Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q9. That which moves the will
Source context
- Theme
- Causal agency behind volitional movement: intellect, appetite, and external movers as sources of the will's actuation
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotle, De Anima III / De Motu AnimaliumAristotle's analysis of orexis (desire) and nous (intellect) as dual sources of animal and human movement provides the direct philosophical substrate for Aquinas's distinction between the intellectual apprehension of the good and the appetitive power that executes motion.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads III.9, IV.4)Plotinus situates the origin of voluntary motion in the soul's orientation toward the Good, distinguishing lower appetitive impulse from intellective assent — a structural parallel to Aquinas's differentiation between sensory appetite and rational will as proximate and remote movers.
- Vedanta (Bhagavad Gita, III.5, XVIII.14)The Gita identifies field-of-action, agent, instrument, effort, and divine providence as the five causes of all karma, a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's layered account of interior and exterior efficient causes of the will's movement.
Q9. That which moves the will
Article 1
[I-II.q.9.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Psalm 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ab intellectu. Dicit enim Augustinus super illud psalm. cxviii: Concupivit anima mea desiderare justificaciones tuas, conc. viii, § 4, col. 1522, t. 4: « Prævolat intellectus, sequitur tardus aut nullus effectus; scimus bonum, nec delectat agere. » Hoc autem non esset, si voluntas ab intellectu moveretur, quia motus mobilis sequitur motionem moventis. Ergo intellectus non movet voluntatem.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.arg.2] Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, intellectus se habet ad voluntatem ut demonstrans appetibile, sicut imaginatio demonstrat appetibile appetitui sensitivo. Sed imaginatio demonstrans appetibile non movet appetitum sensitivum; imo quandoque ita nos habemus ad ea quæ imaginamur, sicut ad ea quæ in pictura nobis ostenduntur, ex quibus non movemur, ut dicitur in lib. II De anima, text. 154. Ergo neque etiam intellectus movet voluntatem.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.arg.3] Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idem respectu ejusdem non est movens et motum. Sed voluntas movet intellectum; intelligimus enim quando volumus. Ergo intellectus non movet voluntatem.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved."
[I-II.q.9.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosopbus dicit in III De anima, text. 54, quod « appetibile intellectum est movens non motum; voluntas autem est movens motum. »
[I-II.q.9.a.1.co] A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Question 1, Article 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod intantum aliquid indiget moveri ab aliquo, inquantum est in potentia ad plura; oportet enim ut id « Prævolat intellectus; et tarde sequitur, et aliquando non sequitur humanus atque infirmus quod est in potentia reducatur in actum per aliquid quod est in actu; et hoc est movere. Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animæ invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa: uno modo quantum ad agere vel non agere; alio modo quantum ad agere hoc vel illud; sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt, et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo; scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus, et quantum ad determinationem actus; quorum primum est ex parte subjecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens; aliud autem est ex parte objecti, secundum quod specificatur actus. Motio autem ipsius subjecti est ex agente aliquo. Et cum omne agens agat propter finem, ut supra ostensum est, principium hujus motionis est ex fine. Et inde est quod ars ad quam pertinet finis, movet suo imperio artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem; sicut gubernatoria ars imperat navifactivæ, ut in II Physic., text. 25, dicitur. Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est objectum voluntatis; et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animæ ad suos actus. Utimur enim aliis potentiis, cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quædam particularia bona. Semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei. Sed objectum movet determinando actum ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur, sicut calefactio a calore. Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est objectum intellectus; et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut præsentans ei objectum suum.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.ad.1] The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex illa auctoritate non habetur quod intellectus non moveat, sed quod non moveat ex necessitate.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.ad.2] Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
[I-II.q.9.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut ima intellectus. » ginatio formæ sine aestimatione convenientis vel nocivi non movet appetitum sensitivum, ita nec apprehensio veri-sine ratione boni et appetibilis movet appetitum intellectivum qui est voluntas. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 46 et seq.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.ad.3] The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.
[I-II.q.9.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus: quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono, ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte objecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quamdam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri. Et sic patet, quod non est idem movens et motum secundum idem.
Article 2
[I-II.q.9.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas ab appetitu sensitivo moveri non possit. Movens enim et agens est præstantius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit, XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xvI, § 33, col. 467, t. 3. Sed appetitus sensitivus est inferior voluntate, quae est appetitus intellectivus; sicut sensus est inferior intellectu. Ergo appetitus sensitivus non movet intellectum.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.arg.2] Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulla virtus particularis potest facere effectum universalem. Sed appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis; consequitur enim particularem sensus apprehensionem. Ergo non potest causare mo-; desunt in Parm. et in omnibus edit. hæc verba: « movet appetitum intellectivum qui est voluntas. » Thomistæ scinduntur. Concorditer admittunt quod voluntatem quoad specificationem seu determinationem actus movet intellectus ut principium a quo, non ut principium quod, quia principium quod est per se subsistens; intellectus autem non per se subsistit. Sensus igitur esset: « homo » per intellectum voluntatem quoad specificationem actus movet. Sed Conradus, Cajetanus, et quidam alii tenent quod intellectus sic movet voluntatem in genere causæ efficientis « ut quo; » Capreolus vero, Ferra-tum voluntatis, qui est universalis, velut consequens apprehensionem universalem intellectus.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.arg.3] Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ut probatur in VIII Physic., text. 40, movens non movetur ab eo quod movet, ut sit motio reciproca. Sed voluntas movet appetitum sensitivum, inquantum appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi. Ergo appetitus sensitivus non movet voluntatem.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.sc] It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jacobi, 1, 14: Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus. Non autem abstrahere-tur quis a concupiscentia, nisi voluntas ejus moveretur ab appetitu sensitivo, in quo est concupiscentia. Ergo appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), that which is apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex conditione ejus quod proponitur, et ejus cui proponitur; conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet. Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens, et ut non conveniens. Unde Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. v, a med.: « Qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. » Manifestum est autem, quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem: unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur ipsi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti; sicut irato videtur bonum quod non videtur quieto; et per hunc modum ex parte objecti appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.ad.1] Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil prohibet id quod est simpliciter et secundum se præstantius, quoad aliquid esse debilius. Voluntas igitur simpliciter præstantior est riensis, Bannes, Gonet, et alii, in genere causæ finalis, et formalis extrinsece tantum, ita ut intellectus moveat voluntatem demonstrando illi et finem et exemplar sui actus, et non aliter. Hæc ultima sententia D. Thomæ conformior esse vide-tur. Voluntas autem et intellectum movet, et ad suos actus potentias inferiores applicat. De hoc non ambigitur. Sed quæritur ulterius quomodo voluntas potentias inferiores moveat et applicet? Vi solius sympathiæ et connexionis? An impressione quadam reali, physice potentias immutante? Hæc posterior sententia Renato Billuart magis arridet. quam appetitus sensitivus; sed quoad istum in quo passio dominatur, inquantum subjacet passioni, præeminet appetitus sensitivus.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.ad.2] Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod actus et electiones hominum sunt circa singularia; unde ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis, habet magnam virtutem ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo, ut ei aliquid videatur sic vel aliter circa singularia.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.ad.3] As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
[I-II.q.9.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in I Polit., cap. III, post med., ratio in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem; non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem; et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.
Article 3
[I-II.q.9.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such" [Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1. Now the same is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat seipsam. Omne enim movens, inquantum hujusmodi, est in actu; quod autem movetur, est in potentia; nam motus est « actus existentis in potentia, inquantum hujusmodi. » Sed non est idem in potentia et in actu respectu ejusdem. Ergo nihil movet seipsum; neque ergo voluntas seipsam movere potest.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.arg.2] Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, mobile movetur ad præsentiam moventis. Sed voluntas semper sibi est præsens. Si ergo seipsam moveret, semper moveretur; quod patet esse falsum.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.arg.3] Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above (Article 1). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, voluntas movetur ab intellectu, ut dictum est. Si igitur voluntas movet seipsam, sequitur quod idem simul moveatur a duobus motoribus immediate: quod videur inconveniens. Non ergo voluntas movet seipsam.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.sc] The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quia voluntas domina est sui actus, et in ipsa est velle et non velle; quod non esset si non haberet in potestate movere seipsam ad volendum. Ergo ipsa movet seipsam.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (Question 8, Article 2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis objectum. Sed, sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus. Manifestum est autem, quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum; et hoc modo movet seipsum; et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem movet seipsam ad volendum ea quæ sunt ad finem.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.ad.1] It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntas non secundum idem movet et movetur; unde nec secundum idem est in actu et in potentia; sed inquantum actu vult finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quæ sunt ad finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.ad.2] The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi præsens; sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquando, non semper est in ipsa voluntate; per hunc autem modum movet seipsam. Unde non sequitur quod semper seipsam moveat.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.ad.3] The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.
[I-II.q.9.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non eodem modo voluntas movetur ab intellectu et a seipsa; sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem objecti; a seipsa vero quantum ad exercitium actus secundum rationem finis.
Article 4
[I-II.q.9.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ab aliquo exteriori. Motus enim voluntatis est voluntarius. Sed de ratione voluntarii est quod sit a principio intrinseco, sicut et de ratione naturalis. Non ergo motus voluntatis est ab aliquo extrinseco.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.arg.2] Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (Question 6, Article 4). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is outside the agent" [Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, voluntas violentiam pati non potest, ut supra ostensum est. Sed violentum est « cujus principium est extra. » Ergo voluntas non potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.arg.3] Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quod sufficienter movetur ab uno motore, non indiget moveri ab alio. Sed voluntas sufficienter movet seipsam. Non ergo movetur ab aliquo exteriori.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.sc] The will is moved by the object, as stated above (Article 1). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.sc] Sed contra, voluntas movetur ab objecto, ut dictum est. Sed objectum voluntatis potest esse aliqua res exterior sensui proposita. Ergo voluntas potest ab aliquo exteriori movetri.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.co] As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (Article 3), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
[I-II.q.9.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum quod voluntas movetur ab objecto, manifestum est quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori. Sed eo modo quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, adhuc necesse est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori movetri. Omne enim quod quando est agens in actu, et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem, quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem, sicut dictum est, ipsa movet seipsam inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quæ sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi consilio mediante. Cum enim aliquis vult sanari, incipit cogitare quomodo hoc consequi possit; et per talem cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per medicum, et hoc vult. Sed quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit, necesse est quod inceperit velle sanari ab aliquo movente. Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsam ad volendum, oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret ex aliqua voluntate præsupposita. Hoc autem est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicujus exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam cap. Ethic. Eudomicæ, cap. xviii, circ. princ..
[I-II.q.9.a.4.ad.1] It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod de ratione voluntarii est quod principium ejus sit intra; sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius, etsi habeat principium proximum intrinse- 1 Ita cod.; — 2 — 3 Ita edit. Rom. cum Patav.; Nicolaï: « proximo. » 4 « Corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora cum, tamen principium primum est ab extra, sicut et primum principium motus naturalis est ab extra, quod scilicet movet naturam.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.ad.2] For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of him that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti, quod principium sit extra; sed oportet addere quod nihil conferat vim patiens; quod non contingit dum voluntas ab exteriori movetur; nam ipsa est quæ vult, ab alio tamen mota. Esset autem motus iste violentus, si esset contrarius motui voluntatis; quod in proposito esse non potest, quia sic idem vellet et non vellet.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.ad.3] The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.
[I-II.q.9.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas quantum ad aliquid sufficienter se movet, et in suo ordine, scilicet sicut agens proximum; sed non potest seipsam movere quantum ad omnia, ut ostensum est; unde indiget moveri ab alio, sicut a primo movente.
Article 5
[I-II.q.9.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas humana a corpore cælesti moveatur. Omnes enim motus varii et multiformes reducuntur, sicut in causam, in motum uniformem, qui est motus cæli, ut probatur in VIII Phys., text. 76, et lib. IV, text. 133. Sed motus humani sunt varii et multiformes, incipientes postquam prius non fuerant. Ergo reducuntur in motum cæli sicut in causam, qui est uniformis secundum naturam.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.arg.2] Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, III De Trinit., cap. iv, § 9, col. 873, t. 8, « corpora inferiora moventur per corpora superiora. » Sed motus humani corporis, qui causatur a voluntate, non posset reduci in motum cæli sicut in causam, nisi etiam voluntas a cælo moveretur. Ergo cælum movet voluntatem humanam.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.arg.3] Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per observationem cælestium corporum astrologi quædam vera prænuntiant de humanis actibus futuris, qui sunt a et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur. » Deus etiam, ut prima causa, voluntatem ut causam secundam ad omnes suas volitiones movet. voluntate; quod non esset si corpora cælestia voluntatem hominis movere non possent. Movetur ergo voluntas humana a cælesti corpore.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in II lib. Orthod. fid., cap. vii, col. 894, t. 1, quod « corpora cælestia non sunt causæ nostrorum actuum. » Essent autem, si voluntas, quæ est humanorum actuum principium, a corporibus cælestibus moveretur. Non ergo movetur voluntas a corporibus cælestibus.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.co] It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on" [Odyssey xviii. 135 (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.
But since it has been stated (2) that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod eo modo quo voluntas movetur ab exteriori objecto, manifestum est quod voluntas potest moveri a corporibus cælestibus, inquantum scilicet corpora exteriora, quæ sensui proposita movent voluntatem, et etiam ipsa organa potentiarum sensitivarum, subjacent motibus cælestium corporum. Sed eo modo quo voluntas movetur, quantum ad exercitium actus, ab aliquo exteriori agente, adhuc quidam posuerunt, corpora cælestia directe imprimere in voluntatem humanam. Sed hoc est impossibile. Voluntas enim, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 42, est in ratione. Ratio autem est potentia animæ non alligata organo corporali. Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea. Manifestum est autem, quod nullum corpus agere potest in rem incorpoream, sed potius e converso, eo quod res incorporeæ et immateriales sunt formalioris et universalioris virtutis quam quæcumque res corporales. Unde impossibile est quod corpus cæleste imprimat directe in intellectum aut voluntatem. Et propter hoc Aristoteles, in lib. II De anima, text. 150, recitans opinionem dicentium quod « talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater deorum, virorumque, » scilicet Jupiter, per quem totum cælum intelligitur, attribuit eis qui ponebant intellectum non differre a sensu. Omnes enim vires sensitivæ, cum sint actus organorum corporalium, per accidens moveri possunt a cælestibus corporibus, motis scilicet corporibus quorum sunt actus. Sed quia dictum est, quod appetitus intellectivus quodammodo movetur ab appetitu sensitivo, indirecte redundat motus cælestium corporum in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet per passiones appetitus sensitivi voluntatem moveri contingit.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.ad.1] The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its cause.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod multiformes motus voluntatis humanæ reducuntur in aliquam causam uniformem, quæ est tamen intellectu et voluntate superior; quod non potest dici de aliquo corpore, sed de aliqua superiori substantia immateriali. Unde non oportet quod motus voluntatis in motum cæli reducatur sicut in causam.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.ad.2] The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod motus corporales humani reducuntur in motum cælestis corporis sicut in causam, inquantum ipsa dispositio organorum congrua est ad motum aliqualiter ex impressione cælestium corporum; et inquantum etiam appetitus sensitivus commovetur ex impressione cælestium corporum; et ulterius inquantum corpora exteriora moventur secundum motum cælestium corporum, ex quorum occursu voluntas incipit aliquid velle, vel non velle, sicut adveniente frigore incipit aliquis velle facere ignem. Sed ista motio voluntatis est ex parte objecti exterius præsentati, non ex parte interioris instinctus.
[I-II.q.9.a.5.ad.3] As stated above (Cf. I, 84, 6,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits."
[I-II.q.9.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporalis. Unde nihil prohibet ex impressione corporum cælestium aliquos esse habiles ad irascendum vel ad concupiscendum, vel ad aliquam hujusmodi passionem; sicut ex complexione naturali plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quibus soli sapientes resistunt. Et ideo ut in pluribus verificantur ea quae prænuntiantur de actibus hominum secundum considerationem cælestium corporum. Sed tamen, ut Ptolemæus dicit in Centiloquio, parum a princ., « sapiens dominatur astris, scilicet quia resistens passionibus impedit per voluntatem liberam et nequaquam motui cælesti subjectam, hujusmodi cælestium corporum effectus. Vel, ut Augustinus dicit, II Super Gen. ad litt., c. xvii, § 37, col. 278, t. 3, « fatendum est, quando ab astrologis vera dicuntur, instinctu quodam occultissimo dici, quem nescientes humanæ mentes patiuntur; quod cum ad est in intellectu et voluntate superiorum. » Ita cod.; Parm. non habet: « vel non velle; » sed hoc habent codd. Alibi legitur: « et non velle. » « Ea » deest in edit. decipiendos homines fit, spirituum seductorum operatio est. »
Article 6
[I-II.q.9.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas non a solo Deo moveatur sicut ab exteriori principio. Inferius enim natum est moveri a suo superiori, sicut corpora inferiora a corporibus cælestibus. Sed voluntas hominis habet aliquid superius post Deum, scilicet angelum. Ergo voluntas potest moveri, sicut ab exteriori principio, etiam ab angelo.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.arg.2] Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, actus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed intellectus hominis reducitur in suum actum non solum a Deo, sed etiam ab angelo per illuminationes, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. iv Cælest. hier., § 14, col. 179, t. 1. Ergo eadem ratione et voluntas.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.arg.3] Further, God is not the cause of other than good things, according to Genesis 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
[I-II.q.9.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Deus non est causa nisi bonorum, secundum illud Genes., 1, 31: Vidit Deus cuncta quæ fecerat, et erant valde bona. Si ergo a solo Deo voluntas hominis moveretur, nunquam moveretur ad malum cum tamen « voluntas sit qua peccatur, et recte vivitur, » ut Augustinus dicit I Retract., cap. ix, § 4, col. 596, t. 1.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.sc] It is written (Philippians 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish."
[I-II.q.9.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Philip., ii, 13: Deus est qui operatur in vobis velle et perficere*.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.co] The movement of the will is from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in the I, 90, 2. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod motus voluntatis est ab intrinseco, sicut et motus naturalis. Quamvis autem rem naturalem possit aliquid movere quod non est causa naturæ rei motæ, tamen motum naturalem causare non potest nisi quod est aliqualiter causa naturæ. Movetur enim lapis sursum ab homine, qui naturam lapidis non causat; sed hic motus non est lapidi naturalis; naturalis autem motus ejus non causatur nisi ab eo quod causat naturam. Unde dicitur in VIII Phys., text. 29, 30, 31 et 32, quod « generans movet secundum locum gravia et levia. » Sic ergo hominem voluntatem habentem contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa ejus; sed quod motus voluntarius ejus sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile. Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animæ rationalis, quæ a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in I dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum; unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum; particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem; unde nec materia prima, quæ est in potentia ad omnes formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.ad.1] An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod angelus non sic est supra hominem, quod sit causa voluntatis ejus, sicut corpora cælestia sunt causa formarum naturalium, ad quas consequuntur naturales motus corporum naturalium.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.ad.2] Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above (Article 4).
[I-II.q.9.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus hominis movetur ab angelo ex parte objecti quod sibi proponitur virtute angelici luminis cognoscendi; et sic etiam voluntas ab exteriori creatura potest moveri, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.9.a.6.ad.3] God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (109, 2).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.9.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum; et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle; sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud quod est vere bonum, vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.
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