæ nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu, aliquid uno motu, et aliquid pluribus. Habere autem perfectum bonum sine motu convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. » Habere autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam operationem praecedentem. Cum autem beatitudemo excedat omnem naturam creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed angelus, qui est superior ordine naturæ quam homo, consecutus est eam ex ordine divinæ sapientiæ uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in primo expositum est; homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam secundum Philosophum, I Ethic., cap. 1x, et X, cap. vi, etc., « beatitudo est præmium virtuosarum operationum. »
[I-II.q.5.a.7.ad.1] Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod operatio hominis non præxigitur ad consecutionem beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinæ virtutis beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.ad.2] God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," according to Hebrews 2:10, "had brought many children into glory"; therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit absque aliqua dispositione, vel operatione creaturæ praecedente; quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per ea natura propagaretur ad posteros. Et similiter quia per Christum, qui est Deus et homo, beatituduo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud Apostoli ad Hebr., 11, 10: Qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat; statim a principio suæ conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione meritoria praecedente, anima ejus fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare in ipso. Nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint in eis merita propria, eo quod per baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.ad.3] The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.
[I-II.q.5.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quæ habetur per gratiam justificantem, quæ quidem non 1 In Calvinus: nulli homini opera sunt necessaria datur propter opera pracedentia; non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo; sed magis est principium motus, quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.
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